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Abstract
Remanding Women: A Qualitative Study Of Magistrates* Decisions In 
Contested Remand Hearings In Three Metropolitan Boroughs
This thesis examines magistrates’ decision-making in contested remand hearings in 
three boroughs of a large English city. The remand hearings for sixty four women (103 
separate court appearances) who were ‘at risk’ of a custodial remand were observed.
The first section describes how the wide scope for discretionary practice and the weak 
regulatory structures in the remand system allowed the legal framework to be 
interpreted in different ways. It is argued that remand decision making was influenced 
by the socio-political and organisational contexts within which it took place. These 
contexts contributed to actors’ understandings of what custodial remands were ‘for’, 
thus affecting remand outcomes.
In the second section it is argued that actors employed different models of remand to 
reach decisions, depending on which of the contradictory goals (legal and extra-legal) of 
the remand system they were attempting to satisfy. Information was filtered and bail 
law was selectively applied depending on how magistrates’ defined individual cases. 
Gender considerations were found to significantly feature in magistrates’ decisions 
when cases were on the ‘cusp’ between conditional bail and custodial remand.
The final section examines how the remand models were translated into practice in the 
social world of the magistrates’ court. The goals of the three models were observed to 
fit into, and compete with, the variety of roles and responsibilities that court actors had; 
the application of bail law was found to be a social process as well as a legal one. 
Lastly, structural influences, such as ‘court culture’ and patterns of deference, on courts’ 
social processes are explored.
The thesis concludes that the majority of remand decisions are based on the seriousness 
of the offence but magistrates are influenced by personal characteristics, such as gender, 
in ‘cusp’ cases. It suggests a model of remand decision making for women in which 
different types of cases and defendants are processed according to different rationales.
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Chapter One
Introduction
We saw that the numbers of women remanded in custody have been 
increasing, that they made up a quarter of the female prison population, and 
yet only 30 per cent eventually receive a custodial sentence. Considering the 
distress and disruption caused by imprisonment for the women and the 
difficulties which this creates for the management of prison regimes, this 
would appear to be an obvious first place to seek a reduction in the female 
prison population. Yet we know all too little about how and why courts use 
remand. (Wedderbum 2000:51 emphasis added)
The remand decision throws into relief one of the most fundamental conflicts in the 
criminal process: balancing the rights of the individual not to be imprisoned prior to 
conviction and/or sentence against the requirement to protect the public from crime. It 
appears that this balance may be shifting for some defendants as Prison Service data 
show marked increases in the frequency with which women are being remanded in 
custody, often for relatively minor offences. This research is intended to develop our 
understanding of women’s treatment by, and experience of, the criminal justice system 
by addressing our current lack of knowledge on how and why remand decisions are 
taken.
Whilst there has been some analysis of the remand system\ there are a number of gaps 
in research to date. These are briefly outlined here as they are explored more fully in 
Chapter Two. Firstly, where women’s custodial remands are mentioned in the research, 
the discussion is typically cursory. As 92.6 per cent of the custodial remand population 
in England and Wales^ is male, this focus is understandable. However, as will be 
discussed later, there are different trends in female and male custodial remand 
populations so we need to have separate analyses of these two groups. Secondly, 
although most previous studies do acknowledge the large degree of discretion that 
operates in the remand system, legal categories are often accepted unproblematically.
* See Chapter Two for references and a fiill discussion o f this work.
 ^ All figures in this chapter relate to England and Wales. Unless otherwise stated, all figures in this 
chapter are from Home Office (2003a) ‘Statistics on Women and the Criminal Justice System’ and Home 
Office (2002) ‘Prison Statistics England and Wales 2002’.
Thus there are few questions asked about whether the formal exceptions to the right to 
bail (see below) are the only reasons why people are actually remanded in custody. This 
research characterises remand decision making as a social process as well as a legal 
process. Consequently, it moves analysis beyond a focus solely on the legal framework 
and develops the work that has already been done on the social dynamics of remand 
courts, commonly conceptualised as ‘court culture’. Thirdly, few studies have tried to 
incorporate defendants’ choices into their analyses and have, instead, focused entirely 
on the working practices and decision making of professional criminal justice agents. 
Although defendants’ choices may be constrained choices, they still affect remand 
hearings and should be included in analysis^. This thesis aims to address these and other 
issues, building on knowledge from previous research projects to construct a fuller 
understanding of decision making in the remand system.
There is a fairly substantial body of work on the exercise of discretion and 
discrimination in sentencing, but remand decision making has not received much 
attention. Evidence that women are treated more harshly or more leniently at the 
sentencing stage of the criminal process is inconclusive (these issues are discussed more 
fully in Chapters Two and Six), pointing to the need for more sensitive offence 
categorisation and the inclusion of other variables (e.g. race and social class) which 
bisect the simple binary gender division (Carlen 1988; Hedderman and Hough 1994). 
The evidence that does exist indicates that women are not discriminated against in 
magistrates’ remand decisions and may, in fact' be treated more leniently.
Females are less likely than males to be remanded in custody during 
proceedings at magistrates’ courts (24% of females compared with 42% of 
males). However, research has shown that taking into account offending 
history and type of offence, the defendant’s sex seems to have only a 
marginal effect on remand decisions. (Home Office 2003a: 15).
One piece of research on contested bail applications by Brown and Hullin (1993) has 
raised important questions about how the system operates as a whole. It has shown that 
even if there is no bias in the remand decisions made by magistrates, disparities may 
arise from decision making elsewhere in the remand process. Whilst their research 
found no differences in the proportion of male white and Afro-Caribbean defendants
 ^ Disappointingly, it proved difficult to secure interviews with defendants in this analysis o f the remand 
system. However, wherever possible, the role and perspective o f the defendant is included. These 
problems are discussed in Chapter Three.
remanded in custody in cases where the CPS opposed bail, it did find evidence that 
black defendants were more likely to have their bail applications opposed than were 
white defendants (Brown and Hullin 1993). Moreover, the acquittal rate for Affo- 
Caribbeans remanded in custody was 7.5 per cent, nearly twice the rate for white 
defendants. Despite the fact that magistrates’ decision making was not discriminatory, a 
greater proportion of ethnic minorities were actually remanded in custody because of 
CPS decisions to disproportionately contest their bail applications, and, judging by the 
acquittal rate, a greater proportion were being remanded in custody unnecessarily. 
These data suggest that male Affo-Caribbean defendants may be making different 
choices and/or being treated differently to male white defendants and demonstrate the 
value of examining the processes, and not just the outcomes, of remand decisions.
It is possible that other minority groups, such as women, are also treated, and behave, 
differently in the remand system compared to the majority group: white male 
defendants. As will be discussed below, there is evidence of differences in the male and 
female custodial remand populations. There is a difference in the rate at which these 
two groups are increasing in size, and the male and female populations differ both in 
terms of their charged offence profiles and the characteristics of the individuals 
incarcerated. This thesis aims to identify and explain these trends in the female custodial 
remand population through a focused examination of how and why remand decisions 
are made in magistrates’ courts.
This chapter presents ways of understanding the process and details the importance of 
the remand decision in order to introduce the debate in subsequent chapters. It 
commences with a summary of the remand system in order to identify the different 
types of remand and to clarify the terminology used in this thesis. Following this is a 
description of relevant remand legislation which fi*ames decisions and provides the 
formal rationale for custodial remands. The legal framework is an essential component 
in understanding how and why custodial remands are used. Trends in the use of 
custodial remands, particularly for women, are examined in the next section. Of 
particular note is the increasing fi*equency with which custodial remands are used for 
women, more than half of whom do not go on to receive a custodial sentence. These 
figures raise a number of questions about the purpose of custodial remands which are 
explored in subsequent chapters. In light of the trends outlined in the preceding section, 
this chapter goes on to explore concerns about the damaging effects custodial remands
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are having on an increasing number of female defendants and their families. There is 
clear evidence that the custodial remand population consists of particularly vulnerable 
and socially excluded people. The chapter then presents a statement of the aims and 
objectives of the research which emerged from the material outlined in this chapter. In 
conclusion, an overview of the structure of the thesis is provided.
The Legal Framework
This section explains remand terminology, outlines the processes involved in the 
remand process, and summarises the main points of the legal framework to familiarise 
the reader with the basic structures of the decision making process.
The Remand Process
A magistrate’s remand decision is not an isolated event but is one stage in an on-going 
and cumulative process of deciding whether a defendant should be held in custody or 
bailed and released into the community (with or without conditions attached to their 
bail) pending the next stage in the criminal process. The process begins with the police 
when custody officers decide whether or not to release a suspect on police bail to appear 
at a magistrates’ court on a given date, or to hold them in overnight custody to be taken 
to appear at a magistrates’ court the next morning. The power to attach conditions to 
bail used to be limited to magistrates and Crown Court judges when they granted court 
bail, but the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 extended this and now the 
police have powers to impose conditions on defendants released on police bail. When 
defendants appear at a magistrates’ court, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) can 
oppose a defendant’s release on bail and/or request certain conditions be attached to any 
grant of bail. Recommendations are usually informed, at least in part, by police 
comments and information. In some areas, bail information schemes (BISs), usually 
organised by the local probation area, are available in courts and/or in local prisons. 
These are intended to supply the court with more, independently verified, information 
about the defendant and their application. BISs do not operate in all areas.
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There are thus a number of different points within the criminal justice process when 
remand decisions can be made. There are variations between the remand decisions made 
at these different stages, including in the personnel involved, the reasons a remand 
decision is required, the legal status of the person being remanded, and the law 
governing the decision making process. The sites in which remand decisions may be 
made are: police stations, magistrates’ courts. Crown Courts and higher courts e.g. the 
Court of Appeal. Although important decisions are obviously made in the other sites, 
this thesis focuses on remand decision making in magistrates’ courts (the reasons for 
this are more fully discussed in Chapter Three).
At the first hearing in a magistrates’ court, the defendant elects whether or not to apply 
for bail through her defence representative. A bench"  ^of at least two, but usually three, 
lay magistrates or a district judge (salaried and legally qualified members of the 
professional judiciary, previously known as stipendiary magistrates), after hearing CPS 
recommendations and the defence bail application, make a remand decision. A court has 
three options in a remand decision: release on unconditional bail, release on conditional 
bail, or remand in custody. The defendant can make a second bail apphcation based on 
the same factual or legal information under the principles laid down by the Nottingham 
Justices (Cavadino and Gibson 1993) (later enacted and inserted into the Bail Act 1976 
by s. 154 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988), but any subsequent applications must be 
based on new information or a change in circumstances. This procedure is intended to 
recognise the fact that defendants held on overnight custody may not have had time to 
verify information, organise a surety or security (the deposit of monies or pledging a 
sum to be forfeited if the defendant breaches the terms of her bail), or deal with other 
matters which could have undermined the success of their first bail application. Equally, 
the system is intended to prevent defendants from wasting court time making repeat 
applications based on the same information.
If bail is refused, magistrates must state their reasons in open court and the defendant 
should be given a written copy of this information so they are in full possession of the 
facts for any possible future application for bail. Magistrates can remand ‘untried’ (see 
below) defendants in custody for up to eight days initially and thereafter can remand for 
up to 28 days at a time. They can remand ‘convicted unsentenced’ (see below)
Throughout this thesis, ‘bench’ refers to a panel o f two or three lay magistrates, whereas ‘Bench’ 
denotes the cohort o f all magistrates who sit at a particular court.
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defendants in custody for a pre-sentence report (PSR) to be completed, a process that 
usually took three weeks in the courts in this study.
‘Remand’ is often used to denote custodial remands e.g. ‘the remand population’ is used 
elsewhere as a shorthand for ‘the custodial remand population’. However, this thesis 
does not adopt this usage as it confuses the act with the outcome. Thus, where the terms 
‘the remand system/hearing/ decision/etc.’ are used, they are general terms for the 
processes or act of decision making in which a defendant can, specifically, be remanded 
on bail (conditional or unconditional) or remanded in custody. Although a remand on 
bail is sometimes reduced to ‘bail’, for the sake of clarity a custodial remand is never 
referred to as a ‘remand’.
Magistrates are called upon to make remand decisions for different categories of 
defendants:
(a) Untried defendants: If a defendant is not sentenced immediately, magistrates (or 
Crown Court judges if  the case is sent to the Crown Court by a magistrates’ court) must 
remand the defendant in custody or on bail (conditional or unconditional). As discussed 
above, the defendant can make two bail applications based on the same factual or legal 
information. Additional applications will only be heard if  it can be established that there 
has been a change in circumstance.
(b) Convicted unsentenced defendants: Magistrates may be required to make a remand 
decision on an offender who has been convicted but not yet sentenced:
i -  to allow time for inquiries to be made and pre-sentence reports (PSRs) or psychiatric 
reports to be written if further information about the most appropriate sentence is 
required.
ii -  if  magistrates’ sentencing powers are insufficient, they can commit an offender 
either on bail or in custody to the Crown Court for sentencing.
(c) Post-sentence appeals by defendants: A convicted offender may be remanded by a 
magistrates’ court if they are appealing conviction, sentence, or on a question of law.
This thesis focuses on remand decisions made in magistrates’ courts about untried 
defendants and those convicted unsentenced defendants remanded for reports, the two 
largest groups of custodial remandees.
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Remand Law
The Bail Act 1976 is the primary piece of remand law. It frames the central issue of 
remand in terms of balance: do defendants present a substantial enough risk to the 
community to over-rule their rights not to be imprisoned before they have been tried 
and/or sentenced? The formal purpose of a remand hearing is to make a decision about 
the degree of risk a defendant presents to the community and subsequently to decide on 
the appropriate level of containment: unconditional bail, conditional bail, or a remand in 
custody.
Section 4 of the Bail Act establishes the “General right to bail”. Although the Bail Act 
1976 asserts a right to hail, this is somewhat misleading. A right to bail is guaranteed 
unless certain criteria apply. Thus, the ‘right’ to bail is not an absolute right but is a 
presumptive right, and one that rests upon criteria that can be very widely interpreted 
(see below). The Bail Act 1976 adopted many of the recommendations of the 1974 
Working Party on Bail Procedures in Magistrates’ Courts which set out the reasons for 
the presumption in favour of bail.
One of the foundations of our criminal justice system is the presumption of 
innocence. We regard it as important that a similar presumption should be 
created in relation to bail in favour of the defendant. There is at present no 
obligation on the court to consider the question of bail in the absence of an 
application from the defendant. We can see no reason why the onus should 
be on the defendant to make the application. In our view the court should of 
its own volition consider, on each occasion when it remands an accused, 
whether the remand should be on bail or in custody... We see the 
presumption in favour of bail not so much as a means of defining in detail in 
what circumstances people should and should not be bailed, but rather as an 
indication to courts of the attitude they should adopt -  that they should not 
look to the defendant to show cause why he should be granted bail, but 
should rather consider whether there are good reasons why he should not. 
(Home Office 1974:27).
Section 4 of the Bail Act 1976 details to whom the ‘right to bail’ applies. For the 
purposes of this thesis, the two most important groups who have the right to bail are 
untried defendants, and convicted unsentenced defendants remanded for reports.
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Section 4(1) of the Bail Act 1976 states that “a person to whom this section applies shall 
be granted bail except as provided in Schedule 1 to this Act”. Part of Schedule 1 
details the “exceptions to the right to bail” i.e. the reasons why the right to bail can be 
overturned and the defendant remanded in custody. The key reasons^ for refusing bail 
are contained in paragraph 2: that there are “substantial grounds” for believing a 
defendant would (a) fail to surrender to custody; (b) commit an offence while on bail; or
(c) interfere with witnesses or otherwise obstruct the course of justice. When 
considering a custodial remand, a court “shall have regard to” one or more of the 
grounds contained in Schedule 1, Part I, paragraph 9. These grounds include the nature 
and seriousness of the offence, the character and community ties of the defendant, and 
“any others which appear to be relevant.”^
In sum, under the Bail Act 1976, untried defendants, and convicted unsentenced 
defendants being remanded for reports to be written, have a right to bail unless one of 
the exceptions to the right applies: that there are substantial grounds for believing they 
will abscond, offend on bail, or interfere with the course of justice. In assessing whether 
an exception applies, the magistrates can consider a wide range of grounds covering 
both the offence and the circumstances of the person charged with the offence. There is 
a dualism in the approach to bail decisions in this legislation as it contains a mixture of 
classical or just deserts and individualistic decision making. This thesis attempts to 
explore the tensions between these conflicting approaches and how they are resolved in 
the routine practices of actors in magistrates’ courts.
There are some additional amendments and specific elements of bail law that will be 
discussed more fully where relevant in later chapters. For example, the Criminal Justice 
and Public Order Act 1994 (sections 25-26) reversed the presumption in favour of bail 
with certain serious offences, and the Bail (Amendment) Act 1993 established the 
prosecution’s right to appeal against an award of bail where previously only the defence 
could appeal a remand decision.
There are two further issues which need to be raised in this overview of the legal 
framework. Firstly, the Human Rights Act 1998 and, secondly, government proposals 
on bail in the Criminal Justice Bill 2003.
 ^Part n  refers to non-imprisonable offences which are not discussed here.
 ^For the full list o f exceptions to the right to bail, see Appendix One.
 ^See Appendix One for the full list.
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As domestic law has to be read and given effect in ways that are compatible with the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), there was much speculation as to how the HRA would 
impact on the application of the Bail Act 1976.
UK courts, therefore, considering bail applications under the HRA, will 
have to adopt a new approach. It will not just be a matter of considering 
whether there are “substantial grounds” for believing one of the exceptions 
to bail is made out. Courts will have to consider and give weight to the 
principle of the presumption of innocence. They will have to consider 
whether there really is relevant and sufficient objective evidence which 
justifies a departure from the right to liberty. There must be no judicial 
speculation. And judges and magistrates will have to show a greater 
willingness to keep the situation under review by allowing applications at 
regular intervals covering all aspects of the case throughout the period of 
remand, accepting that the passage of time is a relevant consideration. Fully 
argued decisions will have to be given, which must incorporate the 
defendants own arguments and these decisions will have to be fully 
recorded. (Burrow 2000a:679).
The HRA has resulted in some minor amendments to existing law but, despite these 
early predictions, the impact of the HRA on the application of bail law has, in fact, been 
minimal. These issues are explored further in later chapters.
Turning to the Criminal Justice Act 2003, one of its main proposals on bail introduces a
clause relating to withholding bail because of drug misuse.
The Bill creates a presumption that bail will not be granted for a person aged 
18 or over who is charged with an imprisonable offence, and tests positive 
for a specified Class A drug, if he refuses to undergo an assessment as to his 
dependency or propensity to misuse such drugs, or following an assessment, 
refuses any relevant follow-up action recommended unless the court is 
satisfied that there is no significant risk of his reoffending on bail. (House of 
Lords 2003).
At the time of writing, this proposal has not yet been implemented. However, it is 
included here as it illustrates the direction of developments in bail law which have 
steadily undermined the principle of the right to bail by introducing supplementary 
exceptions^.
® Section 153 o f the Criminal Justice Act 1988 required the court to justify bail granted to defendants 
accused o f murder (and attempted murder), manslaughter and rape (including attempted rape). Section 25 
of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act (CJPG) 1994 removed the right to bail for defendants 
charged with the serious offences listed above who had previously been convicted o f  such offences. 
Section 54 o f the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 restored discretion to the court in such cases but required 
the defence to establish there were exceptional reasons for the grant of bail. Section 26 o f the CJPG 1994
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Moreover, it raises many of the issues of interest in this thesis, such as how the 
presumption in favour of bail is used in practice, the multiple rationales for custodial 
remand contained within bail law, and the discretion accorded to courts when assessing 
bail risk. It will be discussed in Chapter Nine in light of findings from this research.
Trends in the Use of Custodial Remands for Women
This section explores changing patterns in the application of remand law. It presents 
data on trends in the use of custodial remands which raise questions about how and why 
custodial remand is used, particularly for women. Of note are the rapid expansion of the 
female custodial remand populations and the fact that over half the women on custodial 
remand do not go on to receive a custodial sentence.
Although there are many more men in custody, there are particular concerns about the 
female prison population because it is increasing much more rapidly than the male 
prison population. The average number of women in custody increased by 15 per cent to 
3,740 between 2001 and 2002, compared to an increase of 6 per cent for males in 
custody. Longer term comparisons reveal even more striking differences.
In 1992, women comprised 3.5 per cent of the prison population in England 
and Wales. By 2000 they were 5.2 per cent. This may sound like a small 
change but it reflects a 115 per cent increase in the female prison 
population. During the same period, the male population went up by 42 per 
cent. The number of women received into prison rose even more sharply 
than the population, more than tripling from 2200 in 1992 to 7000 in 2000.
Over the same period male receptions rose by only 58 per cent. (Hedderman 
2004:82).
The custodial remand population shows similar trends. Both the male and female 
custodial remand populations are increasing. Between 2001 and 2002, the average 
custodial remand population increased by 14 per cent compared to an increase of 6 per 
cent in the average sentenced population. Within this rise, the rates of increase in the
removed defendants’ right to bail in cases where they had been accused or convicted o f an offence on 
bail. Section 14 o f the Criminal Justice Act 2003 states that if  a defendant was on bail at the time o f the 
offence, he may not be granted bail unless the court is satisfied that there is no significant risk of his 
committing an offence while on bail. Section 15 states that where a defendant has failed to attend court, 
he may not be granted bail unless the court is satisfied that there is no significant risk that, if  released on 
bail (whether subject to conditions or not), he would fail to surrender to custody.
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female custodial remand population and receptions outstrip the rates of increase in the 
male population and receptions, with interesting variations between the untried and 
convicted unsentenced populations (see below and Table 1.1).
We see different trends for men and women, with the female custodial remand 
population increasing in numbers and as a proportion of the total custodial remand 
population (see Table 1.2).
Table 1.1: Untried and convicted unsentenced prisoners in prison: average 
population, receptions(i) and estimated time spent in custody
England and Wales 
Males and Females Number of persons/days
Type of prisoner 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Untried prisoners
Males
Average population 7,122 8,696 8,004 7,730 6,701 7,189
Receptions 47,501 54,157 55,545 60,157 50,866 53,754
Estimated average number of 
days in custody (2)
55 59 53 47 49 49
Females
Average population 264 350 371 426 396 496
Receptions 2,368 2,922 3,343 4,540 4,026 4,954
Estimated average number of 
days in custody (2)(4)
41 44 41 34 36 37
Convicted unsentenced prisoners
Males
Average population 1,885 3,042 3,071 4,133 3,873 4,600
Receptions 20,051 32,751 32,993 39,945 40,116 47,851
Estimated average number of 
days in custody (3)
34 34 34 38 35 35
Females
Average population 104 139 167 278 304 449
Receptions 1,199 1,812 1,994 3,442 3,773 5,450
Estimated average number of 
days in custody (3)(4)
32 28 31 30 30 32
(1) Total receptions cannot be calculated by adding together receptions in each category, because there is double 
counting.
(2) Time spent in Prison Service establishments before conviction, acquittal, etc.
(3) Time spent in Prison Service establishments after conviction before being sentenced.
(4) Averages are subject to wide variation because of the small population on which they are based.
Source: (Home Office 2003a: 17).
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Table 1.2: Female remand prisoners as a proportion of all remand prisoners 1998 
to 2002
Annual population 
averages
Female custodial 
remand population 
(Thousands)
Total custodial 
remand population
Females as a 
percentage of total 
custodial remand 
population
1998 0.70 12.57 5.6%
1999 0.75 12.52 5.9%
2000 0.70 11.28 6.2%
2001 0.78 11.24 6.9%
2002 0.95 12.79 7.4%
Source: adapted from (Home Office 2002:14),
Before examining these figures more closely, it is important to establish how to measure 
the remand populations. The average custodial remand population is a somewhat 
misleading measure of trends as it is subject to distortion from other factors, primarily 
the average duration of custodial remands. While the number of receptions has 
continued to rise, this rate of increase is not so apparent when looking at the average 
population figures because of the decrease in the average length of custodial remands 
during the same period. For example. Table 1.1 shows that although the number of men 
received into custodial remand rose by 6000 between 1994 and 1998, the average 
population figures for the same period actually show a fall in the population. While the 
average population is an important measure for issues such as overcrowding and regime 
conditions, it does not provide an accurate indication of trends in the use of custodial 
remand or how many individuals experience custodial remand each year. Using 
reception figures, it is evident that women are a growing proportion of all prison remand 
receptions, both untried and convicted unsentenced.
Although the custodial remand population is only 18 per cent of the average custodial 
population, custodial remand receptions account for 62 per cent of all receptions into 
prison (see Table 1.3). Of course the majority of individuals sentenced to custody will 
be serving sentences far longer than the average of 38 days that custodial remand 
prisoners spend in prison (see Table 1.1). However, although shorter, a custodial 
remand can still cause many of the same problems as a custodial sentence, especially 
given the particularly vulnerable nature of the custodial remand populations (see 
below).
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Table 1.3: Remand prisoners as a proportion of receptions into prison and average 
population in custody, by sex
Receptions into Prison Service 
establishments 2002
Average population in custody 2002
Males Females All males 
and
females
Males Females All males 
and
females
All persons in 
custody
134,484 13,380 147,864 66,562 4,299 70,861
Prisoners on 
remand
82,835 8,690 91,525 11,847 945 12,792
Remand prisoners 
as a percentage of 
total prisoners
62% 65% 62% 18% 22% 18%
Source: adapted from (Home Office 2002:14).
Comparisons of the untried and the convicted unsentenced custodial remand figures 
show that for both groups female receptions are rising more rapidly than male 
receptions. They also show that for both men and women, receptions of convicted 
unsentenced custodial remand prisoners are increasing more quickly than receptions of 
untried prisoners.
Receptions of all untried prisoners rose by 10 per cent between 2001 and 2002 to 
58,708. However, Table 1.1 shows that whilst receptions of male untried prisoners rose 
to 53,754, an increase of 9 per cent, receptions of female untried prisoners rose by 20 
per cent to 4,954. A similar pattern is evident in the receptions of convicted 
unsentenced prisoners. The total population rose between 2001 to 2002 by 14 per cent 
to 53,301 but whilst receptions of males rose by 13 per cent to 47,851, female 
receptions rose to 5,450, an increase of 25 per cent. These figures indicate there are 
differences in the expansion of the male and female remand populations which need to 
be explored.
A further difference between the custodial remands of men and women can be seen in 
Table 1.1. For both untried and convicted unsentenced custodial remand prisoners, 
women are held for shorter periods of time than men. In 2002, 4,950 female untried 
prisoners entered Prison Service establishments. They spent an estimated 37 days on 
average in custody before conviction, compared with an average of 49 days for males. 
In the same year, 5,450 female convicted unsentenced prisoners entered Prison Service 
establishments and they spent an estimated 32 days on average in custody, compared 
with an average 35 days for males.
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These figures raise a number of questions which will be returned to in Chapter Nine in 
light of the findings. Why is the reception of females into custodial remand rising so 
rapidly compared to the male population? Why is a greater proportion of the female 
prison estate accounted for by custodial remand prisoners compared to the male prison 
estate? Moreover, why are receptions of convicted unsentenced custodial remand 
prisoners (female and, to a lesser extent, male) increasing more quickly than receptions 
of untried custodial remand prisoners.
Questions about the necessity of custodial remands, for men and women, are raised by 
the evidence contained in Tables 1.4 and 1.5. It is clear from the breakdown of offences 
for which individuals are remanded in custody (Table 1.4) that many women are held on 
custodial remand for relatively minor matters. Most notably, 41 per cent of remand 
receptions of females in 2002 were for theft and handling compared to 24 per cent for 
males. The figures in Table 1.4 illustrate that receptions for the most serious offences 
(i.e. violence against the person, sexual offences, burglary and robbery) account for 41 
per cent of males received into custodial remand; for women these offences accounted 
for only 22 per cent of receptions in 2002.
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Table 1.4: Receptions(i) Of Remand Prisoners Into Prison Service Establishments 
By Offence And Sex In 2002
Offence Number of persons remanded 
in custody
Percentage of persons 
remanded in custody
Males
All offences 82,835 100.0
Violence against 
the person
12,990 15.7
Sexual offences 2,711 3.3
Burglary 12,768 15.4
Robbery 5,560 6.7
Theft and 
handling
20,258 24.5
Fraud and 
forgery
1,787 2.2
Drugs offences 6,693 8.0
Other offences 18,661 22.5
Offence not on 
record
1,407 1.7
Females
All offences 8,690 100.0
Violence against 
the person
860 9.9
Sexual offences 16 0.2
Burglary 584 6.7
Robbery 469 5.4
Theft and 
handling
3,601 41.4
Fraud and 
forgery
363 4.2
Drugs offences 978 11.3
Other offences 1,510 17.4
Offence not on 
record
309 3.5
(1) Total receptions cannot be calculated by adding together receptions in each category, because there is 
double counting.
Source: Adapted from (Home Office 2003a: 19).
Figures on sentencing outcome (Table 1.5) illustrate that fifty per cent of males held on 
custodial remand subsequently received a custodial sentence in 2002; the rate for 
females was 41 per cent. This means that 50 per cent of men and 59 per cent of women 
remanded in custody do not receive a custodial sentence. Twenty one per cent of males 
and 20% of females remanded in custody were acquitted or had proceedings against 
them terminated early. Sixteen per cent of males and 22 per cent of females held on 
custodial remand eventually received a community sentence.
22
Table 1.5: Final court outcome for persons remanded in custody at some stage in 
magistrates’ court proceedings (i)
England and Wales Estimated percentages
Final court outcome (2) Males Females
2000 2001 2002 2000 2001 2002
Acquitted, etc. 23 21 21 22 21 20
Convicted (3): 77 78 79 78 78 80
Discharge 3 3 3 6 5 5
Fine 6 4 4 6 5 5
Community Sentence (4) 15 13 16 23 19 22
Fully suspended 
sentence
- - - - - -
Immediate custody (5) 48 51 50 36 42 41
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
(1) Includes persons remanded in custody by magistrates during proceedings or on committal.
(2) Includes estimated outcome at the Crown Court for those committed for trial or sentence.
(3) Includes offences otherwise dealt with.
(4) Includes community rehabilitation orders, supervision orders, community sentence orders, attendance centre 
orders, community punishment and rehabilitation orders, curfew orders, reparation orders (from June 2000), action 
plan orders (from June 2000) and drug treatment and testing orders (from October 2000).
(5) Includes detention in a young offender institution, detention and training order and unsuspended imprisonment. 
Source: (Home Office 2002:49)
If these offences and offenders are not considered serious enough to warrant a custodial 
sentence, why is it necessary to hold them on custodial remand prior to trial and/or 
sentence? Why do magistrates’ courts remand so many individuals in custody when the 
offences charged are relatively minor? As there are different reasons for remanding in 
custody and for sentencing, we should be cautious about using sentencing criteria to 
make judgements on the use of custodial remand. These reasons will be more fully 
explored in this thesis. However, the number of women held on custodial remand for 
minor offences, and who later receive non-custodial sentences, does raise the question 
why magistrates consider custodial remands necessary in such cases.
The Effect of Custodial Remands
As has been seen, there are a growing number of women being held on custodial 
remand, raising questions of whether this should cause concern, and why; what 
problems does the expanding custodial remand population present? There are practical 
problems for Prison Service staff (HMI Prisons 2000) in managing the custodial remand 
population as, by definition, it is a transient population. Although female remand
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prisoners only constituted 22 per cent of the prison population in 2002, they made up 65 
per cent of receptions into already crowded prisons.
For the prisoners themselves, the consequences of a custodial remand can be very 
damaging as they are a particularly vulnerable group. Their characteristics, such as drug 
misuse, mental health problems, self-harm and suicide risk, as well as social and 
educational needs, also make them a potentially difficult group for prison staff to 
manage.
The general picture for adults on remand is of isolated, anxious, sad, 
disturbed and often desperate men and women, many with children. Before 
coming into prison they were likely to be living in impoverished 
circumstances and dependent on the State for survival. Most were without 
work, living alone and a significant number were misusing drugs and/or 
alcohol. Their precarious position and mental state is ftuther jeopardised by 
the experience of imprisonment which threatens housing, work and, 
particularly for women, contact with their children. (HMI Prisons 2000:24).
The Prison Reform Trust ‘Innocent Until Proven Guilty’ campaign identifies the often
poor regimes remand prisoners have to cope with (see also (Casale 1989) on the specific
experiences of women) and lists the complex needs of remand prisoners. In most of
these areas, remand prisoners have more severe problems than sentenced prisoners.
Many of those held on remand will have a complicated set of needs -  drug 
and alcohol misuse, poor educational attainment, mental illness and unstable 
accommodation are particularly prevalent amongst remand prisoners. 
(Prison Reform Trust 2004).
There is evidence that the female custodial remand population consists of an even more
vulnerable group of women than the female sentenced population. Time spent on
custodial remand can be as damaging to women as a custodial sentence, threatening
accommodation and employment opportunities and straining community, familial and
friendship ties. These difficulties often compound existing dimensions of social
exclusion firom which many women involved in the criminal justice system suffer.
Research documents the adverse life experiences of this group which include parental
separation, histories of sexual and physical abuse, time in local authority care, disrupted
education, low household income, poor employment histories and homelessness (for
example, see (Eaton 1993; Loucks 2004; Wedderbum 2000)).
[T]he differences between women and men in prison stood out much more 
starkly than I had ever imagined. Throughout the research on women, a 
consistent picture of poverty, deprivation, victimisation and marginalisation
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made up the basis of every female population in every jurisdiction. The 
‘career’ criminals and thrill-seekers common amongst male prisoners were 
virtually absent in women’s prisons, replaced instead by people in custody 
often through desperate circumstances or lives so chaotic that they failed to 
comply with community penalties or bail. (Loucks 2004:142).
The Wedderbum Report (2000) explored whether women on custodial remand (untried 
and convicted unsentenced) possessed different characteristics to the sentenced female 
prison population. In terms of offending profiles, the two groups were comparable, the 
only difference being that dmg offences were more common in the sentenced 
population (Wedderbum 2000:4). However, the ‘personal characteristics’ of women on 
remand were found to differ from the sentenced population in three ways. Firstly, whilst 
both groups had histories of deprivation, there was some evidence that this was more 
prevalent in the remand population. Secondly,
[I]t is in relation to mental health problems that the biggest differences are to 
be found. Although the same percentage of both groups, 40 per cent, had 
received help or treatment for a mental health problem before entering 
prison, more remand prisoners had been admitted to a mental hospital and 
they were twice as likely to have been admitted to a locked ward or secure 
unit. While the prevalence of ‘personality disorder’ was high in both groups, 
the probability of psychosis and of neurotic disorders was greater among the 
remand population. Furthermore, women on remand appear to be at a high 
risk of suicide. Over a quarter had attempted to kill themselves in the last 
year and nearly a quarter had had suicidal thoughts in the previous week. 
(Wedderbum 2000:4).
Mental health problems are also evident in the male remand population but women were 
found to present more acute mental health problems, and female remandees were twice 
as likely to have attempted suicide (25 per cent of women and 12 per cent of men) in the 
previous year (HMI Prisons 2000:22).
The third difference the Wedderbum Report identified between remanded and sentenced 
prison populations was the level of dmg use. Opiate dependence in particular and 
intravenous dmg use was found to be more common in the remand population 
(Wedderbum 2000:4). Comparisons with the male prison population show that 
dependence on opiates was proportionately higher in the female prison population. 
Significantly, opiate use was reported to be more common in both the male and the 
female remand prison populations than in the sentenced populations (Home Office 
1999b:31).
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Social exclusion, mental health problems, and drug dependence are significant issues 
for the male and female prison populations alike, and particularly so for the custodial 
remand populations. Clearly the experience of a custodial remand can be very damaging 
to such vulnerable individuals. However, at present we do not know enough about how 
these problems affect working practices and remand decision making in magistrates’ 
courts.
In addition to causing difficulties in their own lives, the imprisonment of mothers can be 
severely disruptive to their children, many of whom are cared for solely or primarily by 
their mothers. Women in prison often have to rely on grandparents and other female 
relatives to provide temporary care for their children. It is reported that some women 
may not reveal that they have children because they fear they will be taken into care 
(Wedderbum 2000:9). The children of imprisoned mothers reportedly demonstrate a 
variety of behavioural problems resulting from this separation (Caddie and Crisp 1996).
The separation of mothers fi*om children can also affect offending rates; there is 
evidence to suggest that maintaining family ties may help to reduce further offending 
(Ditchfield 1994). There are also concerns about the long term effects on the life course 
of the children of imprisoned mothers. There is growing evidence of the 
intergenerational transmission of social exclusion (Wedderbum 2000), suggesting that 
the children of imprisoned mothers may later become involved in the criminal justice 
system themselves.
The results do show a remarkable (and perhaps worrying) degree of 
continuity across the generations and the life-course. There is fairly general 
evidence of the transmission of social exclusion and disadvantage fi"om 
parents to their children and from childhood to adulthood. (Hobcraft 
1998:86).
The problems that emanate from the separation of female defendants from their families 
are compounded by the fact that women are often housed far from home: in a Prison 
Service document firom 2000, it was reported that only seven of the, then existing, 13 
Prison Service areas held unsentenced women.
This represents enormous social dislocation for women (most of whom [77 
per cent] are parents of young children) who are held in establishments 
significantly distant from their home areas. (HMI Prisons 2000:21).
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In addition to the harm done by custodial remands to the individual and her family, 
there is also some evidence that custodial remands have adverse effects on subsequent 
sentencing decisions. A study on racial bias in remand decisions found that
Some of the factors affecting the remand decision, particularly the 
seriousness of the offence will, of course, similarly affect the sentencing 
decision itself. However, there is some evidence that even where gravity of 
offence is matched (using the Cambridge Risk of Custody Scale, Version 2), 
there is a much greater likelihood of a defendant who has been remanded in 
custody receiving a custodial sentence than one who has been remanded on 
bail. (Brown and Hullin 1993:108).
Part of the explanation of this may well be that defendants remanded in custody have 
less access to their solicitors and are therefore disadvantaged when it comes to 
preparing their case.
It is clear that those men and women remanded in custody are a very vulnerable group 
with myriad social, economic and personal difficulties. The evidence suggests that there 
is an association between remands in custody and custodial sentences. Moreover, as 
many female custodial remandees are primary carers for their children, custodial 
remands can also be very detrimental to their dependants. Given the characteristics of 
this group of women and the harm done to them (and their children) by custodial 
remands, it is evident that wherever possible bail should be granted. However, as 
discussed above, the fi'equency with which women are being remanded in custody is 
increasing and this group is one of the fastest growing groups in the prison system. This 
raises the question whether custodial remands really are only being used as a last resort.
Aims and Objectives
The primary aim of this research is to further understand how and why custodial remand 
decisions about women are actually reached in magistrates’ courts. It originated from a 
concern about the increasing frequency with which custodial remands were being used 
for women, and from the potential harm done by imprisoning this particularly 
vulnerable group. This aim is approached by a detailed examination of decision making 
in cases where females are at risk of being remanded in custody. This exploration of the
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remand process is undertaken in magistrate’s courts in three districts of a large city. The 
more precise research questions that informed the focus of this study are:
• What is the relationship between the legal framework and remand practice? How 
closely do magistrates adhere to the principles and criteria for withholding bail 
contained in the Bail Act 1976 and in subsequent remand legislation?
• What are the characteristics of remand courts’ cultures and how do these social 
dynamics influence decision making processes and remand outcomes?
• For what reasons are women remanded in custody? What issues do criminal 
justice personnel identify as being important in remand hearings? Given the low 
rate of women remanded in custody who are subsequently given custodial 
sentences, and given the availability of female-only bail hostel places, why are 
women being remanded in custody?
• How can we explain the increase in the number of women remanded in custody 
and the increased frequency with which custodial remands are used for women? 
What is the relationship between increases in the remand and in the sentenced 
prison populations?
Thesis Overview
After outlining key findings from previous work on the remand system. Chapter Two 
presents a critique of the approach that most research to date has taken, A range of 
literature is then discussed to locate the research within the conceptual framework that 
is adopted in this thesis to explore the processes of decision making, the 
conceptualisation of women, and the social production of remand decisions in 
magistrates’ courts.
Chapter Three presents the methodological approach which was selected in light of the 
theoretical and practical issues raised in Chapters One and Two. Qualitative 
methodologies are used to allow themes to develop from the emerging data and for 
subsequent stages of data collection and analysis to be informed by earlier findings.
Chapter Four explores the nature and impact of the regulatory influences in the remand 
decision making environment. In this chapter, remand hearings are located within a
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number of structural constraints: socio-political influences; organisational context; 
regulatory systems; and the legal framework. Each is discussed in turn with illustrations 
of how they affect remand processing and outcomes.
Chapter Five presents evidence that the wide scope for discretionary practice in the 
remand system allows remand law to be differentially applied. Legal criteria are 
selectively used depending on the nature of the offence and, to a lesser extent, the 
characteristics of the defendant. Three ideal-typical models of remand are presented 
which illustrate the varying priorities and concerns magistrates, and other court actors, 
depending on the characteristics of the offence, the defendant, and the case.
Chapter Six focuses on the characterisation of female defendants in contested remand 
hearings. The chapter explores the gendered nature of both magistrates’ moral 
assessments of female defendants’ characters and of defence representatives’ mitigation 
speeches. Debates on the treatment of women in the criminal justice system (e.g. the 
‘chivalry’ hypothesis) are discussed in light of the data from this thesis.
Chapter Seven looks at the ways in which the models of remand identified in Chapter 
Five are translated into practice in the social world of a magistrates’ court. It provides 
illustrations of the competing range of roles and responsibilities evident within and 
between groups of participants in the remand process. The ways in which individuals 
choose to prioritise their own roles, and how to respond to other actors’ choices, are 
shown to directly affect case outcomes, at times overriding legal criteria.
Chapter Eight further develops the analysis of remand as a social process, and not 
simply a legal process. In remand hearings, representatives of different professional 
groups compete and negotiate with each other to try and assert their view of how to 
resolve a case. The underlying social organisation of magistrates’ courts, that structures 
this interaction, is identified and used to explain persistent patterns in how decisions are 
collectively produced.
Chapter Nine summarises the key empirical findings from the research and relates them 
to wider theoretical debates about criminal justice processing and decision making 
systems. Also included in this chapter is a discussion of the policy implications of this 
research, particularly in light of government proposals about future developments in the
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remand system. Finally, the chapter identifies issues from this analysis of the remand 
system which could be further explored in future research.
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Chapter Two
Literature Review
This chapter draws on a range of literature to locate this research in the context of what 
is already known about remand and to provide a theoretical framework for analysis of 
the remand system. It begins by outlining the key empirical findings from studies of the 
remand system. Following this is a critique of previous remand research. The last 
section outlines the conceptual literature which has informed this study.
Remand Research
With the exception of Dhami (2001) the majority of published work on remand decision 
making has adopted a socio-legal approach using methods including observing hearings, 
analysis of court documents, analysis of official statistics, questionnaires and 
interviews. The results of these studies will be summarised before considering some of 
the weaknesses of the research.
There are a series of factors which are consistently reported as being related to remand 
outcomes which are presented here under three main themes: firstly, the offence and 
defendant characteristics that inform decision makers’ resolution of remand hearings; 
secondly, the social and organisational processes which characterise the decision 
making environment; and thirdly, the variation in remand outcomes between courts and 
areas.
Offence And Defendant Characteristics
Summarising an analysis of official statistics on 222,000 remand decisions, Jones
(1985) concluded that
The results strongly suggest that the most significant factors in the court 
remand decision are the police remand decision, the offence group and court 
policy. Other factors such as the age and sex of the defendant and the type 
of proceedings (charge or summons), though associated with the remand
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decision, tend to be of marginal significance in the overall explanation of 
individual court remand decisions. (Jones 1985:116).
Examining the impact of offence seriousness, Jones concluded that the risk of a remand 
in custody varied both across and within offence categories depending on their 
seriousness. King (1971) found “a close correlation existed between the granting of bail 
and the seriousness of the offence” (King 1971:17). Doherty and East (1985) also found 
offence-specific remand patterns e.g. custodial remands were more likely for domestic 
burglaries than other offences, and as the value of the goods stolen increased, so did the 
likelihood of a remand in custody. Hucklesby (1994b) also found variations in remand 
in custody rates according to offence seriousness.
Looking at previous convictions, Hucklesby (1994b) found that defendants with 
previous convictions had a significantly higher custodial remand rate than those with no 
antecedents. A poor bail record was also a factor in increased risk of being remanded in 
custody.
A defendant’s community ties have been linked to remand outcomes. Defendants with 
no fixed abode, or unsuitable bail accommodation, have been found to be at a higher 
risk of custodial remand (Doherty and East 1985; Hucklesby 1994b; Kellough and 
Wortley 2002). Doherty and East (1985) did, however, find that of the 24 defendants 
with no fixed abode, six were still granted bail. Hucklesby (1994b) found that 
defendants who did not reside in the local area were significantly more likely to be 
refused bail than those who lived in the area.
No clear link has been found between age and remand outcome (Brown and Hullin 
1993; Doherty and East 1985; Kellough and Wortley 2002), although Jones (1985) 
reported the rate of custodial remand for juvenile males was significantly lower than for 
adult males. Dhami (2001) found that age was a factor considered by some magistrates, 
with the use of custodial remands increasing with the age of the defendant.
Women have been consistently found to be at a significantly lower risk of custodial 
remand than men (Brown, et al. 2004; Doherty and East 1985; Hucklesby 1994b; Jones 
1985; Kellough and Wortley 2002). Most have explained this apparent difference in 
terms of the less serious offences charged and bail records of females compared to 
males but Hucklesby (1996) argued that the effect remained even after allowing for
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these factors. Kellough (2002) also found that, allowing for other variables, women 
were still significantly less likely to be remanded in custody than men. Eaton (1987) 
argued that simple comparisons between males and females could not be made. Instead, 
she explored the nature of gender expectations exhibited by magistrates in relation to 
men and women and how these related to remand outcomes. These issues are explored 
further below and in Chapter Six.
The evidence on the relationship between race and remand decisions is contradictory. 
Brown and Hullin (1993) found no difference between remand rates for Afro-Caribbean 
and white defendants but Walker (1989) found that blacks faced a greater risk of 
custodial remand at every stage of the remand process. Asians were consistently found 
to be remanded in custody less frequently than whites or blacks. Walker suggested that 
these figures may be related to the fact that a greater proportion of black defendants 
pleaded not guilty and this may have affected magistrates’ bail assessments. Kellough 
(2002) also found evidence that black defendants were remanded in custody more often 
than other racial groups in her study of Canadian remand decision making.
Taking factors like criminal record, type of charge and number of current 
charges into statistical account, the odds of being detained are 
approximately 1.5 times greater for black accused than for accused from 
other racial backgrounds. (Kellough and Wortley 2002:196).
In contrast, Dhami (2001) found that race was rarely used in magistrates’ decision 
making and “they mostly used it in the opposite direction to that reported by 
criminologists” (Dhami 2001:177), although he does acknowledge this result could be a 
product of magistrates’ heightened awareness of the issue in the research.
These studies show a generally stronger association between remand decisions and 
factors related to offence seriousness and risk of further offending than to the personal 
factors that are permitted within the Bail Act (e.g. community ties) or personal 
characteristics such as gender or age. This suggests that some types of information are 
more influential in determining remand outcomes than others.
However, some findings indicate that certain groups of defendants may be treated 
differently in the remand process, with outcomes varying according to the gender and/or 
race of a defendant. This suggests that the relevance of extra-legal factors to remand 
decision making needs to be further explored. It also alerts us to the possibility that
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groups of defendants might make different choices about how, whether and when to 
apply for bail.
Social And Organisational Processes
Highlighting many of the themes of this section, Doherty and East (1985) stated.
The police and the defendant’s representatives are the main source of 
information. Whilst.. .they suggest reasons for the granting or refusing of 
bail these assertions are rarely scrutinised. The result is that decision­
makers, often amateurs with limited training who are working under a time- 
pressure, have to make subjective decisions on the basis of limited 
unsubstantiated information. The quality of decision-making must thus be 
regarded as suspect. (Doherty and East 1985:263).
The rapidity of most remand hearings has been commented in remand research (Doherty 
and East 1985; Hucklesby 1994b; King 1971; Zander 1979). Doherty and East (1985) 
reported that 62 per cent of hearings were completed within two minutes and 96 per 
cent within 10 minutes. More time was found to be spent on cases where bail was 
refused than where is was granted but even with these cases, 38 per cent took less than 
two minutes and 87 pei; cent took less than 10 minutes. Doherty and East observed that 
the informal behavioural norms in remand proceedings favoured the swift resolution of 
cases, for example the clerks spoke rapidly when dealing with procedural issues. Others 
have commented on the ‘camaraderie’ between court actors which may encourage non- 
adversarial, and consequently faster, hearings (Brink and Stone 1988; Doherty and East 
1985; Hucklesby 1994b).
Previous research has also identified the lack of information presented in remand 
hearings (Bottomley 1970; Burrows, et al. 1994a; Doherty and East 1985; East and 
Doherty 1984; Hucklesby 1994b; King 1971; Zander 1971; Zander 1979). Zander 
(1979) recorded that none of the information in 56 per cent of the cases observed in his 
study referred to Bail Act criteria such as offence seriousness. However, it is possible 
that this information was available to the magistrates in written form. Zander (1971) 
found that information on community ties, relevant information under the Bail Act, was 
rarely given in remand hearings. However, more information on Bail Act criteria was 
given in contested cases, a finding reported by Hucklesby (1994b) too. Research has 
also found that lay magistrates do not ask for additional information in remand hearings 
(Burrows, et al. 1994a; East and Doherty 1984; Hucklesby 1994b; Zander 1979). In
34
contrast, Dhami (2001) found lay magistrates did seek additional information and ask 
questions of court personnel in over half of the cases. The question whether magistrates 
ask for additional information is particularly important given the findings that police or 
prosecution staff do not always provide reasons for opposing bail (East and Doherty 
1984; Hucklesby 1994b). East and Doherty (1984) found police did not provide reasons 
for requests in 12 per cent of cases, whilst Hucklesby (1994b) recorded that reasons for 
remand recommendations were only given 12 per cent of the time.
The question who are the key decision makers is frequently discussed in research. 
Whilst magistrates formally take the bail decision, it is argued that they are variously 
influenced by police and prosecution decisions and recommendations, and by defence 
representations.
Although there is variation in the degree to which magistrates have been found to bail 
according to police recommendations, studies prior to the establishment of the Crown 
Prosecution Service (which introduced independent prosecutors) typically found police 
recommendations to be influential on magistrates’ decisions. (Bottomley 1970; Doherty 
and East 1985; Jones 1985; King 1971; Zander 1971). Jones (1985) recorded that police 
bail decisions were the most important single factor in remand decisions in magistrates’ 
courts: 89 per cent of those bailed by police are bailed by magistrates; 90 per cent of 
those held on overnight custody by police are remanded in custody in magistrates’ 
courts. Importantly, however, Jones notes that this pattern is not universal.
[W]hile the influence of the type of offence on the court remand decision 
appears to be independent of area the same is not the case for police remand 
decisions. It is clear that despite an overall close association between police 
and court decisions the degree to which the court decision agrees with the 
police decision varies from area to area. (Jones 1985:117).
The issue of variation between areas is further discussed below. Remaining with the 
issue of influential participants in the bail decision, Hucklesby (1996, 1997b) argued 
that the CPS were the most important people in the remand process, with magistrates 
following their recommendations in 95 per cent of cases. Whilst the CPS assumed the 
police’s former responsibility for making a remand request, Hucklesby noted that the 
CPS were still dependant on police for information and therefore the police still 
exercised influence over remand hearings.
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There is evidence that defence representations make a difference to magistrates’ 
ultimate decisions. Zander (1971) found that where the police opposed bail, those with a 
defence representative had almost twice the chance of being bailed than those without 
representation. Doherty and East (1985) reported that even where police objected to 
bail, magistrates bailed defendants in approximately one third of the cases where 
defence representations were made. Brink and Stone (1988) examined another facet of 
defence representatives’ influence on remand decisions: the decision not to apply for 
bail. They found that between one-half and three-quarters of the defendants in the 
various courts they surveyed, who were remanded in custody at their first appearance, 
had not made a bail application because their representatives advised against it.
[Rjemand prisoners are failing to ask for bail, not because they want to go to 
prison, but because they are advised that the best way to obtain bail is not to 
ask for it -  at least not yet. (Brink and Stone 1988:154).
Doherty and East (1985) identified 47 cases where no bail application was made. In 33 
of these cases no application was made as no new circumstances were evident so a bail 
application was not possible. In nine cases no application was made as the defence 
representative was seeking protective custody, most commonly this meant hospital 
treatment for defendants requiring psychiatric treatment. In one case the defence felt a 
more favourable pre-sentence report would be made if the defendant was in custody 
rather than in the community. Another defendant’s record was so substantial that a bail 
application was not made as it would obviously not be granted. Although the numbers 
are not large, the data suggest that defence recommendations to their clients are an 
important factor to consider when examining remand outcomes.
Magistrates themselves obviously impact on remand decisions too. Studies have found 
different custodial remand rates between lay and stipendiary magistrates (now called 
district judges) with lay magistrates deferring to police or prosecution recommendations 
more often (Hucklesby 1994b; Zander 1971). Dhami (2001) however, found little 
difference between the decisions of lay and stipendiary magistrates, and between more 
and less experienced lay magistrates, in a remand decision making exercise. He did, 
however, find that more experienced magistrates tended to use more complex 
approaches to decision making, for example they used a greater number of cues. 
Doherty and East (1985) found no significant differences between lay and stipendiary 
magistrates but previous court decisions were seen to be influential: 71 per cent of
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defendants previously remanded in custody were remanded in custody at later hearings, 
and 96 per cent who were previously bailed were re-bailed. This could, of course, be 
explained not by later benches deferring to earlier benches’ decisions, but by benches 
concurring due to the fact that they are using the same information to make the decision.
Most studies demonstrate that remand decisions are not solely made by magistrates in 
isolation. Research has highlighted the relative importance of the various criminal 
justice personnel involved in the remand process, and the influence they can exert over 
decision processing and outcomes, both prior to and during the remand hearing itself. 
This indicates that remand outcomes may be related not just to the nature of the offence 
and/or defendant, but also to the nature of interaction between participants. Equally it 
has been argued that organisational factors, such as the pressure of time, affect remand 
processing and case resolution.
Variation In Remand Outcomes Between Courts And Areas
A number of studies have recorded variation in remand outcomes between different 
courts (Brown, et al. 2004; Cutts 1982; Dhami 2001; Hucklesby 1997a; Jones 1985; 
King 1971). For example. King (1971) observed that Liverpool courts bailed up to 80 
per cent of cases compared to Bristol and Brighton courts where the bail rate was under 
55 per cent. ‘Court culture’ has been offered as an explanation of differences between 
courts. Identifying variation between courts in their study. Brown et al (2004) recorded
There is wide variation in the remand rates across the Sheriff Courts with no 
obvious explanation other than that of differing ‘court cultures’ (Brown, et 
al. 2004:i).
Hucklesby (1994b) analysed decisions in three courts and found two of them had 
custodial remand rates of 9 per cent whilst the third had a rate of 25 per cent. These 
variations could not be explained by differences in the cases (e.g. type of offence, 
offender characteristics, etc), heard at the three courts. Observations revealed a greater 
propensity by the prosecution to ask for a custodial remand in the court with the highest 
rate, leading Hucklesby to assert that prosecution requests were highly influential on 
magistrates’ decisions. Thus, it is in the practices of the prosecution that variations 
between courts are said to lie.
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However, Jones (1985) argued that courts varied in the extent to which they were 
influenced by prosecution recommendations (in this study, the police were the 
prosecutors as the research took place prior to the establishment of the CPS) and thus 
prosecution practices alone are not a sufficient explanation of variation. He found the 
remand in custody rate to vary from less than 10 per cent in some areas to over 30 per 
cent in others. Although evidence was found that police recommendations were 
important in explaining some of this variation, it was not the whole answer as courts 
varied in the degree to which they followed police recommendations (see above). 
Instead, he concluded that
[0]ver and above the important influence of the police remand decision and 
the offence mix, courts do have different policies and practices when 
deciding whether to remand defendants in custody or on bail. (Jones 
1985:111).
Bottomley (1970) found variation between urban and rural courts and more recent 
research (Dhami 2001) has also reported differences between metropolitan and 
provincial courts in decision making policies. Metropolitan magistrates tended to be 
‘fast and frugal’, perhaps reflecting variations in decision making strategies due to the 
greater time pressure in the busier urban courts.
Research has identified variations between courts’ remand rates that cannot be 
explained by legal or offence based factors. The ‘court culture’ explanation of this 
focuses attention on how social processes can shape how legal decisions are resolved. It 
has also been suggested that variation between courts may also be explained by 
practical and organisational influences, such as a shortage of time. As such, the social 
and organisational environments in which remand decision making takes place are 
further important elements in an explanation of how remand decisions are reached.
A Critique Of Previous Research
Before moving on to a discussion of the conceptual literature that informs this thesis, a 
general critique of previous remand studies is presented. Many were conducted prior to 
the Bail Act and/or before the establishment of the CPS, making many of their findings 
potentially obsolete. Consequently, as will be seen, this thesis relies on a small number 
of more recent studies when discussing findings in relation to previous research.
38
Whilst not all the studies discussed above employ the same methods (most notably, 
Jones (1985) who conducted a large-scale statistical analysis rather than small-scale 
court observations), they share some common shortcomings which are discussed below.
Many of the studies acknowledge, either implicitly or explicitly, that the remand system 
is one characterised by a large degree of discretion.
The nature of the system inhibits rather than guarantees informed and 
consistent decisions; as is clear from the Bail Act criteria for refusing bail, it 
is expected to be multi-purpose... The necessity of having regard to several 
matters makes for complexity in bail decision-making, which is increased by 
the fact that in relation to each and all of them numerous factors may have to 
be taken into account. (Doherty and East 1985:262).
The correct judicial approach to bail in criminal proceedings is confused by 
the absence of statutory rules of procedure specifically dealing with bail 
whenever it falls to be determined in a magistrates’ court...In these 
circumstances, magistrates’ courts have inevitably found it necessary to 
develop and adopt their own procedural approaches to bail in criminal 
proceedings, not all of which are consistent with each other. (Lydiate 
1987:164).
The overwhelming majority of bail decisions are made either by the police 
or by the magistrates’ court, in the exercise of a discretion that is only 
partially circumscribed by precise legal rules and criteria. (Zander 
1967:100).
However, despite this awareness, these studies have not, on the whole, sought to explore 
whether or not the Bail Act reasons for withholding bail are, in fact, the only criteria 
that decision makers actually use when reaching remand decisions, or are simply the 
ones they use to account for their decision making in line with Bail Act requirements. 
Doherty and East (1985) did comment on the observed cases where no bail application 
was made. However, there was no discussion of how these decisions to remand in 
custody were officially recorded, or whether the official reasons reflected the 
information provided in hearings. Thus an opportunity to raise questions about whether 
formal Bail Act reasons for withholding bail concealed other, extra-legal, reasons was 
missed.
Furthermore, even where the Bail Act (and its subsequent amendments) was seen to be 
disregarded, this is not discussed. Although the possibility of non-Bail Act criteria was
39
not explicitly explored, Hucklesby (1994b) found strong evidence that the magistrates 
in her study innovated beyond what is defined by the Bail Act as acceptable criteria for 
withholding bail, and, moreover, they were not challenged by other participants in the 
remand process when they behaved in this way. Magistrates were observed to use 
offence seriousness as a reason in and of itself for remanding in custody; this is not a 
valid reason for withholding bail under the Bail Act. Despite this finding, Hucklesby did 
not go on to question why other court personnel, particularly clerks and defence 
representatives, did not dispute the validity of ‘offence seriousness’ as a reason for 
withholding bail, or whether other extra-legal reasons formed the foundations for the 
refusal of bail. In general, previous research on remand has been too uncritical of the 
implementation of legislation and put too much emphasis on remand decisions per se.
As discussed above, there is interest in whether magistrates ‘rubber stamp’ CPS and/or 
police recommendations but there is little subsequent questioning of how the CPS and 
the police reach their decisions and make the recommendations that they do. If, as is 
argued by many (Bottomley 1970; Doherty and East 1985; Jones 1985; King 1971; 
Zander 1971), CPS and police recommendations are highly influential, why is there no 
exploration of the criteria that they use to make their decisions and reach their 
recommendations?
Kellough (2002) did attempt to explore whether or not Canadian criminal justice 
personnel had extralegal reasons for remanding in custody. Kellough reported that 
custodial remands were used as bargaining tools to secure plea bargains. Moreover, she 
explored the factors that influenced remand decision making and found that the police’s 
moral assessments of defendants was a significant indicator of risk of custodial remand. 
With the exception of Eaton (1987), no other studies have looked at the ways in which 
magistrates categorise the defendants that appear before them according to non- 
offence/offending-based criteria.
Some studies have commented on the fact that reasons are often not given to support 
remand requests (East and Doherty 1984; Hucklesby 1994b) but they do not discuss this 
any further than to suggest it indicates the extent to which magistrates defer 
unquestioningly to police and CPS recommendations. Whilst this may be the case, it is 
also possible that there are other reasons why no reasons are required. What, if 
anything, do cases where no reasons are given have in common?
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A further problem with these studies is that they discuss the reasons for refusing bail 
(such as offence and defendant related issues, police and prosecution recommendations, 
etc) but they do not discuss reasons for granting bail in either uncontested or contested 
cases. As offence seriousness is closely related to the risk of custodial remands, it is, 
perhaps, regarded as self-evident that non-serious offences will be uncontested and 
granted bail. There is, however, no discussion of the decision-making processes except 
for comments on the dearth of information in these cases.
Moreover, as this thesis found, some individuals are remanded in custody for relatively 
minor offences; a fact which is not fully discussed by research to date. It may be that the 
numbers of contested, non-serious cases are too small to be significant in many of the 
studies and this accounts for their neglect. However, the figures for contested bail 
applications do need to be addressed. Although the majority of cases where the 
prosecution or police object to bail do result in custodial remands, some studies show a 
substantial minority of such cases which result in a grant of bail. Zander (1971) found 
25 percent of cases where police requested a custodial remand resulted in bail being 
granted; King (1971) found 22 per cent; Zander (1979) found 42 per cent; and Doherty 
and East (1985) found 31 per cent. Although these figures are minorities, they still 
represent a reasonably substantial number of defendants who are being granted bail 
despite objections. Discussions of why magistrates disagree with police and prosecution 
recommendations in these cases are limited. Although there are comments that defence 
representations can make a difference to magistrates’ decisions (Doherty and East 1985; 
Zander 1971), there is no discussion of what makes a successful bail application or how 
it affects magistrates’ reasoning in contested cases.
A related point is that, with the exception of Doherty and East (1985) and Brink and 
Stone (1988), there is little comment on why defendants do not request bail. Moreover, 
even in Brink and Stone’s (1988) article entitled '"'Defendants who do not ask for bail” 
(emphasis added), there is little discussion of defendants themselves. Defendants’ 
choice not to apply for bail is credited to the advice they receive from their 
representative. Defendants themselves are absent from most research. Whilst the advice 
given by defence representatives is no doubt influential, questions remain about why 
defendants endure “weeks or even months” (Brink and Stone 1988:154) on custodial 
remand without seeking bail, particularly, as Brink and Stone (1988) themselves point
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out, given that remand prisoners often have to endure worse conditions than sentenced 
prisoners.
[RJemand prisoners face many conditions that are far worse than those faced 
by sentenced prisoners, such as confinement in their cells for 23 hours each 
day and detention in the most overcrowded and antiquated establishments.
(Brink and Stone 1988:153).
The choices that defendants make need to be explored if we are to develop a full 
understanding of remand processing and outcomes.
[The] natural focus [of analyses of criminal justice decision making] is upon 
the exercise of choice and the use of reasoning of those officials who are 
legally empowered to exercise discretion. But decision subjects are rarely, if 
ever, totally passive participants in the decision-making process, even if 
their ‘participation’ is often unwitting or inadvertent. (Hawkins 2003:202).
A further criticism of previous remand research is the limited attempts made to examine 
court-based social interaction and to incorporate it into explanations of remand 
decisions. As noted above, previous research on the remand system has taken some 
account of the impact social processes have on remand outcomes through discussions of 
‘court culture’. This concept, however, has been under-researched and, it is argued here, 
is insufficiently defined in remand research. ‘Court culture’ does usefully sensitise 
researchers to the ways in which the particular configurations of social interaction and 
court procedures can vary between courts, and that these variations can affect remand 
outcomes. However, remand research has failed to ask many important questions such 
as what the patterns of interaction are; where do they originate; and how, exactly, do 
they impact on decision making? For example, it is not sufficient to observe a 
concordance between magistrates’ decisions and CPS recommendations and conclude 
that magistrates ‘rubber stamp’ CPS decisions. It has been shown that CPS and defence 
solicitors anticipate magistrates’ decisions and adjust their own actions accordingly 
(Hucklesby 1997a; McConville, et al. 1994). Thus, a close correlation between CPS 
recommendations and magistrates’ decisions may be due to deferential magistrates or 
deferential CPS officers, or other, as yet unidentified, working norms and social 
processes.
Despite evidence that processes and decisions are influenced by a range of criminal 
justice actors (see (Darbyshire 1984; Darbyshire 1999) on court clerks and
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(McConville, et al. 1994) on defence representatives, as well as the previously cited 
remand research on the police, magistrates, and CPS officers), remand research still 
appears to be typically concerned with identifying the single most influential group in 
the remand process. Given this, coupled with evidence that the role of participants, such 
as the police, varies in significance from court to court (Jones 1985), it is argued here 
that other questions may be more instructive. For example: why does the influence of 
professional groups vary; which groups are deferential under what circumstances; is 
court-based interaction more complex than the previous unidirectional description e.g. 
CPS influence magistrates or CPS anticipate magistrates’ decisions; and what the 
underlying forces are that shape courtroom dynamics?
Similarly, studies that seek to uncover what types of information are most influential in 
remand decisions need to consider more fully the social dynamics of remand 
processing. For example. Zander (1979) and Hucklesby (1994b) recorded whether, and 
how much, information about issues such as family responsibilities were mentioned in a 
hearing. Predetermined categories were used instead of recording proceedings verbatim. 
Moreover, there was no attempt to record the impact of pieces of information and how 
other court users responded to it. This method of recording data prevents analysis of the 
quality and tone of the information supplied, or the significance accorded to this 
information by other participants. The use of a pro forma imposes a conceptual structure 
on the remand hearing and inhibits the possibility of unanticipated themes emerging 
from the data.
Previous research has emphasised the complexity of remand decision making, a process 
with wide scope for discretionary practice which involves a series of stages, a range of 
personnel and the use of multiple decision making criteria. These findings, adapted and 
developed in light of their shortcomings, outlined above, have contributed to the 
framing of this study, highlighting issues to be explored further in the research. Firstly, 
the formal categories and rationale for decisions are not sufficient explanations of actual 
practice because the potential for discretionary practice is marked in the remand system. 
Legal and extra-legal criteria are both used for decision making so analysis must 
incorporate both. The nature of the organisational environment can affect how cases are 
processed. Equally, the social environment in which remand decisions are made is 
crucially important as decisions are the product of interaction between a range of 
participants.
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Conceptualising The Remand System
The conceptual literature which informed this thesis’ analysis of the remand decision 
making process will be summarised here. The theoretical paradigm outlined in this 
section provided the foundation for the construction of the research questions and 
shaped the approach to the data collection. This section places the study in a wider 
conceptual framework thus both developing understanding of remand and, more widely, 
contributing to debates about the nature of decision making within a complex 
organisation such as the criminal justice system. This thesis aims to explore the nature 
of, and influences on, courts’ social dynamics and working practices to understand how 
remand decisions are produced. Literature from a number of areas is discussed in 
relation to the examination of remand decision making in this thesis: firstly, models of 
the criminal justice system; secondly, approaches to the analysis of discretion and 
regulation; thirdly, the symbolic interactionist tradition; and, lastly, gender and 
criminology. The literature presented here is further discussed in subsequent chapters, 
where relevant, in light of findings from the data.
Modelling The Criminal Justice System
Some previous work on remand (Dhami 2001; Hucklesby 1994b) has framed the 
process within the literature on models of the criminal justice system. The most well 
known of these are Packer’s (1969) ‘crime control’ and ‘due process’ models. In the 
crime control model, the criminal justice system’s priorities are to ensure a high rate of 
detection and conviction. Fast, efficient decision making is the goal in the “assembly- 
line conveyor belt” (Packer 1969:159) of criminal justice processing. Defendants who 
are not screened out by the police are presumed to be guilty and, in the remand process, 
custodial remands are regarded as a way of preventing further offending or absconding. 
Pre-trial detention encourages defendants to enter a guilty plea (something Kellough 
(2002) found evidence of in the Canadian remand system) and, it is argued, deters 
people from offending. Where defendants are bailed, their release is less to do with a 
‘right’ to bail and more to do with promoting efficiency in the process.
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At the other end of the continuum is the due process model where conveyor belt 
processing is replaced with a concern for quality control in decision making. Speed and 
efficiency in processing the presumed guilty makes way for
[FJormal, adjudicative, adversary fact-finding processes in which the factual 
case against the accused is publicly heard by an impartial tribunal and is 
evaluated only after the accused has had a full opportunity to discredit the 
case against him. (Packer 1969:163-164).
In the due process model, it is not presumed that the defendant will be found guilty and 
custodial remands are seen to inhibit their right to access legal advice and the 
preparation of their case. The presumption is in favour of bailing the defendant and 
conditions, rather than custodial remand, should be used to allay fears of offending or 
absconding.
There are a number of critiques of these models (King 1981; McBamet 1981) which 
will not be extensively explored as it is argued here that models are not an adequate 
theoretical framework for analysis of the remand system. One of the main problems 
with this framework is that the relationship between the models is not explored 
(Ashworth 1998). If they are at opposite ends of a continuum, then how do they relate to 
each other? In what circumstances is one used and not the other? What elements of the 
case, the immediate environment, the socio-political situation, etc. promote the use of 
one over the other? The models are not descriptions of existing systems but are ideal 
types to which the practice in actual systems can be compared, and degrees of deviation 
and variation illustrated. Models may be useful at the level of analysing abstract 
complex processes, but are less useful in the study of the detailed micro-processes of 
individual cases.
Further, following King (1981), it is also believed that multiple models may co-exist in 
the justice system, both at different stages in the system and between different groups of 
criminal justice agents. Previous analyses, which have focused on whether the remand 
system is typified by crime control or due process models, have failed to explore the 
extent to which a range of models co-exist and compete in the remand process.
Models do, however, usefully highlight certain issues, such as how practitioners’ aims 
and intentions (e.g. crime control) impact on the ways cases are processed and resolved.
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They also serve as reminders that there are links between the stages of the 
criminalisation process, for example
[T]he principles of sentencing are strongly related both to the criteria for
diversion from the criminal process and to the system of plea negotiation.
(Ashworth 1998:25).
They also illustrate the different ways in which one of the central dilemmas of the 
criminal justice system can be played out in practice: the tension between securing the 
proper pursuit of justice for the state and preventing defendants from being treated any 
more punitively that can be helped. These opposing principles are particularly evident in 
pre-trial processes, such as remand, as defendants’ guilt or innocence has yet to be 
established.
These, and subsequent models (Bottoms and McClean 1976; King 1981), also sensitise 
analysis to the various possible functions of the criminal justice system and the tensions 
between them. Models illustrate how purposes are related to the goals and the roles of 
the professional groups working within the system. As conceptual frameworks, they 
foster an understanding of patterns in decision making in terms of the organisational and 
social prioritisation of particular goals. Moreover, they illustrate that apposite processes 
and practices are selected and adopted by criminal justice agents in order to achieve 
those goals. An examination of working practices can thus be used to illuminate the 
actual function(s) of the remand process and the rationale(s) behind remand decisions.
Discretion, Regulation And Legal Rules
As discussed above, the legal framework and the decision making environment contain 
a great deal of scope for the operation of discretion. There are two broad approaches to 
the analysis of discretion in the criminal justice system: the legal and the social science 
perspectives.
In the legal approach, the concern is with discretion and its regulation through the use of 
legal rules. For example, Davis (1969), whilst accepting some discretion was necessary 
and desirable, was concerned about the excessive use of discretionary powers. He 
argued that more legal rules could be the answer to the problem of too much discretion
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if they were coupled with greater accountability in the operation of discretion. Increased 
regulation through legal rules would prevent the unnecessary use of discretion. Galligan
(1986) also approached discretion from a legal perspective. He accepted that some 
discretion was inevitable but argued that its extent should and could be limited by the 
adoption of clear legal rules with less room for interpretation and discretionary practice. 
Other authors writing from the legal perspective have also been concerned with how to 
frame legal rules in order to minimise the potential for discretion (Schneider 1992).
The regulatory impact of legal rules is important to this research as they do help to 
frame the structure of the process and affect social processes (see below). There is a 
relationship between legal rules and criminal justice action. Discussing the work of 
Nonet and Selznick, Galligan (1987) explains that discretion can be regulated through 
clearer expressions of purpose in the criminal justice system.
According to their account, the purposes of any sub-system of authority can 
be made objective enough to provide guidance in designing the institutions 
and procedures for decision-making, and in settling the substantive ends to 
which decisions are to be directed. ((Galligan 1987) reproduced in (Lacey 
1994:154)).
It is true that the purposes of the remand system are not clearly defined by its legal 
framework.
[T]he discretionary bail decision is structured in terms of statutory criteria 
which embody a presumption in favour of bail...However, the statutory 
criteria themselves point in a number of directions, and it is widely 
recognized that the apparent presumption in favour of bail translates in 
practice into just the opposite, at least in cases regarded as relatively serious. 
(Lacey 1994:15).
Clearly, the way in which the law is framed is important. If the legal framework in bail 
hearings included explicit recognition of these purposes that are evident in working 
practice, they would be more susceptible to regulation and thus discretion would be 
limited.
However, the use of the legal perspective is limited because this study focuses more 
widely on decision making practices rather than simply the nature and operation of 
discretion. Thus, instead of concentrating on defining discretion and exploring what 
types of discretion operate at what points in the remand system (Galligan 1986;
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Schneider 1992), the focus is on decision making and the ends to which discretion is 
employed.
In contrast to the legal approach, the social science approach tends to focus less on the 
relationship between legal rules and the operation of discretion, and instead examines 
decision making processes.
[C]riminal statutes are written without social relationships and context in 
mind, but they can only he interpreted and applied with reference to social 
relationships and context. ((Daly 1989) reproduced in (Lacey 1994:236)).
The legal framework is not the focus of this perspective and the analytic emphasis is on 
the influence of rules other than legal rules. Discussing the differences between legal 
and social science approaches to discretion and decision making, Hawkins (1992b) 
comments that
[DJiscretionary decisions are rarely as unconstrained as they might appear. It 
is precisely those social constraints that lead to highly patterned outcomes of 
discretionary decisions in the aggregate and may prompt some to conclude 
that little or no effective discretion really exists.. .Patterns in discretionary 
outcomes provide a marked contrast to the characteristic legal view of the 
use of discretion as individualized decision-making that is potentially 
capricious. While lawyers may conceive of a part of a legal system without 
rules as one of ‘absolute discretion’. .., it does not make sense from a social 
scientific point of view to speak of ‘absolute’ or ‘unfettered’ discretion, 
since to do so is to imply that discretion in the real world may be 
constrained only by legal rules, and to overlook the fact that it is also shaped 
by political, economic, social and organizational forces outside the legal 
structure. (Hawkins 1992b:38).
The legal framework must be incorporated in any analysis of criminal justice decision 
making as both legal rules and social rules in combination influence the production of 
decisions.
The contrasting approaches of law and social science have both, however, 
tended to underplay various important sources of influence. Where lawyers 
have usually shown little concern for the actual behaviour of those who 
exercise legal discretion, social scientists have frequently been guilty of 
discounting the part played by legal rules in shaping discretion. (Hawkins 
1992b: 19).
[W]e should reject any dichotomy between legal and social science 
approaches. Rather, we should recognize the importance of a pluralistic 
approach to the issues raised by the existence of discretionary power in legal
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contexts, seen as a pervasive form of social and political power. (Lacey 
1992:363).
The formation and impact of various types of social rules on decision making have been 
explored by other authors (e.g. see (Skolnick 1967) on working practices, (Lipsky 1980) 
on organisational culture and (Carlen 1976; Carlen 1983) on the role of extra-legal 
variable such as gender). These ideas are more fully developed in the next section on 
symbolic interactionism and the contribution this perspective makes to an understanding 
of criminal justice decision making. Literature on decision making in the criminal 
justice system highlights the importance of exploring the extent of discretionary 
practices and the legal and social rules which constrain such discretion. Models of 
criminal justice processing usefully combine with discretion literature as they can help 
to illuminate why discretion is exercised to particular ends. Equally, the insights from 
discretion literature enables an understanding of how and why different models can 
(co)exist in the criminal justice system.
Symbolic Interactionism
The interactionist perspective is adopted in this thesis because it locates decision 
making and variation in criminal justice outcomes in the ways that cases are processed. 
Early studies of Taw in action’ (e.g. see (Cicourel 1968; Skolnick 1967; Sudnow 1965)) 
examined social processes taking place outside courtrooms themselves. Indeed, 
Goffman’s (1959) position was that what went on ‘back stage’ could be more revealing 
and significant than what took place in a central and public arena. Subsequent works 
began to explore the social interaction and decision making processes of courtrooms 
themselves (Baldwin and McConville 1977; Carlen 1976; Eaton 1984; McConville, et 
al. 1994; Parker, et al. 1981; Parker, et al. 1989; Rumgay 1998). Whilst acknowledging 
the importance of the ‘back stage’, this thesis draws on these later studies and explores 
how decisions are collectively produced in the unique environment of the courtroom 
itself. The court is an arena where representatives from numerous professions, as well as 
those involved in and affected by the alleged offence, gather to process the case 
collectively and produce an outcome.
Symbolic interactionism places process rather than legal rules at the centre of the field 
of enquiry. Instead of accepting formal rules and categories, this approach regards them
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as problematical and seeks to explore the meanings that actions and decisions have for 
participants. Thus the official criteria for refusing bail, that are contained in the Bail 
Act, are not accepted as the focus of enquiry. This research explores the various 
purposes that custodial remands may be used to satisfy. These purposes may have little 
or no relation to the Bail Act criteria and, moreover, may actually be concealed by the 
requirement to frame accounts of decisions in terms of the formal Bail Act categories.
Where the question is explicitly addressed by criminal justice studies in the 
interactionist tradition, variation in outcome is explained by differences in how cases 
are processed. For example, Cicourel (1968) identified the central importance of 
different working practices in explaining patterns in outcomes for juveniles involved in 
the justice system in two areas that could be expected to have similar inputs and, 
therefore, outputs. Criminal justice outcomes are socially produced rather than 
determined by a legal framework. A number of previous studies have analysed 
courtrooms’ social dynamics to explain patterns of decision making (Baldwin and 
McConville 1977; Carlen 1976; Eaton 1984; Eaton 1987; Parker, et al. 1989; Rumgay 
1998). Cases are not regarded as being processed by rational legal actors, carefully 
balancing the issues of the case within a legal framework to reach predictable, rational 
decisions. Focusing on Taw in action’, the ways in which formal rules and sanctions are 
applied are understood to be the product of a process of social interaction.
The limited regulatory impact of formal legal rules does not, however, mean that 
criminal justice outputs are the unpredictable results of individualised decision making. 
Social action is patterned and structured by social rules.
[Sjocial activity is not random. It is patterned and structured, and part of the 
sociological enterprise is devoted to identifying and explaining the patterns 
of social interaction. (Hutter and Lloyd-Bostock 1997:36).
Two particular aspects of the interactionist approach are useful for the analysis of 
patterns of decision making in the remand system: courtroom (sub)culture, and labelling 
and typification of defendants.
The general culture of magistrates’ courts has been understood as a reflection of the 
social composition of the magistracy and of dominant social norms and attitudes. For 
example, Carlen (1976) and Eaton (1984) illustrate how traditional class and gender
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roles are reproduced in, and reinforced by, interaction and decision making in 
magistrates’ courts. Other work has accounted for more specific differences between 
various courts’ outcomes in terms of patterns of social interaction (Brown, et al. 2004; 
Hucklesby 1997a; Jones 1985).
The term ‘court culture’ is often used to describe enduring variation in working 
practices in individual courts. Rock’s (1993) ethnography of a Crown Court clearly 
describes the resilience of the court’s social organisation despite the challenge of a 
relocation to a new building. Rumgay (1995) describes how, in contrast to findings from 
some other studies. City’s court held probation officers in high regard and their 
recommendations were afforded an unusual degree of influence. As discussed above, 
Jones (1985) identified persistent variations in the extent to which courts were 
influenced by police recommendations and explained this in terms of the courts’ 
working practices. Whether described as court culture or persistent working practices, 
the literature indicates the importance of courtroom dynamics in explaining particular 
practices and variations between courts’ outcomes. Rumgay (1995) notes that 
situational factors can additionally affect courtroom dynamics.
Labelling and typification theories explore how defendants are constructed by
participants in the remand process, and the consequences this has for case resolution.
Berger and Luckmann (1966) illustrated how identities are socially constructed, and
thus related to the social structure. Participants in social interaction employ ‘typificatory
schemes’ which provide the framework for understanding what the situation ‘means’
and thus how that interaction should proceed.
The reality of everyday life contains typificatory schemes in terms of which 
others are apprehended and ‘dealt with’ in face-to-face encounters. Thus I 
apprehend the other as ‘a man’, ‘a European’, ‘a buyer’, ‘a jovial type’, and 
so on. All these typifications ongoingly affect my interaction with him...
Our face-to-face interaction will be patterned by these typifications as long 
as they do not become problematic through interference on his part. Thus he 
may come up with evidence that, although a ‘man’, ‘a European’, ‘a buyer’, 
he is also a self-righteous moralist, and that what appeared first as joviality 
is actually an expression of contempt for Americans in general and 
American salesmen in particular. At this point, of course, my typificatory 
scheme will have to be modified... Unless thus challenged, though, the 
typifications will hold until further notice and will determine my actions in 
the situation. (Berger and Luckmann 1966:45).
Identity is formed by social processes. Once crystallized, it is maintained, 
modified, or even reshaped by social relations. The social processes
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involved in both the formation and the maintenance of identity are 
determined by the social structure. (Berger and Luckmann 1966:194).
Typification, with its origins in the ‘labelling school’, is employed in this thesis to 
explore social construction in remand hearings, and how female defendants^ are 
understood, characterised and responded to by other participants in the process. What 
are the typifications of women that pattern remand hearings, and to what extent are 
defendants able to challenge these typifications? Previous work has illustrated how the 
justice system is organised to render defendants powerless (Carlen 1976; Ericson and 
Baranek 1982; Rock 1993), and are thus unable to ‘interfere’ with the typifications 
applied to them. Consequently, defendants are reliant on their defence representatives’ 
responses to the typifications being employed in their case.
The typifications used in magistrates’ courts will be organised around both the broad 
categories employed in wider society (e.g. on gender and social class see Eaton (1984) 
and Carlen (1976)) as well the specific categories that emerge from the organisational 
concerns and the functions of the courts. For example, Reiner (1992) documents how 
police officers categorised members of the public, around which the exercise of 
discretion was organised. Rumgay (1998) records the routinisation of responses to 
‘drinking offenders’. Lipsky (1980) showed how typifications about deservingness were 
constructed as a way of managing the distribution of scarce resources. Sudnow (1965) 
illustrated how the concept of a ‘normal crime’ was used to routinise, and thus speed up, 
case processing.
The symbolic interactionist approach raises certain types of questions for this thesis, for 
example, how does social interaction in courts influence the operation of discretion and 
decision making; what are the respective roles and goals of agencies and individuals in 
the system; and, how is interaction between them organised?
However, whilst the approach illuminates the importance of the rules of face-to-face 
interaction, within a coercive environment such as the criminal justice system an 
exploration of power dynamics must also be included in the analytic framework. 
Consequently, the other literatures discussed here are used to supplement this
 ^There are, o f course, manifold typifications employed in the justice system around cues such as race, 
class, age, nationality, etc. This thesis, however, primarily focuses on the experience and treatment of 
women in the remand system.
52
perspective. Models and discretion illustrate that there are decision making rules which 
are not created, though may be influenced by, the social dynamics of a particular court. 
For example, the outcomes of every courtroom, no matter what its culture, are affected 
by the structure of legal rules.
Gender
As discussed above, analysis of remand decisions must take account of the nature of 
interaction in individual courts, but must also locate decision outcomes in broader social 
and organisational structures. This study explores how the wider social dynamics and 
structures of gender are manifested in court and, consequently, how they affect decision 
outcomes.
It is important to first note that any analysis which prioritises one element of social 
identity is in danger of overlooking or obscuring other important elements e.g. race, 
class, nationality. Moreover, it is problematic to talk about ‘women’ in the remand 
system as if they constituted a cohesive group. The social inequalities that arise from 
gender are bisected, compounded, and ameliorated by other aspects of individuals’ 
social identities and the social and economic resources that they can draw upon. 
Research on sentencing has recorded variations between and within different women’s 
experiences and treatment (Hedderman and Gelsthorpe 1997). It is fully acknowledged 
that this thesis is, to a degree, limited by its failure to explore many of these 
complexities in relation to decision making in the remand system.
Whilst the research focuses on women, the wider concern is with decision making; the 
findings on, for example, the decision making environment (power dynamics, 
constraints, regulatory mechanisms, resource shortages, etc), may have relevance to any 
individual or social group being processed by the system. Many of the same issues, 
structural constraints, working practices, etc. will arise whether the defendant is male or 
female. Although many of the findings in this thesis on the remand system may be 
generalisable, caution should still be exercised before applying conclusions reached 
from studying female defendants to other social groups. For example, although there are 
shortages of information with both male and female defendants, magistrates may 
respond to this problem differentially. It is possible that, because women are
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comparatively scarce in the remand system, magistrates would be inclined to make 
individualised rather than routinised decisions and so seek more information about 
female defendants and/or use different cues to reach decisions.
Although there are debates about the role feminism has to play in criminology 
(Heidensohn 1997) and tensions between the different ‘feminist criminologies’ 
(Gelsthorpe 1997), it is still possible to identify certain questions that recur in feminist 
perspectives on crime, criminal justice and criminology. These are briefly discussed 
below in relation to their relevance to this thesis; far more comprehensive summaries 
are available elsewhere (e.g. see (Gelsthorpe 1997; Heidensohn 1997; Heidensohn and 
Silvestri 1995)).
The Invisibility Of Women
One of the main feminist critiques of mainstream criminology has been the invisibility
of women. This relates both to the absence of a consideration of gender in
criminological theories until the late twentieth century (Heidensohn 1968), and to the
[EJpistemological and methodological project which has focused on the 
need to recognize forms of knowledge based on experience, and the need to 
use research methods sensitive to the task of eliciting an understanding of 
women’s experiences. (Gelsthorpe 1997:511,original emphasis).
Much has been done to remedy the first of these concerns. There is a great deal more 
research into women and crime and it is now accepted that general criminological 
theories must account for women’s historically and cross-culturally lower rate of 
offending (e.g. see (Braithwaite 1989)). There is, however, little research on women in 
the remand system. The gender-specific work that has been done has been very small 
scale (Eaton 1987), or has focused on women’s experiences of behind held on custodial 
remand (Casale 1989). This thesis attempts to address that gap in our knowledge and 
provide information about women’s treatment in a system which can define their 
treatment in later stages of the criminal justice process. It was also intended that this 
thesis would be an opportunity for us to understand women’s perspectives on, and 
experiences of, the remand system through hearing their own voices and exploring the 
choices that they make. However, as will be discussed in Chapter Three, it was difficult 
to secure access to women at risk of custodial remand and thus, regrettably, there are 
limitations on the extent to which their views inform this analysis.
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Are Women Treated Differently By The Criminal Justice System?
This is a much discussed question that is usually framed in terms of whether women are 
treated more ‘leniently’ than men. The question is rephrased here because the evidence 
to date demonstrates the leniency debate is dated. The apparently more lenient treatment 
of women by the criminal justice system has been explained by the ‘chivalry thesis’. In 
a review of the research data on this, Heidensohn (1995) summarised the evidence.
Ten years ago it was not possible to give a firm and unequivocal answer to 
queries about ‘chivalry’: about how fair to women the criminal justice 
system was. The answers, a decade later, must remain equivocal and 
qualified. Now, this is not because of a lack of evidence -  there are 
numerous studies -  but because there has been increased recognition of the 
complexities involved in making comparisons and also since the results of 
all the studies rarely give firm clear answers. (Heidensohn and Silvestri 
1995:207).
Daly (1994) found little evidence of chivalry or, in her terms, “paternalism”. Neither
was there much support for the evil woman thesis that officials will react 
more punitively when women not only deviate from expectable female 
conformity by committing a crime but when they commit a male-typed 
offense... My research in this court and two others... leads me to suggest 
that the paternalism and evil woman concepts should be laid to rest. These 
concepts first appeared as claims without empirical support... No one has 
yet shown their explanatory merit. (Daly 1994:196-197).
Comparative work illustrates that we cannot meaningfully compare women’s treatment 
in the criminal justice system en masse to men’s; different groups of men and women 
are treated differently depending on a range of other variables such as race, class, 
offence type, etc. (Hedderman and Hough 1994; Kellough and Wortley 2002). This is 
not to say that gender is unimportant to an understanding of criminal justice processing, 
but that a more productive approach is to adopt more subtle and discerning analyses of 
the way that it influences decision making. This approach will be elaborated in the 
section ‘Conceptualising and constructing women in the justice system’.
A further point to note is the difficulty of comparing women’s treatment to men’s 
because of the differences in patterns of offending. Research on this issue has often 
centred on comparative analyses of large data sets which attempt to control for the 
fundamental differences between men and women’s typical offending patterns: women 
commit less crime, and less serious offences, than men; women’s criminal careers are 
shorter; and women have different pathways in and out of crime (e.g. see (Daly 1994; 
Gelsthorpe 2004; Gelsthorpe and Morris 2002; Hedderman and Gelsthorpe 1997;
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Hedderman and Hough 1994)). This research is not comparative but the nature, 
prevalence and persistence of female offending are relevant to the remand decisions to 
the degree that magistrates and others may consider them when deciding whether or not 
to withhold bail.
Why Do Women Commit Less Crime?
Given that this thesis is about the women who have already entered the criminal justice 
system, discussions of why women are consistently reported to commit fewer crimes 
than men are largely tangential. The more pertinent questions address the processing of 
those women who have entered the remand system (see below). There remain some 
questions about gender dynamics in the criminalisation of certain behaviours but these 
are not discussed here as the primary and obvious example of this, prostitution, is 
excluded from this study as no women are remanded in custody for this offence -  
although it is still possible for them to be imprisoned for secondary offences such as 
breaching an anti-social behaviour order (ASBO) prohibiting the defendant from 
loitering for the purposes of prostitution in certain areas.
Theories about why women commit less crime do have some relevance given that they 
may inform how magistrates, and other key decision makers, conceptualise women and 
how they choose to respond to women in remand hearings. These issues are discussed 
below.
Conceptualising And Constructing Women In The Justice System
As discussed above, one of the central concerns of this thesis is the ways in which 
women are conceptualised and constructed in the remand system. Women have been 
observed to be understood and responded to by criminal justice personnel according to 
dominant social narratives of female domesticity and sexuality (Allen 1987a; Allen 
1987b; Daly 1994; Eaton 1984; Eaton 1987; Worrall 1990). Whilst many of the issues 
relating to this question overlap with discussions of ‘leniency’ in criminal justice 
processing, they should not be conflated. Most obviously, although demonstrations of 
domesticity may encourage ‘chivalrous’ responses, they may also result in women 
being ‘uptarriffed’ because magistrates are unwilling to fine a woman in case her 
children suffer economic privations (Hedderman and Gelsthorpe 1997). Therefore, this 
thesis addresses both the issues of a) how women are conceptualised in the remand 
system, and b) the consequences of the ways in which women are conceptualised.
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This summary of women and crime, criminology and criminal justice has just touched
the surface of a rich body of literature. It has illustrated that gender should be one of the
central organising principles in criminal justice research as women’s entry into,
treatment by, and experience of the criminal justice system are all influenced by gender.
There is, however, a danger of polarising the experience of men and women too much.
The focus on women may highlight certain issues.
It is possible that when gender disparities in sentencing are a research focus, 
family is suddenly more visible. ((Daly 1989) reproduced in (Lacey 
1994:238)).
but
[SJtudies with a presumptive male as the defendant also reveal a family- 
based logic...court officials... confi*ont a dilemma of justice when men and 
women who have responsibilities for the care or economic welfare of others 
are convicted of crime. ((Daly 1989) reproduced in (Lacey 1994:238)).
Whilst this research is organised around the treatment and experience of women in the 
remand system, it is possible that some results may also contribute to debates about 
men’s experiences of, and treatment by, the remand system.
Conclusion
The findings from previous research studies indicate the issues to be explored in this 
exploration of the remand system. One of the most important themes is the extent to 
which remand decisions are based on offence- and offending-related factors, such as 
offence seriousness and previous convictions, and/or on defendants’ personal 
characteristics, such as age, race and gender. Whilst this research focuses on exploring 
gender considerations in remand decisions, it also addresses the broader question of the 
balance between offence and personal characteristics in reaching remand decisions.
The second broad theme in remand research to date highlights the importance of the 
environment in which decisions are made. Consequently, this research aims to explore 
the ways in which the social and the organisational contexts influence remand 
processing and outcomes.
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In order to explore these issues and the relationship between them, the theoretical 
framework discussed above has been constructed from a range of perspectives on the 
criminal justice system, court dynamics and the operation of discretion in decision 
making. This thesis seeks to locate remand decision making in a network of individual, 
organisational, and societal influences. Although the organisation of material and the 
terminology employed vary, the principles of this framework are drawn from Hawkins’ 
(2002; 2003) ‘naturalistic’ analysis of decision making.
[Ijdenfiying the formal locus of discretion is best seen as a preliminary, if 
the task is to understand actual decision practices, and what shapes them.
One way of thinking about legal decision making seeks to get away from 
approaches which focus on ‘criteria’ or ‘factors’ said to have been taken into 
account in making a particular choice. The argument, instead, is that 
decisions can only be understood by reference to their broad environment, 
particular context, and interpretive practices: their surrounds, fields and 
frames ... On this view, criminal justice decisions are made in the broader 
setting of a surround and within a context, or field, defined by legal and 
organizational mandates. Such decisions are made in a rich and complex 
environment, which acts as the setting for the play of shifting currents of 
broad political and economic values and forces. Decision frames, the 
interpretative and classificatory devices operating in particular instances, are 
shaped by both surround and field. To understand the nature of criminal 
justice decision making better, a connection needs to be forged between 
forces in the decision-making environment, and the interpretive processes 
that individuals engage in when deciding a particular case. (Hawkins 
2003:188-189).
The range of perspectives explored is necessary as they each contribute to an integrated 
understanding of how remand decisions are produced. Whilst symbolic interactionism is 
an appropriate approach to explore the nature, organisation and experience of social 
interaction in the courtroom, it is less appropriate to an understanding of power 
dynamics and wider social and organisational forces. Discretion literature also 
illustrates the value of interpretive sociology to an understanding of how and why legal 
powers are used as they are, but, additionally, it focuses attention on the legal 
framework and how this can shape the exercise of discretion. Models of the justice 
system are used to explore relationship between legal, organisational and socio-political 
aims and ideologies, and courts’ working practices. Finally, remand decision making is 
located within the wider societal dynamics of gender, aiming to explore how they are 
manifested, and acted upon, in the remand system.
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In combination, these various perspectives inform the practical and analytic frameworks 
of this thesis. In accepting the inevitability of discretionary practices, and in exploring 
the interaction between a variety of influences on remand decision making (including 
the legal and regulatory environment, socio-political and systemic constraints, and 
professional and organisational cultures), the thesis does, indeed, aim to “understand 
actual decision-making practices, and what shapes them” (Hawkins 2003:189).
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Chapter Three
Methodology
This chapter describes the research process. It begins with an explanation of why the 
methodological approach was selected and locates this within the theoretical issues 
raised in the previous chapter. Following this is an outline of such practical 
considerations as access problems and selection of the research sites. Details of the 
individual research methods used are then described along with relevant issues that 
arose during the fieldwork. Finally, matters concerning analysis of the data are briefly 
outlined.
Introduction
The choice of methods reflects the theoretical concerns of the thesis outlined in the 
previous chapter. In sum, this thesis understands remand outcomes to be the product of 
interaction between a range of actors, only partially described and constrained by the 
legal framework of the Bail Act and its amendments.
[L]aw is treated, not as a formal structure of more or less unproblematic 
rules, but as a constantly shifting, negotiated, emergent matter, a system of 
meanings, constantly evolving, and constantly dependent on social context. 
(Hawkins 2002:viii).
In order to understand how remand decisions are produced, we need first to understand 
the frames within which the actors operate i.e. to ask the question “what is going on 
here?” (Goffinan 1975). What are the meanings of remand and the classifications 
through which bail hearings are interpreted and decisions made?
There are important and interesting research issues including the use of bail conditions 
or rates of offending and absconding whilst on bail, but this thesis focuses on decision 
making concerning women who were defined as being ‘at risk’ of receiving a custodial 
remand. Thus, this study was not concerned with routine remand hearings, the vast 
majority of which result in bail. The research explores the decision-making process and
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outcomes in remand hearings where the defendant was at risk of a custodial remand. Of 
the 63 casesstud ied , 47 were disputed hearings where the CPS objected to bail and the 
defence representative made a bail application. In the remaining 16 cases, the defence 
representative did not make a bail application and the woman was remanded in custody. 
It is argued in this thesis that there is significjmt x 4ldationJn the processing of different 
types of cases. Consequently the results presented in this thesis should not be applied to 
the bulk of remand cases without caution.
Police decisions to hold a woman on overnight custody were used as a proxy indicator 
that a woman was at risk of a custodial remand; this was how cases were selected for 
court observation. It was reasoned that the police would not release a woman if they 
wanted the court to remand her in custody. However, it was not a foolproof indicator as 
holding a woman on overnight custody did not necessarily mean the police wanted the 
courts to remand her in custody. For example, many women on loitering charges were 
held overnight by the police to ensure that they attended court and paid their fines, but 
there was no likelihood that they would be remanded in custody for loitering charges. 
Of the women who were genuinely at risk of custodial remand, of particular interest 
were the ‘contested’ and the ‘cusp’ cases. Contested cases are those where the CPS 
oppose bail and defence representatives make a bail application in response. Not all of 
the ‘at risk’ cases were contested as some women chose not to make bail applications 
for a variety of reasons explored in later chapters. Cusp cases are those specific 
contested cases where a defendant is on the borderline between bail and a remand in 
custody. Not all contested cases are cusp cases, for example if  the offence is serious 
then, although bail may be applied for, in all probability the defendant will be remanded 
in custody regardless of factors raised in the bail application (see Chapter Five).
There were two reasons for focusing on women at risk of a custodial remand. Firstly, 
the research originated in my curiosity as to why the number and proportions of women 
remanded in custody (both before and after trial) was increasing relative to the 
sentenced population. In order to explore possible court-based reasons for this trend, it 
was necessary to look at cases where the use of custody was considered.
The number o f cases differs from the number o f hearings (103) as some women made more than one 
bail application. This distinction is maintained throughout the text.
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Secondly, by selecting ‘at risk’ cases, I would, by default, be observing all contested 
cases and cusp cases. As Patton (1990:169-81) argues, one strategy for choosing a 
sample of cases that will illuminate the field of study is through purposively selecting 
extreme or deviant cases rather than using random sampling. The overwhelming 
majority of remand hearings result in bail being granted. Although there are questions 
on the appropriateness of bail conditions (Hucklesby 1994a), there is no dispute that 
bail will be granted. Studies on remand have consistently found that more information is 
advanced in contested cases than in cases where there is a consensual view on how to 
proceed (Bottomley 1970; East and Doherty 1984; Hucklesby 1994b; King 1971). 
Previous work has tended to focus on all remand decisions, not just contested cases. 
Dhami (2003) claims a model with 95 per cent predictive accuracy. However, Dhami 
acknowledges that this “fast and fhigal” model of decision making can not predict 
whether bail will be conditional or unconditional. As bail conditions become more 
onerous (e.g. the proposed use of electronic monitoring for bailees), it becomes even 
more important to understand how and why conditions are applied. Although, as 
Chapter Five argues, most bail decisions are made on a limited number of criteria, 
supporting Dhami’s (2003) model, it is clear that ‘cusp cases’ (those on the borderline 
between bail and custodial remand) cannot be predicted using such a mechanistic 
approach. Through observing and analysing cases where difficult decisions have to be 
made, the logic and functioning of the remand system is disclosed.
It is not possible to understand the complexities of the remand decision through the use 
of quantitative methodologies. Quantitative and qualitative methods can usefully he 
combined (Robson 1993) to build understandings of the remand system. However, 
without first establishing the meanings that decisions have for actors, such an approach 
fails to illuminate the field. Hucklesby (1994b) uses some qualitative analysis to 
supplement her quantitative findings. When looking at the statistical evidence of 
differential remand rates between courts, she acknowledges that “these findings provide 
very little insight into the remand process” (Hucklesby 1994b: 191).
Decision making must first be located in, and understood with reference to, the contexts 
within which it takes place. For example, custodial remands can only be accounted for 
in terms of the official criteria for withholding bail contained in the Bail Act. Regardless 
of the actual purpose of a custodial remand, actors are procedurally obliged to classify 
their decisions in terms of a few pre-defined options. As will be explored in later
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chapters, the reasons magistrates remand defendants in custody are not limited to those 
contained in the Bail Act. Analysis of statistical data on the use of the various 
exceptions to the right to bail tells us not about why women are remanded in custody 
but about the official ex post facto accounts of why they are in prison.
Research Sites
Data collection was reasonably unproblematic. Fieldwork was completed in a little over 
one year. Approximately six months was spent doing court observations in each 
District. A police contact in the boroughs would phone me each morning to tell me if 
any stations had held any women on overnight custody and give me the name, charge 
and where relevant which of the borough’s courts she was appearing at that morning. I 
would then cycle to the appropriate court where I observed the hearings, taking full 
notes on everything that was said and done. Depending on the outcome, I would attend 
any subsequent court appearances. I had intended to trace women through to sentence 
but that proved impossible in most cases. The majority of women were either sentenced 
after I had left the borough, failed to attend court, or were sent to the crown court which 
I could not cover in addition to the magistrates courts.
Court observations were undertaken in three City districts, hereafter referred to as 
Central District (courts: Castleford Road and Connorton Road), Inner District (court: 
Inswick Comer), and Outer District (courts: Old Market Street and Orrington Street). 
The names indicate the location of the Districts within the city. The selection of 
Districts was partly influenced by the practical consideration of their proximity to my 
base as I would often have only half an hour between receiving a phone call from the 
police, alerting me to a case, and the courts opening. Districts were also selected 
because their various populations reflected a number of issues that may have impacted 
on remand decision making and are evident in major cities in England and Wales e.g. 
race, nationality, age, social class, transitory populations, local policing priorities etc. 
However, given the small number of hearings that were observed, it proved impossible 
to explore many of these issues in a systematic and comparative way due to the absence 
of enough matched pairs of cases. (Daly 1994).
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After the first three months at Central District, I began observations in Inner District. 
After six months I withdrew from Central District and started in Outer District. In the 
final three months, when I was only observing in Outer District, I conducted the 
majority of the interviews. When cases in different courts and/or boroughs clashed, I 
prioritised which case to attend based on a) whether it was a first appearance or was a 
second or subsequent hearing (every effort was made to follow each stage of cases in 
order to see how information flowed); and on b) the nature of the offence (e.g. some 
Districts held women on loitering charges overnight and I did not follow these cases as 
they never resulted in a custodial remand). Ideally I would have only been in one at a 
time but that would simply have taken too long.
It is important to note that these courts are all located within a large city. Not only is 
there evidence that rural and urban magistrates’ courts have different patterns of 
sentencing (Bottomley 1970), but City courts, being busier, were often presided over by 
district judges and had to contend with some specific problems as well as the generic 
issues which face most magistrates’ courts. For example, all the courts studied had to 
cope with very busy remand court lists, routinely required translator services, and other 
issues, such as the movement of staff between courts -  the importance of which become 
evident in later chapters.
So, there are questions as to the extent to which findings from this research have 
generalisability (Flick 1998) and can be applied to remand processing in other courts 
and with other groups of defendants. Undoubtedly, the research was embedded within 
the environments in which it took place and this does caution against wider application 
of its findings. Most obviously, the focus was on female defendants and, in terms of 
understanding the female custodial remand population, there is one major shortcoming 
with this research: the absence of observations of cases involving foreign national 
females on custodial remand for drugs importation. As a precursor to the fieldwork, I 
visited a prison that held female remand prisoners. I met a number of foreign nationals 
on custodial remand and would have liked to include their issues in this research but 
practicalities prevented it. The exclusion of such cases was partly a practical 
consideration given the courts through which the majority of these defendants are 
processed (i.e. those near the major airports) were too far away to travel to at short 
notice. Additionally, foreign national women on drug charges present some very 
specific issues which would not be found in the ‘typical’ custodial remands that were
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the focus of this study. It may be useful to explore the processing of foreign nationals in 
light of the findings from this research.
The generalisability of this research may be limited to some degree by its grounding in 
three City districts and its focus on female defendants. It is important to be cognisant of 
the boundaries of the research and not apply its results indiscriminately to all 
magistrates’ courts or to all defendants.
Although much of the book is an exploration of routine activity directed by 
the insider’s recipe knowledge of how to conduct trials in any court, it does 
not pretend to generalize or compare far beyond what happened in a single 
court in a little under one year. (Rock 1993:6) (original emphasis).
However, this research was not intended to be an ethnographic study of the type Rock 
undertook; indeed, it would be difficult to do justice to such an approach in five 
separate courts within one year. The comparative element was a foundation of the 
research design and, although the limited numbers of cases prevented meaningful 
comparisons on many issues, themes in the processing and outcomes in all courts were 
sought and identified. The inclusion of five courts in three districts ensures that whilst 
the idiosyncrasies of courts were identifiable, the commonalities of the remand process 
demonstrated in each court was also evident; multiple courts were included in the 
research design for this very reason.
Access And Consent
Initially, it was also hoped that observations could take place in police custody suites to 
explore every stage of the remand process from police decision-making onwards. 
Although City Police were very helpful on other matters, they were unwilling to 
facilitate this element of the fieldwork because of the problems of disclosure of 
evidence. There were fears that if I was observing and questioning custody sergeants 
and arresting officers on bail decisions in “live” cases, I could potentially be called as a 
witness in those cases. Senior officers presented this in terms of protecting both myself 
and their officers. Although previous observational research has been successfully 
undertaken in police stations before (Reiner 2000b), it was evident that senior officers 
would not easily relent on this issue and so it was not pursued for fear of disrupting
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discussions on the essential police role of alerting me when relevant women appeared in 
court.
Notwithstanding the regrettable absence of data on police decision-making in the 
research^ \  officers in the City Police Service were essential to efficient use of 
researcher time and targeted data collection. It was agreed centrally that an officer in 
each district in turn would notify me each morning if an adult female had been held on 
overnight custody at any station in the district and was due to appear at court. The 
defendant’s name, age, ethnic origin, offence and the court they were appearing at 
(where the district contained more than one court) were supplied. This intelligence 
proved invaluable as it enabled me to follow (almost) all cases of women at risk of 
custodial remand in a district during the observation period. It also prevented me fi*om 
having to spend wasted days sitting in courts as female defendants were rare and those 
at risk of a custodial remand proved rarer still.
This system worked well, on the whole, in the three districts. The primary problem with 
access was not that City Police were unwilling to cooperate*^ but that the need to 
engage each level of police hierarchy, and the necessity of allowing time for orders to 
filter through the layers of bureaucracy, proved more time consuming than had been 
anticipated. Once secured, though, police cooperation could only be faulted by the gaps 
in provision of documents (see below) which were consequent on trying to fit my 
requests for information into the sheer volume of work my contacts were already 
undertaking.
The morning telephone call firom officers in the three boroughs, informing me whether 
or not any women had been held on overnight custody, was the foundation of this 
research. It allowed me to attend the relevant court and follow the progress of the case. 
Without this cooperation, the fieldwork would have been far more time consuming and
As was argued earlier, remand outcomes must be conceived of as the product o f a series of decision­
making stages. The police decision has crucial significance as, it has been argued, it frames the progress 
of the case (e.g. see Hucklesby, 1994b). It was intended that police decision-making would be studied in- 
depth; indeed, the absence o f such close analysis was argued as a weakness o f all previous remand 
research in the initial ESRC proposal. However, as discussed, access was problematic and, it became 
evident at later stages, the practicalities o f undertaking fieldwork in a series o f courts was ambitious 
enough for a single researcher without trying to include police observations too.
Thanks to Dr Janet Foster’s contacts and personal recommendation, securing initial access to senior 
members o f  City Police research team was unproblematic. Following a number o f meetings with the team 
and their senior officers they agreed to support the research. Their cooperation guaranteed that authorised 
access would be granted by senior officers in the individual districts.
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fewer courts and cases would have been covered as it would not have been possible to 
monitor two courts, let alone two districts, at the same time.
The names of the courts and the districts in which the research was conducted have been 
changed to protect the individuals who agreed to be interviewed; some would be easily 
identifiable if the court were known. A letter describing the research was circulated to 
magistrates and court staff by the Chief Clerks of the courts, and individuals 
subsequently volunteered for interview (discussed below). All interviewees’ anonymity 
was guaranteed and a record of their informed consent was secured by the consent slip I 
requested they sign and return to me. No interviewee objected to the interview being 
tape recorded.
The consent of the women whose cases I observed was not sought. Firstly, the women 
would have been difficult to trace as I rarely had knowledge of their home addresses or 
they were in custody. Secondly, the information on them which features in this study 
was all collected from observing their public appearances in court. As will be seen 
below, the supply of the remand forms (the ‘MGs’) from the police was erratic and they 
rarely contained any information which was not disclosed in open court. It was felt that 
as the information on the defendants was in the public domain, it was not necessary to 
secure individual women’s consent.
Research Methods
A combination of different sources of data was necessitated in this thesis by the nature 
of the issues being explored. Case vignettes were constructed to elicit information about 
magistrates’ decision-making processes. Magistrates were asked to verbalise their 
decision-making, allowing the author to compare the relative importance of issues in 
different types of cases. Such analysis of observation data would be impossible as 
magistrates never gave detailed public accounts of how and why they reached their 
decisions. As Hucklesby notes, observations do not necessarily allow the researcher to 
reach an understanding of the relative importance of pieces of information to 
magistrates,
[MJagistrates themselves only had the same information available to them as
the researcher had. However, simply because the information is available to
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the court does not necessarily mean that it played a part in the magistrates’ 
decision. (Hucklesby 1994b: 196).
Conversely, when exploring the purposes of remand and defence representatives’ 
techniques, court observations were the most appropriate source of data. The 
observations allowed me to identify and analyse issues that occurred in real cases, and 
include the roles played by other court actors (not least, the defendant herself). 
Vignettes or interview data could obviously not supply such information as they are 
accounts of what individuals think they do, rather than records of what individuals in a 
group setting actually do. As McBamet (1981) argues, decisions are actually made on 
different criteria to those evident in the rhetoric of legal judgements and accounts: “The 
rhetoric lives on in the statute but is routinely negated in the courts by judicial 
reasoning” (McBamet 1981:160). Moreover, with vignettes and in interview, 
magistrates responded to an artificial situation, unlike the genuine situations that 
occurred in courts. The combination of observation, interview and case vignettes was 
considered to be the approach to data collection which would most comprehensively 
capture the issues of interest in this thesis. This methodological triangulation (Robson 
1993:66-72) also maximised the data’s validity; although each stage of data collection 
was designed to target specific issues, they all explored overlapping themes and the 
findings from the various approaches did all resonate with each other.
Documentary Sources
The police alerted me when women had been held on overnight custody which enabled 
me to attend and observe their court hearing. The police were also supposed to give me 
copies of the paperwork prepared on these women. The two most relevant forms were 
known as the MG5 and the MG7. The MG5 was the police summary of the offence. The 
MG7 was meant to be filled out when defendants were held on overnight custody and it 
contained a record of police reasons for withholding bail and their objections, if any^ ,^ 
to court bail being granted. This form was for CPS reference only and was not available 
to the defence representatives. Most of the form was a series of tick-boxes but one 
section was anticipated to be of particular interest: the section where the police could
In many cases police refused bail but were content for court bail to be granted. This happened, for 
exanç)le, when the defendant could not safely be released late at night because they were incapacitated 
through alcohol or drugs. In Inner District, the police had a policy o f holding prostitutes overnight to 
ensure their attendance at court but, as they were invariably released on “time served” or with a fine by 
the magistrates, this overnight remand was clearly not an indicator o f being at risk o f a longer term 
custodial remand.
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write comments substantiating their recommendation that court bail should be refused. 
Although some of these forms did contain useful information, they were erratically 
supplied to me because of the pressure of work my contacts were under. Unfortunately, 
as they were not routinely available to me, I was unable to incorporate them into the 
research in a systematic way and instead used them as a supplementary data source to 
check information such as a defendant’s date of birth or the precise wording of the 
charge. A study of the content and impact of the MG7 form would be a very interesting 
project as this is the primary form of communication between the police and the CPS on 
bail issues and it may elucidate decision making rationale at the first stage of the 
remand process.
Court Observations
The number and outcome of observed cases are listed in Table 3,1, Table 3.2 contains 
the remand outcomes in pre- and post-conviction hearings. In agreement with 
Hucklesby’s (1994b) analysis, pre- and post-conviction remands are discussed together 
throughout this thesis. The legislative framework is the same for both groups (where 
convicted unsentenced offenders were remanded for reports) and magistrates expressed 
a strong reluctance to use custody prior to sentence regardless of the stage in 
proceedings. Where relevant, the data from the two groups are discussed separately.
Table 3.1: Outcomes In Observed Cases
Hearing Outcome Number Of Hearings
Remand in custody 55
Conditional bail 36
Sentenced 7
Failed to attend 3
Unconditional bail 1
Case discontinued 1
TOTAL 103
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Table 3.2: Remand Outcomes In Pre- And Post-Conviction Hearings
Hearing Outcome Pre-conviction Post-conviction
Remand in custody 37 18
Conditional bail 21 15
Unconditional bail - 1
Total hearings (where a remand 
decision was given)
58 34
Table 3.3 contains the offence types of all the observed cases. As can be seen from 
Table 3.3, the offences the women at risk of a custodial remand were charged with 
ranged from very serious offences (e.g. arson) through to shoplifting. Although it 
broadly reflects the general pattern of female offending (i.e. largely non-violent 
property offences, (e.g. see (Burman 2004; Daly 1994; Hedderman 2004; Hedderman 
and Gelsthorpe 1997; Home Office 2003a)), there were a number of serious offences 
(e.g. robbery, domestic burglary, arson). This is unsurprising given that the women were 
selected because they were at risk of custodial remand. What is more notable is that 
nearly half the women at risk of a custodial remand in this research were charged with 
offences that were not serious: either comparatively low-value thefts (22 women) or 
low-value deception (seven women). The rationale behind remand decisions for 
offences of varying seriousness are explored in Chapter Five.
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Table 3.3: Offence Types In Observed Cases
Primary Charge Number Of Women Charged
Theft from a shop 12
Deception (credit/debit cards) 7
Robbery 7
Burglary 6
Theft of a handbag 4
ABH 2
Arson 2
Handling stolen goods 2
Living off immoral earnings 2
Possession of an offensive weapon 2
Possession with intent to supply Class A drug 2
Theft (unspecified) 2
Wanted on warrant 2
Allowing self to be carried in a stolen vehicle 1
Assault on police 1
Breach of an anti-social behaviour order 1
Criminal damage 1
Going eguipped to steal 1
Possession of a firearm 1
Racial harassment 1
Theft by distraction 1
Theft from employer 1
Theft by finding 1
Theft from person 1
Unknown 1
TOTAL 64
Cases were observed and verbatim notes were taken on everything that was said and 
done during the course of remand hearings, along with observations on actors’ 
demeanour and other events that were taking place on the periphery of the actual 
hearing. Previous studies (Hucklesby 1994b; King 1971) have collected and organised 
data given verbally in court proceedings under a series of categories e.g. offence type, 
employment status, residence status, etc. and recorded the amount of information 
provided about each. However, the view was taken that proceedings should be recorded 
verbatim and categorised later as part of the analysis. By recording information in pre­
defined categories, the ‘script’ of the proceedings is lost. For example, cases were 
observed where magistrates interrupted defence representatives, telling them that bail 
would not be granted. If the hearing had been recorded under categories, the hearing 
record would show ‘no additional information provided’ without this being 
contextualised by the crucial point that the magistrates circumvented procedure and 
prevented information being supplied. Additionally, without a verbatim record, the
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moral tone of the hearing is lost. For example, child care responsibilities were 
mentioned in numerous cases but occasionally they would be afforded greater 
significance (e.g. in one case it was argued the defendant needed to be granted bail so 
she could attend a custody hearing for her children). Observations were not limited to 
the specific cases I followed: notes were also made on the general nature of the court 
and its staff, and on activities and conversations both inside and outside courtrooms.
As I wanted to observe the systemic nature of the remand process, a decision was taken 
not to try and form a prior affiliation with any particular participating group but to 
observe decision making from a ‘peripheral membership role’ (Adler and Adler 
1987:36-49) separate from all participants. Adopting this role meant that I did not 
participate in any activities that defined groups’ membership and this, inevitably, 
impacted on the nature of information available to me. For example, although I did not 
risk alienating any one group through a strong affiliation with other groups, I was not a 
privileged member of any group and this would have limited their degree of trust in me 
and levels of disclosure. Despite this, I did acquire a degree of insider status and was 
accepted by almost all court actors. For example, although the majority did not know 
who I was or why I was there, I was allowed to enter restricted, semi-private courtroom 
space and sit in the ‘home territory’ reserved for the courts’ ‘miscellaneous users’ (Rock 
1993) without challenge.
[R]eserved spaces [were] marked by visible and invisible frontiers and 
stringently policed by ushers and clerks.. .Court staff were concerned always 
about people out of place, and the ushers and court clerks, whose territory 
the courtroom was, would eye and question all those who seemed to be 
acting improperly or whose identity was infirm. (Rock 1993:234-235).
I had no agreed access to the semi-private spaces in courtrooms and initial access to this 
part of the courtroom was secured early in the fieldwork stage when a list-caller at 
Connorton Road mistook me for a lawyer doing articles. He beckoned me from the 
public gallery and told me he would let me sit in the courtroom itself if I was interested 
in a particular case. I did not try to explain I was a researcher as the court was sitting 
and I did not want to risk disrupting the hearing. When he was replaced by another list 
caller some minutes later, the second official did not question my presence. I remained 
there without being questioned all afternoon. Following this, I decided it might be 
possible to go unchallenged in other courts too so I entered the restricted part of the 
courtroom in Castleford Road when I next had a hearing there. The list caller there
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looked puzzled when I sat down but I just smiled confidently and nodded at him. He did 
not have a chance to challenge me because the district judge entered the court at that 
moment. The list caller did not question me later and, the next time I entered the 
courtroom, he acknowledged me with a nod then continued with his responsibilities.
I observed the public obediently filtering into the public galleries rather than cross the 
real and symbolic boundaries that segregated the courtroom. Other court users were 
witnessed being removed from these seats and asked to sit in the appropriate position in 
court. My assumption is that my acceptance as an insider was consequent on the way 
that I managed my behaviour in the field and on the particular nature of magistrates’ 
courtrooms as a research site.
The confident way that I located myself physically in areas of the courtrooms that were 
reserved for ‘insiders’ signalled my acceptability to the court. Few knew my actual role 
even though I made no effort to conceal my researcher status. I had written to all the 
Chief Clerks about the research and happily discussed it when asked, but I was rarely 
asked. If they did ever wonder about my role, most court actors filled in the gaps 
themselves rather than asking me for information. On one of my last days at Inswick 
Comer, the security staff told me that they had been taking bets on what my actual role 
was. The options included policewoman, probation officer, trainee magistrate, reporter 
and trainee lawyer. In the year that I spent in courts I was only challenged once about 
my right to sit in restricted areas -  it appears that I did not look “out of place”.
Perhaps one reason why I was not challenged and clusters (see below) formed 
regardless of my presence was the acceptability that was afforded by the identity card 
the police had issued me. Initially I displayed it prominently, hanging it around my neck 
and holding it up whenever I asked for information or I came through the security 
checks. After a while, I became self-conscious of it as I felt it marked me as an outsider, 
albeit an officially sanctioned one. I experimented with having the chain visible but 
concealing the card under my clothes. Knowing that I could produce the card if 
challenged afforded me a confidence which was probably reflected in my manner; I had 
a purpose to fulfil and a right to be there. Court actors responded to that and treated me 
accordingly. However, there was still always an ambiguity about my role. When in 
public areas of courthouses, I repeatedly experienced defendants looking at me, taking 
steps towards me then veering off and asking someone else for information. They
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seemed to identify me as someone official but could not quite place my role. Security 
guards, with whom I quickly began to exchange morning pleasantries, waved me 
through security checks; my bag, like those of permanent staff and the more familiar 
peripatetic defence representatives, was routinely left unsearched. Occasionally new 
staff would begin to check my bag but older staff would intervene and usher me 
through.
The fact that court actors voluntarily and spontaneously legitimised me and my 
presence without explanation from me was evident by this absence of challenge or 
suspicion. This was exemplified by the actions of one security guard at Inswick Comer. 
On one occasion when he was allowing me to jump the queue and bypass the security 
check, he commented on the ID card which was, as usual, obscured by my clothing, 
saying “What is that card, anyway? It could be your bus pass for all I know.” I took this 
as a challenge for me to establish my identity but, before I could display the card, he 
turned away to deal with the next person in the queue. Despite the ambiguity about my 
role and identity, I was, nonetheless, accepted.
When magistrates or district judges retired, the court was brought together in the 
common purpose of waiting. During such periods, the court would subtly re-orientate 
itself away from a focus on the magistrate to a more inclusive formation. CPS officers 
would typically move to one side to form a “cluster” that included the clerk in front of 
them and the defence representatives sitting immediately behind them. Defence 
representatives sitting further back would often move to the front of the court to define 
themselves as part of this group. A cluster is formed by people with a common purpose 
or identity; it is
a set of persons physically close together and facially orientated to one
another, their backs towards those who are not participants (Goffrnan
1963:100).
Within these clusters, participants sometimes engaged in indiscreet exchanges of 
information. With the magistrate and defendant removed (defendants in custody were 
taken back to the cells when magistrates retired), it was possible for them to become the 
topic of conversation. Often these conversations were innocuous but, at times, I 
overheard personal and professional criticisms of magistrates and privileged details of 
defendants’ cases and lives. I learned which magistrates were respected and which were
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the subject of mockery, which magistrates liked a “liquid lunch” and which retired 
unnecessarily because they wanted a cigarette. I learned defendants’ offending records, 
their histories of abuse, their domestic situations, and their alleged guilt despite their 
professed innocence. I was repeatedly surprised that actors engaged in these 
conversations when I was, in plain view, listening and making notes. They appeared to 
regard me as an unthreatening satellite to their clusters - 1 was of the group but not in it.
Participants may have been less wary than many who have been the subject of 
observation by an ambiguous other in previous research projects because they were not 
themselves the law breakers and their work was not low-visibility (Hunt 1984). 
Magistrates’ courts have a high throughput of people, especially in remand hearings, so 
solid in-groups and out-groups are less likely to be formed. This may promote tolerance 
of strangers who can signal their acceptability through dress and behavioural cues etc. It 
may also be that the actors considered the courtroom their “home territory” (Rock 1993) 
once the magistrates had left.
A home territory was a piece of ‘defensible space’ marked off from the rest 
by physical or token boundaries... To be in a home territory was to be away 
from strangers and with one’s own. (Rock 1993:210).
The adequacy of a private space turned on its privacy, freedom and safety. A 
good home territory was sealed against unwelcome intrusion. It was not 
incursions fi*om other professionals which were feared: they posed little 
threat to freedom or confidentiality. It was insiders, not the public, who 
came to the CPS room, for instance, and they were defined as innocuous.
(Rock 1993:211).
Although the courtroom (in the absence of the magistrates and defendant) did not 
constitute a “good” home territory because members of the public were still present in 
the public gallery, it did operate as a home territory nonetheless because the public 
were, in most of the courts, in a physically separate gallery that was screened off. The 
public could see what was happening in court and could hear anything said in a 
commanding tone of voice (e.g. when defendants were called to the dock), but 
conversational tones could rarely be heard in the public galleries. It was unquestionably 
a professionals’ territory.
My insider (if ambiguous) status enabled me to sit unchallenged in an area of the court 
where I could hear all routine court interactions without difficulty and was privy to the
75
indiscrete conversations which actors felt able to have in clusters in their home territory 
when magistrates and defendants had left the arena.
Semi-structured Interviews
The range of personnel interviewed is listed in Table 3.4. Although I was somewhat 
limited by who chose to respond, an attempt was made to incorporate some basic socio­
demographic factors into the magistrates I selected for interview from those who 
responded to my request for interview. I tried to get a balance of male and female 
magistrates, a range of experience, and, with limited success, respondents from all the 
courts.
Table 3.4: Interviewees
FEMALE MALE TOTAL
Lay magistrates 12 12 24
Clerks 1 3 4
CPS officers 2 3 5
Defence representatives 1 3 4
Women on bail 4 - 4
Total 20 21 41
The Chief Clerk in Central District refused to circulate my letter requesting an interview 
to magistrates. I was told that the District’s courts were busy and could not 
accommodate all those interested in researching them. Although I knew individual 
Central District magistrates, who had expressed an willingness to participate in the 
research, they felt unable to do so without the sanction of their Chief Clerk. This was 
unfortunate as it meant Central District magistrates were not among those interviewed.
The Chief Clerks in Inner and Outer District were supportive of the research and 
distributed my letter requesting interviews to their benches. The Clerk in Outer District 
actively promoted the research by twice circulating the letter in magistrates’ mail. All 
respondents were self-selected as they had to volunteer to participate. This is clearly a 
weakness of the research but it is believed that the range of magistrates that did 
participate was not as narrow as it could have been; a number of magistrates declared 
they were “not the type” (male magistrate) to normally volunteer for interviews but had 
done so because of their Clerk’s encouragement. One magistrate told me that she would
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not have cooperated with the research if the Clerk had not lent it his seal of approval 
and made it “sort of official, sanctioned” (female magistrate).
In fact, the response rate was so good from Inner and Outer Districts that I was able to 
select an equal number of men and women and, towards the end, turned down a number 
of magistrates because I did not have time to undertake and transcribe any more 
interviews. As with all research, providence played its part in the number of interviews I 
secured: eight of the interviewees said they were encouraged to participate because they 
had either been to the university I attend themselves or their children had been or were 
students there. I had a series of encounters where I first had to respond to names, dates 
and photographs that interviewees offered me, seeking to find further common ground 
before the interviews could actually begin.
It is very regrettable that no district judges were prepared to be interviewed; the bulk of 
the observed cases were presided over by district judges but there was no opportunity to 
explore remand processing with them in interview. The other professionals were either 
approached directly or via letter from the court Chief Clerks. Again, the range of 
interviewees was entirely dependent on who volunteered.
Contact was made with a female only Home Office bail and probation hostel in the city 
with the intention of recruiting some women on bail for interview. These women were 
approached as substitutes for the women who appeared in the observed remand 
hearings. As the women in all the observed cases had been held on overnight custody, 
they were always returned to the courts’ cells after a hearing for processing, whether or 
not they had been remanded in custody. This meant it was very difficult to access the 
women in observed cases to see if  they were willing to participate in an interview. It 
was reasoned that women who had been bailed to a hostel were likely to have been at 
risk of a custodial remand, the target group for this research, because of insecure 
housing, support needs, substance misuse, etc.
The women in the female only bail hostel were all offered £5 to participate in an 
interview on their experiences of the bail system. It was made clear, at the request of the 
hostel management, that the money would be given to their keyworker and not directly 
to the women. Unfortunately (and significantly, see Chapter Four), the bail and 
probation hostel had very few bail residents and the majority of the beds were taken by
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women on CROs or on licence. Despite repeated visits to the hostel over a period of 
some weeks, only four women on bail took part in the research.
Interview schedules (see Appendix Two) were constructed for all interviewees except 
the women in the bail hostel (I felt a less formal, conversational approach would be 
more appropriate) and, in the main, were followed although not always in sequence. In 
most cases all the set questions were asked but other topics were pursued if respondents 
raised them. Questions were formulated after time had been spent in all three Districts 
so the emerging data could inform further data collection (see below. Data Analysis). 
With the exception of the women on bail, many of the same themes, and some of the 
same questions, were explored with all the professionals interviewed although the 
phrasing and content of questions were adapted to reflect their professional 
responsibilities and perspectives. The questions were organised thematically using the 
‘natural conversation’ technique (Gilliham 2000) to encourage interviewees to engage.
A number of options were given to respondents and most chose to be interviewed in 
their own homes. This maximised confidentiality as it eliminated the possibility of 
colleagues overhearing or interrupting the interview, and it minimised inconvenience to 
the interviewees, many of whom were very busy. Where interviews were conducted in 
courthouses, I requested that they booked a room so we would not be disturbed. 
Interviews typically lasted for one and a half hours; with magistrates, the first half hour, 
approximately, was taken up with the case vignettes.
For magistrates, the case vignette exercise preceded the interview questions. This order 
was followed for two reasons. Firstly, I did not want magistrates to be sensitised to the 
issues explored in the interview when they took part in the case vignette decision­
making exercise. Secondly, the vignettes allowed me to establish my own level of 
expertise and experience without being threatening. I appeared knowledgeable about the 
practicalities of court-based decision making and the range of issues that magistrates 
had to take into account, but also communicated that I was unaware of the details of 
their decision-making processes. Magistrates repeatedly made such comments as “well, 
you know how it is in court” and “you obviously know that....”
I also engaged in a number of informal discussions, or ‘ethnographic interviews’ (Flick 
1998), with some court actors and the police contacts in each District. Casual
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conversations in the field took place with some CPS officers, defence representatives, 
list callers, and clerks. Defendants and magistrates were the only groups that I could not 
engage with in this way because they occupied territories to which I had no access. It 
was not possible to talk to magistrates about specific cases in court as they retired to 
private areas to which I had no access and most of the defendants were either taken back 
into custody or returned to the cells in order to be processed for release. With separate 
entrances and territories, our paths did not cross.
Case Vignettes^"^
Case vignettes usually consist of a short story about hypothetical characters in particular 
situations and respondents are questioned, typically on what they think should happen 
next. Case vignettes can be employed in decision-making research in a number of ways. 
A great deal of work has been done using case vignettes as the basis of, or as adjuncts 
to, statistical analysis (Alexander and Becker 1978; Finch 1987; Martin, et al. 1991). 
This approach tends to use an experimental design where individual variables are 
manipulated to test their significance. Contextualised case vignettes are an under-used 
methodology and can contribute significantly to real-world understanding of decision­
making. These vignettes supply supplementary information rather than simply a few 
‘key’ facts. In this study, for example, the vignettes indicated whether the information 
source was a defence representatives or the CPS. Previous users of case vignettes in 
remand decision-making studies have argued that one or two key variables can account 
for remand decision outcomes (Dhami 2001). It is argued here that such methodologies 
are flawed because the vignettes focused on legal variables (such as offence seriousness 
and offending history) alone. Consequently they failed to incorporate contextual and 
extra-legal factors which, the thesis found, were central to the ways in which actors’ 
understood and subsequently resolved contested cases. The use of contextualised case 
vignettes to supplement court observations can provide invaluable insights into the 
understandings and intentions of decision makers: elements of decision-making that are 
impossible to capture through observations or interviews alone.
In this research, case vignettes were not used to test the relative importance of specific 
pieces of information as measured by decision outcomes i.e. they were not designed to 
measure how/if risk of a custodial remand varies proportionately with housing status.
Copies o f the full case vignettes are contained in Appendix Three.
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employment status, offence type, number of antecedents, etc. Magistrates’ decision 
making is situationally dependent (e.g. time pressure will alter the number of cues 
magistrates use to make decisions (Dhami 2003) ) and the information that magistrates 
receive in court is inevitably subject to dispute in contested cases. Asking respondents 
to make judgements based on a summary of the agreed ‘facts’ of the case can only 
produce artificial outcomes that do not reflect the reality of court-based decisions. 
Moreover, a distinction has been drawn between substantive and procedural consensus. 
Finch and Mason (1991) found whilst there was a consensus about the factors that were 
selected by respondents to be important, this did not necessarily result in agreement 
about what should be done i.e. decision making on kinship obligations was considered 
to be based on a general set of principles rather than specific and concrete rules.
The vignettes were used to explore the general principles of decision making rather than 
any specific rules which might be attached to key pieces of information. The 
construction of the vignettes was not random but was informed by issues that arose 
from earlier stages in the research: they were designed to explore the specific hypothesis 
that magistrates’ approaches to decision making varied with the characteristics of the 
case and, accordingly, the same pieces or types of information would be used or 
weighted differently. Case vignettes were designed to elicit responses which would 
elucidate an observed relationship between the nature and seriousness of the offence and 
magistrates’ approach to bail hearings. The categories and the text of the vignettes 
themselves emerged from observation data and their validity is confirmed by the fact 
that the themes apparent in the case vignettes were all evident in the observed cases. 
Nothing arose from vignette decision-making which did not tally with observed 
courtroom decision making. Each vignette was conducted with 24 lay magistrates from 
Inner District and Outer District. Magistrates were asked to verbalise their decision­
making, allowing the author to compare the relative importance of issues in different 
types of cases. Such analysis of observation data would be impossible as magistrates 
never gave detailed public accounts of how and why they reached their decisions.
As it is argued that decision making must be understood in context, the vignettes were 
constructed to be as ‘real’ as possible. Firstly, they were composite cases made up of 
various cases which had been observed over a period of some months. Secondly, the 
information was presented to the magistrates in the same format as they would receive it 
in court. I read out the information, informing magistrates what role I was playing at
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any one time, and the magistrates were given pen and paper to make notes on the case if 
they desired. Vignettes began with the details which would appear on the court list or 
would be announced by the clerk at the beginning of the hearing (e.g. age, gender, 
offence type, stage in the remand process). Next, as the CPS officer, I would read out 
why bail was objected to. Lastly, as the defence representative, I would read out the 
defence response to the CPS and make a case for bail. Magistrates would then be asked 
to make a bail decision based on what they had heard and explain their reasoning to me.
The one criticism of the vignettes that magistrates repeated was that it was hard to make 
a decision without seeing a defendant.
[The] crucial difference between an artificial exercise and what actually 
happens is that you see the defendant and that can be critical (male 
magistrate).
What’s interesting is that when you think about what we’re doing in court, 
how influenced are we by the, of course we shouldn’t be, by the demeanour 
and manner of the people in the court (male magistrate).
Notwithstanding this problem (the importance of demeanour is discussed in Chapter 
Six), the ‘realness’ of the vignettes was evidenced by the responses of magistrates who 
found the vignettes convincing and appeared to genuinely engage with the cases and the 
women because they ‘recognised’ them.
They’re very believable, I sort of recognised one of them, I think, are they 
fi*om actual cases? (male magistrate).
Oh, they feel real, yes! That BHS one, I feel I’ve heard it a dozen times 
(female magistrate).
I’ve tried to be honest with you about how I feel with these women. I’ve 
tried to respond just how I would when I see these kinds of cases in court 
(male magistrate).
I’m worried about her, very worried about what will happen if she doesn’t 
get help soon. It’s a sad, familiar story (female magistrate).
The vignettes’ construction and delivery was made as real as possible in order to try and 
promote responses that were close to court-based decision making. As Alexander and 
Becker (1978) argued, people often are not very insightful about the issues involved in 
the decision-making process. Consequently, asking direct questions about the relative
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importance of key pieces of data would not access the rich decision-making processes 
that responses to more complex and grounded vignettes deliver.
Data Analysis
Observation, interview and vignette data were all analysed using the qualitative analysis 
package ‘QSR N6’. In keeping with the nature of qualitative research, data analysis was 
undertaken as an on-going process in order for subsequent data collection methods to be 
informed by earlier findings. Court observations were carried out for approximately 
nine months before interviewing began (a period which allowed me to experience 
remand hearings in all three courts). During this time the observation data was 
periodically organised into broad themes. These themes, and the particular issues that 
arose from observations which were in need of clarification, were then used to construct 
the case vignettes and interview schedules for the second stage of data collection. This 
data, in turn, was transcribed, entered into QSR N6, and coded thematically. In the final 
stage, further and more abstract links between the data sources emerged from analysis 
of the material.
Conclusion
This chapter has detailed the choice and application of the research methods employed 
in this research. The selection of qualitative methods was embedded in the theoretical 
framework of the thesis. Using a number of qualitative techniques in combination 
ensured results from each individual source were confirmed (triangulation) and also 
enabled me to augment data that could not be fully captured by using one method alone. 
Allowing one stage of data collection to inform later stages, and using the different 
methods sequentially, facilitated more in-depth analysis of specific themes which 
emerged from the data.
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Chapter Four_____________ ___________
structural Constraints on the Rem and Decision
This chapter explores how remand decision making is structured by the socio-political, 
organisational and formal regulatory contexts in which it takes place. It argues that these 
influences contribute to the ideas in the decision-making environment about what is 
possible and what is desirable in remand decisions. It draws on data from court 
observations, interviews, and on the work of other authors to document how these three 
contexts affect day-to-day decision making. The three contexts are distinct and are 
presented separately for the purposes of analysis but, in reality, they are highly 
interrelated. Thus, the categories are somewhat artificial and I support Hucklesby’s 
argument that “levels...interact and often become blurred when issues of practice are 
tackled” (Hucklesby 1994b: 108).
Introduction
Remand decision making takes place within a number of different environments or 
contexts. As Hucklesby (Hucklesby 1994b: 108), for example, argues, analysis of the 
remand system must be located in an appreciation of the influences of the criminal 
justice process specifically, and in the wider political and economic environment more 
generally. This chapter presents some of the contextual influences on remand; some are 
recurring issues in the criminal justice system, but others are peculiar to the remand 
system. Firstly, selected socio-political influences are presented and their impact 
explored. Secondly, some of the particular characteristics of the remand system are 
described along with illustrations of how they affect the decision making process and 
remand outcomes. Lastly, the formal regulatory procedures are described (interpersonal 
interaction also served to regulate decision making and this is explored in detail in 
Chapters Seven and Eight). It is argued that, taken in conjunction, these three contexts 
all contribute to participants’ ideas of what is possible and what is desirable in the 
remand system. These ideas, in turn, filter how individual cases are processed and 
resolved.
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Following Hawkins’ model, what is understood here as the socio-political context can 
be described as the “surround”, and the organisational and regulatory contexts as 
“fields” (Hawkins 2002). Although the terminology may differ, the importance of 
locating decision making in its wider contexts is a common theme in interpretive 
analyses of decision making. As Hawkins argues.
Legal decisions, like other kinds of decision, are made not in a vacuum, but 
in a broader context of demands and expectations arising from the 
environment in which the decision-maker lives and works. An explanation 
of decision-making behaviour therefore requires attention to the social, 
political, and organizational context in which decisions are taken. All of 
these create pressure for action or inaction or conspire to make a particular 
decision outcome seem more or less rational in a particular matter....In 
other words, the variety of outcomes possible need to be located in the 
context of the social forces at play in the decision process. (Hawkins 
2002:31).
The discussion of all three different influences in this chapter is necessitated by the 
shortage of space. Each could be a topic of study in its own right and the combination of 
the three here may seem somewhat arbitrary. However, in order to understand how and 
why individual remand decisions are produced, the central concern of this thesis, it is 
necessary to first establish the ways in which the system’s actors, processes, and 
outcomes are constrained, or otherwise, by the environments within which they are 
located.
Socio-Political Context
This discussion is necessarily limited to how the socio-political context influences the 
remand system but many of these issues are played out in similar ways at other stages of 
the criminal justice process. The following is not intended to represent the complete 
range of socio-political influences on remand, and on criminal justice decision making 
more widely, as such a project was beyond the scope and focus of this research. 
However, as interviewees themselves repeatedly referred to socio-political influences on 
decision making, the following section has been included to provide a brief indication 
of their concerns about the nature and impact of some elements of the socio-political 
context.
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Central Government Policy
In this research, the most obvious and immediate influence central government had over 
remand decision making was seen in legislative changes and recommendations. Simon 
and Weatheritt (1974) argue that legislative changes may not have as significant an 
impact on remand decisions as they may appear. They looked at decision making in 
magistrates’ court before and after the introduction of the Criminal Justice Act 1967; 
one aspect of this Act was intended to discourage custodial remands. They argued that 
the reduction in the use of custodial remand following the implementation of the Act 
was due not to the legislative changes but was a consequence of the more general 
pattern in the reduced use of custody that was evident in sentencing. Hucklesby (1994) 
argues there is a closer relationship between central government policy and remand 
outcomes. She detailed the relationship between changes in remand law and practice, 
and the central government imperative to reduce spending:
[T]he impetus behind many of the legal changes to the remand system has 
been to reduce the prison population which culminated in the presumption 
of bail which was introduced by the Bail Act 1976. Although some of this 
impetus for reducing the prison population was for humanitarian reasons, 
these were coupled with a need to reduce public expenditure. This is a goal 
which has become increasingly important since 1979 and has arguably 
become the major vehicle for change, not only in the remand process but in 
the criminal justice process as a whole. (Hucklesby 1994b:99).
During the course of this research, the Lord Chief Justice Woolf issued advice to 
magistrates and judges that custody should not be used for first time burglars. This 
directive was spontaneously raised by interviewees as an example of how specific 
recommendations from central government had a direct impact on decision making 
practice. Court observations also revealed it to have a direct and immediate impact on 
remand proceedings.
Example 4.1
A man in his early twenties appeared before a mixed^^ lay bench in Orrington Street 
charged with domestic burglary. The Lord Chief Justice had issued his advice to not use 
custody for first time burglars the previous week. The defence representative rested his 
bail application primarily on this advice and repeatedly pointed out that the defendant 
should be released “according to the Lord Chief Justice’s advice.” The magistrates
Throughout this thesis, a ‘mixed bench’ refers to one made up o f male and female lay magistrates, and 
‘male’ and ‘female’ benches indicate single sex lay panels. Although magistrates’ visible ethnicity was 
recorded in observations, it has not been reported in examples as this thesis is not able to discuss 
questions o f race and ethnicity (see Chapter Three). All district judges observed were white, as were the 
large majority o f lay magistrates.
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appeared reluctant to release the man on bail as he had a substantial record of offending 
-  though not for domestic burglary. Unsure of whether he fitted the Lord Chief Justice’s 
criteria due to his previous record, they asked the clerk for his advice. The clerk 
admitted he did not know how to interpret the recommendation and asked the 
magistrates to rise whilst he phoned a senior colleague for advice. Whilst the 
magistrates were out of the courtroom, the defence representative told the court that he 
did not think they should release his client on bail but felt that the Lord Chief Justice 
had provided him with a very strong basis for a bail application. He then related the 
details of a similar case when he had represented a first time burglar at Inner District a 
few days earlier. The defence representative said “if he’d appeared the week before [the 
Lord Chief Justice’s advice], he would have been in custody, no question. But he bailed 
him. Bad decision, I thought.” The clerk, CPS officer and other defence representatives 
in the court all discussed the recommendation and all who expressed an opinion felt it 
was poor advice. “But, they [lay magistrates] will take it on board. I’m going to have a 
hard time arguing against it, for a while at least” (male CPS officer). The defendant was 
released.
Thus, it appears that very specific recommendations fi’om the centre did resonate in 
courtroom decisions as magistrates sought to respond to them and integrate them into 
everyday practice. The present study found that magistrates and others struggled with 
how to react to the contradictory messages that emanated from the centre. Following the 
Lord Chief Justice’s recommendation, the Home Secretary, David Blunkett, pointedly 
distanced himself from the advice to give bail to first time burglars and sought to 
reaffirm the government’s ‘tough’ credentials on criminal justice matters. One 
magistrate succinctly expressed his reaction.
I think in lots of ways contradictory messages are being sent out. I don’t 
think anyone understands what’s going on as far as burglary is concerned 
(male magistrate).
Magistrates’ finstration with inconsistencies in public pronouncements, and their 
struggle to find ways to respond to the conflicting messages, have also been found in 
relation to sentencing (Hough, et al. 2003:53-57).
This political discourse and others, such as the moral panic (Cohen 2002) in the 1990s 
on “bail bandits” offending on bail, illustrate the increasingly tough stance on the use of 
bail that has emanated from central government. Since the Bail Act, there has been a 
gradual shift in the main purpose of bail from ensuring attendance to prevention of 
offences on bail (Corre and Wolchover 1999). The clear principles of décarcération that 
were contained in the Bail Act have been diluted, resulting in the current confused 
picture of what the aims of the remand system are.
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Fm not sure what bail is for any longer. I would have said x years ago that 
what it was about was décarcération and it was about the rights of 
individuals not to be locked away if they were charged with an offence.
Now Fm not so sure I could say what it’s about, but it’s not about that any 
longer. I don’t think you’d find many people arguing that viewpoint now. 
(Stephen Stanley, Intelligence Officer in the former Inner London Probation 
Service. Personal communication 26.04.01)
Central government could also influence proceedings in other, less specific, ways. Some 
of those professionals who regularly sat in court referred to the long-term effects of 
government targets. Two clerks commented in interview on the pressure of time felt in 
remand courts and attributed this, in part, to the pervasive target-driven atmosphere 
fostered by government intervention in the management of courts.
I think we’ve all been conscious in the last four or five years of an attempt 
to speed up the process. The Narey courts, clearly an attempt to get people 
in the system, get a plea taken quickly, and indeed sentenced if we can do it 
that quickly as well (male clerk).
The Media And Public Opinion
The relationship between the media and/or public opinion and decision making in 
remand decisions has been explored in previous studies (Hucklesby 1994b; Prison 
Reform Trust 2004). This research also found that an awareness of media and public 
opinion impacted on remand processing and outcomes. Three CPS lawyers expressed 
concerns about the personal and professional implications of making remand 
recommendations. One CPS officer had coined the phrase “the Evening [Paper] test” to 
sum up his fears about what the press would say if  he recommended bail for a serious 
offender who then reoffended whilst on bail. Many remand decisions were fairly clear- 
cut (see Chapter Five) but most criminal justice personnel agreed that there were 
occasional cases where “brave” decisions should rightfully be made, A CPS officer 
admitted that she was sometimes over-cautious when making recommendations because 
she feared what would happen to her if  the papers published the story. She preferred to 
leave these “difficult decisions” up to the magistrates and protect herself by 
recommending a custodial remand. Evidently, in some cases, anxiety about possible 
media reactions to remand decisions directly impacted on the recommendations that 
CPS officers made.
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Magistrates commented on the media much less than the CPS officers but were aware 
that they operated in a public arena, commenting on ‘public opinion’ instead. Hucklesby 
(1994b) also found that public opinion was an important factor in magistrates’ decision 
making. When she asked her respondents whether they believed magistrates’ decisions 
were affected by public feeling about an offence, 38 per cent said they thought 
magistrates’ decisions were substantially affected, 43 per cent thought decisions were 
sometimes affected, and only 19 per cent said public opinion had little, if any, affect on 
magistrates’ decisions. All magistrates in this study said they would not let possible 
public reactions affect remand decisions as they felt the public was not necessarily 
sufficiently informed to understand the issues. The view that the public were 
uninformed reflects recent findings on sentencing (Hough, et al. 2003:54).
We’re there to balance the defendant’s rights with the public interest. The 
thing is sometimes it might be hard for people to see why we made a 
decision, in serious cases, say. They read it in [local paper] and must wonder 
what we’re up to! But we’ve got a responsibility to the facts that we hear in 
the court. They aren’t always fully reported, (male magistrate)
Although the majority of magistrates in this study said they would not let public opinion 
affect their remand decisions, three did admit that with one particular offence, domestic 
burglary, they found it difficult not to take public opinion into account. Domestic 
burglary was perceived to be most people’s “number one priority” (female magistrate) 
and was a very emotive offence.
Domestic burglary, that’s the one people really worry about, are really afraid 
of. That’s in my mind, I suppose I feel a particular responsibility for that 
one. There’s nothing worse than having someone break into your home, is 
there? (female magistrate)
It is interesting that these magistrates did not cite sexual or violent offences as being 
difficult. Perhaps this reflects the fact that few defendants charged with such offences 
made bail applications in magistrates’ courts and instead saved their first application for 
the crown court (see Chapter Seven). Consequently, magistrates very rarely had to 
struggle with possible public reaction with these types of offences. The singling out of 
domestic burglary might also have reflected the fact that decisions in burglary cases had 
a raised public profile at the time of the research resulting from the Lord Chief Justice’s 
guidance on not using custody for first-time burglars.
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Summary
Participants in the system reported feeling that central government messages were 
sometimes contradictory but it appeared that they did attempt to respond to them in 
routine court proceedings. Over a period of time, legislative changes altered views on 
what the remand system was for and should aim to achieve. Participants’ concern about 
public and media reactions could have an immediate impact on their remand decisions.
Organisational Context
The particular characteristics of the remand system affected how cases were processed. 
The defining feature of the key organisational influences on remand was that of 
shortage: shortage of time, information, and resources. Although this section focuses on 
the specifics of the remand system, these issues may have some relevance to analysis of 
the criminal justice system more generally. However, it is argued that they are 
manifested in particular ways in the remand system and the same pressures may not 
have an impact in the same way in different parts of the system. For example, whilst the 
pressure to prevent delay and use court time efficiently is evident throughout the 
criminal justice process, it is most immediately, and therefore most acutely, felt at the 
remand stage because, for example, there are often a large number of cases to process 
within a very limited time firame: 10.00am to 1.00pm. Clock watching and fiiistration 
with time wasting were evident in all the courts as participants worked towards the 
collective goal of completing court business by lunchtime to prevent them having to 
return to the court in the afternoon.
Time/Delays
The lack of time spent on each remand hearing has been commented on in previous 
remand research. For example. Zander (1979) found that 47 per cent of remand hearings 
were dealt with in under two minutes, and Doherty and East (1985) found that 62 per 
cent of hearings were dealt with in less than two minutes and 90 per cent in less than ten 
minutes. In contrast, the present study found only 54% of cases were resolved in less 
than ten minutes and 46% took ten minutes or longer (up to 25 minutes in one case) to 
complete (see Table 4.1). This is unsurprising as the majority of the cases included in 
the present study were contested cases.
89
16Table 4.1: Duration Of All Hearings
(excluding those with co-defendants and/or where interpreters were required)
No application made 
and defendant 
remanded in custody 
(n=19)
Application made 
and defendant 
remanded in custody 
(n=23)
Application made 
and defendant 
conditionally bailed 
(n=27)
Mean duration of 
hearing 6 minutes 11 minutes 10 minutes
Hearings taking 0-4 
minutes 26% 0% 3%
Hearings taking 5-9 
minutes 58% 31% 49%
Hearings taking IQ- 
14 minutes 16% 43% 33%
Hearings taking 15+ 
minutes 0% 26% 15%
It has been argued that the rapidity of remand decision making originates in a
cooperative court culture which promotes a camaraderie resulting in non-adversarial
remand hearings (Brink and Stone 1988; Doherty and East 1985; Hucklesby 1996).
However, this research found little evidence to support the claim that hearings were
truncated because of a cooperative camaraderie (‘court culture’ is discussed in Chapter
Eight), The brevity of remand hearings is instead explained firstly in terms of
organisational pressures on court actors.
[T]he implicit feeling of time pressure and the subsequent speed with which 
magistrates make the remand decisions may affect their decision making 
strategies (Dhami 2001:38).
Secondly, short hearings indicate minimal information was presented to the court. It has 
been argued the short duration of most remand hearings reflected the limited 
information which was provided (Brown, et al. 2004; Burrows, et al. 1994a; Doherty 
and East 1985; Hucklesby 1994b; Morgan and Henderson 1998; Zander 1979). A short 
remand hearing may indicate that limited information was presented but it does not 
mean, however, that limited information was available. This is most clearly seen by the 
fact that around one quarter of the uncontested cases which resulted in a remand in
Cases were timed from the moment a defendant entered the courtroom to the moment she left. In some 
cases defendants appeared on several occasions in one sitting as cases were put back for a variety o f  
reasons. In these cases, the duration of each appearance has been added to give a total for time spent in 
the courtroom. This does not include the time magistrates took in deliberations when they retired. All 
cases where there was a co-defendant or an interpreter was required have been excluded as these factors 
resulted in substantial but misleading increases in the duration o f the remand hearing.
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custody took less than four minutes to resolve. Clearly these very short hearings are a 
product of the fact that the remand in custody was not opposed by defence 
representatives. If the defendant had asked to make a bail application, more information 
would have been necessary and the mean duration would increase. This can be seen in 
contested cases that resulted in a remand in custody (the second column of Table 4.1): 
none of these cases took less than four minutes to resolve and one quarter took fifteen 
minutes or more to complete.
That the duration reflects, in part, the amount of information requested, rather than the 
amount available, is supported by a further interesting variation within the contested 
cases. Sixty nine per cent of the contested cases that resulted in the defendant being 
remanded in custody took ten minutes or more to resolve. In those contested cases 
where the defendant was released on conditional bail, only 48% took ten minutes or 
more to complete. Using observation data to interpret these figures, it is argued that 
court actors signal (using verbal and non-verbal cues) their remand intentions to each 
other and the amount of information supplied is adjusted accordingly. Thus, district 
judges were observed interrupting defence representatives in contested cases to tell 
them that bail would be granted and they should stop making their application and 
address themselves to the question of appropriate bail conditions.
It has been argued that time pressure can impact on the task of processing information 
in courtrooms (Shapland 1987) and that the brevity of remand hearings is a cause for 
concern (Bottomley 1970). In contested cases, there may be some unease that decisions 
are being made on inappropriate or ill-judged criteria if the duration of a hearing is 
short. However, in most cases, the brevity of a remand hearing should not be advanced 
as sole evidence of poor decision making. The present study suggests that the duration 
of a remand hearing is consequent on how much information is seen to be required for a 
decision to be reached; where more information or discussion is required, more time is 
available. This is clearly seen in the majority of cases where the CPS do not object to 
bail. Little time is required as there is no need for the court to hear detailed information 
when the right to bail is not being challenged.
Whilst the findings of this study caution against using the brevity of many hearings as 
evidence of hasty or hurried decision making, the pressure of time in the remand system 
was a recurring theme in court observations and in interviews. Whenever there was a
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lull in court proceedings, the district judge, lay magistrate or a clerk (only if sitting with 
a lay bench) would routinely ask the list caller to run through the morning’s list and 
update the court as to the readiness of each case. Given that all five courthouses were 
located in metropolitan districts which generated busy court lists, any lull in 
proceedings was not received as a welcome break but was endured with finstration as it 
meant delay rather than an absence of work. Particularly at Inner District, district judges 
would call defence representatives into the court, even if they were occupied taking 
instructions from their clients, to account for why they were not ready to appear. One 
district judge in particular was observed to say on more than one occasion “put out a 
tannoy, I will not wait all day” for the defence representatives to appear in court.
The time at which those defendants held on overnight custody (the group most likely to 
be the subject of a contested bail hearing at first appearance) arrived at court was 
determined by when they were collected from police stations’ cells and delivered to 
court by the security company. During the observation period, there were particular 
problems with this service which were the cause of much finstration to all court actors. 
For a period of some months it was unusual for overnight custody cases to arrive at 
court before 11.30am -  courts typically sat at 10.00am. This meant they did not appear 
in court until at least 12.00pm as their representatives first needed time to take 
instructions on how to proceed with the case. As this left only a relatively short period 
until the morning list was supposed to be completed, it did cause delays - especially if 
there were a large number of overnight custody cases. This caused particular problems 
for courts’ duty solicitors who provided legal advice to all those who did not have their 
own representative. Duty solicitors sometimes had to take instructions from and appear 
on behalf of multiple clients in a very limited period. Of course, if necessary, they could 
overrun and continue the case after lunch but all court professionals worked to the 
common goal of finishing the morning remand list by lunchtime if they could.
Of course we can ask for extra time if we need it. I actually had to do it the 
other day, asked the DJ to rise, and he did. But it’s not something you, it’s 
something you avoid if you can. Best to keep things moving, if it’s at all 
possible, unless you’re in real trouble, (male CPS)
When lay magistrates retired to make a remand decision, it was not uncommon for the 
remaining court actors to complain about the slow pace of a remand court with a lay 
bench and to regale each other with (possibly apocryphal) stories of lay benches taking
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inordinate amounts of time to reach ‘obvious’ decisions. On three occasions in two 
difference court houses, two CPS officers and one clerk were observed telling the rest of 
the court, after the bench had risen, that if the government was serious about reducing 
delays in court proceedings they should introduce legislation to ban the purchase of 
chocolate biscuits by courts to prevent lay magistrates rising just because they wanted a 
cup of tea and a nice biscuit.
District judges were preferred, by all legal professionals interviewed, for a variety of 
reasons, including their consistency and predictability, but most commonly because 
court business was conducted more quickly in remand courts with district j u d g e s a s  
they did not have to rise to discuss decisions with colleagues.
Lay magistrates were aware of the pressure to conclude cases succinctly. Five
magistrates, who admitted that they did not follow structured decision making^ 
accounted for this failure to engage strictly with the prescribed procedure by reference 
to time pressures.
[Structured decision making] means you’ve got to go out, it’s holding up
everything to go out so we do sometimes decide in court (female
magistrate).
This could have been the real reason they did not use structured decision making or they 
may simply have cited time pressure to justify their failure to follow correct procedure. 
Either way, it is illustrative of the fact that the pressure to conclude hearings quickly 
was of significance to court actors, particularly magistrates on whom the pace of the 
court business largely rested.
Time pressure did not appear to affect decisions directly; without privileged information 
it is impossible to say for certain, but it is believed that magistrates were never observed 
making hasty judgements or concluding cases prematurely for reasons of time 
constraints alone. On the contrary, there were occasions when magistrates asked that 
complicated cases be put back to ensure they were fully heard and not rushed. Six lay
All the clerks entered the caveat that whilst on balance they preferred district judges, working with a 
lay bench was more interesting for them as their duties then included the role o f legal advisor.
Structured decision (further discussed below) making is an approach employed in magistrates’ courts. It 
encourages magistrates to break decisions down into a series o f constituent and sequential parts, each 
stage determining the options for the next decision. It is intended to encourage consistency in the use o f  
discretionary powers and to counter stereotyped assumptions affecting judgements.
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magistrates admitted in interview to being self-conscious at the amount of time they 
took to reach decisions but defended this on the grounds that they were taking their 
responsibilities seriously.
It is contended that whilst the pressure to resolve cases quickly was not sufficient to 
foster injudicious decisions, it did contribute to a common expectation that cases should 
be processed without delay and this may have fostered working practices which 
discouraged all options, in some cases on busy days, being explored as fully as they 
could have been. The fact that the pressure of time was keenly felt by at least some 
magistrates was evident in observed court interaction.
Example 4.2
In Connorton Road, a male district judge was sitting in a remand court and business 
appeared to be proceeding as normal. Without warning, mid-way through a hearing, the 
district judge announced to the court that he was not going to rush decisions any more 
and he would return to his normal pace of work. He said, “I know some amongst you 
will feel I work a little too slowly, but I am concerned not to rush these decisions.” It 
was very unusual for a district judge to address the court in such a manner but in the 
overheard conversations in the court’s canteen (where defence, defendants and 
miscellaneous people were separated from prosecutors and witnesses by an obviously 
post hoc partition [on design of courts and the separation of space, see (Rock 1993) ] at 
lunchtime there appeared to be more comment on the fact that it was a district judge (i.e. 
not ‘just’ a lay panel) who found the pace of work untenable.
Example 4.3
A  mixed lay panel was sitting at Inswick Comer. The morning list was busy but not 
unusually so. At 12.40pm the chairman announced to the court that the panel was going 
to rise for lunch early because they were feeling “pressurised” by the court’s 
proceedings and needed to retire to collect their thoughts. When they had left, the CPS 
officer and the defence representatives in the court expressed their bemusement that the 
panel were not “up to the job.”
Perceptions of Available Information
The link between available time and available information was strong in the remand 
system. For example, given that defence representatives on overnight custody cases 
were restricted in the time they had to prepare bail applications, and there was limited 
court time available to hear and respond to issues in applications, it was anticipated that 
a lack of verified information would be a feature of the remand system. The absence of 
information in the remand system has been commented on in previous research (Brown,
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et al. 2004; Burrows 1994b; Doherty and East 1985; Hucklesby 1994b; Morgan and 
Henderson 1998; Zander 1979). Indeed, the perceived absence of sufficient information 
in remand hearings was one of the factors behind the Manhattan Bail Project in the USA 
and the emergence of bail information schemes in the UK. Citing the numbers of 
defendants who either offend on bail or are remanded in custody but receive non­
custodial sentences or are acquitted, Sanders (1997) asserts.
Clearly magistrates have inadequate information on which to make
confident decisions. (Sanders 1997:1077).
It is argued here that possible difficulties with the supply and flow of information in the 
remand system must actually be established in research. It is unsatisfactory to simply 
examine figures on the numbers of people remanded in custody who are not given 
custodial sentences, then conclude that the disjuncture between the two must have been 
caused by a lack of information. The processes involved and other possible reasons 
must be identified and explored before a conclusion about the relative role of 
information in these two separate decisions can be drawn. It will be established in an 
analysis of the vignettes in Chapter Five that magistrates will remand in custody even 
where there is a low risk of offending on bail, and will bail where there is a high risk, 
depending on offence seriousness. That a shoplifter offends on bail or an alleged 
murderer is remanded in custody but later acquitted should not be advanced as proof of 
inadequate information being available. The vignettes show magistrates will sometimes 
make decisions despite the evidence of bail risk, not because of it. It is a mistake to 
attribute cause (inadequate information) to outcome (acquittal, offence on bail, etc) 
when the magistrates’ purpose has not first been established.
It is not being suggested that access to reliable information was unproblematic. Bail 
information schemes did not operate in the courts studied and there were some cases 
observed where defendants were remanded in custody under the Bail Act exception that 
insufficient information was available to reach a decision or because key pieces of data 
were missing fi*om files.
Example 4.4
A 29 year old woman appeared at Inswick Comer charged with theft of a handbag. The 
CPS objected to bail on the grounds that she lived in a squat and she had failed to 
surrender in the past. The defence countered that she only had one fail to appear 
conviction on her record, was suffering fi-om depression and deep vein thrombosis, and
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in fact lived in a housing association flat, not a squat. The female district judge 
interrupted the bail application being made for her male co-defendant to ask if the 
woman’s address could be verified. The defence began to suggest contacting the 
housing association but the magistrate again interrupted and said
She will be remanded in custody as I have insufficient information to make a 
remand decision. I suggest you [the defence representative] check with 
probation to check on your client’s address as I see from her record that she is 
currently on a CRO.
Example 4.5
A 38 year old woman appeared at Old Market Street on a charge of breaching an anti­
social behaviour order (ASBO). The defence requested a week’s adjournment to appear 
against the length of the original order, which was eight years. The CPS stated
I don’t have the full file. I don’t have any details of previous history so I can’t 
make comments on bail except to point out that the order would have been made 
with her previous convictions in mind. The length of the order suggests an 
extensive history.
The defence representative said that the ASBO had been made because of loitering 
matters and it served to exclude her from the northern half of the city. He acknowledged 
the bench’s probable concerns but again pointed out that the original matter was 
loitering and the breach was entering a section of the city, there was no accusation that 
she had been loitering when arrested. The mixed lay bench remanded the defendant in 
custody for a week.
Example 4.6
A 24 year old woman appeared at Inswick Comer having been arrested on a warrant for 
failing to appear at court. She had been charged with theft of packages from the Royal 
Mail and the failure to appear dated back three years. The CPS stated that he had very 
few papers in court and did not know if she had antecedents but he believed she was 
unemployed and was of no fixed abode. The defence representative offered information 
on the failure to appear and details of a medical condition i.e. she was on a methadone 
script and had a blood clot. The male district judge stated that he did not have sufficient 
information to make a decision and remanded her in custody.
Evidently, on occasion the absence of information did cause problems for decision 
makers. However, it was generally felt by most of the professionals interviewed that 
between the CPS records, the court records and defence representations, there was 
sufficient information to make a bail decision. Hucklesby (1994b) also found that most 
of her respondents felt there was sufficient information available in most remand 
decisions for the court to make a reasoned judgement, especially by the time of the 
second or subsequent hearing.
More commonly, it was not the lack of information per se that caused difficulties but 
whether or not it had been verified. Sometimes magistrates were observed to accept
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defence representatives’ word on, for example, the suitability of a bail address, whilst at 
other times magistrates would challenge them to substantiate their assertions. The 
reasons for this are explored more fully in Chapter Eight. On those occasions when 
defence representatives were unable to provide the verification a magistrate asked for, 
defendants were at risk of being remanded in custody. This risk was heightened if time 
was short and magistrates wanted to resolve the case quickly. In the following example, 
the district judge could have remanded the defendant in custody on the grounds of 
insufficient information for her to reappear at court the next day. He decided, however, 
to remand in custody for one week.
Example 4.7
A 25 year old woman was appeared at Castleford Road charged with shoplifting. She 
had a very extensive record, had repeatedly offended on bail and appeared to be known 
by the district judge. Her defence representative told the court that her client was now 
attending a substance misuse programme and asked the district judge not to jeopardise 
the place by remanding her client in custody. The male district judge asked for details 
about her progress at the centre, commenting that he was sceptical about her 
commitment to rehabilitation. The defence representative was unable to answer the 
questions, so the case was put back for further enquiries to be made. When the case was 
recalled, the defence representative told the court that she had been unable to contact 
her client’s keyworker. Another staff member had confirmed the defendant was 
attending but could offer no further information. The defendant was remanded in 
custody because of a risk of offending on bail.
Magistrates’ decisions are based on the information that is presented in court. Thus, as 
Shapland (1987) has pointed out, their decisions are a product of what information other 
court actors choose to impart. Bail information schemes are intended to supply courts 
with information about defendants to facilitate remand decision making. Some studies 
have shown that supplying magistrates with additional information results in some 
defendants being diverted from custody (Lloyd 1992) but others have argued this is not 
the case (Dhami 2002). It has been argued that the success of bail information schemes 
lies in the fact that they present verified and independent data to the court. There is 
evidence from this (see Chapter Eight) and other studies (Hucklesby 1994b; Rumgay 
1998; Shapland 1981; Shapland 1987) to show that magistrates do not trust all sources 
of information equally: as it is the responsibility of defence representatives to secure 
bail for their clients, some magistrates observed that their mitigation should be taken 
with “a pinch of salt” (male magistrate).
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No bail information schemes were in operation for adults in the three Districts studied 
but analysis of the impact of verified information on decisions was attempted by 
comparing first and second bail applications where the defendant had initially been 
remanded in custody. It was presumed that during the week-long remand, defence 
representatives would have time to verify information, secure places at bail hostels, 
raise sureties, etc. which would improve the chances of the defendant being released on 
conditional bail. Contrary to expectations, few defendants appeared to be released 
because additional information was supplied and/or verified (see Chapter Six). It may 
be significant that the source of information was still defence representatives and not 
independent bail information schemes. However, the bail applications of those women 
who were released at second hearings were not distinguishable from their initial bail 
applications in terms of the amount of (verified) information they contained. The 
noticeable difference was in how the defendants were characterised and presented to the 
court (see Chapter Six for a discussion of how defence representatives constructed 
women as being ‘worthy’ of conditional bail).
It may be that attempts to furnish the court with additional information at second bail 
applications were less effective in observed cases than data fi'om bail information 
schemes would have predicted because all the defendants were women. As Dhami 
(2001) shows, accommodation is one of the key issues that bail schemes seek to provide 
the court with verified information on. However, as is explored below, housing was not 
typically a problem for women appearing in the courts studied. It is suggested here that 
bail information schemes might prove to be more effective in securing the release of 
male defendants because schemes are able to address the kinds of problems that more 
commonly affect men, thus overcoming court objections to bail. It would be useful to 
explore gender differentials in bail information schemes’ effectiveness.
The rushed and sometimes chaotic nature of the remand system suggests that it may be 
difficult to secure and/or circulate all the relevant information. Although multiple 
examples were observed during the course of the research where there were problems 
with information, if the information was considered important the case would typically 
be put back for facts to be gathered and/or checked. At times this was not possible 
because of the pressure of time and a decision would be made with inadequate 
information or the woman was remanded in custody whilst information was gathered. 
When asked, all interviewees considered sufficient information was usually available in
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court. Whilst, some magistrates and CPS officers did report cases where insufficient 
information was available to make confident decisions, they all argued that this was not 
usually caused by problems with the system itself (e.g. being too rushed or files being 
lost, though this certainly did happen) but was the unavoidable result of the remand 
hearing taking place early on in the criminal justice process: one female magistrate 
commented that “we’d like more info, it just isn’t there at that stage in many cases.”
It had been assumed that the observed conversations that defence representatives and 
CPS officers fitted in around court proceedings consisted of defence representatives 
requesting further information about CPS bail objections and/or bargaining with bail 
conditions. However, in interview all the CPS officers and defence representatives said 
the conversations were usually about how to progress the case and bail was rarely 
discussed. The universal view was that a lack of information was something that 
became more problematic as cases progressed.
The bail stage is relatively simple, it’s pretty much all there. There’s not 
much, if  anything, that exists which isn’t in court, I find. It’s when the case 
progresses, or doesn’t progress, that we have trouble. You’ll ask for full 
disclosure, be told you’ll have it by whatever date. You’ll get to the date and 
the CPS are there in court promising me, the bench, that we’ll have it by a 
new date (male defence representative).
There are potential improvements in information systems which could be usefully 
made. For example, bail information schemes may reduce the numbers held on 
custodial remand, and clerks and magistrates alike said up-to-date electronic 
information on previous convictions would be invaluable in court both for remand and 
sentencing. There clearly were some difficulties with securing and verifying 
information in the remand system but they should not be exaggerated. “The majority of 
remand decisions are no-brainers” (male clerk); outcomes were obvious and undisputed 
so only a cursory amount of information was necessary to proceedings. In contested 
cases, more information was required but it was usually made available. Problems 
occurred more commonly when magistrates did not accept defence representatives’ 
assertions without proof but there was too little time to get information verified. Very 
occasionally there was simply too little information available to make a reasoned 
decision, though this could be a result of magistrates being unable or unwilling to wait 
for information to be gathered and verified. The fact that initial remand decisions need
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to be made so early in the criminal justice process meant in some cases more 
information was desirable but simply was not yet available.
Perceptions of Available Resources
Previous research has shown that general criminal justice resourcing, both actual and 
perceived, may affect remand decision making. Hucklesby (1994b) found 23 per cent of 
respondents felt prison overcrowding substantially affected remand decisions and 29 per 
cent felt it affected the decision sometimes (Hucklesby 1994b:51). However, the still 
rising numbers of women in prison suggest that overcrowding does not significantly 
reduce the number of women remanded in custody.
The problem of securing access to bail hostels was the main example of how resource 
shortages affected remand decision making. In the area which covered Central, Inner, 
and Outer Districts, requests for a bail hostel place all had to go through a centralised 
referral system operated by probation. The referral would then be sent on to any 
relevant bail hostels for assessment. Referrals to the central system could only be made 
by probation officers or probation service officers who acted as gatekeepers to the 
resource. Probation officers were never observed to ration access to bail hostels (Lipsky 
1980) but their involvement was essential if  a referral was to be made. In Central and 
Inner District, a probation service officer was usually, though not always, available in 
the courthouses even if a delay of 30 minutes or more was incurred when she was 
engaged in another courtroom. Whilst this did not usually matter, when a district judge 
or a bench was impatient to resolve a hearing, they were sometimes not prepared to 
suffer the delay.
Example 4.8
At Inswick Comer, a female district judge had put a case back on the defence 
representative’s request for the possibility of a bail hostel to be investigated. The 
representative was twice called to address the magistrate on the progress of the 
application during the course of the morning, and he explained that he could not find a 
probation officer to make the application for him. On the second occasions, the district 
judge replied
What do you mean you can’t find probation? They’ve got offices here. 
[Addressing the list caller] Get me a probation officer in here now.
On investigation, the list caller reported that the probation officers were busy in other 
courts and could not make themselves available. The district judge replied that she had 
waited all day for probation and now doubted there was time for an application. She
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asked the list caller to inform probation that they had responsibilities to all the 
courtrooms in the building. The defendant was remanded in custody for one week.
In Outer District, which contained busy but smaller courthouses, probation staff were 
sometimes absent and this affected referrals to an even greater extent.
Example 4.9
In conversation with a defence representative outside Old Market Street, I explained the 
nature of this research. The defence representative replied,
I wish I’d known about you before. I’ve been in court all morning trying to 
get my client bail but he’s homeless. I wanted to try for a bail hostel but this 
isn’t a probation day today, apparently. Meanwhile, my guy is inside for 
seven days until he’s back here. Let’s hope probation decide to work that 
day, or I might be asking you for details of local hostels!
He began to walk away then returned and said.
Actually, seriously, can you give me some details of local ones? For future 
reference, you know.
The central referral system was introduced to improve access to bail hostels by 
removing the need to make multiple referrals to different bail hostels and providing 
more immediate information on availability of places. These were all creditable 
ambitions but their intentions were frustrated because, at times, there were no probation 
staff available in magistrates’ courts. Without probation staff, referrals could not be 
made and defendants could be remanded in custody.
Although difficulties securing bail hostel places were observed, there was an additional 
problem with expectations of availability of bail hostel bed spaces. Removing all 
pressures of time, magistrates and defence representatives may possibly have explored 
the option of a bail hostel place for more defendants, but magistrates and defence 
representatives alike reported operating on the assumption that bail hostels were always 
full. When the issue was discussed in interview, and I reported that the local Home 
Office female-only bail and probation hostel routinely had empty beds, all interviewees 
(except the women on bail) expressed surprise. Defence representatives uniformly 
thanked me for informing them of the resource and five of the 24 magistrates said they 
would bear it in mind when they were next in court. It should be noted that this bail 
hostel did do an annual mail-shot to magistrates’ courts in the City to try and raise its 
profile. Observations suggested that district judges had a greater awareness of this bail 
hostel than lay magistrates, probably because they sat more frequently. When defence 
representatives said they had applied for a place in a local bail hostel, district judges in
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Inner District particularly -  geographically the closest to the hostel -  would ask “is that 
[name] hostel?”, whereas lay magistrates did not have the same level of familiarity. 
Some lay magistrates thought that they probably had received information about the 
local female-only hostel but had forgotten it.
We do get an awful lot to read through. I’m afraid to confess that 
sometimes, if  you’re not using the information immediately or regularly, it 
slips one’s mind (female magistrate).
In addition to assumptions about a lack of bed spaces, it is likely that few incidents of 
females being referred to bail hostels were observed because magistrates believed that, 
in general, bail hostels did not address the problems that result in women being 
remanded in custody. Of the 24 magistrates interviewed, 19 expressed the view that bail 
hostels’ primary purpose was to provide a secure bail address and female defendants 
tended to have problems with accommodation much less frequently than male 
defendants.
I think bail hostels are useful for the accommodation issue primarily. They 
do offer support, I know, but that’s secondary to the issue of providing a 
bed. I just don’t recall a female defendant needing a bail bed. That could be 
my faulty memory, but I do feel the issue comes up more commonly for 
men. Women don’t seem to have, in my experience I haven’t seen many, if 
any, women with that, I feel it’s more of a male issue, (male magistrate)
Even where a bail hostel bed would address a concern about accommodation or 
enforcing a curfew, magistrates and other legal professionals (most crucially, defence 
representatives) sometimes dismissed the option. All but two magistrates and all the 
defence representatives believed that bail hostels would not accept defendants with 
substance misuse problems. Some expressed great frustration at this.
It’s ridiculous, the people who need bail hostels the most, the users who 
need a safe secure place with support, are exactly the ones the bail hostels 
refuse to take. It seems like the criteria for acceptance actually probably 
mean you don’t really need a bail bed anyway. Users and people with 
alcohol problems are excluded yet users and people with alcohol problems 
are exactly the kind of people bail hostels should be there to help, (female 
magistrate)
In fact, the nearby female-only bail and probation hostel was prepared to accept women 
with substance misuse problems. Referrals would be decided on a case-by-case basis
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depending on how many other women with similar problems were already resident in 
the hostel. Although hostel staff were careful not to have too many active substance 
misusers resident at any one time for reasons of safety and control, they actively 
promoted their preparedness to consider women with drug and alcohol problems. 
Despite this being prominently featured in the promotional material the hostel sent to all 
magistrates’ courts in the area, the overwhelming majority of legal professionals were 
unaware of this (or had forgotten it) and may not have made full use of the bail hostel as 
a result.
The shortage of probation resources had other impacts on remand. During the course of 
the research the local Probation Board sent a letter to all magistrates’ courts in the 
Districts informing them that a pressure on resources meant requests for PSRs should be 
limited if possible. The scale of the research makes it impossible to quantify the impact 
of the Probation Board’s request but, based on observation data, a drop in the convicted 
unsentenced custodial remand population would be expected as more defendants were 
sentenced instead of remanded for reports.
We’re very aware not to ask for PSRs at the drop of a hat. Probation have 
reminded us a few times recently that they’re short staffed so, and also I 
think it’s very wrong when defendants have to wait a long time for a report 
to be completed. We’re seeing that a bit more often now, delays in getting 
reports done, and so on. (female magistrate)
Magistrates were also cognisant of resourcing issues elsewhere in the criminal justice 
system, for example some magistrates reported being particularly loath to use custody 
for women. They explained this not only with reference to differences in gender roles 
(see Chapter Six) but also in terms of conditions in the female prison estate. Two main 
issues were raised by six magistrates. Firstly, the women’s prison which served the 
courts in all three Districts had been severely criticised by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of 
Prisons, amongst others, on a number of occasions. This resulted in a reluctance to use 
custodial remands as it meant sending women to this particular prison.
What I find most difficult is that we’ve been told so many times by people 
who should know that [Local] Prison is an horrific place to go, that it really 
is very very under standard. So that makes custody even more of a major 
decision (female magistrate).
Having been a prison visitor in [Local] Prison, I don’t think I want to put 
any woman in [Local] Prison (male magistrate).
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In the back of one’s mind, if we’re talking about City for example, we’re 
talking about [Local] Prison. There’s no where else to go... It’s something 
you do rather reluctantly (male magistrate).
I suppose the issue of [Local] Prison hanging over us, that’s a big issue 
about where they’ll go and we all, we have always been told that our 
decision is independent and is has to be seen to be that but nevertheless 
there is at the back of your mind where a female who goes in actually goes 
to (male magistrate).
The second issue which three of the magistrates also raised was the fact that young 
offenders would be housed at the local prison. This was not explored in interview as the 
research focused on the adult remand system but the same reluctance to use custodial 
remand because of the prison’s reputation, along with an absence of dedicated facilities 
for young offenders, was raised.
That’s the real problem, sending them to ... [Local] Prison which has an 
appalling reputation and our problem is especially with young women and 
first timers who are more vulnerable...We actually don’t have the facilities 
for female young offenders in this area and it is a nightmare (female 
magistrate).
Although this has greater relevance to sentencing practice than to remand, seven 
magistrates spontaneously bemoaned in interview the lack of rehabilitation services in 
the community and a further five also commented on the poor service provided in 
[Local] Prison for substance misusers. Magistrates voiced their fi-ustration that they 
were sending women to prison instead of offering them support when it was clear that 
the local prison would do little more than “warehouse” (female magistrate) them until 
their release.
That is an area that is really frustrating because there aren’t enough places, 
there isn’t enough help...It’s frustrating really. There are two levels. 
Obviously there’s a job to be done and I’m happy to do the job to the best of 
my ability and I recognise that what we’re there to do is to apply the law, 
not make it. But on a personal level it is fimstrating that there aren’t more 
resources available. You look at what the government is doing and banging 
more and more people into prison is not good and when you go and look at 
the prisons and see the amount of overcrowding, that’s depressing (male 
magistrate).
There clearly is the will to try and help defendants with problems and, if  greater 
provision of substance misuse services were available, it seems probable that
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magistrates would willingly divert defendants from custody and into rehabilitation 
programmes.
Summary
The organisational context in which decisions were made did influence remand 
processing and outcomes. As Rumgay (1998) argues when discussing time pressures 
and the poor quality of information available in court,
In these circumstances, the notion that the sentencing decision is reached 
through a logical, mathematical weighing up of discrete items of mitigating 
and aggravating information, as advice to sentencers suggests it should be, is 
highly suspect. (Rumgay 1998:104).
The constraints on time were found to affect how magistrates and others approached 
decisions but the limited duration of hearings cannot necessarily be advanced as 
evidence of poor decision making. Some examples of restricted availability of 
information were found but it was not typically believed to be a routine difficulty in 
remand decision making. That a limited amount of information was presented was 
usually a reflection of a consensual view on how to resolve the case rather than on the 
availability of information. More problematic was the issue of whether or not 
information had been verified and was accepted by magistrates. The difficulties defence 
representatives had in verifying information was compounded by the pressure on time 
which meant they were sometimes unable to confirm information before the court rose. 
Shortages of various resources and perceptions of how appropriate the available 
resources were did limit the options magistrates had when dealing with remand cases 
but did not necessarily weight decisions in one direction. Resourcing also impacted on 
others, for example the delays in moving defendants between police stations and courts 
sometimes meant defence representatives had limited time to take instructions from 
their clients and to verify information.
Formal Regulatory Context
This section examines the regulatory context which framed remand decisions. The legal 
framework, the Bail Act and subsequent amendments etc. discussed in Chapter One,
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obviously contains regulatory elements as it sets limits on the circumstances in which 
custodial remand can be used. In practice these legal powers are necessarily subject to a 
process of interpretation by participants in the remand system, illustrating the classic 
distinction between law in books and law in action. The ways in which the actors 
involved in the remand process interpreted and implemented their legal powers is 
explored in more detail in the next chapter. The regulatory context is understood and 
presented here as the formal procedures which are intended to guarantee the fair and 
reasoned application of the powers contained in the legal framework. Galligan (1987) 
argued that the protections afforded by such due process ideals are a method for 
regulating pre-trial decision making. However, it is argued that these formal regulatory 
procedures have limited impact on remand decision making as they are easily evaded or 
subverted. McBamet (1981) usefully demonstrates how due process rhetoric can 
obscure actual working practice rationale.
Following Rumgay (1998), it is not contended that magistrates commonly and wilfully 
misinterpret or misapply the law and engage in conscious strategies to subvert the 
intentions of regulatory mechanisms. The majority of magistrates interviewed expressed 
an apparently genuine commitment to the principles of regulation. All those who argued 
against strict adherence to regulatory practices did not disagree with the aims of 
regulation (e.g. considered and unbiased decision making) but rather felt that they were 
so experienced they did not need to follow the exact procedures in order to reach the 
‘right’ conclusion. This belief was reiterated when magistrates talked about younger 
(i.e. less experienced) members of the bench whose close observance of regulatory 
practices was felt to be a method of ensuring ‘good’ decisions until they had gained 
sufficient experience to enable them to short-circuit them.
The various actors involved in the remand process all had their own professional 
responsibilities (more fully explored in Chapter Seven). For example, defence 
representatives had a duty to follow their clients’ instructions and represent them to the 
best of their ability. CPS officers had a duty to make well reasoned bail 
recommendations to magistrates. Clerks had a duty to ensure the legality of the 
proceedings. Broadly, these actors were observed to adhere to their professional codes 
of conduct -  although some exceptions were witnessed (see Chapter Seven). Where 
they did breach these norms, it was interesting to note that they were sometimes 
corrected by other actors through comments and actions (see Chapters Seven and
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Eight). However, they were not subject to any formal regulatory court-based 
procedures. Formal regulatory mechanisms were aimed at magistrates’ actions and 
decision making; as magistrates were the ultimate arbiters in the remand process this is 
unsurprising. However, as will be seen in later chapters, magistrates were significantly 
influenced by other participants in the process -  participants whose actions and 
decisions were not addressed by the regulatory framework.
Before examining the impact of specific regulatory mechanisms, it should be noted that 
observation evidence showed the overwhelming majority of lay magistrates and district 
judges did not remand many people in custody and did not use the power carelessly. All 
of the magistrates and clerks interviewed commented that custodial remands were only 
used rarely. Many of the interviewees employed the same phrase: custodial remands 
were used as the “last resort”. Interestingly, use of the same phrase was recorded in 
research on the use of custodial sentences (Hough, et al. 2003).
The Triumvirate
The triumvirate, the three lay magistrates sitting together to make up a bench^^, was 
argued by ten magistrates to produce balanced and fair outcomes. It was assumed that 
lay magistrates would “balance each other out” (female magistrate) and this was one of 
the strengths of the lay system^^.
A bench o f lay magistrates usually consists o f three individuals: a more experienced chairman and two 
“wingers”. The chairman takes the senior role and directs proceedings e.g. all questions and decisions are 
voiced by the chairman. Chairmen also sit as wingers on occasion; it is possible, but not common, for 
wingers to be more experienced than the chairman o f a particular bench. District judges sit alone.
There was some unease that district judges could act as “judge, jury and executioner” (male clerk) as 
they operate alone. It was noticeable that magistrates and clerks always exempted the district judges at 
their own courts, for whom there was universal respect, from such concerns. Their ‘own’ district judges 
were ‘balanced’, ‘fair’, ‘reasonable’, ‘professional’, etc.
I’m a great fan o f our district judge. I think he’s fair, he sees it for what it is and I feel 
reassured when the court is in front o f him. (male clerk)
Clerks regularly observed the district judges in court and were prepared to criticise general style and 
specific decisions but generally viewed district judges’ decisions favourably (lay magistrates were 
considerably and more comprehensively criticised). In contrast, lay magistrates’ criticisms of district 
judges were restricted to comments on personality (e.g. commonly at Outer District, “he’s not as 
approachable as our last DJ” (female magistrate)) rather than professional conduct for which there was 
universal approval. As magistrates were never observed to sit in on district judges’ courts (the one 
exception to this was a female magistrate at Old Market Street who observed cases as part o f the field 
work for her own PhD), it was unclear what evidence the lay magistrates used as the basis for the positive 
assessments o f ‘their’ district judges in comparison to others. Some district judges were observed in the 
course o f this research to make some questionable decisions which bordered, and occasionally crossed, 
the boundaries o f  correct legal procedure (e.g. see Exanç)le 7.4). Whether magistrates were unaware of 
such behaviour, or were aware but excused it, it appeared that the esteem in which district judges were
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The discretion is not just one person. It is three people making that decision 
so, the one thing about magistrates is they are all very, I was going to say 
opinionated, but no-one is afraid of saying their bit and if they disagree with 
the others, you put your argument...So I think everybody does get a chance 
to say their bit and it’s like a debate, you say your bit, they say theirs, 
(female magistrate)
The good thing is that it’s [decision making] safeguarded by three of them 
sitting that at least there are discussions and also you can’t have the chair 
dominating the decision, (female CPS)
Baldwin (1976) argued that the reason for the triumvirate system was that individual 
idiosyncrasies and prejudices would be balanced out and their impact negated by sitting 
with two colleagues with differing views. Kapardis (1987) found that more extreme 
views were tempered somewhat but there was no consistency in how they were evened 
out: some benches’ decisions were harsher than the average of the three members’ 
views and some were more lenient than the average.
In this research, the perceived benefits of the lay bench system were not limited to the 
balancing out of extreme or unreasonable views, although magistrates did comment on 
this in interview. The collective nature of the decision also served to reassure individual 
magistrates when they lacked confidence in their own assessment of a case. In the cusp 
vignette, which explored a particularly problematic remand case, nine out of 24 
magistrates volunteered the information that they “could be persuaded” if their 
colleagues felt strongly about a case. This could have been a defence adopted by 
magistrates who wanted to qualify their decision in case they were being tested in some 
way by the vignette exercise. However, the sentiment was expressed even by 
experienced magistrates who judged the other vignettes confidently and assertively. 
This is illustrative of the difficulties magistrates have in resolving cusp cases (see 
Chapter Five for a discussion of the findings from the case vignettes exercise). The 
vignette evidence suggests that assertive magistrates and those with strong views can be 
more influential in determining outcomes in cusp cases as there is greater uncertainty 
among their colleagues as to the right course of action and greater preparedness to allow 
themselves to “be persuaded”.
held by lay magistrates was based in large part on the authority of the position rather than on knowledge 
of individuals’ actual conduct (see Chapter Eight for a fuller discussion o f district judges’ authority).
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The degree to which the triumvirate was effective at securing a genuine debate between 
its members or was heavily influenced by decisions taken by its principal member 
(usually the chair) was discussed by Kapardis.
It was found that 48 per cent of 504 decisions about sentence were majority 
decisions. Three-quarters of these embodied the chairperson’s decision (by 
chance we would expect two-thirds). When the bench chairperson had his or 
her way, there was a tendency towards severity in relation to the bench 
average. (Kapardis 1987:200).
This thesis found the effectiveness of the triumvirate system in balancing out 
idiosyncrasies and tempering the influence of more senior magistrates was 
fundamentally affected by the way in which decision making was organised. There was 
convincing evidence that the Outer District Bench took the responsibility of chairmen 
(or more experienced magistrates) not to influence the views of less experienced 
members very seriously. In interview, magistrates from this district reported a policy of 
asking the least experienced member of the bench for their views first and affirming that 
their views were as important as those of longer-serving magistrates.
The thing is that is slightly worrying sometimes is they always ask the most 
junior person there to say their bit first so they are not swayed by the others 
and that sometimes when you first start is difficult to, you know, you think 
‘do I dare, do I know anything?’ (female magistrate)
Organising deliberations in such a manner did not preclude the possibility that the more 
experienced members of benches used their seniority to influence decisions. However, 
the policy did contribute to a climate where the less experienced magistrates reported 
feeling confident that their views mattered and were taken seriously. Without observing 
discussions in retiring rooms, it is not possible to know the extent to which junior 
magistrates actually did challenge chairs or simply believed they did or they could.
Given that the scope of magistrates’ decisions is limited by previous decision making 
stages in the criminal justice system (Hawkins 2002; Shapland 1987), inconsistency in 
the remand system cannot wholly be magistrates’ responsibility. Unfortunately, this 
research was of insufficient scale to allow the matching of cases which would have 
supported a more meaningful discussion of consistency in various stages of remand
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decision making. The question of magistrates’ consistency was, instead, explored 
through the experience of the legal professionals who worked with lay benches.
The clerks, the defence lawyers and the CPS officers were asked how often they could 
predict lay magistrates’ decisions. Whilst they all expressed a fairly high degree of 
confidence in predicting decisions, this fell markedly when they were subsequently 
asked how often they could predict outcomes in contested cases. Of the 13 legal 
professionals interviewed, the majority felt unable to predict magistrates’ decisions and 
expressed bemusement as to how and why magistrates reached their decisions. Only one 
individual, a clerk of many years’ experience in the Outer District courts, reported being 
able to predict outcomes with any certainty when a lay bench was hearing a contested 
bail application. She explicitly stated that this was not because the triumvirate generated 
consistency in decision outcomes, but was because she knew the magistrates as 
individuals and so could predict how they would respond to cases.
Structured Decision Making
Structured decision making is used in magistrates’ courts to encourage consistency in 
the use of discretionary powers and to minimise the potential for stereotyped 
assumptions to affect legal judgements. The approach requires magistrates to address 
and resolve each stage of a decision sequentially before moving on to the next part. For 
example, decision making cues prompt magistrates to consider whether any bail risk 
exists before deciding how this might be addressed. How each stage is resolved 
determines the issues and options to be considered at the next stage. Structured decision 
making is intended to prevent irrelevant information or extra-legal factors influencing 
decision outcomes. In the majority of remand hearings the outcome was agreed by all 
parties so, in effect, no structured decision was required. Structured decision making 
was employed when cases were contested. By requiring magistrates to examine 
evidence of bail risk sequentially, structured decision making was intended to prevent 
magistrates prematurely reaching conclusions based on conscious and/or unconscious 
bias.
Typically, structured decision making was regarded positively. All the clerks 
interviewed maintained that magistrates’ decision making was improved by use of this 
method as it helped magistrates focus on their thought processes and thus prevented
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cursory decisions. Magistrates also supported the approach: 20 of the 24 magistrates 
interviewed said they used structured decision making and expressed a strong 
commitment to its principles. Even those 11 magistrates, all with a number of years’ 
experience, who then admitted to circumventing structured decision making did not 
argue that the process or its intentions were wrong. They simply felt that they were 
experienced enough to achieve the same outcomes without having to adhere to such a 
laborious process.
We’re constantly being reminded of [structured decision making], going to 
training on it. I suppose because I’m long in the tooth as a magistrate, I think 
it probably fair to say that I don’t feel I need to use it quite as 
conscientiously as maybe I should...And I do use it and I suppose I use it, 
when I do use it it’s as part of an on the job training for new magistrates 
(female magistrate).
Despite this overwhelming commitment to the technique, its utility in regulating 
decision-making was uncertain. Paradoxically, even the clerks, who all supported its 
use, and those magistrates who said they used structured decision making assiduously 
all admitted it may not actually affect outcomes. When asked in interview, all but 12 of 
the 24 magistrates, four clerks, and five CPS officers said they believed it affected the 
decision making process but not necessarily the outcomes of decisions. It was argued 
that the procedure did not alter the criteria on which magistrates judged cases, but rather 
changed the way that they accounted for their decisions.
I suspect our practice hasn’t changed very much in terms of outcome. I think 
it’s a useful exercise in articulating for the benefit of your colleagues what 
you’re actually thinking. But it’s unclear to me as to whether people are 
picking reasons that fit in their instinct or gut reaction or whether they really 
are looking at the reasons objectively and choosing an outcome that’s 
appropriate in the context (female magistrate).
We’ve all had to look harder as to if the court was going to say that they had 
substantial grounds to say that someone was going to fail to surrender, they 
would have to think long and hard about why they’ve come to that 
conclusion and then give reasons in open court. But effectively the decision 
remained the same, it just focused magistrates’ minds as to what they were 
doing. I don’t think that as a result of structured decision making and the 
European legislation, I don’t think any less people are being remanded in 
custody (male CPS).
I do recall a, and this is whether someone is guilty or not [and not a remand 
decision], I recall a magistrates saying “Oh, he must be guilty, he’s got 
green hair.” And they do come out with comments like that. Obviously they
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know they’re not going to come out and say he must be guilty because he’s 
black or he’s Muslim or some racist thing. They wouldn’t say that because 
they know that’s not acceptable. But it’s just as bad to find someone guilty 
because he’s got green hair but they’re more likely to say something like 
that. And you don’t know if they’re thinking the racist things but they’re not 
going to actually say it so we’re not ever going to know (male clerk).
The limitations of attempting to use process to affect outcome were also found, for 
example, in research on the use of structured national gravity scores for issuing final 
warnings to young offenders. Some police officers were shown to use the gravity scores 
not as the foundation of decisions but as ex post facto  justifications. Decisions were 
actually reached on the basis of their previous cautioning practice (Evans and Peuch 
2001).
Whilst the efficacy of structured decision making in producing more consistent 
decisions was clearly debatable, it did provide some junior magistrates with the leverage 
to ensure their opinions were listened to by some of the more intractable senior 
magistrates. Although chairmen may not have been swayed by, or even considered, 
opposing views, junior magistrates did feel that structured decision making provided 
them with a means of challenging other members of a bench and this, they said, 
bolstered their preparedness to do so
I think we do feel that our views are listened to, and it’s all done in a 
structured way. If it’s not, we can, there was one case where a Chair, and 
this is very unusual, but this Chair didn’t ask me my views. He just said 
‘custody, I think’. And I said, ‘I thought we used structured decision 
making, shouldn’t we consider the facts?’ And he was a bit shamefaced! 
(female magistrate)
I think remand decision making is much more structured than it was 
before.... There’s having to give reasons. When I first started in court, the 
one thing you never did was open your mouth.. .When I started there were a 
number, particularly of men, who there was no decision making, it was just 
‘that’s it’. There was no discussion... and I think for me, certainly in Outer 
District, that’s the thing that’s changed enormously in the last ten years. 
Now, we really encourage Chairs to make sure they consult the junior 
members of the bench (female magistrate)
Given the widespread acknowledgment that structured decision making had not 
changed outcomes very much, why was there a majority commitment to using it? It 
appears that the benefit of the approach may lie more in the ethos of decision making
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that it fostered rather than in any real control it exercised over how individual cases 
were resolved.
Certainly there’s a change in culture, they are much more encouraged now 
to apply structured decision making to every decision. I don’t feel it makes 
any difference to the outcomes. I could be wrong. Often it’s simply, the 
structure justifies their first decision, they’ll think ‘oh I don’t think we 
should give him bail’ and then they’ll go through it and they might just find 
more reasons to support their first view, but equally there are situations 
where they might actually conclude they should give bail. It’s hard to say.
But it has been a cultural change over the years. That’s not how it was when 
I first started. The older ones were just, they didn’t think they had to justify 
any decision, they just did it. That’s just not the case now, they all, well 
nearly all, put time and thought into their decisions, (female clerk)
Its procedures were reported to be easily circumvented (consciously or unconsciously) 
but the general principle that decisions should be based on acceptable criteria, 
sequentially considered, did resonate strongly with all those involved in the remand 
decision.
Giving Individualised Reasons For Decisions In Open Court
Since the integration of the Human Rights Act 1998 into UK law, magistrates have been 
required to give individualised reasons for applying conditions to bail or withholding 
bail in open court. Prior to this time, the Bail Act 1976 (s.5(3) and s.5 (4)) required 
reasons to be given but a pro forma was used and the grounds for applying an exception 
to the right to bail were selected from a list. Magistrates expressed a strong commitment 
to the practice of giving reasons for refusing bail or applying conditions to bail in 
interview and commented on how much emphasis their Chief Clerks placed on the 
importance of giving sound reasons. However, there was evidence that this principle 
was not necessarily adhered to in practice.
The exception under which bail is refused, and the related grounds, should be 
announced in open court and recorded on a bail information sheet that is given to the 
defendant. Although the reasons for all custodial remands are supposed to be recorded, 
the only available criteria for formally accounting for a refusal of bail are the grounds 
under the Bail Act i.e. risk of failing to attend, offending, and interfering with justice. 
So, whatever the real reason for a remand, it would necessarily be recorded in terms of 
these categories. As one male CPS officer observed,
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[The exceptions] are pegs really, you just pick one and hang your hat on it.
Most things can be fitted in to them somehow. Reoffending is always a good 
one, it can cover pretty much anything.
It can be seen from Table 4.2 that antecedents, bail history, and the nature and gravity of 
the offence were the most commonly cited grounds in cases where the defendant was 
remanded in custody and these had all been options on the old bail forms. It is possible 
that these grounds were the most appropriate and relevant ones in these individual 
cases. Alternatively, this continuity may show that standardised reasons have persisted 
despite the emphasis on individualised decision making. The reasons given in court may 
simply be ex post facto accounts of decisions rather than accurate records of 
magistrates’ reasoning. All the clerks commented that this change had not substantially 
affected magistrates’ decision making. Magistrates also admitted that although the 
requirement had superficially altered the process, previous practices still remained.
The bail form has actually altered where previously we had prescribed 
reasons for applying exceptions and we actually now construct those as 
appropriate to each individual case, although I have to say that we tend to 
use the old clichés anyway (female magistrate).
The reasons for the exceptions to bail, there’s probably only four or five that 
we ever use...and those are really the ones we used to use as well. Now it 
just makes us think about them a little more, I suppose, but that’s all. But 
I’m not convinced there’s been much of a change quite honestly. I don’t 
think there has (male clerk).
We used to have pre-printed bail forms with reasons for the magistrates’ 
decisions and we just used to virtually tick off the reason but now we, in 
theory anyway, tailor reasons specifically to that individual case although 
often, actually, the reasons given are much the same as the standard ones 
used to be. (male clerk)
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Table 4.2: Grounds Cited In Support Of Custodial Remands
Grounds Given In Open Court In Support Of 
The Exceptions To The Right To Bail
Number Of Times Cited
(in the 55 cases that resulted in a remand in
custody)
None given 26
Antecedents 13
History of breach of bail
(failing to appear and offending on bail)
13
Nature and gravity of the offence 11
Likely sentence 4
Mental health concerns 4
Wanted at another court 3
Lack of community ties 3
No fixed abode 2
Drug habit 2
Foreign national 1
Vulnerable witnesses 1
Even more striking is the fact that in nearly half the cases that resulted in a remand in 
custody, magistrates ignored the legal requirement and no grounds were given at all. 
This finding echoes Hucklesby (1994b) who found reasons for a remand in custody 
were only given in 47 per cent of cases. This deficiency indicates that the requirement to 
give reasons (individualised or otherwise) is not an effective mechanism for regulating 
magistrates’ behaviour. This is reinforced by the data in Table 4.3 which shows that in 
11 of the 55 cases which resulted in a remand in custody, magistrates did not even state 
which exception to the right to bail they were applying.
Table 4.3: Exceptions To The Right To Bail Given In Court
Exceptions To The Right To Bail Given In 
Open Court
Number Of Times Cited
(in the 55 cases that resulted in a RIC)
Risk of further offending* 36
Risk of failure to appear* 30
None given 11
Risk of interfering with justice 5
For the defendant’s own welfare 4
Insufficient information 2
Unknown 1
*fail to appear and/or fiirther offences were cited in 40 of the 44 cases where a reason was known to be 
given in open court
As some magistrates evidently did not feel constrained by the requirement to give 
individualised reasons or the specific grounds for remanding in custody, there must be 
some doubt as to how thoughtful these reasons and grounds for custodial remands were. 
All the clerks were doubtful about the rigour of some magistrates’ reasoning at times 
and argued the requirement to give reasons did not necessarily constrain them.
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We would insist that we would have the reasons, because we have to have 
the reasons to write them down. At the end of the day there must be a reason 
within the Bail Act otherwise they’re not going to get remanded in custody.
Now it may be that the magistrates have a different agenda and don’t tell us 
the real reasons but as long as they tell us reasons which we can fill in on the 
form as being reasons under the Bail Act then we can’t stop them (male 
clerk).
Hucklesby (1994b) also found that defence representatives and clerks believed 
magistrates used incorrect grounds or poorly reasoned grounds.
He [a magistrate] went on that the reasons for keeping a defendant in 
custody sometimes do not relate to the Bail Act 1976. However, he could 
always find reasons under the Bail Act 1976 to keep someone in. If this is 
the case, it suggests that the real reasons why defendants are remanded in 
custody do not relate to the grounds under the Bail Act 1976 (Hucklesby 
1994b:282).
Following the introduction of this requirement to give individualised reasons, it became 
more common for clerks to retire with magistrates to help them draft their reasons for 
withholding bail. Unsurprisingly, all the clerks argued that this resulted in better 
decision making. The clerks insisted that they would never unduly influence 
magistrates’ decisions (a claim explored further in Chapters Seven and Eight) but they 
did acknowledge that their role in the remand process had increased as a result of the 
Human Rights Act and there was a “fine line” between providing advice on the legality 
of a decision and actually influencing outcomes. As the quote below illustrates, clerks 
were aware of their power to influence magistrates’ decisions.
Thus, an unintended consequence of the move towards more transparent decision 
making (i.e. through requiring individualised reasons) was to afford clerks with more 
opportunities to influence magistrates’ decision making, unobserved by any other 
parties. The requirement to give individualised reasons resulted in magistrates’ 
reasoning being scrutinised by clerks to ensure they were fair and appropriate. However, 
although clerks did feel strongly bound by the codes of their professional conduct, there 
were no formal regulatory controls governing clerks’ greater levels of involvement in 
remand decision making. One clerk expressed his surprise that this had not resulted in 
decisions being appealed.
We all thought that [The Human Rights Act] was going to have an 
enormous impact. We’ve all done reasons since the Human Rights Act and
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we were all very cautious about retiring with the magistrates. The Chair 
would say “we’re asking the legal advisor to retire with us to assist in the 
drafting of reasons” when in fact we would go out and talk to them about the 
case and if we thought they were going wild we’d try and bring it back and 
get them to focus on what the issues are. And for some strange reasons we 
were never challenged. No challenges came from defence lawyers at 
all....and I think it’s because we are trusted. We’re not seen as being part of 
the magistrates, part of the decision making process. Although we probably 
have quite a considerable input, we’re not a fourth member, but it’s not 
difficult to shape what’s going on if we think they are going a little wild. 
But it’s not really become an issue, strangely enougfr (male clerk).
Appeals
The Bail Act allows the defence to appeal remand decisions and, since the Bail 
(Amendment) Act 1993, the CPS has also been able to appeal against magistrates’ 
decisions in cases which attract a custodial sentence of five years or more^\ Hucklesby 
(1994b) raised concerns that the introduction of this power would further encourage 
magistrates to concur with CPS remand recommendations because they feared appeal. 
The present research did not find magistrates to be concerned about the risk of having a 
decision appealed by the CPS. This may in part be because magistrates’ decisions were 
rarely appealed; an appeal was never observed during the course of this study.
There was a revealing disparity between magistrates’ and clerks’ perceptions of the lack 
of appeals and the CPS’s views on this. The five magistrates who commented on 
prosecution appeal and all four clerks in interview believed that the lack of appeals 
indicated magistrates were getting remand decisions right most of the time.
You can judge that by the number of appeals can’t you. Bail Amendment 
Act appeals. We get the odd one, not loads, but that seems to me to be an 
indication that by and large they get it right, (female clerk)
However, the CPS officers interviewed all said they felt that magistrates made some 
very poor decisions but they would only appeal those decisions involving a significant 
risk of the defendant committing another violent offence. CPS officers appeared to 
regard it appropriate to use their power to appeal only in the most serious cases even if
Or an offence under section 12 (taking a conveyance without authority) or I2A (aggravated vehicle 
taking) o f the Theft Act 1968.
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they felt the decision was outside what was ‘reasonable’; the power was a safeguard not 
to be used routinely.
If I’ve got a serious case, it’s much less of a worry to have the DJ there 
because I felt that you are going to get a decision within the reasonable 
range of bail decisions whereas with lay benches you will get a number of 
decisions that, in my opinion, are outside that. And then you’ve got the 
agonising thing of do I appeal it or not? (male CPS).
I wouldn’t normally appeal a case like that because it wasn’t the most 
exciting case and there was no violence, but the sums of money involved 
were enormous, and an officer appeared in court and he reckoned he’d 
probably stashed away 400 to 450 grand somewhere, (male CPS)
[Bail appeal] is an option that we just don’t use very often unless we believe 
it’s a very, very bad decision (female CPS).
On the evidence of this study, the prosecution’s power to appeal does act as a safeguard 
against poor decisions in the most serious cases but it has not significantly impacted on 
magistrates’ decision making. They did not incorporate the risk of appeal into their 
decision making because it was such a rare event. Additionally, they did not have an 
opportunity to learn from their poor decisions as information about what happened to 
appealed cases in the Crown Court was not routinely fed back to the magistrates’ court.
Summary
Analysis of the impact of formal regulatory structures on remand decision making 
suggests that they are largely ineffective at regulating behaviour or standardising 
decisions. Some magistrates’ unsustainable decisions and failures to adhere to correct 
legal procedure were observed to go unchallenged and legal professionals reported 
significant inconsistency in how magistrates resolved contested cases. However, 
although regulatory structures were ineffective in individual cases, their existence did 
serve as an on-going reminder to magistrates to approach remand decisions fairly and 
with caution. Although the procedures were at times dismissed as unnecessary and time 
consuming, all magistrates did report great hesitance to use custodial remand and 
believed that is should only be used as a last resort.
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Conclusion
Whilst not intended to provide an exhaustive description of all the structural influences 
on remand decision making, this chapter has sought to contextualise the processing and 
resolution of individual remand hearings -  the subject of the remaining chapters. There 
were multiple pressures on the remand system from different sources. It has been 
suggested that magistrates received confused and conflicting messages from central 
government about the aims of the remand system and the general tenor of what they 
should be trying to achieve. Participants in the remand system were acutely aware that 
some of their decisions may be subjected to public/media scrutiny and they struggled to 
resolve the tensions between what was ‘right’, protecting themselves, and ensuring that 
justice was seen to be done.
Pervasive and sometimes chronic shortages of time, information and resources 
characterised the remand system. Decision making within such an environment was 
inevitably constrained and/or compromised at times; outcomes were sometimes reached 
under less than ideal conditions, restricted by the nature and availability of resources. 
However, as will be seen, many outcomes are not affected by these shortages as they 
rely on decision making cues, such as offence seriousness, which were available even 
when time and information are restricted.
It was established that the regulatory mechanisms did not effectively constrain decision 
making processes and outcomes as they were easily subverted. Moreover, they were all 
aimed primarily at regulating magistrates’ decisions hut they did little to regulate the 
other participants in the remand process who have been shown by this and previous 
research (Bottomley 1970; Darbyshire 1984; King 1971; Shapland 1981; Shapland 
1987) to affect remand outcomes substantially. Some of the formal regulatory practices 
were seen to have greater significance in affecting decision making in the longer term as 
they contributed to the formation of normative ideas on what was desirable in the 
remand system. Whilst they could not prevent individual poor decisions, they did 
encourage magistrates to strive to achieve the principles of methodical, unbiased and 
reasoned decision making.
It is also evident that these three environments were connected and impacted on each 
other. For example, government targets on reducing delay enhanced the already existing
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organisational pressures on time felt in the courtroom. In turn, this pressure on time 
either encouraged or excused magistrates’ failure to adhere to regulatory procedures 
such as structured decision making. This is just one example of how measures intended 
to effect certain changes may have unintended consequences in other parts of the 
system. Despite the emphasis in the regulatory structures to ensure that custody was 
only used as a last resort, it appears that socio-political pressures and agendas may have 
reduced tolerance in the remand system and the ‘last resort’ has become a point more 
quickly reached by magistrates. This last point is suggested but not substantiated by this 
study and needs to be explored in further research. Finally, it is not argued that the 
influence of these three contexts was always direct, obvious or unavoidable; they were 
loosely coupled to the processing and outcomes of individual remand decisions. Their 
analytic significance lies in the fact that they contributed to the formation of operating 
practices by helping to frame ideas of what was possible and what was desirable in the 
remand system.
The next chapter illustrates how some of these structural influences filtered into remand 
decision making, affecting how the law was interpreted and decisions reached.
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Chapter Five__________________
M odels of R em and  Decision Making
This chapter presents evidence that remand law was differentially applied depending on 
the characteristics of the case. Actors were identified employing three different models 
of remand which emerged fi*om the data, each with its own decision making criteria: 
offence seriousness; cusp cases; and case processing. The way a case was processed, 
and its likely outcome, varied according to how it fitted into this typology. In these 
models, remand decisions have different functions and this structures the information 
that actors select as relevant from the hearing and how they apply that data to the 
resolution of the case. Each model is presented in turn and the way in which the legal 
framework was adapted to suit the rationale of each model is explored.
Introduction
The previous chapter demonstrated that there were conflicting aims in the remand 
system, and that the regulatory mechanisms permitted discretion to be exercised in 
remand decision making. This chapter explores the ways in which discretion was 
employed in the remand system. It argues that actors in the criminal justice system had 
a great deal of discretion in how they chose between different approaches to remand 
hearings. Remand cases were seen to be categorised by participants, and whether and 
how legal powers were used was consequent on this categorisation.
Thus, as will be seen, the legal framework provided some structure to remand hearings 
but it was not rigidly applied to all cases alike. For example, although the rhetoric of the 
‘right to bail' was the dominant narrative in the legal framework, it was not necessarily 
adhered to in practice. The formal language of remand law concealed a series of 
different considerations that were evident in working practices.
The rhetoric and the law operate at two different levels, the abstract and the 
concrete, and the contradiction is operationally negated and a clear clash 
prevented by each being pigeon-holed out of the other’s realm of discourse.
The rhetoric is rarely actually denied, it is simply whittled away by 
exceptions, provisos, qualifications. Law in this form is rather like a Russian
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doll. You begin with the rhetoric and a single, apparently definite, condition 
which on closer inspection turns out to contain another less clear condition 
which in turn opens up to the unpredictability of ‘it all depends on the 
circumstances’ -  which criteria we use in your case depends on your case. 
(McBamet 1981:161) (emphasis added).
That the legal framework could be manipulated, and that there was scope for such 
discretionary working practices in the remand system, was established in the previous 
chapter. Firstly, bail law itself does not tightly constrain actions as it contains a range of 
reasons for refusing bail (from risk of absconding to insufficient information) and 
allows magistrates to draw supporting evidence from multiple grounds (including any 
information “which appear[s] to be relevant”). Secondly, it was also demonstrated that 
the formal regulatory framework was, in fact, easily circumvented and so it had only a 
limited ability to constrain magistrates’ decision making, for example, the use of extra- 
legal criteria in decision making.
From court observations, it was noted that, notwithstanding the flexibility of the legal 
framework, cases with certain characteristics were, in fact, approached in a consistent 
manner. There was an underlying structure to remand decisions which was related to, 
but not wholly constrained by, the legal framework. Three models of remand were 
constructed from the regularised ways in which cases were seen to be processed and 
resolved, each defined by a separate remand rationale that was evident in the criteria 
used for case resolution. These models are used to explain the structure and nature of 
the different types of remand decision making that were observed. The models of 
remand can be equated with theories of punishment in that they delineate the priorities 
and the rationale of decisions: what are we trying to achieve, why, and how?
A number of authors have constructed and employed models in attempts to understand 
and explain the workings of the criminal justice system and the decisions made by its 
participants (King 1981; McBamet 1981; Packer 1969). Models help us to understand 
apparent contradictions and discrepancies in decision making by elucidating how 
participants understand and chose their roles in decision making and how they orientate 
their actions and decisions to the fulfilment of particular goals. Dhami (2001) discussed 
Packer’s (1968) models in relation to the remand system.
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Although the Bail Act 1976 contains due process and crime control 
principles, it also affords magistrates much discretion in which of these 
principles is enforced, and how they are enforced (Dhami 2001:41).
The consensus in remand research in the last 30 years is that the remand process is 
characterised by the crime control model. Both crime control and due process models 
(see Chapter Two for an explanation of these models) were evident in this research to 
varying degrees but they could not account for many of the observed remand decisions 
as case outcomes were observed which did not fit their rationales. Instead, as with King 
(1981), it is argued that a number of models co-existed in the system. Magistrates used 
what has been described as “eclecticism” (Walker 1991) in relation to sentencing: the 
selection of which approach to apply in the resolution of a case depended on the 
characteristics of that case and the defendant.
Criminal justice models are best understood as ideal types, or ‘normative’ models 
(Packer 1969) i.e. they are reified accounts of what exists in reality in more diluted and 
confused forms. The three models presented here are ideal types which were 
extrapolated fi*om the issues that emerged firom court observations and were 
corroborated in the case vignette exercise. Thus, their identification and presentation 
here should not be understood as a portrayal of a ‘tidy’ system operating on wholly 
discrete categories of remand. Although they were observed in ‘pure’ form in many 
remand hearings, cases were also observed to be located in a combination of categories 
and also moved between them, depending on the circumstances of the case and in the 
court at each subsequent hearing. The ways in which the social dynamics of courtrooms 
affected the application of models will be discussed in Chapters Seven and Eight. This 
chapter focuses on the rationale of remand decision making contained within each of the 
three models, and how they resulted in the law being differentially applied.
It is not possible to indicate with certainty how many observed cases fell into each of 
the three models for three reasons. Firstly, as explained above, these models are not all 
necessarily mutually exclusive and it was possible for a case to move between models at 
different stages, or to be a combination of two. For example, a cusp case could also 
have elements which encouraged participants to see it in case processing terms too 
(these terms are explained fully below). Secondly, magistrates had access to information 
about a case which was not available to me. Although comprehensive field notes were 
taken, data in some of the observation cases were incomplete, for example magistrates
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referred to information on defendants’ antecedents which was not always commented 
on in court (and thus could not be recorded in the observation notes) but which may 
have been significant in decision making. For example, magistrates may have had 
information on other cases involving a defendant being processed by the same court. 
Such information could result in a case being fi’amed in terms of the organisational 
needs of the system but it would not necessarily be evident to me as an observer. 
Thirdly, as will be explored in Chapters Seven and Eight, the processing and resolution 
o f cases was also affected by courts’ social dynamics and the choices participants made. 
For example, on occasion defendants chose not to apply for bail for reasons 
unconnected to these models. Thus, in some hearings, the ways in which cases were 
processed and resolved depended more on interpersonal and inter-professional 
dynamics than on the characteristics of the case.
Magistrates rarely explained their motivations for decisions and never gave a public 
account of the thought processes whereby they reached their decisions. Given this, and 
the other shortcomings of the observation data discussed above, case vignettes were 
used to explore remand decision making rationale in detail. The vignettes were 
constructed after months of observations and were composites of cases typically found 
within a model (see Chapter Three for a full discussion of the case vignette 
methodology). Each section begins with a real example of the type of case being 
discussed to introduce the nature of each model but, unless otherwise stated, all quotes 
are fi*om comments made during the case vignette exercise.
Before exploring the nature of each model, the question of how and why cases were 
allocated to the models is discussed. In the majority of remand hearings, the offence 
itself determined which model was used. As will be seen in Model One, offence 
seriousness was the primary cue for decision making and made the resolution of a case 
“self-evident” (female CPS). There were some cases that could not be easily categorised 
in terms of offence seriousness. Those on the ‘cusp’, were allocated to Model Two and 
processed using different criteria. As will be evident fi*om the discussion below, there 
were certain factors which led to a case being defined as a cusp case. Unlike the other 
two models. Model Three approach was used not because of the characteristics of the 
offence, but because it was warranted by the criminal justice system’s administrative 
needs. Thus, when case processing problems were identified, the remand decision was 
firamed not by the nature of the offence, but by a concern for overcoming that problem.
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As will be seen, organisational pressures in the remand system, such as poor 
administrative support, that were explored in the previous chapter contributed to the 
cases processing problems that Model Three was employed to solve. Thus it can be seen 
that models are applied in light of contextual pressures.
So, the majority of cases were allocated to models on the basis of key pieces of 
information which were recognised by all participants in a remand hearing. This 
common understanding allowed cases to be processed quickly (see below). Where an 
actor tried to introduce a piece of information that was ‘spurious’ in relation to the 
model being employed, other actors were observed to reassert the dominant narrative in 
order to negate the relevance of the comments. For example, occasionally CPS officers 
would raise bail concerns in routine trivial offences (as opposed to those which had 
crossed over into the cusp category -  see below). In response, defence representatives 
rarely even acknowledged their comments, but simply restated that it was not a serious 
offence. The subtext of this was that a discussion of bail risk was irrelevant as the court 
knew the offence was not serious enough to attract a custodial remand. However, as will 
be discussed in Chapter Seven, case processing was also a social process and so it was 
possible for a case to be misclassified, or the rationale of the models to be bypassed, 
because of courtroom dynamics. So, although the approach to be taken in majority of 
cases was ‘self evident’ to participants, some cases were processed not on the basis of 
their characteristics, or the needs of the justice system, but because of interpersonal 
dynamics in the courtroom. These cases will be returned to in Chapter Seven and Eight.
Model One: Offence Seriousness
This research found offence seriousness to be the primary cue influencing how 
participants organised their response to a defendant and allocated a case to a particular 
model. It was seen in Chapter Two that previous research on remand also found offence 
seriousness to be strongly correlated to remand outcomes. For example, in an analysis 
of official statistics on remand decisions at first appearances, Jones (1985) found that 
defendants charged with indictable offences were at a greater risk of receiving a 
custodial remand than defendants charged with triable-either-way offences. This finding 
is echoed in all remand research to date. This section uses case vignettes to explain why
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the nature of the offence was so strongly associated to remand outcome, and explore the 
subsequent ways in which remand law was selectively interpreted and applied.
It could be argued that this model adheres to the risk-based “new penology” (Simon and 
Feeley 1995) in that its criteria for judging a case are explicitly rule hound rather than 
based on individual defendants’ personal characteristics. Even where defendants were 
perceived to invite moral censure, character assessments did not affect remand 
outcomes. It was found that the majority of remand decisions were resolved using this 
model’s rationale in which decisions were founded on offence-related criteria alone.
However, it is argued that bail risk assessments are far cruder than the actuarial decision 
making of the new penology. The findings from Model One suggest that offence 
seriousness was not used as a proxy signifier of risk but was the primary reason for 
remand outcomes regardless of actual levels of risk. As will be seen, magistrates 
themselves admitted that the working conception of risk in the remand system was 
defined by offence seriousness and assessments of ‘risk’ in many remand cases were, in 
fact, simply accounts of how serious the offence was. For example, where offences were 
serious, it was highly probable that the defendant would be remanded in custody even if 
there was no objective evidence of risk. Conversely, where an offence was not serious, 
the defendant would invariably be released on bail even where it was acknowledged that 
she would almost certainly reoffend.
Moreover, as will be seen, in cases where decisions could not be based on offence 
seriousness, decision makers turned to defendants’ personal characteristics in order to 
reach decisions. As Model Two illustrates, even where an individual’s record 
established there was a high risk of reoffending or failing to attend court, it was still 
possible for her to be bailed if magistrates’ perceived her to be a ‘deserving’ individual. 
These findings demonstrate that the new penology and risk assessment have not 
replaced individualised moral reasoning and they echo those of Kellough (2002) in her 
analysis of the Canadian remand system. Further, Model Three shows that some remand 
decisions were made for practical, case processing reasons and not because of risk 
assessments. These findings suggest that there has not been a decisive break with the 
previous focus on the individual defendant (Garland 1995) and that whilst ‘risk’ is 
inevitably referred to in remand decision making, the term actually conceals a range of
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decision making rationales rather than signifies a single coherent approach to remand 
reasoning. It is these different approaches which are explored in this chapter.
The formal reasons for withholding bail are presented in terms of the level of risk that 
the defendant will fail to appear, offend on bail, or interfere with justice. Observation 
and vignette data alike revealed that when such issues were considered, the concern was 
not whether a breach of bail would take place but instead focused on the potential harm 
that would be done if one occurred. In cases where risk assessment was the primary 
narrative or purpose, risk (of reoffending etc), was overwhelmingly defined in terms of 
potential ‘harm’. What constituted harm and who needed to be protected fi*om it, the 
defendant or the public (including victims and witnesses), was determined by offence 
seriousness. If the offence was serious, public protection was paramount. If the offence 
was not serious, the defendant should be protected firom the harm of a custodial remand. 
However, not all cases could be easily categorised and processed according to their 
offence seriousness. ‘Cusp cases’ are those on the borderline between a custodial 
remand and bail. Magistrates approached and resolved cusp cases in a significantly 
different way and, as will be seen, the reasons for granting bail in cusp cases are 
constructed around moral assessments, not risk assessments. Cusp cases are discussed 
below.
The Working Party on Bail Procedures in Magistrates’ Courts, the forerunner of the 
Bail Act, said there may
exceptionally be occasions when all the circumstances of the case make the 
offence so grave and so shocking to public opinion that bail can properly be 
refused...even though the danger of absconding or of offences being 
committed if bail is granted is slight. (Home Office 1974:18).
and, conversely.
the comparative triviality of the offence may of itself indicate that a remand 
in custody is not justified, whatever the other considerations. (Home Office 
1974:19).
The impossibility of simultaneously minimising harm done to the defendant and to the 
public was identified by the Working Party. It is argued here that in order to understand 
remand decisions, it is first essential to appreciate that with serious offences, the balance
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of this zero-sum calculation shifts away firom the defendants’ rights towards the rights 
of the public, prompting a risk prevention approach (Hudson 2003:25) because of the 
potential for harm. Thus the rationale of remand decisions in non-serious offences (to 
minimise harm done to the defendant) differs from the rationale of decisions on serious 
offences (to minimise harm done to the public) and consequently different tests of risk 
or “substantial grounds” are applied. It is argued below that magistrates employed a 
‘bifurcated’ approach to remand decision making when offence seriousness was the 
primary criterion for reaching a decision. There was significant differentiation in the 
ways magistrates approached and applied bail law to serious and non-serious offences. 
This dual approach was witnessed in observations and explored in the vignettes.
i - Permissible Bail Risk: Non-Serious Offences
The reasoning magistrates employed when the offence was not serious was explored in 
Vignette One. The following example is a case that was observed at Orrington Street 
and is a typical example of a non-serious offence.
Example 5.1
A 38 year old woman appeared at Orrington Street charged with shoplifting. The CPS 
officer told the court,
The shoplifting matter was at BHS where she stole £51 of clothes. Nothing 
unusual about the theft and full admissions were made. The defendant was 
charged and bailed to appear on the 20th August when she failed to appear. 
There are previous convictions, 38 matters in total mostly for dishonesty matters 
and all types of punishment have been used in the past.
Vignette One - Case Summary:
A 30 year old woman appearing on overnight custody charged with shoplifting to the 
value of £120. She has a very poor bail record and extensive convictions for similar 
offences.
Despite strong contrary indications to granting bail (i.e. previous failures to appear and 
offending on bail) none of the magistrates remanded this woman into custody. The 
universal reason for this was that the offence was not serious enough to warrant a 
remand in custody. In this context, ‘non-serious’ offences are defined as nuisance 
offences (such as criminal damage, allowing yourself to be carried in a stolen car, etc) 
and lesser property offences (such as handling stolen goods and shoplifting). A female
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magistrate summed up the views of the 12 magistrates who simply cited triviality as a 
reason in itself not to remand in custody when she said “it just doesn’t seem a serious 
enough offence to deprive her of her liberty.” However, defendants charged with non- 
serious offences could occasionally be at risk of a custodial remand depending on their 
bail and/or offending history (see ‘cusp cases’ below).
Anticipating sentencing, nine magistrates said they would not consider a custodial 
remand in light of a probable non-custodial disposal: “at the end of the day if  she’s 
convicted then it’s very unlikely that she’ll go to prison and therefore remanding her in 
custody is not equitable” (male magistrate). The anticipated length of a remand 
compared to the probable sentence length was a very important consideration for some 
magistrates who felt they had a responsibility not to punish defendants excessively.
Benches, although they don’t like to say that they do this, they have an eye 
on how long the remand would be. If it was only for one week they tend to 
think ‘well maybe we’d better be safe’ and keep her in but if it was going to 
be for say four weeks they’d think ‘well I’m not keen to keep her in for four 
weeks.’ (female magistrate)
The injustice of a custodial remand longer than anticipated sentence length was 
frequently used by defence representatives either to prevent a remand in custody or to 
secure release from custodial remand, particularly if there had been delays, for example, 
in getting a PSR done. The comments of one defence representative in court illustrate 
how proportionality between the nature of the offence and the remand decision was 
used to try and secure bail. The defendant was granted conditional bail for a delayed 
PSR to be completed.
She has been in custody for the equivalent of a six week custodial sentence 
so she has been fairly well punished already (female defence representative).
Remands in custody were seen to be inappropriate and unfair for non-serious offences 
and this extended to the use of overnight custody. One possible consequence of a night 
in the cells was receiving undemanding bail conditions - five of the magistrates 
commented that the night the woman in Vignette One had spent in the cells was 
punishment enough; it was a sharp reminder to her of what would happen if she 
breached her bail and lenient bail conditions could be given in consequence.
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The trivial nature of the offence meant that magistrates chose to ignore bail risks when 
making decisions. Magistrates judged that the woman would probably breach her bail 
but were prepared to accept this because the offences were not serious. Twelve 
magistrates made comments such as “I mean it’s worrying I have to say and one would 
be running a risk by giving her bail but I am willing to risk another shop losing another 
couple of jackets” (female magistrate). The way in which magistrates resolved the 
conflict between the rights of the defendant and protection of the public altered 
depending on the nature of the offending.
Bail conditions were given by all but one female magistrate who felt that as no bail 
conditions could prevent the defendant from offending, she would grant unconditional 
bail. This action was unusual as it implied a practical approach to the use of bail 
conditions with a non-serious offence. It was implicit in most magistrates’ comments on 
the usefulness of bail conditions that they often considered conditions ineffective, 
particularly at preventing offending. Two magistrates explicitly stated that applying bail 
conditions could “often be more for our sake, feeling like we’re doing something more 
than actually altering their [defendants’] actions” (male magistrate). When asked how a 
residence condition would address his stated concern about further offending, a male 
magistrate replied, “Well it doesn’t really, but at least the police will know where to 
find her.” Similarly, five of the 24 magistrates asked for the defendant to be excluded 
from the shopping centre in which she had offended. Whilst this may have prevented 
the commission of offences in that area, it would not have prevented her from 
shoplifting elsewhere. In interview, two clerks said exclusion zones could be useful for 
some types of offences (particularly offences against the person) but expressed their 
bemusement that magistrates used the condition for shoplifting as they regarded it as 
pointless. The vignettes demonstrated magistrates’ use of ineffective and unnecessary 
bail conditions for non-serious offences. In contrast to bail conditions given for other 
offences, conditions for non-serious offences appeared to be selected somewhat 
perfunctorily. Observations also confirmed that magistrates ‘delivered’ bail conditions 
for different types of offence differently (see below).
A further theme was that when the offending was non-serious, the defendant’s character 
was not considered relevant. Disapproval of the defendant’s behaviour and disbelief of 
her story was commented on in the vignette but bail was always granted. This contrasts 
with the more serious offending in cusp cases where remand outcomes were crucially
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influenced by the credibility of the defendant and whether they were perceived to be a 
sympathetic character. This is discussed below and also more extensively in relation to 
women in Chapter Six.
From the responses to Vignette One it was evident that if an offence was not serious, 
magistrates were loath to remand in custody and would consequently dismiss evidence 
of bail risks.
With that sort of record but with crimes against the person, he [sic] would be 
a definite remand in custody but for this one, it’s extremely unlikely (female 
magistrate).
and
There’s a good chance she’ll offend on bail, in fact I know near as damn it 
that she will. But I’m not going to remand someone like her in custody 
(male magistrate).
In such cases, the harm done to the defendant by a remand in custody superseded the 
potential harm to the public and defendants are bailed. Bail law was employed to suit 
the outcome of the case that was predetermined by the nature of the offence.
Although the overwhelming majority of non-serious offences were bailed, it was 
possible for such offending to move into the “cusp” category and thus be at risk of a 
custodial remand if the offending was exceptionally prolific or if the defendant was 
considered to be blatantly defying the court (see below). As will be seen in the next 
section, magistrates employed a very different approach to making remand decisions on 
serious offences.
ii -  Insubstantial Grounds: Serious Offences
The reasoning magistrates employed when the offence was serious was explored in 
Vignette Two. The following example is a case that was observed at Inswick Comer 
and illustrates the issues that were regarded as relevant in serious offences.
Example 5.2
A 31 year-old woman appeared on overnight custody charged with ‘entering enclosed 
premises’ and ‘burglary’. The defendant had entered two premises, trying to find 
somewhere to smoke dmgs. She left each of the premises almost immediately, saying 
that she decided they were unsuitable. She did not actually enter any dwellings, but did 
enter communal hallways. Her actions were caught on a surveillance camera. Given that
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the behaviour in each incident was identical, her defence representative repeatedly 
stated that she could not understand why different charges had been laid.
“It appears to be a serious charge but it is not in this case. She accepts that she 
did enter both premises. Why are the Crown putting the two incidents as 
different types of charges? The evidence of burglary is not strong.”
The mixed bench remanded her in custody on the grounds of failing to appear and 
committing further offences. They said they based that assessment on the nature and 
seriousness of the offence and the likely penalty.
The defence representative’s repeated questioning of the charge, her bald statement that 
the offence was not as serious as it seemed, and the magistrates’ specific (and unusual) 
reference to the likely penalty indicates that the seriousness of the charge (and not the 
nature of the actual offence) was the key factor in this remand decision.
In this context, ‘serious offences’ are defined as: any offences where violence or the 
threat of violence is used; domestic burglary; and offences involving large sums of 
money. Defendants charged with serious offences were only very rarely bailed by 
magistrates; the seriousness of the offence overrode other considerations. In court 
observations, the relationship between offence seriousness and custodial remands was 
evident:
• Seven charges of robbery: all were remanded in custody
• six charges of domestic burglary: four were remanded in custody and in the
remaining two there were queries about whether ‘burglary’ was an inappropriate 
charge which should be reduced to, for example, ‘unlawful entry’.
• Two charges of arson: both were remanded in custody.
• Two charges of living off immoral earnings: both were remanded in custody. They
involved allegations of human trafficking for the purposes of prostitution, violent 
intimidation of victims/witnesses, and very large sums of money.
Although the nature and gravity of the offence is not one of the exceptions to the right 
to bail under the Bail Act 1976, Hucklesby (1994b) observed that the seriousness of the 
offence^^ had, in fact, become a de facto  exception to the right to bail. This reason for 
refusing bail was also observed to be accepted unchallenged in courts in this research. 
This provides further evidence that remand decisions were not founded on assessments 
of risk, as described in the Bail Act, but were statements on the seriousness of the 
offence charged, almost regardless of the actual risks involved (see below). Again, the 
inadequacy of procedural requirements in effectively regulating magistrates’ behaviour 
was evident.
It is possible that the adoption of this rationale in remand decision making was an unintended 
consequence of the ‘just deserts’ principles o f the Criminal Justice Act 1991. The link between sentencing 
principles and remand practice is discussed in Chapter Nine.
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Also of note, is the frequent use of the nature of an offence as a reason for 
withholding bail. The nature and seriousness of an offence does not in itself 
provide an exception to the presumption of bail under the Bail Act 1976 
although it does constitute one of the considerations that may be taken into 
account. Nevertheless, the findings of this study seem to suggest that it is the 
third most commonly used reason for objecting to bail. (Hucklesby 
1994b:312)
In an attempt to understand further the importance of offence seriousness in magistrates’ 
decision making, and to explore the extent to which it overrode other considerations, 
particularly assessments of the risk of reoffending. Vignette Two explored the impact of 
a serious offence on the conduct and resolution of bail hearings, and on any subsequent 
consideration of the presumption in favour of bail. This presumption was particularly 
tested by Vignette Two which presented a serious offence (domestic burglary) but the 
case rested on weak evidence, the defendant had no record of burglaries and a good 
record for attending court i.e. although the offence was serious, the grounds for refusing 
bail were not substantial.
Vignette Two - Case Summary:
A 28 year old woman appearing on overnight custody charged with domestic burglary. 
The evidence against her is very weak, she has no record for burglary, and she has a 
good bail record.
Of the 24 magistrates, 15 remanded this woman into custody and nine gave her 
conditional bail. All magistrates commented that domestic burglary was a serious 
offence. This was the primary consideration of all those who remanded her in custody. 
Although two who remanded her in custody actually thought she was innocent, they 
refused her bail because of the seriousness of the charge; they felt duty-bound to accept 
the facts of the case as presented by the CPS (see below). Of the nine who bailed her, 
six said they believed there was no charge to answer as the case was too weak to 
proceed and/or convict her so a remand in custody would be unfair and unnecessary. It 
is important to note that these six were not arguing for bail despite the nature of the 
offence: they were not disputing that offence seriousness should be the key issue in such 
cases. They also commented on the ‘nasty’ nature of domestic burglary and would 
probably have responded to the remand decision in the same way as the majority of 
their colleagues had and remanded her in custody i f  the GPS’s case had not been 
(designed to be) so conspicuously weak. The remaining three who granted bail did not
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question the strength of the case. They all commented on the nature of the offence 
(“domestic burglary is a very nasty crime” - female magistrate) and stated that if  the 
mitigation had not been so strong, they would have remanded her in custody. So, of the 
16 who accepted there was a case to answer, 13 remanded her in custody and two of the 
eight who believed her probably innocent also remanded her in custody.
In Vignettes One and Two it was clearly simply the seriousness of the offence, rather 
than any assessments of the risk of failing to attend, reoffending or interfering with 
justice, that was the primary determinant of the outcome. In explaining their decisions 
on Vignette Two, magistrates referred to many of the same considerations they applied 
to Vignette One.
The likely custodial sentence was referred to by six of the 15 who remanded her in 
custody. They did not advance this as grounds to withhold bail because of risk of 
absconding^^ but argued that the time she spent on custodial remand would come off her 
sentence anyway so it benefited her to be in custody: “in a sense you’re giving her an 
inverted sort of hand in this really” (male magistrate); “any custodial sentence she got in 
the outcome would be reduced by the amount of time that she’s been on remand and in 
slightly nicer conditions” (male magistrate).
In contrast to the outcomes of bail risk assessments for non-serious offences, with 
serious offences magistrates were not prepared to take any chances with reoffending. 
Even those magistrates who were not convinced that the woman in Vignette Two would 
offend on bail were unwilling to bail her because of the seriousness of the offence: 
“This is a marginal one but I think my reaction is more that it would be better to keep 
her in custody because of the seriousness of the offence” (female magistrate).
With serious offences, bail was refused because of a fear of the consequences i f  the 
defendant offended and not because of a probability, or even possibility that she would 
offend. It was rare that bail conditions could be found which were ‘strong’ enough to 
override this fear about granting bail for serious offences. In interview, magistrates 
commented on the difficulty of finding bail conditions that prevented any type of
If the offence is serious magistrates sometimes advanced the argument that defendants may abscond 
because a long term in prison is likely. However, failure to attend based only on the likely sentence was 
not regarded as sufficient reason to withhold bail. “The case law says that it shouldn’t be the only ground 
for refusing bail on the fear that there would be a fail to surrender. Just because somebody is likely to be 
facing five years imprisonment, that shouldn’t be the only ground.” (male clerk).
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offending. Those magistrates who granted bail because of mitigation, rather than 
because they believed she was innocent, wanted extensive and onerous bail conditions 
that specifically addressed their fears of her offending. The first required residence, a 
surety, daily reporting to a police station, and a curfew. The second remanded her to a 
bail hostel and wanted to extend the hours of the hostel’s own curfew. The third gave 
conditions of residence, a curfew and an electronic tag.^ "^  It is important to note that 
these magistrates were not using the generalised and token conditions of Vignette One. 
They all volunteered a bail condition, the curfew, which they believed directly 
addressed the risk of her offending by restricting her movements. Other magistrates, 
who did not accept the premise that she would only offend at night, did not bail her 
because a curfew did not allay their fears: “I could keep her indoors at night but what’s 
to stop her burgling for drugs during the day when everyone’s at work?” (male 
magistrate).
Only four magistrates made any kind of comment about the defendant’s character. Of 
these, two magistrates dismissed the impact of a custodial remand on her based on their 
judgement that she was already “corrupt”. That defendants with antecedents appear to 
be afforded less sympathy and remanded in custody more easily is discussed in a later 
section.
So, if  we deny her bail she’s going to be in prison for six or seven weeks.
That in itself is not necessarily the most appalling thing for her because 
she’s already been in custody many times so she’s not going to be further
corrupted by it because she is already corrupted or corrupt We have so
little information at this stage that we can’t tell if she’s guilty or innocent 
but she’s not exactly like Caesar’s wife, beyond reproach, (male magistrate)
The other two magistrates commented that it would be useful to “see a body” in this 
case. They felt her demeanour in court would provide useful information. Interestingly, 
unlike assessments of defendants in cusp cases (see below), they did not frame this in 
terms of how sympathetic or genuine she appeared, but were simply interested to know 
whether she appeared to be withdrawing firom drugs. This would indicate that she might 
be ‘desperate’ to satisfy her addiction and would offend on release to raise money to
Three magistrates requested a bail condition o f electronic tagging in Vignette Two, mistakenly 
believing this to be a power available to them. It may be that they were drawing on their experience of  
working in the Youth Courts where tagging is more widely used. When asked what changes they would 
like to see in the remand system, ten magistrates and one clerk volunteered the idea o f using electronic 
tagging for bail.
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buy drugs. As with non-serious offences, character did not seem to be considered as an 
important element in remand decisions for serious offences.
Eight of the 24 magistrates stated erroneously that they were required to take the 
prosecution’s case at its highest i.e. they had to assume the defendant was guilty and 
would be convicted regardless of their own views on the strength of the evidence. Two 
magistrates even remanded the woman in custody despite their belief that she was not 
guilty because they felt obliged to incorporate her alleged guilt into their decisions. 
Those six magistrates who granted her bail because they did not believe her to be guilty 
were all chairmen and/or had many years experience. They either had sufficient 
confidence in their own expertise (see Chapter Seven) to ignore this apparent 
requirement to accept the prosecution’s case at its highest or they knew that there was 
no such requirement.
It’s a pretty weak case but our training tells us in a magistrates’ court on a 
bail application that we have to accept the facts of the case given by the 
prosecution as true. But, and this is important, even if  they are true they 
don’t necessarily prove the case, (female magistrate)
The obligation to take the prosecution case at its highest was asserted so often that a 
question on it was included on the interviews for all legally qualified respondents. All 
but one of the five CPS officers, four clerks and four defence lawyers interviewed 
believed that magistrates were indeed required to take the prosecution case at its 
highest. When asked where this was requirement was enacted, none of them knew. One 
CPS officer made contact some weeks after the interview with the following statement
Further to our interview. I've now checked the position: there is no statutory 
provision to support that the Court has to take the prosecution case at the 
highest during bail application. Perhaps it is just a phrase commonly used by 
advocates (prosecutors and defence lawyers, at times the Magistrates!), 
(female CPS officer)
Bail hearings are supposed to be based around bail concerns and not on the strength of 
the case. At such an early stage in the process it would be impossible and inappropriate, 
particularly with complex cases, to make meaningful judgements about guilt. However, 
it was worrying that this general principle of practice was considered to be a statutory 
requirement by the majority of respondents.
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Vignette Two is based on a real case: despite disjointed and sparse objections to bail by 
the CPS, the bench remanded her in custody. The CPS withdrew the case the following 
week citing lack of evidence. It would be an overstatement to say that defendants 
charged with serious offences were never bailed. However, court observations and the 
responses to Vignette Two demonstrated that magistrates were very reluctant to grant 
bail on serious offences because they feared the consequences. This was true even when 
the objections to bail were not substantial. Moreover, magistrates were less willing to 
consider personal mitigation when assessing the defendant and the risk they presented 
when the alleged offence was serious. Custody appeared almost inescapable for serious 
offences, regardless of mitigating factors. Referring to Vignette Two, a female 
magistrate explained how simple the decision rationale was,
the fact that the people were upstairs means it is a serious offence. That is 
probably over-weighing everything else you’ve told me. (female magistrate)
Both the Working Party and previous Lord Chancellors expressed the view that the dual 
approach to remand according to offence seriousness was acceptable:
I would be slow to grant bail in cases where the charge was murder, 
attempted murder, rape or attempted rape, or wounding, or other grave 
crimes. This list is not exhaustive...if the exceptions and restrictions 
provided by the Schedule to the [Bail] Act were properly applied, only in 
exceptional cases would one expect to see bail granted to a person charged 
with murder, rape, wounding, or other grave crimes. (Lord Hailsham 
addressing the Magistrates’ Association in 1984 cited in (Corre and 
Wolchover 1999:29)
It is clear from the language used that offence seriousness should not be the only matter 
considered, and ‘seriousness’ specifically relates to very “grave” crimes. More research 
is needed on the boundaries of what magistrates consider constitutes a ‘serious’ offence 
in practice. Observations in the current study suggest that the benchmark of 
‘seriousness’ has moved since Lord Hailsham’s statement and now encompasses many 
more offences. This may reflect a shift from the original primary purpose of custodial 
remand, to ensure attendance^^, towards a prioritisation of preventing offending on bail 
(Corre and Wolchover 1999). Offence seriousness and the harm to potential future
“The principal matter which the court has to consider in deciding a bail application is whether, if  
granted bail, the defendant is likely to attend at the time and place required.” (Home Office 1974:18). 
Chapter Four explored how the socio-political context has altered the main purpose o f remand from 
ensuring attendance to preventing offending on bail.
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victims are valid considerations in remand decisions. However, it is suggested here that 
flexible guidelines (i.e. ones which allow for variations in seriousness within categories 
of offences) should be issued on what constitutes a serious enough offence to alter the 
assessment and consideration of the grounds for withholding bail. One observed case in 
particular, Example 5.2 demonstrated magistrates’ sometimes arbitrary response to 
offence seriousness and illustrated the need for guidance on the appropriate use of 
‘offence seriousness’ as a ground for withholding bail.
The responsibility to take account of the strength of the evidence had particular salience 
in cases where the seriousness of the offence predisposed magistrates to remand in 
custody regardless of mitigating factors and, sometimes, in the absence of any 
‘substantial grounds’ for remanding in custody.
Evidently, in the majority of cases the seriousness of the offence charged was the most 
significant consideration in remand hearings. It framed how magistrates approached 
cases and was the primary determinant of case resolution, often irrespective of other 
issues. Hucklesby was struck by the fact that magistrates still often granted bail even 
when defendants had breached their bail,
72 per cent of defendants who were charged with a bail offence were still 
granted bail which is surprising considering the historical and legal 
significance of failing to appear and suggests that the majority of defendants 
charged with a bail offence are trusted to appear at a later date (Hucklesby 
1994b:210).
In the context of the models outlined above, these figures are not surprising. It is posited 
that the majority of the 72 per cent were not actually trusted to reappear but were re­
granted bail because their original offence was not serious enough to warrant a remand 
in custody despite the evident bail risk. However, some defendants fail to appear with 
such regularity that, even though their offences are not serious, their contempt for court 
proceedings eventually results in their re-categorisation as cusp cases which exposes 
them to the risk of being remanded in custody. It is to cusp cases that the discussion 
now turns.
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Model Two: Cusp Cases and Individualised Decision Making
Before the responses to Vignette Three are presented, a fuller explanation and definition 
o f ‘cusp cases’ is required. Vignette Three explored cusp cases: those cases that did not 
fall easily into the bifurcated pattern of decision making outlined above. Cusp cases are 
those on the borderline between conditional bail and custodial remand. The overriding 
determinant of magistrates’ resolution of Vignettes One and Two was the seriousness of 
the offence. The offences in the cusp category can be understood as being of ‘mid- 
range’ seriousness. However, unlike both non-serious and serious offences, in the cusp 
category ‘seriousness’ is not simply defined by the offence type but by the 
characteristics of the defendant, the pattern of offending, and the specific nature of the 
offence which may be concealed by broad offence categories. Echoing Hough et al’s 
(2003) findings on borderline sentencing decisions, observations of cusp cases revealed 
no patterns either in the types of offences that fell into the cusp category, or in the 
remand outcomes of offence types in the cusp category.
The cusp category probably does contain some offence types which are regarded by 
magistrates as being of mid-range seriousness and are thus not approached in the 
manner that non-serious or serious offences are. For example, although Hough et al 
(2003) found that borderline cases were not defined by offence type, they noted that 
certain types of violent offences were more commonly defined as ‘borderline’ than 
others (Hough, et al. 2003:39).
Replicating previous evidence on female offending (Burman 2004; Daly 1994; 
Hedderman 2004; Hedderman and Gelsthorpe 1997; Home Office 2003a), the women 
tracked through the remand system were typically either non-serious but prolific 
offenders (e.g. shoplifting or handling stolen goods) or had committed one very serious 
offence (e.g. arson or burglary). Because of the nature of the observed females’ 
offending patterns, the present study is unable to conclude whether or not particular 
offence types have intrinsic mid-range seriousness and are, therefore, categorised as 
cusp cases. It would be interesting to conduct similar research on males in the remand 
system to see what, if any, the differences in the cusp category for the two groups were. 
During the interviews and vignettes, magistrates did comment that making bail 
decisions for females was much harder than for men because of the nature of their 
offending.
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It’s predominantly men that we see and the question of bail is usually much 
more straightforward than with women because of the offences they’ve 
committed, (male magistrate).
If the cases in the cusp category were not determined by seriousness as defined simply 
by offence type, how should the category be understood? Three different types of cusp 
cases were observed. The first concerned offences that initially appeared serious but 
when the details were presented in court there was reason not to remand in custody 
because the nature of the offence did not automatically warrant it. This finding reflects 
more general comparisons between male and female offending: the broad offence 
categories mask variations in seriousness between male and female offending (Daly 
1994). In the present study some of the most serious charges fell into this category: two 
charges of possession of offensive weapons, one charge of possessing a firearm, and 
two charges of burglary fitted this pattern. The following example illustrates how the 
same offence categorisation can conceal very different offending behaviour.
Example 5.3
One burglary case related to a woman who had broken into her ex-husband’s flat during 
the day whilst he was known to be away on holiday. She removed goods she claimed 
were hers and left the building. This contrasts with another case of burglary, this time a 
male, whose case also happened to be observed during the same week at the same court. 
The female occupant of a flat had woken up at approximately 3.00am to find a man in 
her bedroom. Having broken into her flat, he had disturbed her whilst going through her 
bedroom chest of drawers. Although both were defined as domestic burglaries, the 
female’s offence is far less serious with none of the aggravating features evident in the 
male’s offence.
The second type of offences which populated the cusp category were those which were 
not serious in their character but were aggravated by the prolific nature of the offending. 
Commonly observed examples were shoplifting and attempted deception using stolen 
credit or debit cards. The level and frequency of offending had to be very significant for 
magistrates to debate whether to use custodial remand for a non-serious offence.
Example 5.4
A 20 year old woman appeared before a male lay bench at Orrington Street charged 
with shoplifting (two leather jackets valued at £60 each) and going equipped for theft 
(possession of a multi-tool used for removing the jackets’ security tags). She had 
pleaded not guilty to all charges six weeks previously and had been released on bail
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pending the trial. She had failed to attend the trial and was charged with this too. When 
the charge of failing to attend court was put, her defence representative said:
She has no explanation really and will plead guilty to it. She has been a heroin 
user for some time. She was released from court in November and fell back into 
use and simply failed to attend.
The CPS officer added that the police had informed him that she had failed to report for 
police bail. The defendant disputed this and pleaded not guilty to these charges. The 
CPS officer opposed bail:
Bail is opposed as she has failed to appear in the past. She has also failed to 
appear three times on the November matter. The defendant will fail to attend and 
she may commit further offences to feed her drug habit.
The clerk added that she has “a lot of other matters, thefls, that she has pleaded guilty 
on that are awaiting a PSR.” Her defence representative made a bail application stating 
that her child had recently been taken into care and she was suffering from depression 
and was now “desperate to get off drugs” as a result. This defendant had a very 
extensive record for shoplifting and failing to attend court and the magistrates retired to 
consider bail. They bailed her with multiple conditions: residence, daily reporting to a 
police station, and a 7am to 7pm curfew (to prevent her stealing from shops).
Another type of offence in this group was non-serious offences which did not warrant a 
remand in custody because of their prolific nature but defendants were still at risk of 
custodial remand because they conspicuously defied the court. Magistrates struggled 
with the conclusion that they had “no other choice” but to use custodial remand for a 
non-serious offence.
Example 5.5
A woman was charged with criminal damage in Central District. She had been arrested 
for breaking windows in a high-profile, and heavily policed, public building. The 
defendant was of no fixed abode and appeared in court on overnight custody. She did 
not have a significant record of antecedents and the CPS did not object to bail. The 
defence bail application stated that she was homeless and had broken the windows in an 
attempt to draw attention to her situation. The male district judge began to explain that 
she would be released on conditional bail when she interrupted him and stated her 
intention to commit the same offence as soon as she was released unless housing was 
found for her. The district judge appeared annoyed and told her that she could not 
“blackmail” the court. He bailed her. She reappeared the following day before the same 
district judge for the same offence. Again she said she would reoffend. The district 
judge remanded her in custody, telling her that he had “no other option as I cannot allow 
you to flout the authority of the court again.” It is possible that the woman might have 
been bailed again if her chosen target was not such a high-profile public building.
As cusp cases were not primarily organised around the seriousness of the offence or 
system imperatives (see Model Three below), decision making was much more 
individualised and the particular characteristics and needs of the defendants were 
paramount. This model is in the tradition of the positivist approach to criminal justice 
decision making which is concerned with the reasons why individuals offend, and what
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interventions, if any, could and should be employed in particular cases. In this research, 
cusp case remand decisions were seen to be highly individualised and ‘evidence’ was 
selected and interpreted depending on the moral assessment of a defendant. The specific 
ways in which moral assessments were made about women are discussed in detail in 
Chapter Six. A favourable impression meant
other potentially condemning data can now be re-assembled so that it 
becomes more difficult to ascribe unfavourable meanings to them. (Hawkins 
1983:110).
The concerns here were welfare and rehabilitation. Many magistrates were deeply 
committed to the idea of ‘doing something to help’ and were prepared to take chances 
and release ‘risky’ defendants because of their perceived needs. There was, however, a 
sharp moral distinction made between those women who magistrates felt were genuine 
and would benefit from help, and those who were seen to be ‘playing the system’, 
cynically making pleas for help or pretending to be candidates for rehabilitation in order 
to secure bail. This moral division between the “troubled” and the “troublesome” 
(Hedderman and Gelsthorpe 1997) women is discussed more fully in the next chapter.
Vignette Three - Case Summary:
A 25 year old woman appeared on overnight custody charged with thefl of a handbag. 
She failed to attend in the current proceedings and has a substantial record for similar 
offences but personal mitigation is presented in her bail application.
Of the 24 magistrates, eight remanded the defendant in Vignette Three in custody, 15 
gave her conditional bail and one gave her unconditional bail. These contradictory 
responses to Vignette Three illustrate magistrates’ inconsistent approach to and 
resolution of this case which contrasts with the greater uniformity evident in Vignettes 
One and Two^^. Such variation was expected as Vignette Three was designed to explore 
decision-making in cases that were on the borderline between a remand in custody and 
conditional bail.
In Vignette Two, the figures are similar: 15 remanded in custody and nine gave conditional bail. It is 
argued, however, that the response to Vignette Two was more consistent than the response to Vignette 
Three: in Vignette Two, o f the 16 who accepted there was a case to answer, 13 remanded in custody and 
two who believed her to be innocent still remanded the defendant in custody because o f the seriousness o f  
the offence. If Vignette Two had not been designed to explore also the secondary issue o f the strength o f  
the evidence, it is believed that the majority o f the magistrates who granted bail would have remanded the 
defendant in custody too.
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Vignette Three was based on a real case which magistrates demonstrably struggled to 
resolve. The vignette allowed analysis of the type of issues that magistrates selected to 
focus on in a typical cusp case and an exploration of how these issues differed from the 
considerations that typified approaches to non-serious and to serious cases. It did elicit 
contradictory responses from the magistrates but, just as with Vignettes One and Two, 
there was significant consistency in the issues that individual magistrates were 
concerned with: i.e., whilst outcomes varied, magistrates all approached decision 
making in the cusp case in the same way. Information was processed in a substantially 
different way from the other two vignettes. For example, much greater attention was 
paid to issues illuminating the ‘character’ of the defendant in the cusp case. This was 
not simply a product of the ways the vignettes were constructed as comparable 
mitigating data was available in the non-serious and serious offence vignettes but 
magistrates did not focus on it.
The ways in which cusp cases should be processed and resolved are, by definition, open 
to debate. Cases are not easily defined by their seriousness and so encourage more 
individualised decision-making; a fact reflected in the issues that magistrates focussed 
on when explaining their decisions.
In contrast to Vignettes One and Two, only two magistrates commented on likely 
sentence for Vignette Three. One explanation of this is that the cases on the cusp for 
remand are also on the cusp for sentencing and so magistrates are not confident in 
anticipating later decisions. They cannot justify a custodial remand on the basis of a 
probable custodial sentence if that sentence is not, in fact, probable. Another possible 
explanation is that, as will be seen below, in cusp cases the ultimate sentence is often 
informed by behaviour during the period of bail. The bail period is used to test the 
defendant’s commitment to rehabilitation programmes etc. and, at the end of the bail 
period, sentencing outcomes will reflect her conduct on bail. So, in some cusp cases 
magistrates were not bailing in anticipation of the likely sentence, as they were with 
serious and non-serious offences, but were granting bail as a way of facilitating a 
subsequent bench’s sentencing decision.
Interestingly, only six magistrates gave any kind of assessment of the bail risk that this 
defendant presented and these were contradictory; some regarded her as likely to
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reoffend whilst others were confident that she would not. In Vignettes One and Two 
‘risk’ was primarily defined by magistrates as the amount of harm done if an offence 
took place (i.e. based on seriousness). The magistrates were more confident in their 
assertions about the nature and significance of the risk in Vignettes One and Two.
As more magistrates bailed the woman in Vignette Three than in Vignette Two and as 
the offence was more serious than in Vignette One, more comment on bail conditions 
was expected. The nature of the particular bail conditions given are not discussed in 
detail here as they were, in large part, the same as the conditions offered by the defence 
representative in the vignette (see Appendix Three). Magistrates did not innovate and 
suggest new conditions in Vignette Three as they did in Vignette Two where they used 
conditions in an attempt to control that defendant. The apparent role of conditions was 
different in the three vignettes and reflected what was observed taking place in 
courtrooms. Magistrates bailed defendants in Vignette One regardless of perceived risk 
and conditions were recognised to have limited utility in preventing breaches of bail. 
They were admitted to be applied more for magistrates’ sake than with any real 
expectation that they would change defendants’ behaviour whilst on bail. Most 
magistrates who bailed in Vignette Two doubted there was a case to answer but those 
who did have concerns suggested stringent bail conditions which, they felt, successfully 
controlled the specific risk of offending in that case. Bail conditions were tailored to the 
specific circumstances and were used to regulate defendants’ behaviour. In Vignette 
Three, seven of the 16 magistrates who gave bail spontaneously said they would address 
the defendant directly to “give them a little homily” (female magistrate) or “read her the 
riot act” (male magistrate) i.e. to encourage her to take the matter seriously, to 
appreciate that she was being given a chance to prove herself and that the consequences 
of any breach of the conditions would be custody. This personalised appeal to 
defendants was totally absent from the discussion (and observations) of non-serious and 
serious offences but was evident in both Vignette Three and the observed cusp cases. It 
may indicate that magistrates were “prepared to take a risk” (male magistrate) in such 
cases, making a ‘personal contract’ (Hough, et al. 2003) with defendants and responding 
to them in a more individualised way.
The most striking difference in the manner of magistrates’ comments on the three 
vignettes was the relevance of ‘character’. Character was commonly equated with 
demeanour. In Vignettes One and Two character was barely commented on despite
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information being provided but in Vignette Three, 12 of the 24 magistrates expressed a 
desire to see the defendant in order to assess her demeanour. A further three said that 
they found cases where the defendant was an addict particularly difficult as they were 
unsure whether or not they could trust what she said and seeing her might help them 
make that judgement. The ways in which actors made moral assessments about 
defendants and the impact these had on hearing outcomes are explored below in depth 
in the next chapter.
Model Three: System Imperatives
The reasoning magistrates employed when the offence was defined by case processing 
needs was not explored using a case vignette. This was partly for practical reasons: it 
was felt that a fourth vignette would limit the time available for discussion of important 
issues in the semi-structured interviews. It was also because this model was explicitly 
acknowledged in remand hearings by participants and so it was not necessary to 
construct a case vignette to encourage magistrates to talk about their reasoning. The data 
in this section are from court observations.
In this third group of cases, the purpose of the remand decision was not to minimise 
harm or to address the needs of a defendant but was instead tailored to the 
organisational and information needs of the criminal justice process itself. Clear links 
can be seen between the rationale of this model and the political and organisational 
pressures outlined in Chapter Four, such as the need to reduce delay in court 
proceedings and the problems faced by the CPS because of insufficient administrative 
support. The legal framework was manipulated to suit case processing needs. It was 
only in those cases where there was a procedural problem that this model was required, 
and it was often, though not always, evident in the remand rationale of the second or 
subsequent hearing i.e. the initial remand decision was more likely to fit the rationale of 
Models One and Two.
Some authors (Hucklesby 1994b) have argued that bail bargaining takes place in the 
remand system. The defence and the prosecution cooperate to produce remand decisions 
which have less to do with grounded assessments of risk and more to do with speeding 
up the hearing by reaching agreement prior to the hearing. Little evidence of this was
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found in the present study, a finding supported elsewhere (Dhami 2001). CPS officers 
and defence representatives were observed in discussion prior to hearings but, when 
these groups were interviewed, all respondents said these snatched conversations were 
rarely about the bail position. Rather, they were about the progress of the case: securing 
disclosure of evidence, establishing convenient dates for hearings, raising potential 
problems, etc. The nature of the relationship between the CPS and defence 
representatives is discussed in Chapter Eight.
However, in other jurisdictions, there appears to be strong evidence that bail is used in 
plea bargaining. This illustrates how the bail stage of criminal proceedings can be 
employed to serve purposes related to later stages of the criminal justice process. What 
structures the remand decision may, for example, have more to do with securing a case 
for the prosecution than with bail risk per se. Kellough (2002) reported in her study on 
the Canadian remand system that
rather than ‘managing risk’, our findings reveal that the detention of accused 
person is a rather important resource that the prosecution uses to encourage 
(or coerce) guilty pleas firom accused persons. (Kellough and Wortley 
2002:186).
The examples found in the present study did not raise the same degree of concern as 
Kellough’s findings, perhaps reflecting differences in the English and Canadian 
systems, but the principle remains: some remand decisions are reached not because of 
assessment of risk, but in order to overcome obstacles (for example, a defendant who 
was not pleading guilty or a prison which failed to produce defendants at court) and 
promote speed and efficiency in the remand process and in later stages of the criminal 
justice system. The following case processing reasons for making a remand decision 
were observed being employed in the courts in this study.
i -  Securing Attendance
Ensuring a defendant attends court is, of course, a primary purpose of the Bail Act. 
However, there was evidence that courts resorted to using their powers to remand in 
custody to ensure attendance in an attempt to compensate for problems elsewhere in the 
criminal justice system, often attempting to overcome shortages of resources which 
might prevent defendants fi*om appearing. In discussing the difficulties magistrates’
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courts had in securing defendants’ appearance in court firom prison, Hucklesby (1994b) 
noted that defendants were remanded
in custody rather than on technical bail (those on bail for the present 
proceedings but who were either in custody to another court or serving a 
sentence) meaning under the eight clear days rule, the defendant must be 
produced (Hucklesby 1994b).
These defendants would he in custody regardless of the remand outcome. However, the 
salient point is that they would appear in remand statistics as custodial remands even 
though a custodial remand was technically unnecessary. Magistrates sought to use the 
legal status of a custodial remand as a tool to force prisons to produce defendants at 
court.
Similarly, the present study found magistrates issued warrants not backed for bail^  ^
when defendants failed to attend court. As warrants not backed for bail were more likely 
to be prioritised by police than warrants backed for bail, magistrates were inclined to 
use them even where there was little or no risk of a subsequent remand in custody. 
Again, magistrates used remand decisions to overcome problems elsewhere in the 
criminal justice system. As a result, defendants would be held in police cells on 
overnight custody waiting to be taken to the magistrates’ court the next morning. As 
Hucklesby argues.
The problems with the execution of warrants, therefore, seem to create a 
situation where the decisions of the court are taken more for pragmatic and 
practical reasons than in the interests of the defendant, the court, or justice. 
(Hucklesby 1994b:56).
It is also possible to remand a person in custody for reports (typically a convicted 
defendant) if  releasing the defendant would make it impracticable to secure the report 
because, for example, the defendant would not attend the probation appointment. Whilst 
the necessity of this power is not questioned, the research raised some serious concerns 
about the disproportionate length of time that some defendants were kept in custody 
awaiting reports because of pressure on probation resources. Four women were 
observed to receive additional remands in custody because the probation service had 
failed to complete the reports by the court’s stated deadline. This illustrates how the 
contextual factors identified in the previous chapter, such as a shortage of resources, in
A warrant for the defendant’s arrest was issued and it instructed the police not to bail the defendant but 
to hold her overnight to appear at court the next morning. A warrant backed for bail allows the police to 
re-arrest a person but to bail them with a new court date.
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this case probation officers, affected remand decision making. Each of these defendants 
remained in custody for an additional minimum of three weeks. Evidently women were 
serving extra time on custodial remand because of a shortage of resources (see Chapter 
Four).
One case was observed where the CPS sought to use a remand hearing in one case to 
resolve a problem in another unconnected case.
Example 5.6
A young woman appeared on overnight custody at Old Market Street on a charge of 
‘allowing herself to be carried’ (i.e. she had been a passenger in a car, knowing it to be 
stolen). The CPS officer told the mixed lay bench that the defendant had numerous 
other cases proceeding through the court. He said that although the current charge 
would not normally attract a custodial remand, he was requesting one because he 
wanted to make sure that she attended court to answer the other charges that were in the 
system already. The clerk intervened and said that was not an acceptable reason for a 
custodial remand. The CPS officer re-stated his request for custodial remand but said 
the grounds were the risk of failing to appear. The magistrates released her on 
conditional bail.
Although unsuccessful in this case, the request for a custodial remand may have been 
supported by magistrates if the CPS officer had phrased his argument differently and 
thus avoided the objection by the clerk. It is impossible to know in how many other 
remand hearings similar considerations are the basis of the request but they are never 
voiced in open court.
ii - Bringing Together Disparate Charges
Another example of remand decisions whose purpose lay in procedural needs rather 
than risk assessment was the practice of delaying sentencing in order to tie the case in 
with other cases and/or PSRs that were being processed by a court. If sentence was 
postponed, the question of remand arose.
There are two sets of matters. The old matters at Connorton Road, which led 
to the breach, and the new matters before this court. I request that we take a 
consolidated overview to be taken in sentencing her so I would like to keep 
all matters together, so I will not be making a bail application (male defence 
representative).
On four occasions defence representatives requested sentencing be delayed so charges 
could be brought together and a remand in custody resulted. Obviously there were pre­
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existing grounds for the custodial remands but, if  custodial remand statistics are to be 
meaningfully interpreted, it is important to understand that some remands are required 
because defendants choose to delay the resolution of their case. Ironically, in the 
following example, the defence representative declined to apply for bail to try and speed 
up the process of sentencing but, as a result, the defendant actually had to spend even 
longer in custody.
Example 5.7
A 22 year old woman appeared at Inswick Comer on a charge of deception using a 
stolen credit card and a breach of bail (it was argued that she was not resident at the 
address she had been bailed to). Her defence solicitor explained that she disputed the 
breach.
The failure to reside is contested because the address the court had was wrong 
and she has been residing at her home.
Despite the fact that this could have formed the basis of a bail application, her defence 
solicitor did not apply for bail. He said.
There is a PSR on another matter and that’s due on 6*^  December. It is for a 
similar matter of handling a stolen credit card and, therefore, if it assists, I will 
not make a bail application and the two charges can be brought together for that 
PSR.
The male district judge agreed that it made sense but the probation officer in court said. 
Because the court had the wrong address, the PSR appointment letter will have 
gone to the wrong address so we cannot meet the 6^  ^December date.
The defence representative replied
But I was told the letter hadn’t gone out yet so the wrong address cannot be the 
reason for not meeting the 6^  ^December date.
The probation officer said
But that date could only be met if she were not in custody.
The magistrate said
Are you content for her to be remanded in custody until 16^  ^December? [The 
defendant looked at her representative and then shrugged her assent]. Then I’m 
afraid it’s remand in custody until 16^  ^December for the preparation of a PSR 
with all sentencing options.
When the defendant reappeared in court on the 16^  ^ December, the probation officer 
said the report still had not been completed. The defendant was remanded in custody 
until after Christmas.
iii -  Anticipating Sentence
In contrast to Hucklesby (1994b), the present study found that some magistrates did 
report considering possible sentencing outcomes when making remand decisions. This 
was seen in the previous section (Model One) where magistrates would only 
exceptionally remand in custody if a custodial sentence was unlikely. Although it was 
never explicitly commented on in court, if  a custodial sentence was considered likely,
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magistrates said in interview they would be inclined to remand in custody for any 
requested reports to be completed, bi this way, “she can start her sentence early; there’s 
not much point bailing her if she’s going to be locked up again really” (female 
magistrate). Some magistrates even persuaded themselves that they were doing the 
defendant a favour.
Any custodial sentence she got in the outcome would be reduced by the 
amount of time that she’s been on remand in slightly nicer conditions, 
(female magistrate)
Defendants themselves also saw the advantage of getting a custodial sentence underway 
as soon as possible and chose not to make a bail application for that reason (see Chapter 
Seven for a discussion of how defendants’ choices affected remand hearings and 
outcomes). However, 59% of women remanded in custody do not receive custodial 
sentences (see Table 1.5). In interview, clerks commented on magistrates’ inconsistent 
sentencing, indicating that magistrates may have different views on whether an offence 
would be likely to attract a custodial sentence. One bench might justify a remand in 
custody to themselves based on an expectation of a probable custodial sentence but the 
sentencing panel may take a different view and issue a community penalty. Moreover, 
magistrates at the sentencing stage have access to information which is unavailable at 
the remand stage e.g. PSRs that may mitigate against a custodial sentence. Justifying a 
remand in terms of an anticipated sentence is fraught with problems, particularly when 
the charge has not yet been proved, and may result in unjust custodial remands.
iv -  Remand As A Sentencing Tool
In most cases this rationale applied to the grant of bail and to convicted women awaiting 
sentencing. The duration of the bail period was used as an informal assessment period, 
an opportunity for her to prove that she would refrain from taking drugs, attend all 
appointments, cooperate with the PSR, etc. on bail.
I would ask for a four week remand at [hostel] to show that she will comply 
with the rules of the hostel. If she succeeds, the court may feel she would be 
capable of a full CRO (male defence representative at Inswick Comer).
The purpose was explicitly stated in court: proof of good behaviour on bail makes a 
community sentence more likely.
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Example 5.8
A 25 year old woman appeared at Old Market Street charged with attempted deception. 
The CPS had opposed bail on the grounds of the risk of further offending as she had 
committed a number of offences on bail. Her defence representative urged the mixed lay 
bench to
consider her for bail and give her an opportunity to show that she can cooperate 
with probation and that may help the court in sentencing in a few weeks time 
(male defence representative).
Although this rationale was usually used when granting women bail, there was one case 
where the defendant was told that if she remained drug-free on custodial remand for two 
weeks, she would be allowed into a bail hostel and, in turn, that would affect her likely 
sentence as she could then be assessed for a drug treatment and testing order (DTTO). 
Only rarely could defendants receive a DTTO from custody as they need to be assessed 
in the community.
More commonly, the police decision to hold a defendant on overnight custody for a 
non-serious offence was reported by magistrates in interview to be useful for the 
processing of some defendants (particularly loiterers and beggars) as the option of 
sentencing them to ‘time served’ allowed them to dispose of the case immediately.
In all these cusp cases, the remand decisions cannot be understood simply in terms of 
offence seriousness or moral assessment. Even though it would not be evident from 
official records, it is apparent in court that the specific purpose of such remands were 
the system imperatives of the criminal justice process and these worked both in tandem 
with and over-rode other considerations.
Conclusion
Remands in custody can only be accounted for in terms of the risk criteria of the Bail 
Act, regardless of the real rationale of a remand decision. Consequently, the language of 
risk was almost always present in remand hearings, in both defence applications and in 
the formal reasons cited for a remand decision. However, it has been shown in this 
chapter that although the system required actors to address the narrative of bail risk, it 
was not the only, or even the primary, rationale for most remand decisions. As 
McBamet (1981) argues, a system’s rhetoric does not necessarily reflect the reality of 
its decisions making practices. This chapter identified and explained the other rationales
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for decision making that were evident in the working practices and norms of the remand 
system.
This chapter has shown that the flexibility of the law, and the inability of regulatory 
mechanisms to constrain magistrates’ decision rationales, allowed magistrates to adapt 
the legal framework according to concerns relating to the nature of the offence, the 
character of the defendant, and the procedural needs of the justice system. The remand 
system was found to operate using a set of different rationales for decision making, 
illustrated in the three models of remand, each of which prioritised different concerns 
and adapted the remand process and remand law accordingly.
In Model One, offence seriousness was used as a proxy measure of bail ‘risk’. 
Moreover, offence seriousness was so fundamental to remand outcomes that petty 
offences were always bailed regardless of strong evidence that the defendant would 
breach their bail, and serious offences always resulted in custodial remands even where 
there was little evidence of actual risk. As was seen in the previous chapter, actors 
incorporated anticipation of public opinion and media reporting into their actions. In 
serious cases, CPS officers were seen to be reluctant to recommend, and magistrates 
reluctant to grant, conditional bail for fear of the possible public/media reaction. The 
socio-political context can evidently affect the ways in which magistrates and others 
choose to categorise particular offences. It is suggested that heightened social and/or 
media anxiety about particular offences could result in them being defined and 
processed as ‘serious’ offences, and thus determine remand outcomes.
In Model Two, difficulties with categorising the seriousness of the offences resulted in 
magistrates adopting a more individualised approach to decision making that rested on 
assessments of defendants’ needs and deservingness. In this model, decision making 
was based on moral assessment, not risk assessment. The next chapter explores in more 
detail how this model was used in cusp cases involving female defendants.
In Model Three, it was the needs of the criminal process itself that structured why 
remand decisions were made. This chapter illustrated how the organisational and 
political pressures on the remand system, identified in the previous chapter, were 
translated into practice in remand courts.
152
This chapter has laid out the various ways in which the legal framework was interpreted 
by magistrates and others. The application of these models in practice, however, was 
not always unproblematic and straightforward. Chapters Seven and Eight illustrate that 
the ways in which the models were translated into practice in the remand court was 
partly structured by the complex social framework of the magistrates’ court. Before 
moving on to consider the social organisation of magistrates’ courts and the effect it had 
on decision making, the next chapter will discuss in more detail the degree to which 
remand decisions about female defendants were influenced by considerations of gender.
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Chapter Six________________________
T he Role Of G en der  In R em and  Decisions
The previous chapter identified that where remand outcomes were not determined by 
the nature of the offence, magistrates used more individualised decision making that 
focused on the needs of the defendant. Central to outcomes in this model were 
judgements about the ‘deservingness’ of defendants which were based on moral 
assessments of individuals. It is argued that where individualised decisions were 
required, magistrates were more likely to be influenced by extralegal factors such as 
class and gender. This chapter illustrates that extralegal considerations did affect 
remand outcomes in cusp cases, and that the moral assessments of female defendants in 
this study were, in large part, structured by magistrates’ perceptions of women’s 
conformity to traditional gender roles. It is also demonstrated that defence 
representatives successfully used evidence of gender role conformity to construct 
mitigation in remand hearings.
Introduction
The previous chapter explored the degree to which the legal framework was adhered to 
in remand decisions. It was established that offence seriousness was magistrates’ 
primary consideration when reaching decisions on the appropriate outcome in remand 
cases, and remand law was differentially applied in light of this assessment of offence 
seriousness. It was further established that where the offence was not easily categorised 
in terms of seriousness, i.e. the cusp cases, magistrates adopted a more individualised 
approach to the resolution of remand hearings which included assessment of the 
individual defendant’s character.
This chapter considers the extent to which extralegal factors such as gender influenced 
the moral characterisation of women. The chapter begins with a consideration of why 
extralegal factors are used in decision making. It goes on to demonstrate the importance 
of extralegal factors in remand decision making by briefly illustrating how defendants’ 
class and demeanour affected magistrates’ decisions. The chapter then focuses in more
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depth on the extent to which decisions made about female defendants were framed in 
terms of their gender in cusp cases.
Under the Bail Act 1976, it is permissible to consider a defendant’s ‘character’ when 
deciding whether or not one of the exceptions to the right to bail apply. It is argued in 
this chapter that, for women, ‘character’ was constructed primarily around gender role 
fulfilment: a woman who could demonstrate conventionality and conformity was more 
likely to secure bail than a woman who could not. Again, although the language of 
‘risk’ was necessarily employed, decisions were, in fact, based on assessments of need 
and deservingness which provided the real rationale for remand decisions in these cases.
It is also argued that magistrates’ gender expectations meant they responded to 
women’s mitigation because they were less inclined to perceive women as entrenched 
and culpable offenders. Whilst there is evidence that this perception is based in the 
reality of female offending patterns (e.g. see (Burman 2004; Daly 1994; Hedderman 
2004; Hedderman and Gelsthorpe 1997; Home Office 2003a)), some magistrates 
admitted that it was gender roles, rather than gendered offending patterns, that shaped 
their bail decisions. For example, magistrates said that they were reluctant to remand 
women with dependants in custody, for the sake of the dependants, but that they viewed 
men who claimed to be carers with suspicion, as men who were ‘trying it on’ to secure 
bail. Gender role expectations shaped magistrates’ perceptions of male and female 
defendants.
The discussion in this chapter is based on a combination of observation and interview 
data. Again, whilst certain patterns and themes in decision making were apparent in 
court observations, magistrates rarely explained the rationale of their decisions to the 
court. Thus it was necessary to supplement observation data with interview data where 
the issues could be explicitly discussed.
The Relevance Of Extralegal Factors
As discussed in the previous chapter, in the majority of cases offence seriousness 
overrode consideration of all other factors, including extralegal issues such as gender. It 
was seen that magistrates did make moral judgements about the defendants in Model 
One, but these judgements were not considered relevant to the remand decision as the
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nature of the offence, above all else, determined the outcome. However, in the cusp 
cases, offence seriousness could not determine remand outcome as the categorisation of 
offence seriousness was itself problematic. In cases where offence seriousness was 
debateable, remand decisions were found to be framed by magistrates’ perceptions of 
individual female defendants’ characters and needs. In cases where routine 
considerations could not resolve a case, magistrates resorted to using extralegal criteria, 
in this case gender, to resolve hearings.
It is suggested here that decision makers might use extralegal factors in order to make 
sense of confused or conflicting information. The complex way information is 
structured and presented in the justice system can cause confusion, and thus possibly 
encourage a greater reliance on extralegal cues even where there is sufficient 
information available. Shapland (1987) describes the problems magistrates encounter 
with sentencing procedures and how they rely on selected items of information. She 
criticises sentencing procedure as being
one of the most inefficient ways we could have devised of presenting a large 
amount of information on a great many different subjects to a decision 
maker... it is likely either that the sentencer will come to fasten upon only a 
few items of information (not necessarily the same ones for each sentencer) 
or that he will place considerable reliance on the judgement of those who 
have had the opportunity to consider everything in peace -  the author of the 
social inquiry report (if there is one) or the defence solicitor or counsel. 
(Shapland 1987:80-81).
The role and influence of the various actors involved in the remand decision is 
discussed in Chapter Seven and Eight. It was established in Chapter Four that the nature 
of the remand system could cause problems for decision makers, with its pressures 
towards rapid case processing and the difficulties in securing verified information. It 
was argued that this did not present problems for decision making in the majority of 
‘self evident’ cases. However, it may have compounded existing uncertainty about how 
to process cusp cases, and further encouraged magistrates to ‘fasten upon only a few 
items of information’ in attempts to make sense of cusp cases under pressure of time 
and with insufficient and/or confused sources of information.
It is often problematic to equate one stage of the criminal justice process with another, 
but legitimate and extralegal or ‘extraneous’ (Kapardis 1987) factors have both been 
identified as influences on magistrates’ assessments of defendants in sentencing
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decisions^^. Moreover, there do appear to be some parallels between how and why 
extralegal factors are employed in remand decision making and in jurors’ assessment of 
guilt. Reskin and Visher (1986) found evidence that jurors resorted to using extralegal 
factors, such as assessments of defendants’ characters, in decision making when the 
evidence was weak.
The influence of extralegal factors were largely confined to weak cases in 
which the defendant’s guilt was ambiguous because the prosecution did not 
present enough hard evidence. In these situations, jurors -  forced to arrive at 
a decision -  were apparently swayed by their own values and reactions to 
the defendants and victims. When the prosecution offered ample hard 
evidence, jurors were more likely to be convinced of the defendant’s guilt 
without considering the extralegal factors we examined. (Reskin and Visher 
1986:436-437).
Unlike jurors deciding on guilt, it appears that in remand hearings magistrates did not 
use extralegal factors, such as gender, when the case was weak, perhaps because this is 
commonplace at the remand stage. However, extralegal factors were found to be 
considered when the outcome was not “self-evident” because the offence was neither 
serious nor trivial enough to determine the outcome, i.e. in cusp cases where the 
outcome was open to dispute. That is, in remand as in sentencing, decision makers 
resort to using extralegal factors to inform their decision when the likely outcome is 
debateable. Other research on remand has also found that the relevance of legal and/or 
extralegal criteria varied depending on the nature of the case.
[T]he saliency of the role of statutorily prescribed factors varies across 
decisions. This finding underscores the importance of context in research of 
this kind. (Nagel 1983:511).
The remainder of the section explores the ways in which magistrates used extralegal 
factors in their decision making. It is argued that a defendant’s personal characteristics 
may foster discriminatory outcomes as magistrates’ assessments of individuals are 
mediated through the magistrates’ own personal beliefs and stereotypes.
In a review o f a series o f research findings on courtroom decision making, Kapardis (1987) points out 
that extraneous factors’ influence on sentencing is not limited to the characteristics o f the defendant but 
also includes those o f the sentencer and the victim. Lay magistrates’ sentencing decisions were found to 
be influenced by legitimate factors as well as “their own characteristics and penal philosophies [which] 
are likely to effect how they perceive and decide on cases.” (Kapardis 1987:193).
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Them  And Us’
As the focus of this study was female defendants, it is unsurprising that the data 
collected through this analytic lens highlighted the issue of gender. However, this is not 
to say that gender was the only extralegal issue that magistrates might have considered. 
It was argued in Chapter Two that gender can be bisected by class, race, ethnicity, 
nationality, etc., all of which may affect decision making practices. Before moving on to 
a fuller discussion of the role that gender played in magistrates’ decision making, this 
chapter will briefly explore how the social status^^ of the defendants and magistrates 
influenced remand decision making.
It is argued that the social and economic disparities between the majority of the 
magistracy and the individuals they were remanding meant that magistrates used 
stereotypes when processing defendants and/or misunderstood motivations for actions, 
which could affect how defendants were assessed and cases categorised.
Contradictory evidence has been found on the link between magistrates’ class and 
leniency in sentencing (Hogarth 1971; Hood 1962). The ‘them’ and ‘us’ attitude that 
was identified in ‘Yellowtown’ (Parker, et al. 1989:22) was not evident in any of the 
interviews conducted in this study. In contrast, for some there was a liberal middle-class 
desire to limit the social distance between magistrates and defendants. Four of the 
magistrates made comments such as “there but for the grace of God”. However, whilst 
all the clerks agreed that many magistrates had this “well meaning” attitude, they 
identified a wide social and economic gulf between the magistrates and the majority of 
defendants. One clerk went on to comment that this affected decision-making. He 
argued that magistrates simply could not relate to most defendants and failed to 
understand their motivations because magistrates applied their own motivations to 
defendants’ actions. Consequently, “they miss the point” in some cases and made, in the 
clerk’s view, harsh decisions.
The courts in this study were selected because they served particularly diverse areas, even in 
conparison to the rest o f the City and it was hoped that data could be collected on possible variations in 
the treatment of different racial, ethnic, and national groups. However, although there were some 
observed differences, for example in the pace o f hearings where translators were required, data on these 
issues was difficult to collect for two reasons. Firstly, particularly as women were the focus o f study, too 
few matched pairs o f cases were observed to generate data sets that could be meaningfully compared. 
Secondly, it was considered unlikely that magistrates would comment on race or nationality in the 
interviews. As three o f the clerks observed, magistrates’ training sensitised them to issues o f racism 
which made them very unlikely to refer to such issues, even if  they did enter magistrates’ decision 
making rationale.
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[Magistrates] don’t get into the minds of what the defendant’s actually 
thinking. Our biggest problem is no insurance. Magistrates think no 
insurance is the most heinous crime committed in this court and we [the 
clerks] often joke saying it was dangerous driving, he went through five red 
traffic lights and all that but it’s alright because he had insurance. If he had 
no insurance they’d be sentencing him to prison straight away. They can’t 
seem to see past it and the reason is, and you can hear it when you discuss it 
with them, is they think if they were to drive a car without insurance, they 
would be doing it completely deliberately with a mindset that insurance 
costs so much per year and I can avoid paying that by driving without 
insurance and if I get caught without tax I’ll just pay the back duty on it and 
so it would be a really deliberate sort of action. But the mindset of the ones 
we get, they bought the car for fifty quid and they haven’t bothered to tax 
and insure it and if  it gets written off or stolen, they just don’t care. The car 
costs less than the insurance. But the magistrates, they would never dream 
of driving their BMW without insurance but these defendants are driving 
their Ford Fiestas without insurance and there’s a much different level of 
criminality between the two things, the consequences are the same if they hit 
someone and there’s no third party.. .but it’s very difficult to get magistrates 
to think like that because they think in terms of what they would do and 
again if you come in to bail decisions then they’ve got to consider, say, 
seriousness of the offence and would they abscond? These people who have 
lived in [economically deprived area] have lived there their entire lives in a 
bedsit or a one bedroom fiat or whatever but they’ve lived there for 20 
years. The magistrate might think ‘well if I lived in a one bedroom fiat I’d 
leave. I’d go to Barbados, I wouldn’t stay around for my trial’, but these 
people would, they do. They’re not going to fail to surrender because they 
don’t know anywhere else, they’ve lived in the area all their life and they’re 
not going to go anywhere. And even if they didn’t turn up they’d be arrested 
on a warrant straight away because they’ll still be walking around [area].
But it’s very difficult to get them to equate that, (male clerk)
This gap between offenders’ motivations and magistrates’ assessments was also
observed to be evident in remand outcomes.
Example 6.1
A woman was refused bail at Inswick Comer on a charge of using a stolen credit card. 
The reason given was the likelihood of her failing to surrender. This was based on her 
previous record of failing to attend. The defence solicitor argued:
She has a large number of fail to appears for loitering offences but she hasn’t 
taken prostitution offences too seriously before as she regards them as not very 
serious. She has never failed to appear for a more serious matter.
The male district judge remanded her in custody saying that he did not believe she 
would attend court based on her previous record. From the dock the defendant begged 
not to be remanded in custody:
Please don’t send me to prison. I really would turn up to court. Please give me a 
chance. Please. Please don’t send me to prison. Please give me a chance. I’d turn up 
cos it’s serious, it’s not like prostitution.
The defendant’s logic was that a failure to appear on a loitering offence did not count as 
the offence was not serious. She distinguished between this and her attitude to the court
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on more serious matters. The district judge, however, seemed not to agree and his 
response was based on a judgement that her failures to attend exemplified her disrespect 
for the court and she could not be trusted to attend.
Some magistrates themselves commented that the magistracy may not be able to 
understand the motivations of the people they are processing because of the social and 
economic gulf between them. Most interviews were conducted in magistrates’ homes. 
The two magistrates who identified themselves (and whose homes - location, size and 
décor - confirmed this) as the least privileged of the magistrates interviewed, both 
spontaneously commented on the problem of whether the majority of their Bench could 
relate to defendants:
I wonder if you’ll be able to pick up on what people’s backgrounds are and 
if they influence things at all. I think they do. I wonder about the magistrates 
who only ever see the poorer and more struggling people in society when 
they’re in court. I wonder how they view them. If I doubt that I can really 
relate, then how can those people who just don’t have any exposure to it?
(male magistrate)
The social distance between defendants and the magistracy has implications for the 
extent to which magistrates’ concerns about bail are justified. Similar to Fitzmaurice 
and Pease’s “false consensus bias” (1986), magistrates equated defendants’ views with 
their own and ‘understood’ bail issues accordingly. Hedderman and Gelsthorpe found 
magistrates were “often flummoxed...[and]...clearly confused” (Hedderman and 
Gelsthorpe 1997:47) by family structures which did not reflect their own. Consequently, 
in those cases where it was considered relevant, magistrates perceived fewer reassuring 
structures of informal social controls in ‘unconventional’ family structures compared to 
magistrates’ own. The greater the social distance between defendants and the 
magistracy, the less familiar, and therefore less accessible, the defendants’ motivations 
and lifestyle were and the greater the chances of magistrates having unjustified bail 
concerns.
Demeanour
Magistrates admitted that their assessments of defendants was affected by individuals’ 
demeanour. In most cases, defendants choose not to involve themselves actively in 
proceedings (see Chapter Seven) but they may still have affected proceedings through 
their appearance and body language. Whilst some magistrates argued in interview that 
they tried to ignore defendants’ demeanour as it could be misleading (a viewpoint also
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found by Hedderman (Hedderman and Gelsthorpe 1997:30)), others admitted it did 
affect their views of the defendant.
Some people are unsympathetic, or one is not sympathetic towards them.
Other people don’t help themselves, some people walk in noisy, boisterous 
and aggressive, rude in court, it really doesn’t help them but you do have to 
try and filter that down a bit. (male magistrate)
In interview, two wingers (the, usually less senior, magistrates on either side of the 
chair) said it was one of their duties to watch the defendant, see how she behaved and 
responded, and to share this information with the other winger and the chair when they 
retired to reach a decision. All the clerks felt that magistrates were influenced by a 
defendant appearing before them. Two clerks reported that in training exercises where 
magistrates were required to make bail decisions on cases, they typically made much 
harsher decisions than when they had a ‘body’ in front of them in court.
When we do training sessions and what have you, we give them 
[magistrates] case studies and they always come up with much harsher 
decisions that they actually would when faced with a person in the court, 
(female clerk)
Both clerks thought that magistrates were influenced by the presence of the defendant 
for two reasons: firstly that they were personally uncomfortable about having to look at 
an individual whilst they remanded them in custody; and secondly, that the defendant’s 
personal characteristics and other cues could influence magistrates’ decision making. 
On occasion, use of these cues might be appropriate: for example, evident physical 
symptoms of drug withdrawal would increase concern that the defendant would leave 
court and “go straight out and offend to get a fix” (female magistrate). However, 
magistrates also made subjective judgements, for example about how ‘sympathetic’ the 
defendant appeared. A study of the psychiatric remand process found that perceptions of 
defendants affected outcomes. It established that black defendants were more likely to 
be remanded in custody, and for a longer time, than white defendants. This was partly 
explained by differences in perceptions of dangerousness that were rooted in stereotypes 
of black men but not borne out by objective evidence (Browne 1990).
Although magistrates were hesitant in interview to say what specific conclusions they 
drew from body language, their comments reflected previous findings on how 
contrition, inexperience of the justice process, respect for the court, credibility, etc were
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all inferred from demeanour and, in turn, impacted on decision-making (Hedderman and
Gelsthorpe 1997:30-34). Sentencers in this study, and other studies (Hedderman and
Gelsthorpe 1997; Parker, et al. 1989), often appeared to construct views on defendants’
characters based on observations of their demeanour and admitted to using these
impressions to inform their decision making. Magistrates were confident that observing
demeanour was a useful tool.
I don’t wish to sound too clever, but very often one can judge by the 
demeanour just how convincing the plea is...body language and tone of 
voice, again there’s no single thing, you have to piece the various actions 
together, (male magistrate).
Hough et al (2003) comment on the importance of character assessments in
understanding sentencing outcomes.
It is no wonder that sentencing patterns are so difficult to explain when at 
the heart of the process is the belief that sentencers, and they alone, are 
uniquely placed to understand not only the uniqueness of the events which 
constitute the offence, but also the character of the individual who has 
committed it (Hough, et al. 2003:42).
The importance of character assessments in explaining remand outcomes was evidenced 
by the responses to Vignette Three. Magistrates were divided as to whether the 
defendant was genuinely trying to help herself and was redeemable (and therefore 
deserving of a ‘second chance’ and bail) or whether she was trying to manipulate the 
court and had cynically arranged an appointment with the rehabilitation centre simply to 
help her secure bail (and therefore could not be trusted so a remand in custody was 
necessary). Over half the respondents to Vignette Three commented on the difficulty of 
making the decision without seeing the defendant, indicating the importance of 
extralegal cues and character assessment in the resolution of cusp cases.
Characterisations Of Defendants
It has been argued that decision makers use characterisations of defendants to facilitate 
decision making. Characterisations have been found to be integral to the organisation of 
knowledge in courtroom decision making and to the selection of appropriate responses 
to defendants (Baldwin and McConville 1977; Carlen 1976; Carlen 1983; Eaton 1984; 
Rumgay 1998; Sudnow 1965).
Decision-makers like to create a picture of the kind of person they are 
facing, also to make the totality of their knowledge more manageable... In
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doing so, board members rely heavily on characterisations of the prisoner... 
Processes of characterisation are central to human judgements about the 
world, and are at the heart of decisions made in the criminal process from 
the policeman on the street onwards. Characterisation is a means of 
endowing individuals with attributes to make sense of them and to place 
them; it creates and organises expectations since it embodies a description 
and a prediction. Embedded in the notion of “the kind of person” is another 
of “what that person is likely to do.” (Hawkins 1983:119).
Characterisations develop with repeated encounters of defendants with similar cues 
which require a decision to be made (Hawkins 2002). Rumgay (1998) found that for the 
majority group of defendants, young adults, rich characterisations existed. This 
contrasted with an older and rarer group of defendants.
There is no need for well-articulated ‘simplifying choice heuristics’ for 
comparatively rare events, particularly when there is a serviceable 
alternative. (Rumgay 1998:134).
Female defendants at risk of custodial remands were found to be a very rare group in the 
magistrates’ courts. The individualised approach that was observed to be taken with 
women who could not be easily categorised and processed on the basis of offence 
seriousness alone may partly be accounted for by the rarity of women in contested 
remand hearings. It is argued that decision makers had not had the opportunity to 
develop concepts of ‘normal cases’ (Sudnow 1965) with this group of female 
defendants. Perhaps women’s greater chances of avoiding custodial remand compared 
to men, even controlling for offence related factors (Jones 1985; Kellough and Wortley 
2002), is because their offences are not the ‘normal crimes’ of young men (the majority 
group in the criminal justice process) and therefore warranted closer attention. In turn, 
this closer attention resulted in more individualised decision making which encouraged 
more lenient treatment (at least for some groups of women, see below).
Routine decision-making stemming from repetitive behaviour is also more 
likely to be stable, consistent, and therefore predictable than the more 
individualistic decision-making behaviour reserved for those cases that seem 
unusual in some way. (Hawkins 2002:36).
Where ‘perceptual shorthand’ (Skolnick 1966) was used by decision makers to classify, 
and thus appropriately process, female defendants they were framed at least partly in 
terms of their gender role fulfilment rather than their criminality. Perhaps in the absence 
of a ‘normal’ female defendant in contested cases, magistrates relied more on whether a
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defendant was a ‘normal’ woman (Shapland 1987). The gendered nature of magistrates’ 
characterisations is explored below.
What Made A Woman ‘Worthy’ Of Help?
As we have seen, cusp cases attracted more individualised decision making, but not all 
defendants whose cases fell into this category actually received help. Magistrates 
differentiated between women who they wanted to try and help and women who were 
considered beyond or undeserving of help. A moral judgement was made about which 
women were ‘worth’ risking a grant of bail for, and which were judged to be not worth 
the risk. We have seen that class and demeanour could affect magistrates’ assessments 
of defendants, and that magistrates employed characterisations of defendants in decision 
making. This section of the chapter explores the specific nature of characterisations 
about women in the remand system.
Caring Responsibilities
The welfare needs of women’s dependants could act as ‘insulators’ against custodial 
remands as decisions were influenced by a concern for ensuring the welfare of others, 
for example, sometimes women were bailed because of concerns about the care of their 
children or elderly relatives. Magistrates who were concerned about these issues said in 
interview that it would never be the deciding factor but they admitted to trying a little 
harder to keep women out of jail if they knew a child would be taken into care as a 
result.
[Women] have extra responsibilities in life over men, usually family and 
children, that sort of thing. Because in a sense you’re not dealing just with 
the offender. You’re actually dealing with the situation because she will 
have care and responsibility probably for other people. ..So I think in a sense 
that you have to look at the bigger picture with a woman I think in many 
ways...I think men are fairly simple to deal with. They do have their own 
problems, I mean, naturally, but generally speaking you can do for a man 
and it’s probably the end of it. If you do for a woman, you can, there can be 
knock-on effects far beyond just the case itself.” (male magistrate).
Observation data suggested that the welfare of others might have an even more direct
affect on remand decisions than magistrates admitted in interview.
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Example 6.2
A woman appeared on charges of shoplifting and theft of a handbag at Castleford Road. 
She was seven and a half months pregnant and on a methadone maintenance 
programme. There were some problems with the pregnancy and she had been admitted 
to hospital ft"om prison because she feared loss of the baby. The defence representative 
told the court that the defendant was “desperately concerned about the safety of her 
child.” The male district judge granted conditional bail and addressed the defendant, 
saying “I am making this decision more in concern for your child than for you.”
Magistrates were also observed remonstrating with women who they felt were not being
good mothers and using the issue to try and secure cooperation.
If you cared for your child at all, you would not risk her care by committing 
these offences. Make sure you turn up or your child will be without her mother 
for some time (male district judge).
One female magistrate stated in interview that a bail hostel would be inappropriate for a 
mother with young children if it was some distance ftrom her family. Her reasoning was 
that the defendant would be tempted to abscond fi*om the hostel to see her children and 
this could have an adverse impact on her future remand status and on her sentence. She 
believed the defendant should be “protected fi*om herself’ and a short custodial remand 
in a prison close to her home would be preferable. Similarly, three magistrates 
spontaneously said that if a bail hostel was too far away fi*om family and defence 
representatives they would have concerns that they were setting the offender up to fail 
as she would not be able to support, and be supported by, her family and may have 
difficulties accessing legal advice.
Unsurprisingly, the majority of magistrates interviewed said they would respond to the 
needs of a situation regardless of the gender of the defendant and would, for example, 
grant the same licence to a man with childcare responsibilities. However, two 
magistrates admitted that although they wanted to believe they would treat men and 
women equally, assessments of need were influenced by gender expectations
Of course men can have childcare responsibilities too and we should treat 
them the same as women’s. But to be honest, if  a defence solicitor says his 
client has caring responsibilities, I think I tend not to believe them, to think 
it’s being tried on. Maybe I shouldn’t have admitted that! (female 
magistrate).
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These magistrates admitted that ingrained gender role expectations probably influenced 
their decision making, and made them less inclined to accept that male defendants were 
carers. These gender expectations were also evident in the comments that magistrates 
occasionally made about men in interview. Two magistrates stated that they would try 
harder to bail a man if custody would mean he lost his job as they felt it unjust that his 
family should suffer the loss of income. It is interesting that magistrates volunteered 
such gendered assessments of defendants’ responsibilities. These findings reflect 
Eaton’s (1984) conclusions that socially dominant models of gender roles are reflected 
in and reproduced by courts.
The ‘Reformable’ Woman?
Research on the Canadian remand system has demonstrated that remand judgements are 
influenced by moral assessments of the defendants, and that variations in remand 
outcomes can be partly be explained by these subjective assessments. Kellough (2002) 
found that
individualized, moral assessments of accused persons have a strong 
influence on remand decisions. Accused persons who receive a negative 
personality assessment by the police are much more likely to be detained 
than those who receive neutral assessments. Our analysis also reveals that 
these subjective character evaluations help explain racial differences in the 
likelihood of pre-trial detention. (Kellough and Wortley 2002:186).
Moreover, these moral assessments operated independently of legal variables i.e. 
defendants were not simply being labelled negatively by the police because of their 
records of offending. Kellough found that the attribution of negative assessments was 
related to defendants’ personal characteristics, such as their race.
[T]he data suggest that the police provide more negative character 
assessments of black accused than white accused or accused from other 
racial groups. These more negative assessments, it would appear, 
subsequently explain the higher rates of pre-trial detention experienced by 
black accused. (Kellough and Wortley 2002:196).
This fmding4upports earlier research which found that mentally vulnerable black male 
defendants were much more likely to be remanded in custody for psychiatric reports 
than mentally vulnerable white male defendants, even where offending and mental 
health histories were similar. The authors argued the key explanatory factor was 
magistrates’ perceptions of black defendants’ “dangerousness” (Browne 1990). Given
166
similar circumstances, black mentally vulnerable defendants were assessed more 
negatively by magistrates than comparable white defendants and this affected 
magistrates’ remand decisions.
[T]he use of discretion which rests with key decision makers in the process 
and the element of subjectivity in making assessments. Decision makers 
seemed more likely to err on the side of caution with Black mentally 
vulnerable defendants and to be affected by a heightened perception of 
dangerousness with regard to this group. (Browne 1990:35) (emphasis 
added).
Similarly, part of the reason why black mental health patients are more likely to be 
defined as suffering fi"om more severe mental illnesses was because of mental health 
professionals’ stereotypical ideas about the prevalence of mental health problems in the 
black population (Boast and Chesterman 1995).
Comparative research by Daly (1994) also showed the importance of the moral
characterisation of groups and identified a greater degree of variability between black
and white men than between black and white women in sentencing. This difference was
also evident in character judgements.
Black women did not register as “hardened street criminals” or beyond 
reform to the same degree as black men did. Nor did black women differ in 
reform potential from white women. The defendant subgroup most at risk to 
receive the harshest penalty in this court is not “black” per se, but black 
men. (Daly 1994:228).
Given the small number of observed cases in the present study, it was not possible to 
draw any conclusions about the representation and treatment of ethnic minorities in the 
remand system; there were too few cases to be able make meaningful comparisons (see 
Chapter Three). It is possible that, as in Daly’s study, the characterisation of women 
was more constant across racial groups than it was for men. This would, however, 
require further research. Whilst aware of the importance of exploring whether or not 
different groups of women experience being processed by the criminal justice system 
differently, this limited study focused on the general representation of women in the 
remand system.
Clearly, the ways in which defendants were characterised could affect how they were 
processed and what decisions were reached. Most of the data in this section emerged 
from discussions in cusp cases -  both in court and from Vignette Three. This is because,
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as we have seen, although magistrates may reach moral judgements about women who 
commit serious and petty offences, the outcomes in these cases were determined by the 
nature of the offence. Defendants’ personal characteristics were primarily of importance 
in cusp cases where, as we saw in Chapter Five, they formed the basis of remand 
decisions. The following section explores how were women characterised in the remand 
system, and what impact this had on decision making in cusp cases.
Data from previous studies suggests that moral characterisations of women do influence 
decision making and that these assessments were often structured around traditional 
gender role expectations. Allen (1987) found women to be at a ‘moral advantage’ 
because of stereotypical assumptions about women’s ‘passivity’ and ‘irresponsibility’ in 
psychiatric reports.
In this calculation of the ‘just deserts’ of their male and female subjects, 
writers of medical reports appear to draw on sexual stereotypes which 
systematically place women at a moral advantage and men at a moral 
disadvantage. (Allen 1987a: 106-107)
Research evidence consistently shows that women do indeed have some kind of 
advantage in the remand system as men are more likely to be remanded in custody than 
women, even controlling for offence related factors such as offence seriousness and 
offending history.
Though several legal variables emerged as significant predictors of pre-trial 
detention, these factors apparently do not entirely explain the effect of both 
race and gender.. .After controlling for legally relevant factors, the data 
indicate that black accused and male accused are still more likely to be held 
in pre-trial custody. Taking factors like criminal record, type of charge and 
number of current charges into account... the odds of being detained are 1.8 
times greater for male than female accused (Kellough and Wortley 
2002:196).
The relationship between remand outcomes and perceptions of women was confirmed 
by magistrates in this study who stated that they believed women were treated more 
leniently than men because of some magistrates’ attitudes towards them. One male 
magistrate observed that his decisions probably reflected a greater propensity to see 
women as deserving help than men, and this originated in his wider views of men and 
women in society. Other male magistrates expressed similar sentiments about the moral 
advantage women possessed in remand hearings.
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The system is skewed towards women receiving bail rather than custody.
It’s skewed partly because a lot of us old fashioned men, that’s how we were 
brought up, so the mindset is that you will start off by looking at a female 
defendant as a person less likely to commit an offence. Particularly a violent 
offence which is a major, major determinant of keeping someone in 
custody....Females do tend to get, in inverted commas, more lenient 
decision making in their favour, (male magistrate).
I would say it probably does help being a woman, they probably get 
preferential treatment. I shouldn’t say that but I would say that’s probably 
the case, (male magistrate).
The representation of women in moral terms is apparent in a section of the 1974 
Working Party on Bail Procedures in Magistrates’ Courts which cites a female prison 
governor’s experiences of women and remand. She believed that women, especially 
young women, were treated differently by the courts. She argued that a “protective” 
approach to females meant courts were reluctant to sentence women to custody but this 
same protective element
shows itself in another way [at the bail stage] and magistrates are 
particularly loath to see women, particularly young women left in ‘at risk’ 
situations...Thus, the protective element which eventually works to keep 
them out of custody has the opposite effect in the first place. (Home Office 
1974:65).
Thirty years later, this protective attitude was seen used explicitly in one case and it 
was, indeed, a young woman of 18 years old.
Example 6.3
An 18 year old woman had been brought to Inswick Comer on overnight custody on 
charges of loitering. Although she did not have extensive previous convictions, and 
although no other woman was ever observed being remanded in custody on loitering 
charges, she was remanded in custody. The defendant waved and called hello to the 
policeman 1 was sitting next to in court. We had already spoken about my research and 
he commented that he knew the defendant well, she was a lovely girl and it was a shame 
to see her living the life she did. He said, “give her a couple more years and she’ll be 
beyond help, if  she’s still alive.” It was this policeman who told me that she did not 
have many previous convictions. The male district judge remanded the defendant in 
custody, citing the risk of her offending on bail and, unusually, for her own welfare. The 
district judge commented on her young age and stated that his concern was her lifestyle 
of dmg use and prostitution was putting her at risk. It was noticeable that throughout the 
hearing, the defendant was referred to as a girl, not a woman. It was assumed that the 
very unusual steps of remanding in custody on loitering charges and of citing her own 
welfare as a reason were prompted by her age and a desire to remove her from the 
damaging lifestyle she had become involved in.
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Research found sentencing patterns also contained characterisations of women which 
demonstrated magistrates’ perceptions of female defendants as ‘troubled’ and male 
defendants as ‘troublesome’(Hedderman and Gelsthorpe 1997). These categories 
illustrate the way that magistrates perceived and treated female defendants as 
sympathetic individuals who needed and deserved help.
Even allowing for the fact that women were more likely to be first offenders 
or less frequent offenders than men, and were more likely to behave 
respectfully in court, on the basis of these interviews it would seem that 
magistrates are less inclined to sympathise with men and to impose a 
sentence intended to address their underlying problems and needs. 
(Hedderman and Gelsthorpe 1997:44).
Similar themes were found in research on the use of gender characterisation in 
psychiatric reports. Allen (1987) found that reports on women were much more likely 
than those on men to recommend supportive interventions.
Reports on males are far less likely than those on females to include a 
sentencing recommendation, and such recommendations as they do include 
will much less often suggest a medical, therapeutic or even loosely 
rehabilitative approach. (Allen 1987a: 104).
These differences could not be accounted for by differences in criminal history or 
mental disorder between the two groups as even some women who were not diagnosed 
as disordered were recommended medical treatment. Such recommendations were 
almost never made for men diagnosed as not disordered.
Daly (1994) noted that women were more often viewed as reformable or as being more 
victims than victimisers i.e. there were gender differences in the character judgements 
made about men and women, and “officials were far less optimistic that the men could 
change” (Daly 1994:199). The origins of this gender distinction about which defendants 
are reformable might be found in men and women’s ‘commitment’ to offending. 
Heidensohn (1995) argues that offending behaviour is more peripheral to women’s lives 
so it is easier for them to resist deviant labels (Heidensohn and Silvestri 1995). Perhaps, 
consequently, women are responded to more in terms of the wider reasons for their 
offending behaviour rather than judged in terms of the offence itself. Important here are 
perceptions of men and women’s pathways into offending and the consequent
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differences in assessments of their motivation and likely continuation of offending 
behaviour.
Daly (1994) found that in pre-sentence investigation reports, writers characterised 
female offenders as vulnerable, and their pathways into offending were explained in 
terms of their own victimisation. For men, the link between victimisation and criminal 
activities was less commonly and less strongly asserted.
the story line went this way: the women were abused or inadequately cared 
for, leading to “out of control” behavior, alcoholism, or drug addiction, 
which in turn led to street life or violence toward others. Another theme was 
that of being under the control of dominating men or being mentally 
unbalanced. These linkages between victimization, offending, and 
criminalization seemed “obvious” for women, though not most women, but 
for four in ten.
For the men, the link between victimization and criminalization was less 
obvious and was made less frequently. Such a link was evident for perhaps 
two of ten men. Fewer men were described as growing up in abusive 
households or having parents unable to care for them. One problem is that 
other sites of the men’s victimization (such as reformatory schools and jails 
while in their teens, or initiation requirements for adolescent male groups) 
are not discussed by the probation officers or the men. The costs of 
masculinity, such as “taking it like a man” and not showing weakness, 
render men less victimized than they might be and construct them as less 
victimized in comparison to women. Overall, then, a portion of men may be 
viewed as more blameworthy than women. (Daly 1994:84-85).
The evidence of the present study supports the idea that magistrates were more inclined 
to view women broadly as troubled or needy, rather than troublesome, and made 
criminal justice decisions based on this conceptualisation of female defendants. 
Generally, women were seen as reformable and magistrates sought to do what they 
could to help female defendants when, in cusp cases, they were given the opportunity to 
make individualised remand decisions.
It is not being argued magistrates were being manipulated into mistakenly thinking 
female defendants had problems that needed addressing. Their difficulties, although 
undoubtedly put forward to elicit sympathetic treatment in some cases, were not 
invented by defence representatives; the issues listed above reflect the problems with 
which many female offenders have to cope (Wedderbum 2000). There is a significant 
body of research that illustrates the welfare needs of female offenders and the fact that
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women’s pathways into offending are often related to these needs (Daly 1994; 
Gelsthorpe and Morris 2002).
Of course, being female did not provide universal protection for all women from 
custodial remands. Firstly, as was seen in Chapter Five, in those cases where the offence 
was serious, the moral perception of a defendant was all but irrelevant as the outcome, 
custodial remand, was determined by the nature of the offence. It was the cusp cases 
where moral assessments of a defendant could affect remand outcomes. Secondly, in 
those cusp cases, magistrates did not respond to all women as ‘troubled’ and deserving 
the benefits of help. Magistrates’ accounts (in interview and in observations) of 
women’s characters distinguished between women who were perceived as needy, as 
victims in their own right who could and should be helped, and those women who were 
beyond help. In interview, magistrates commented that they regarded some women with 
scepticism and dismissed their mitigating accounts as cynical attempts to manipulate the 
court.
It is to how and why magistrates distinguished between deserving and undeserving 
female defendants in cusp cases that this chapter now turns. The next section explores 
the ways in which defence representatives sought to use the perceptions of women 
discussed in this section to portray their clients as ‘reformable’ women in order to 
provoke a sympathetic reaction from magistrates and to secure bail.
Mitigation Techniques: (Re)constructing Women’s Characters
As discussed in the previous section, not all women were afforded the benefit of being 
perceived as troubled women deserving support. There was a distinction made, in fact, 
between women perceived as troubled and those who were perceived as troublesome.
This distinction was not simply made on the basis of previous records of offending, 
though that did represent an obstacle to be overcome. Although women could, indeed, 
have offending histories that indicated they were poor bail risks, this was not sufficient 
to explain the pattern of decision making. Cases were observed where women with long 
records of offending and failing to attend court were granted bail. Conversely, women 
with relatively minor offending histories were remanded in custody. In these cases it
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appeared that the gendered moral assessments magistrates made about the individual 
defendants determined the remand outcome. Although the nature and frequency of a 
woman’s offending was found to be one factor in whether or not she was perceived as 
genuine, it was not insurmountable if her defence representative was able to convince 
the court to make a positive moral assessment of her. In the following example a 
prolific offender who had repeatedly failed to attend court was bailed because her 
defence representative successfully labelled her as someone who now deserved the 
court’s support. The court chose to accept the defence advocate’s representation of the 
defendant and subsequently bailed her.
Example 6.4
A 29 year old woman had pleaded guilty to multiple counts of possession of a Class A 
drug. She failed to appear twice before she pleaded guilty. A PSR was requested and 
she failed to attend the appointment which was rearranged. She failed to attend the 
second appointment. On the third failure to attend an appointment for a PSR, a warrant 
without bail was issued. She was brought to Inswick Comer on overnight custody. Her 
defence representative asked for bail to be granted. He did not try to dispute her record 
and fully accepted her poor offending and bail records. He detailed her disturbing 
family history and then made a remand application based on an assertion that she was 
now ready to change and desperate for the magistrates to help her. He offered no 
tangible reason why she would attend the PSR appointment this time when she had 
failed to attend it just a matter of weeks earlier. Despite her offending history and her 
repeated failures to cooperate with the court and the probation service, the mixed lay 
bench released her on conditional bail. Notably, the Chair addressed the defendant 
directly and said.
We have heard your record on attending is, frankly, awful. We have also heard 
you’re getting your life together and we’re trying to help you. Help yourself now 
by making sure that you keep all your appointments.
Evidently a good bail application which effectively (re)defined a woman as a deserving
character had the power to persuade magistrates to ‘take a chance’ and use the remand
decision as an opportunity to help her, even when her offending and attendance record
would be expected to attract a custodial remand. Example 6.4 demonstrates that even
the most intransigent offender could be redefined as someone who (now) deserved the
help of the court if the mitigation was convincing and if  they could overcome
magistrates’ suspicion of repeat offenders’ sincerity.
Repeat offenders, on the other hand, were viewed very differently. If they 
dressed up and behaved politely (addressing the magistrates and Clerk as 
‘Sir’ or ‘Ma’am’), it was seen to be a con. (Hedderman and Gelsthorpe 
1997:31).
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However, as will be illustrated below, a skilled defence representative could, in fact, 
incorporate apparently damaging information about previous offending or a chaotic 
lifestyle into mitigation and use it to the defendant’s advantage.
Evidence is utterly malleable and can be bent to serve apparently
contradictory purposes (Hawkins 1983:111).
In cusp cases where a woman was at risk of a custodial remand, there were often 
extensive records and poor bail records. The technique defence representatives usually 
adopted was to begin by accepting everything the CPS officer had said as accurate and 
justified -  there was rarely any dispute about events to date. The defence representative 
would then proceed to say “however” and present an alternative account of the 
defendant herself, rather than facts of the case or the defendant’s history, etc. This was 
done to encourage the magistrates to see her as someone who now deserved bail. It 
could be a dangerous strategy because it was most effective when it rested on the 
defendant admitting, without perceived pretence, that there were grounds for refusing 
bail. The defendant’s public proclamation of 'mea culpa’ allowed a ceremony of 
transition enabling the defendant to become newly defined as trustworthy and “worth a 
chance” (male magistrate). If a disingenuous admission of culpability was (perceived to 
be) made, the defendant was viewed as trying to dupe the magistrates and bail was 
refused.
Typically, in such cases where trust was central to the grant of bail, the district judge or 
magistrates addressed these defendants with a direct appeal not to let the magistrate (or 
herself) down. This was evident both in observations and in the responses to Case 
Vignette Three. It was rare for magistrates to speak directly to defendants and was not 
observed in any cases that fitted in to Model One (offence seriousness) or Model Three 
(case processing). The acknowledgement of the defendant as a participant in the 
proceedings was very unusual (see Chapter Seven) and usually only occurred when 
magistrates related to them as sympathetic individuals and sought to strike this kind of 
bargain or pact.
By definition, all cusp cases contained some degree of evident bail risk. However, as 
explored in Chapter Five, what defined these cases was that they were argued not on the 
basis of offence seriousness or bail risk per se, but of character. Defence representatives 
sought to present the women as sympathetically as possible, defining them as 
individuals who deserved to be given bail. Given the importance of character, the
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success or failure of such applications often rested on assessments of honesty: was the 
defendant trustworthy and her account genuine or was she trying to con the bench? As 
outcomes made on the basis of character may conflict with the factual evidence of risk, 
it was common to find phrases such as ‘take a chance’ recurring throughout these bail 
applications.
The central point about such applications was that magistrates were indeed encouraged 
by defence representatives to take a chance, to trust their assessments of defendants’ 
characters and intentions over the evidence of bail risk and/or the inclination to remand 
on the basis of offence seriousness. As magistrates were asked to resolve cases based on 
the degree of trust they had in individual defendants (and, in some cases, their defence 
representative -  see Chapters Seven and Eight), the potential for further extralegal cues 
(race, nationality, class, etc.) to influence decision-making was high. As discussed, this 
research was, unfortunately, unable to analyse the influence of multiple variables.
The observation data was used to identify the narratives defence representatives used to 
encourage magistrates to perceive their clients as a troubled and not a troublesome 
woman. Out of 24 women who spent no time on custodial remand and were given 
conditional bail at their first hearing, nine made bail applications which specifically 
sought establish the woman as someone who ‘deserved’ bail. As all 24 of these women 
were released on bail at the first hearing, it is difficult to assess the relative effectiveness 
of this technique in these cases. More revealingly, out of the 23 women who were 
initially remanded in custody, 18 made subsequent bail applications which included 
information which would encourage a sympathetic assessment of the defendant’s 
character. Of those 18, six were released on conditional bail following their second bail 
application. In all these six cases, the bail application which led to their release 
contained more references to a greater number of morally framed issues (e.g. how she 
had changed, would now be supported, etc), than the initial application which had 
resulted in a custodial remand. Importantly, close reading of proceedings in these six 
cases revealed that five of the second bail applications did not contain any additional 
factual information which might have had a bearing on assessments of bail risk e.g. 
details of the offence, offending history, secure accommodation, offer of sureties, etc. 
The difference in the bail hearings lay in the way that the woman herself wsls presented.
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Example 6.5
A 32 year old woman appeared at Inswick Comer charged with shoplifting (value £41) 
and failing to appear at court following police bail. On her first appearance, she was 
remanded in custody. On her second, she was released on conditional bail.
Application One:
She has a long standing heroin addiction, ten years in fact. She realises now that 
she cannot continue in this manner. She is trying to take steps to change her life 
and, in fact, she attended a dmgs centre but unfortunately she was turned away 
because she did not have an appointment with them and they couldn’t help her. 
Application Two:
She is an intelligent 32 year old woman. She is German, bilingual, a designer 
and mother. A dmg addiction left her in a pitiful state. She is now detoxed and 
determined to remain so. I suggested that she may be released today so I 
challenged her to see if she really wanted a CRO. She is determined to get help 
with her addiction. She has a four year old son who is currently subject to a care 
order, and she wants to be a parent to him. She therefore needs to be dmg free.
It should also be noted that this style of bail application was used twice as often with 
women who were initially remanded in custody than with women who were given 
conditional bail immediately. This may indicate that defence representatives used this 
technique when they anticipated difficulties in securing bail because of the nature of the 
offence. The technique was used more often in cusp cases where the remand outcome 
rested not only on offence seriousness and assessments of harm, but also on 
magistrates’ perceptions of defendants’ characters.
Defence representatives sought to use impression management strategies to influence 
magistrates’ assessments of individual defendants. These impression management 
strategies operated in a similar way to Sykes and Matza’s (1957) ‘techniques of 
neutralization’: they sought to undermine, replace or deny the master status of ‘serious 
offender’ and/or ‘bad bail risk’ so the defendant could resist or minimise her deviant 
status and encourage the court to choose to respond to her offending in a less punitive 
way. It is important to note that there were rarely total ‘denials of responsibility’ (Sykes 
and Matza 1957) as admissions of culpability were central to the success of these 
hearings. Defence representatives attempted to use gendered accounts of women’s 
actions and/or lives not to deny offending, but to try and minimise the significance of 
the offending behaviour in magistrates’ deliberations on bail. As will be seen from the 
following, it is argued that many of these neutralising narratives were grounded in 
gendered representations of women. For example, the ‘she’s free of him now’ account
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engages with perceptions of women’s patterns of offending being related to their 
patterns of victimisation.
The following ways in which defendants were (re)constructed by defence 
representatives are based entirely on observed cases. Six different accounts were seen to 
be repeatedly used in all the courts in the study. Whilst they are presented separately 
here, they were frequently used in combination in bail applications. The cases in which 
such accounts were heard were all disputed cases. There was no need for such intricate 
argument in cases where bail was either not requested or was unopposed, or where 
magistrates offered the defence an early signal that bail would be granted.
The data presented here are illustrative of the highly gendered arguments that featured 
in such bail applications and the ways in which they were used. However, as the 
numbers are small, the results should be regarded as no more than suggestive. Whilst 
they are accurate accounts of the narratives defence representatives used, no conclusions 
can be drawn on their relative effectiveness in securing bail. A study large enough to 
generate data on which logistic regression analysis could be performed is necessary if 
the relative importance of each issue is to be understood.
i - She’s Ready To Change Now
Of the 27 cases (18 women remanded in custody and 9 women conditionally bailed) 
where this technique was used, nine women were presented as having recently 
experienced a significant event which had prompted them to change old patterns of 
behaviour. The catalysts for this preparedness to change included the shock of a recent 
custodial sentence (particularly if it was their first experience of imprisonment); 
children being taken into care and the defendant realising she could not secure custody 
until she was drug-free; recent detoxification which the defendant wanted to maintain; 
and a health scare necessitating a drug-free life. These women were all presented as 
being at a turning point in their lives and the courts were encouraged to recognise and 
support their efforts to change. ‘Change’, if  perceived to be genuine, has been identified 
as an important issue in successful parole applications too (Hawkins 1983). The 
examples below provide an illustration of how this technique could secure bail even in 
very difficult cases.
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Example 6.6
This 37 year-old woman had previously been remanded in custody on two charges of 
shoplifting. She appeared in court from the cells and her male defence representative 
made the following application:
She has a long-term entrenched drug habit.. .My client has been very honest and 
says that she still wants drugs. She is not pretending to the court to be a 
reformed character and her honesty is to her credit. Whilst she is still addicted, 
she wants help to break her addiction. She is asking for a chance to do this.
He followed this with an account of how drugs had affected many members of her 
family. The district judge granted her conditional bail, saying
I will certainly give her the benefit of a chance but I just hope she takes 
advantage of it. It is a very sad case, I have heard that her whole family is 
affected by drugs. [Addressing the defendant] I am trusting you to he sensible 
about this. If you don’t, you’ll be flummoxed and blow your hail.
Example 6.7
A 22 year-old woman appeared on overnight custody on a charge of shoplifting. She 
had a very extensive history of offending and a poor bail record. It was acknowledged 
that she had been repeatedly remanded in custody and sentenced to custody before. Her 
defence representative said:
She pleads guilty at the earliest opportunity and accepts that her offending 
makes prison likely hut she wants to ask for a remand for reports. She realises it 
is a risk as she may be remanded in custody but she is trying to make changes in 
her life...She wants the chance to get reports not so much to give you details of 
her life and conditions but to prove that she can keep appointments and show 
willing.
The male district judge granted conditional bail and addressed the defendant, saying
The time has come to make some effort to make some changes and if you’re 
prepared to do so, we’ll take that risk.
ii - She’s A Good Person, Really
Of the 27 cases, 12 offered information on the general ‘goodness’ of the woman which 
served to challenge perceptions of her simply as an offender and prove she was not 
beyond redemption. In these cases, worth was signified most commonly by accounts of 
what a good mother she was (five cases) but was also evidenced by one or more of the 
following: the fact that her three children all had the same father; there was no social 
services involvement in her children’s lives; she was an intelligent and educated 
woman; she had previously held down a good job; and she was a carer for the 
disabled/aged.
Example 6.8
A 23 year old woman appeared at Old Market Street charged with handling stolen 
goods and attempted deception. Bail was opposed on the grounds that at the time of 
committing the offence, she was on bail to another magistrates’ court and Old Market 
Street for similar offences. There was also concern about failure to surrender and a risk 
of further offences being committed on hail. She had eight convictions for 13 offences
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and 4 cautions all for similar offences. In her bail application, her defence representative 
said,
She has been a user and that has been the reason for most of her offending. She 
does have some successful parts to her life too though, most notably a six year 
old son with whom she has a very good relationship. Her mother informs me 
that she is a good mother and that she cares for her son well. She takes him to 
school every day. This is a lapse, she has slipped up.
The defendant was released on bail with a condition of reporting to the police station.
iii - She’s More A Victim Than An Offender
Of the 27 cases, 13 offered accounts of debilitating difficulties in women’s lives. These 
included illness (six cases); advanced pregnancy; homelessness; and abuse as a child 
(see below for abuse from male partners). These defendants were presented as women 
struggling to cope with their problems, perhaps not fully culpable because of 
circumstance and certainly deserving of some protection and support.
Example 6.9
A 25 year old woman appeared at Old Market Street charged with criminal damage. She 
had damaged some internal walls of the hostel she was living in. She had become 
angered when the staff asked her to leave after finding a man in her room, against hostel 
rules. Her defence representative told the court.
She accepts that she caused the damage. You have heard that she was asked to 
leave the hostel. The man in her room had followed her in from the street and 
followed her to her room. She tried to get him to leave but couldn't make him. 
Staff wouldn't listen to her explanation and this frustrated and angered her.. .She 
was married with children aged seven and nine. Her husband physically abused 
her. A later boyfriend also abused her and this is why she is in a hostel. She has 
had five miscarriages in the last few years and is signed off on a pension because 
of this. She asks the court for help finding accommodation as she cannot return 
to this hostel.
iv - She’s Free Of Him Now
The removal of a corrupting man from the woman’s life was cited in nine cases. This 
could be included in the ‘ready to change’ category but is separated out because 
‘change’ is predicated on an acceptance of past guilt and an opportunity for redemption. 
In this category the woman was presented as not being fully culpable (particularly when 
the man was violent) and now the man had gone, she could be trusted to return to her 
natural law-abiding self. She was led-astray and/or pressurised but now that influence 
has gone.
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Example 6.10
A 22 year old woman appeared at Inswick Comer and pleaded not guilty to a charge of 
theft from a person. It was regarded as a serious offence as money had been snatched 
from a woman at a cash point, and the victim had been assaulted by the defendant’s 
alleged co-defendant. In his bail application, the defence representative argued.
She has a boyfriend and a drug habit and the two are entwined. She buys her 
drugs from her boyfriend and owes him money. He is very possessive of her. He 
doesn’t know her home address to if you grant her bail she therefore has an 
opportunity to break away from him, and thus hopefully from her habit... The 
reason for much of her offending is dmgs. She has broken away from her 
boyfriend who is the root cause of her habit.
The defendant was bailed with conditions of residence at her family’s home address, 
daily reporting at a police station, and an exclusion from the City.
v - She’s An Honest Offender
In bail, unlike sentencing, extensive records of offending can actually be an advantage. 
In four cases, offending history was used to provide evidence that the defendant would 
not abscond or offend. A record without failures to appear could provide proof that the 
woman could be tmsted to attend. Additionally, a prolific record with a recent hiatus 
could be cited as proof that the defendant had changed and is now law abiding and/or 
free of a dmg habit. Past misdemeanours were offered as evidence that these women 
could be tmsted to cooperate and behave.
Example 6.11
A 34 year old woman appeared before a male district judge at Connorton Road charged 
with a failure to appear in court proceedings, one charge of theft of credit cards and five 
charges of deception (using stolen credit cards to obtain goods), values ranging from 
£30 to £112. She pleaded guilty to all charges. Her defence representative said.
It is difficult to apply for bail given her record but these matters pre-date her last 
court appearance. She instmcts me she has now turned a comer. She was in a 
violent relationship which is now over and clearly she has problems. Her last 
prison sentence got her clean and there have been no offences committed since 
she was released three weeks ago. She points out that she usually offends within 
two days of being released. She asks the court to appreciate that she has turned a 
comer now.
The defendant was bailed with conditions of residence, reporting to a police station 
three times a week and a night time curfew.
vi - She’s Got The Support Of Others
In five of the remand in custody cases women were said to have support in the 
community. The argument was that the bench may not judge her to be tmstworthy but 
there were others who would take responsibility for her. Importantly, ‘support’ was only 
successful in securing bail at the second application when it was allied to ‘control’ e.g. a
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husband on whom, the court was told, she was financially dependant; a father who 
would offer residence and would make her work in his shop; a brother-in-law who was 
sitting in the back of the court ready to escort her out of the City to return home. The 
offers of support from mothers did not result in bail being granted at second bail 
applications. The number of cases is too small to make any meaningful generalisations 
from but they are suggestive of Eaton’s (1984) findings that courts respond to 
traditional models of family structures: male relatives are seen to offer ‘control’, an 
essential adjunct to ‘support’ when bail is being considered. Carlen (1983) also found 
that courts were more likely to impose formal controls if the defendant was perceived to 
be beyond the informal controls of familial structures.
Example 6.12
A 20 year old woman appeared at Castleford Road on a charge of theft to the value of 
£153, the goods were recovered. She had been remanded in custody for one week 
previously. The defence representative said that his client could leave the City, to get 
away from her drug taking lifestyle, and return to live in her family home. He said the 
defendant’s brother in law was in court to take her back and, “he’s assured me he’ll 
escort her through the front door.” The defendant was bailed with conditions of 
residence and reporting to a police station.
Not all of the above ‘scripts’ that defence representatives used were conspicuously 
gendered. However, the themes of the women’s needs, informal controls, familial 
responsibilities, and victimisation repeat through the majority of them.
To summarise, previous research shows that magistrates are predisposed to understand 
female defendants and their actions in terms of the women’s needs. This research 
showed that if women and their defence representatives could also successfully 
persuade magistrates to give the defendant a positive character assessment, custodial 
remands could be avoided. Narratives that appealed to gender stereotypes were used by 
defence representatives to minimise perceptions of women as ‘troublesome’ and 
encourage perceptions of them as ‘troubled’. Evidence of women’s fulfilment of 
normative gender roles was presented defence representatives to demonstrate their good 
character, to define the woman as someone who was deserving of help.
I find that one common presupposition is the domestic division of labor and the
vaunted “good family woman.” (Daly 1994:197).
The findings reflect Eaton’s (1986) and Carlen’s (1983) findings that courts operate on, 
and perpetuate, gendered conceptions of men and women’s roles in the criminal justice
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system and in wider society. Whilst Daly (1994) agrees that images of “good family 
women” are used in courts to some women’s advantage, she disputes the contention that 
the existence of such attitudes and their use in mitigation is necessarily detrimental to 
those women who do not satisfy these criteria.
I am not persuaded that surrounding women with familial and maternal 
imagery restricts the range of possibilities for womanhood (excluding, for 
example, single women, those not in heterosexual couplings, and those 
without children). This argument may be right in the abstract, but it is less 
so in actual court practices -  at least in United States courts, with which I 
am familiar. When there are good family women, their labor for others is 
affirmed. But women who are not considered to be good family women are 
not penalized for this status... We should expect to find gendered 
presuppositions in courtroom discourse and actions, but we should explore 
whether such presuppositions harm or adversely affect some women... We 
should not assume that they harm all (or even most) women in all courts.
(Daly 1994:197).
The data from the present research broadly support Daly’s position. Of course 
magistrates and others may have brought unspoken prejudices to the remand court but 
whilst defence representatives did, at times, use gender role fulfilment in mitigation, the 
CPS were never observed referring to women’s gender role misdemeanours in their 
objections to bail. ‘Good family women’ were observed in the courts in this study to be 
characterised more positively, and thus were more likely to be bailed, but there was 
little evidence that women whose characters were more negatively perceived were 
treated any more harshly than men. There was little identifiable evidence that women in 
this study were being doubly damned for being doubly deviant (Carlen 1983; Carlen 
and Worral 1987), but there was evidence that successful mitigation was often framed in 
terms of gender roles, for both women and men; defence representatives were also 
occasionally observed to successfully use men’s gender roles to encourage magistrates 
to grant bail. For example, if a male defendant had a job, magistrates would try harder 
to keep him out of custody because of the strong links between steady employment and 
reduced offending, and to ensure his family did not suffer economic privations by losing 
the family’s income.
Conclusion
This chapter explored the evidence that extralegal cues were used by magistrates when 
they were making remand decisions in cusp cases, i.e. those cases where neither offence
182
seriousness nor the processing needs of the remand system determined the outcome of 
the remand hearing. As the outcomes in these cases were not ‘self evident’, magistrates 
admitted to using extralegal factors, such as demeanour, in their decision making.
Evidence was explored that in cusp cases, where offence seriousness did not determine 
remand outcomes, remand decisions varied according to magistrates’ assessments of 
individual defendant’s character. Magistrates’ perceptions of female defendants’ 
characters were found to be significantly structured around normative gender roles. 
Women were typically perceived to be more ‘troubled’ than men which encouraged 
magistrates to use the remand decision in cusp cases as an opportunity to help and 
support defendants. Gender role fulfilment was found to, consequently, be a resource 
that defence representatives used to (re)construct their clients as women who (now) 
deserved bail. Although this was found to benefit those women who could demonstrate 
these favourable characteristics, those ‘troublesome’ women whose defence 
representatives failed to reconstruct their characters in the eyes of the magistrates were 
not afforded the same latitude.
Whilst there was little evidence that women who were defined as ‘troublesome’ were 
treated more harshly than men were, it is suggested that some women were less likely to 
be perceived as troubled because of their personal characteristics. So, although the skill 
of the defence representative was instrumental in defining magistrates’ perceptions of 
women’s characters, there are concerns that some women may be disadvantaged by 
their social distance from magistrates. For example, what evidence there was on ‘class’ 
indicated that magistrates attributed their own reasoning to defendants’ behaviour, 
suggesting that the greater the social distance between the magistracy and defendants, 
the greater the chances of magistrates resting remand decisions on incorrect assessments 
of defendants’ lifestyles and actions. Further, the potential for discrimination in moral 
assessments was exacerbated by the credence magistrates afforded to extralegal factors, 
such as their impressionistic assessments of defendants’ demeanour in the dock. An 
obvious area for future research would be to explore how magistrates’ moral 
assessments of women varied with personal characteristics such as race, nationality, 
class, age, etc.
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Chapter Seven________________
Negotiating P ro c e ss  And O utcom e: 
C ourt Room  Interaction
In Chapters Five and Six, the three models of remand illustrated that the processing and 
outcomes of remand decisions were shaped by the nature of the offence, the defendant, 
and the case. The next two chapters explore the practical application of these models in 
the complex social environment of the magistrates’ court to further understand how 
remand decisions were produced. The models provided a structure for decision making 
but observations demonstrated that the process of applying these models could affect 
remand decisions, i.e. remand decision making was a social as well as a legal process. It 
is argued in this chapter that court actors had multiple competing roles and 
responsibilities and the ways in which professionals chose to prioritise them affected 
remand processing and outcomes. This chapter examines the range of roles that actors 
had, and provides examples to illustrate that the ways in which actors chose to prioritise 
their responsibilities could have profound effects on both individual remand decisions 
and, as we shall see in the next chapter, on courts’ overall remand rates. The next 
chapter looks at the different ways in which these roles and relationships could be 
structured, depending on the nature of courts’ social structures, and the effect this could 
have on remand outcomes.
Introduction
It has long been argued that participants in organisations such as the criminal justice 
system have to resolve contradictions between their various roles and to organise their 
responsibilities. The contrary nature of criminal justice systems was noted by Rock 
(1993),
Practically, the court was a contradictory enterprise...People were 
adversarial, yet they had also to work together to engage in conflict, and 
there were widely ramifying conventions about how their relations should 
be conducted. (Rock 1993:131-132).
Street level bureaucrats characteristically work in jobs with conflicting and 
ambiguous goals. (Lipsky 1980:40).
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These are apt descriptions of the experience of participants in the remand process. In 
addition to the self-evident conflict in remand law itself (for example in the requirement 
to protect both the public and the defendant from potential or actual harm), participants 
also had to assimilate a range of other, often contradictory, considerations into their 
remand decision making. It is argued that participants’ goals in the remand process were 
not only framed by the formal task they were engaged in (i.e. reaching a remand 
decision about a defendant based on legal and/or extralegal information) but were also 
influenced by, for example, the socio-political and organisational pressures described in 
Chapter Four which helped to frame what was seen as desirable and possible in the 
remand system. These pressures could create further conflict, for example between the 
requirement to use custodial remand to protect the public and a reluctance to remand 
women in prison because of the notoriously poor conditions in the local prison. Further, 
court observations also revealed that the complex social environment of the court itself 
generated additional goals for participants to satisfy, for example magistrates felt a 
responsibility for maintaining order in the courtroom.
It was evident from observations that participants in the remand process had a range of 
roles and responsibilities which often conflicted with each other. Participants had to 
make choices about how they were going to prioritise their own roles and 
responsibilities, and how to engage in the on-going process of negotiation with other 
participants whose own choices would also impact on how remand cases would be 
resolved. So, for example, defence representatives occasionally had to adjust their 
priority away from securing their client bail and towards protecting their own 
professional reputation, depending on magistrates’ responses to them and their bail 
applications. This chapter illustrates how the various contextual and situational, formal 
and informal, legal and social goals of participants in the remand process, that were 
evident in courtroom interaction, were selectively translated into ‘practical work’ (Rock 
1993) by participants and remand decisions produced.
One particular example clearly illustrates that remand decision making was not only 
structured around considerations of the issues highlighted in the three models i.e. the 
offence, the defendant, and the case.
Example 7.1
A female district judge at Inswick Comer remanded a woman in custody on a Friday 
then released her on conditional bail the following Monday. The same district judge,
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CPS officer and defence representative appeared at both hearings. There was no change 
in circumstance which could account for this decision. If anything, the second bail 
application, which resulted in a conditional bail, was weaker than the first, which saw 
her remanded in custody, as there were more doubts over whether her accommodation 
was an appropriate bail address. When presented with almost the same information 
twice, this district judge made two different decisions.
Inconsistency in decision making is often accounted for by the operation of discretion 
(Gelsthorpe and Padfield 2003). Whilst the exercise of discretion makes it possible to 
make two different decisions based on the same information, it does not explain why the 
different conclusions are reached. Inconsistent remand outcomes are explained in this 
chapter as the consequence of actors defining and prioritising their own and others’ 
roles and responsibilities in different ways. The roles and responsibilities that an 
individual assumes will affect the process and the outcome of remand decisions:
a) the process: how s/he goes about making decisions, what questions are asked, what 
information is selected as being important, the nature of the interaction with others 
involved in the system, how much time is given to the decision etc, and
b) the outcome: what is seen as a desirable, or at least as a justifiable, outcome will be 
a product of how the decision-making ‘problem’ is framed e.g. to help, to contain, 
or to process an offender, to finish the court list by lunchtime, to build a professional 
reputation, etc.
Process and outcome are interdependent: the process employed to make a decision will 
influence the outcome and what outcome is seen as desirable will frame how 
information is processed. Although process and outcome can profoundly affect each 
other, it will be seen that there is no automatic relationship between the two: it is not 
always possible to read directly across from one to the other.
In sum, the process and outcome of remand decisions were allied to participants’ 
understanding of what the remand decision was ‘for’. Magistrates did make the final 
decision about the purpose of a remand but the other court actors participated to varying 
degrees in a process of negotiation, seeking to influence how the magistrates decided to 
conceptualise a particular remand case. Each actor in the process had choices to make 
about what s/he wanted to achieve at any given hearing. The underlying structural 
reasons for the choices that actors made are explored in the next chapter. This chapter
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concentrates on demonstrating the range of roles and responsibilities that participants 
had, and how they could affect remand decisions.
This chapter explores the range of court actors’ roles and responsibilities which 
emerged from the interview and observation data. Examples are used to illustrate how 
the roles chosen by actors, and the success with which they were asserted, framed 
magistrates’ decision-making process and/or the outcomes of decisions. Although this 
chapter is primarily based on observation data, interview data are used at times to 
support and elucidate observation findings. No section relies on interview data alone as 
this chapter explores what actually happened in courts rather than what was supposed to 
happen. As such, interview data proved inadequate as what people think they do can 
differ from what they actually do, as is evident in the following example.
Example 7.2
In interview a female magistrate, who had nearly 30 years’ experience, said that she felt 
structured decision making was a positive development as it encouraged proper 
procedures. She stressed the importance of procedures and stated that she encouraged 
new magistrates to adhere to them. She brought out a folder and produced flow charts 
that illustrated the decision making process in bail applications. However, this concern 
for procedure was clearly not demonstrated when she was observed making a bail 
decision on a woman charged with burglary some weeks earlier. The magistrate, who 
was chair of the bench, and the two wingers retired after hearing her co-defendant’s bail 
application. When they returned, they remanded him in custody and announced that “we 
have had a full discussion of both cases and we remand both the defendants in custody.” 
The clerk responded by saying “you haven’t actually heard from the female’s lawyer on 
the matter of bail.” The matter had to be re-heard in another court later that day. 
Procedure was not followed here: a bail application was not heard and clearly the 
magistrates could not have used structured decision making as the basis of an informed 
decision here as they had no information from the defence. This magistrate’s belief in 
the value of procedure was, in this case, not translated into practice.
Not only do people conduct themselves in ways they would not imagine or admit to, 
there is evidence that suggests people’s personal philosophies are not accurate 
predictors of their decision-making (Hogarth 1971). Thus observation data proved a 
superior source of information to interview data as they captured how people really 
behaved in the remand process rather than how they thought they behaved or what they 
believed should happen.
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Roles And Responsibilities in Courtroom interaction
The present study found magistrates to be more involved in and engaged with the 
remand process and decision making than Hucklesby’s “rubber stamping” magistrates 
who habitually deferred to the recommendations the CPS offered (Hucklesby 1996). 
Although the current data does also provide some examples of magistrates making 
unquestioning decisions on the basis of CPS recommendations, the observations reveal 
a much richer role for the magistrates who were seen to be actively engaged with the 
process and outcomes of remand decisions. In fact, the data show all court actors 
engaging with a process of resolving their own complex and conflicting choices about 
how to process individual defendants on a case-by-case basis and responding to the 
choices made by other court actors.
The following list of actors’ roles and responsibilities was constructed from a 
combination of what emerged from the observation data and the interview data, 
supported by findings from previous court-based research.
Magistrates
a) ,. .to make a fair and reasoned decision
b) ...to protect the public
c ) .. .to protect the defendant
d ) .. .to expedite the criminal justice process
e) .. .to verify information
f) .. .not to punish others
g) .. .to maintain authority
CPS
a ) .. .to provide the court with information
b) ...to make recommendations on bail
c) ...to challenge bad decisions
d) ...to protect themselves
Defence representatives
a ) .. .to follow their client’s instructions
b) .. .to advise their clients
c ) .. .not to apply for bail
d) .. .to be truthful
e) ...to protect their professional reputation
Clerks
a ) .. .to protect the defendant
b) .. .to ensure procedure is correctly carried out
c) .. .not to influence magistrates’ decision-making
Defendants
188
a) .. .to be actively involved in the process
Although all personnel in the system had choices to make, some had a greater number 
of competing roles and responsibilities to juggle than others. Whereas clerks had few 
responsibilities which rarely conflicted with each other, magistrates had the greatest 
number of potential responsibilities - some of which were incompatible and required 
magistrates to elect which one(s) to prioritise. As will be seen, defendants had a very 
limited role in a remand process which was monopolised by professionals.
Magistrates’ Roles And Responsibilities
Whether magistrates are understood as being proactively involved in the remand 
process or as simply ‘rubber stamping’ CPS recommendations, they are central to 
proceedings as all decisions must ultimately be made formally by them. As the final 
arbiters, magistrates must find a resolution to the often conflicting aims in remand 
decisions. In their position as the group with the most formal authority (see Chapter 
Eight) in the courtroom, magistrates were unique in the degree of influence they could 
exercise over cases and over the choices made by other court personnel. However, as 
will be seen in this and the subsequent chapter, magistrates, and particularly lay 
magistrates, were greatly influenced in their actions and choices by the roles that other 
actors played.
a) ...To Make A Fair And Reasoned Decision
When asked, all criminal justice personnel said the primary decision makers in the 
remand system were magistrates and magistrates’ principal responsibility was believed 
to be to act as the final arbiter between the CPS and the defence. When talking through 
their decision making on the case vignettes, magistrates almost universally referred to 
the need to “weigh up” and “balance” the conflicting pieces of information and the 
competing rights that were presented to them in remand hearings. Parker et al (1989) 
also found magistrates concerned with the balance between the defendant and the 
public. However, they noted that the need to support the defendant was mentioned much 
less often than the need to protect the public. In the current study, the rights of the 
defendant and the public were invariably mentioned in the same breath. Perhaps this 
reflects the difference between sentencing convicted individuals and bailing 
unconvicted or unsentenced defendants. This responsibility was generally taken very 
seriously. A magistrate of 23 years’ experience summed up the widespread opinion
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amongst magistrates that remand decisions were not to be taken with anything other 
than the utmost care. Even when a defendant was convicted, and therefore the 
presumption in favour of bail did not apply, the potential consequences of a remand in 
custody were considered to be so serious that magistrates felt wary of using their 
powers
Depriving someone of their liberty is an extremely audacious thing to do.
And the law enables you to do that, requires you to do it but it’s a very big 
decision...So I think that’s the main issue that I always have in my mind 
actually when all this comes up. It’s not a game. It may seem to be a game 
in a sense for the people who are prosecuting and defending. But for the 
people who actually have to make the decision, I think it’s a very serious 
business indeed, (male magistrate)
In one case a district judge asserted the importance of correct procedure, even though it 
would not affect the outcome of the hearing.
Example 7.3
When a male district judge at Castleford Road was told that no bail application would 
be made by the defence he said “well I would still like to hear the Crown’s bail refusal 
reasons and something of the case.” This district judge requested information relevant to 
bail even though he was not required to make a decision in this case.
Recent research on sentencing found that magistrates believed they only used custody 
as a “last resort” (Hough, et al. 2003). The present study echoed those findings, with 
magistrates also frequently using this same phrase in interview. However, observations 
detailed how remands in custody were occasionally used where conditional bail would 
have satisfied any bail concerns. As was seen in Example 7.1, given the defendant was 
later released on conditional bail, her initial remand in custody (which was based on the 
same information as the conditional bail decision) could not have been the “last resort”. 
If it had been, she would not have been eligible for release on bail only three days later 
as her circumstances had not changed at all. Again, what magistrates believed they did 
was not always bom out in the way they actually behaved.
Not all magistrates employed such a careful approach as the district judge in Example 
7.3, resulting in unconsidered and perhaps rash decisions.
Example 7.4
A woman who pleaded guilty to two counts of shoplifting (value £89) was remanded in 
custody at Connorton Road. The CPS had not even offered a view on hail when the
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male district judge asked the defence representative if  there was to be a bail application. 
The defence representative said he would be asking for bail and began to make the 
application. The district judge interrupted him and said “I’m not going to grant bail.” 
The defence went on to say that he was asking for a DTTO assessment and that could 
only be done in the community so bail was important. The district judge again 
interrupted him and said “I will not consider bail at this stage.” The district judge did 
not fulfil his responsibility to hear both sides of the argument and make a reasoned 
decision. He did not wait to hear the CPS’s views and he prevented the defence 
representative from even making an application. After three weeks in custody for a 
PSR, this defendant was released on conditional bail to a bail hostel in order for a 
DTTO assessment to be done.
Whether a bail hostel place could have been found and, if so, whether the defendant 
would have been released on conditional bail at the first hearing is unknowable. What is 
evident is that the district judge’s refusal to follow correct bail procedure and listen to 
the bail application meant the possibility could not even be explored. He pre-empted the 
outcome by his arbitrary refusal to follow procedure. It is also interesting to note that in 
this case the clerk failed to challenge this breach of procedure and, further, did not 
prompt the magistrate to announce the formal reasons for refusing bail, something 
which is required by law. (Clerks’ deference to district judges is explored in a later 
section and discussed in the next chapter).
b) .. .To Protect The Public
The remand decision is at heart a question of balancing risk against rights: does a 
defendant present enough of a risk to the public (offending or re-offending against the 
general public or against specific victims or witnesses) and/or the process (failing to 
return to court) to justify incarcerating them? There is a responsibility not to expose the 
public to undue risk and this is achieved either through the use of bail conditions or by 
remanding in custody.
As explored in Chapter Five, with serious offences, a remand in custody was almost 
inevitable, even if the defendant presented a very low risk of reoffending. The rationale 
was that even though reoffending may be unlikely, the harm that would be done by 
another offence being committed was too great to release the defendant.
Example 7.5
A woman was remanded in custody at Orrington Street for domestic burglary. The 
defence made a strong bail application based on the fact that the defendant’s offending 
pattern was almost entirely one of prostitution and deception and she had never been 
convicted of burglary before so reoffending was very unlikely. She had a good record of
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surrendering to court so failure to attend was unlikely. The evidence in the case was so 
weak that the CPS admitted they would be reviewing the case and in fact the case was 
dismissed the following week because of lack of evidence. The mixed bench remanded 
the woman in custody citing the risk of reoffending but no grounds were given to 
support this. This case was used as the basis of one of the case vignettes. Most of the 
magistrates who concluded a remand in custody was necessary in the vignette exercise 
volunteered the information that they would have granted conditional bail if the offence 
was less serious. Even though she was not a bad bail risk, they were not prepared to bail 
her because of the nature of the offence.
In such cases, offence seriousness eclipsed consideration of any other factors, including 
the absence of any “substantial grounds” for refusing bail. It was exceptionally rare for 
a magistrates’ court to bail a defendant charged with a serious offence but it might be 
done under certain circumstances e.g. see Example 8.1 for a striking exception to this 
rule. Two clerks noted that they had previously had to correct magistrates on this issue, 
telling them that offence seriousness alone was not a valid reason for a remand in 
custody. In practice it was understood that offence seriousness would in fact determine 
remand status and this was acceptable to the clerks as long as the decision could be 
accounted for in terms of the Bail Act criteria.
they’ll say because it’s a serious offence and I’ll tell them that’s not enough.
So then they’ll say it’s a serious offence and that means they are likely to
abscond. That’s acceptable, (male clerk)
In their pursuit of public protection, magistrates made decisions based on offence 
seriousness then framed their decisions in terms of Bail Act grounds which provided the 
ex post facto account of the decisions rather than the basis for them.
c) ...To Protect The Defendant
Magistrates have a responsibility to protect defendants’ right to bail and there should be 
“substantial grounds” for refusing bail. As was seen in Vignette Two, wherever the 
offence was not serious, they applied the right to bail, even if there were evident 
concerns about bail risk.
Magistrates were also observed on occasion behaving as active guarantors of 
defendants’ rights. In Hucklesby’s (1994b) study, 34 per cent of magistrates said that 
defendants’ legal representation was of good quality, 22 per cent said it was variable 
quality and depended on the individual solicitor, and 28 per cent said defence 
representation was poor quality (16 per cent gave neutral answers) (Hucklesby
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1994b: 147-148). In interview magistrates in this research also bemoaned the poor
quality of some defence representatives and went on to say they had to work hard to get
enough information to make sure the defendant had a fair hearing. Clerks supported
magistrates’ comments on this,
you do get the occasional one where he’ll get bail despite his rep not 
because of him. The magistrates will do all the work, ask all the questions.
We had one the other day, the Chair said afterwards it was like pulling teeth.
(male clerk)
A prioritisation of the defendant’s rights may secure defendants bail but could also 
affect the process without impacting on the outcome of a remand decision.
Example 7.6
At Inswick Comer, a woman appeared before three district judges on separate 
occasions. At each hearing there was no question of bail being granted as the offence 
was arson and she was on custodial remand for psychiatric assessment. The three 
district judges, two male and one female, all remanded her in custody but responded to 
being told that she was refusing to come into the courtroom very differently. The first 
simply remanded her in custody without commenting on her absence. The second asked 
if the defence wanted him to see her in the cells. The third district judge stopped 
proceedings and told the court
I will go down and see her in the cells, I don’t want to conduct this in her 
absence, (female district judge)
Whilst these different attitudes towards the defendant did not affect the outcome, they 
may have impacted on the defendant herself, as the defence representative commented 
I think it may help if you did see her [in the cells] as it may help her 
acknowledge what’s happening to her. (male defence representative)
Some magistrates also seemed to feel responsible for ensuring the defendants’ welfare 
throughout the remand stage of the criminal justice process. Seven occasions were 
observed when magistrates expressed their concern at the length of custodial remands 
when problems with procedure had delayed their hearings.
Example 7.7
At Castleford Road a woman was remanded in custody for trial on a charge of 
possession of an offensive weapon. Because of a series of administrative problems the 
trial was repeatedly delayed. She had already been in custody for six weeks when the 
trial had to be put back again due to the police officers in the case being sent to the 
wrong court and probation officers mistakenly giving the magistrates a PSR concerning 
other matters which could prejudice the trial. It would be another two weeks before her 
trial could take place. The mixed bench expressed their anger that the defendant would 
have to spend even more time in prison and insisted that the file was marked to indicate 
to the next bench that if the Crown were not able to proceed on the next date, the trial 
should be abandoned. The Chair apologised to the defendant for the continued delay
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and explained again, this time directly to her, that the case would be withdrawn if it 
could not proceed on the next occasion.
In addition, as discussed in Chapter Six, magistrates tried to help ‘sympathetic’ 
defendants when it was possible and they sought to minimise the harm done to the 
defendant. Concern for welfare was exhibited, for example, in magistrates’ 
preparedness to make “risky” remand decisions in explicitly-stated attempts to help 
offenders make changes in their lives instead of simply processing or containing them 
(see Chapter Five). However, a magistrate inadvertently revealed that well-meant 
displays of concern for defendants’ rights were sometimes empty gestures.
We often didn’t retire, the decision was made by the bench. The chairman 
would turn to me and say ‘remand in custody’ and I wasn’t going to start 
arguing with him in court. Now I mean I always take my bench out, or most 
times I do, because I think the defendant deserves it. Even if you’re just 
going out to have a cup of coffee, so to speak, I want the defendant to feel 
that he’s being properly considered, (male magistrate)
d) ...To Expedite The Criminal Justice Process
Magistrates appeared to feel they also had a responsibility to keep the pace of 
proceedings up and to drive cases along when, for example, adjournments were 
requested because further instructions needed to be taken or files had been mislaid. The 
district judges in particular, perhaps because of their legal training or their more 
fi*equent sittings, took responsibility for getting through the daily remand lists by 
lunchtime and for ensuring cases progressed. As discussed in Chapter Four, staff in 
magistrates’ courts felt pressures from central government to reduce delays in the 
criminal justice system.
At times the preoccupation with keeping court business moving had the potential to 
over-ride other duties. In the following example of a shoplifting case at Connorton 
Road, the rights and the dignity of the defendant had to be defended by her 
representative against a district judge keen to resolve the case.
Example 7.8
A defendant had been remanded in custody for psychiatric reports and was due in court 
for sentencing. The defence said.
The defendant is very heavily medicated and they cannot get her out of the van 
that has brought her from [prison]. She is very heavily sedated and in effect is 
fast asleep.
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The male district judge replied,
Well, there must be some way they can get her into court. Fd like to deal with 
this today. It’s a simple matter and it’s only going to have to come back again 
next week. Is she a large person? If not, could they carry her in?
The defence responded.
Sir, the issue is that given she is so heavily medicated, whilst she could be 
physically present in court, I would not be able to take instructions from her and 
she wouldn’t, she could not understand court proceedings.
The district judge then said.
Yes, I see. Remand back to custody for a week then.
Magistrates sometimes struggled with another facet of their responsibility to the 
criminal justice process: remanding in custody because of likelihood of failure to 
appear. The hardest cases were those where the offences themselves were not serious 
(commonly shoplifting in these observations) but the offender had an extensive history 
of simply ignoring all court orders to return for trial or sentencing. Whilst magistrates 
and district judges alike would bail and re-bail the majority of these cases, there would 
be the occasional time when a magistrate felt they had to remand a woman in custody 
because she was simply flouting the authority of the court. In these cases, the ftiistrated 
and exasperated magistrates almost invariably used the phrase “you leave me no other 
choice but to remand you in custody.” Such ‘cusp cases’ were discussed in more detail 
in Chapter Five.
e) ...To Verify Information
As discussed in Chapter Four, it was sometimes difficult to get verified information in 
remand hearings. The reasons why magistrates sometimes reached the decision to 
challenge lawyers to verify their statements are explored in Chapter Eight. The focus 
here is on the consequences of their choice whether or not to request information was 
verified. Magistrates did question the CPS on occasions but more frequently they 
requested the defence state whether or not he himself had verified a defendant’s address 
was suitable for bail, if she really was attending the rehabilitation centre as she claimed, 
if she was in fact the full-time carer of her children, etc. Magistrates who actively 
involved themselves in the process and asked for information to be verified had a 
significant impact on bail outcomes.
Example 7.9
The defence informed the court the defendant’s mother was present to support her 
daughter and he offered residence with her mother along with a curfew and reporting 
conditions. Even though the defence had spoken directly to her mother and her mother’s 
attendance indicated she supported her daughter, the male district judge, unusually, did
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not accept the offer of residence without question. He asked for the mother to take the 
stand, “I want to hear how the mother feels about her staying at her home.” The mother 
communicated her anxieties about having her daughter in her house to the court through 
the defence representative and said she was not prepared to offer her residence. The 
defendant was remanded in custody. In this case, it was only because the district judge 
insisted on hearing first hand verification of the information himself that the problems 
with the bail address were revealed. If he had accepted the word of the defence 
representative, the defendant may well have been released to an unsuitable bail address.
The presence of the mother in the court may have been the reason why the district judge 
asked to hear fi*om her. Perhaps she communicated her anxiety through her expressions 
and body language. Perhaps the district judge asked to speak to her simply because she 
was in the court so he could. Would the district judge have accepted the defence 
representative’s word for the offer of residence if the mother had not been in court? It is 
impossible to say what the outcome might have been in this case but, in general, the 
data illustrate that the extent to which magistrates choose to take court personnel at their 
word or enquire as to the veracity of information affects remand outcomes. The caprice 
with which such requests are made produces irregular and inconsistent remand 
decisions.
In contrast, where magistrates elected not to request verification of information some 
potentially unsafe bail decisions could be made.
Example 7.10
A case of theft from the person at Inswick Comer was considered serious enough for the 
CPS to decline jurisdiction. The defendant was remanded in custody by a male district 
judge because of a substantial likelihood of further offending and failure to surrender 
based on the nature and gravity of the offence and the fact it was committed on bail. At 
the next hearing little had changed but the defence argued for bail based on an 
uncorroborated offer of a residence condition:
Defence: She wants to go home now and live with her brother. I have not spoken 
to him but I have spoken to her father and he says her brother would be prepared 
to have her to stay.
District judge: Would anyone stand surety for her?
Defence: took instmctions and said ‘She says her father would be able to.’
The defendant was released on bail with conditions of residence with her brother, daily 
reporting, exclusion from the city and £500 surety. In this example it is striking that 
even though the defence representative states he has not verified with the brother that he 
has agreed she can reside with him, the court is satisfied that the condition of residence 
is acceptable. No attempt is made to establish whether the brother knows she will be 
bailed to his address and no attempt is made to check on the brother’s character. 
Furthermore, the court accepts a surety based on the defendant’s own word. This would 
be an unenforceable condition as the father has not given the court his consent to stand
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surety. The male district judge released the defendant from custody, granting her 
conditional bail based on an unverified bail address and an unsecured security.
f) .. .Not To Punish Others
At times magistrates demonstrated concern not for either the defendant’s rights or the 
need to protect the public, but concern not to punish innocents. As was seen in Chapter 
Six, most commonly this related to considering giving a woman bail for the sake of her 
children. This was rarely observed to be explicitly stated in court but interview data 
suggested that magistrates “try a little bit harder not to remand a woman in custody if 
she’s got young children” (male magistrate). All but one magistrate interviewed said 
this was one of the hardest things about remanding women in custody.
Example 7.11
In a case of shoplifting at Inswick Comer, a male district judge established that the 
defendant had a history of not co-operating with getting PSRs done and she had 
breached her last CRO. He asked how often the defendant saw her child. Because of the 
defendant’s dmg problem, the child actually lived with the defendant’s mother-in-law 
but the defendant saw her daughter on a regular basis. The magistrate said:
I am inclined to think that custody is the only option. If she didn’t co-operate with 
reports before, why should she now? But, on reflection I will give conditional bail to 
try and get a PSR done. [Turned to address the defendant] I make it clear that you 
will go to prison if you fail to co-operate. I want you to know that I have deliberately 
given you this final chance for your child’s sake.
It was very rare for concern for others to be mentioned by magistrates in court so it is
not possible to know the extent to which it influenced their remand decisions. Most
magistrates said they would afford the same degree of consideration to a man’s bail
application if he was the primary carer of a child. Three magistrates disagreed with this
and said that whilst they hoped they would treat men and women equally, in reality this
was probably not tme
your decision is made very hard because you know you’re putting them into 
care and that’s bound to affect the balance of your decision, isn’t it? And 
that’s unfair, its actually unfair on young men because we really ought to 
always ask the same questions with men. Do they have parental 
responsibilities? But we don’t. I suppose their defence would raise it but, to 
be honest, we don’t think to ask. And I have a feeling that we’d be a bit 
dubious if some young man said he had sole care of a young child. You’d 
expect it with women more, don’t you? (female magistrate)
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g) ...To Maintain Authority
Courtrooms in the different areas did vary to some extent in formality but for the 
majority of the time court personnel in all areas and courts were very deferential to the 
magistrates. However, when it was obvious that a lay bench were not very experienced 
and/or they were having to be guided by clerks because of inadequate control over the 
process and poor decision making, clerks became far more influential and proactive in 
determining case process and outcome.
Example 7.12
Defence representatives played a subtle game with a mixed lay bench at Inswick 
Comer. Defence representatives commented that the bench was “one of the worst I’ve 
seen”: they took an unusually long time to reach decisions in some cases, had to be 
repeatedly prompted by the clerk to give the reasons and grounds for remand decisions, 
rose half an hour early for lunch because “we’re feeling pressurised”, and had to 
apologise to the court when they remanded a woman in custody without first hearing 
her defence representative’s bail application. Defence representatives challenged each 
other to include certain words in their applications. The words became more and more 
difficult to insert into a speech subtly; the final challenge I heard was to use the word 
“elephant” in a bail application. When the defence representative managed to 
incorporate it (“my client, like an elephant, would never forget to attend court”), a few 
defence representatives and the list caller, who was aware of the game, stifled laughs. 
The bench were probably not aware of the mles of the game but could not have failed to 
sense the almost light-hearted atmosphere in the court room. This bench could do little 
to reassert its authority but the clerk began to direct proceedings to an unusual degree.
On other occasions magistrates, and particularly district judges, sought to re-assert their 
authority within the court when they believed it was being challenged. Three district 
judges in Connorton Road and Inswick Comer had a habit, when no-one was ready to 
appear, of calling all defence representatives into their courtroom, even if they were in 
the cells taking instmctions or in other courtrooms waiting to appear, and telling them to 
explain to the court why they were not ready. Most simply proffered apologies and 
asked the court’s indulgence of a few more minutes. Few ventured explanations as this 
usually attracted the full force of the district judge’s irritation.
Example 7.13
A  male district judge in Connorton Road chastised a defence representative for not 
being ready to appear, even though he had been busy in another courtroom, and was 
refusing to let the case be put back for him to take instmctions because he should have 
been ready. The district judge said.
Court One takes precedence. You should have been ready at 10.30am. Your 
client has been in custody all week. This Court takes precedence and this case 
will proceed now.
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It seemed unlikely that the district judge was motivated by a concern for the defendant’s 
welfare as he insisted the case proceed immediately. Consequently, the defence 
representative was forced to take whispered instructions from his client under the 
impatient gaze of the district judge. The best interests of the defendant could not 
possibly have been served in this hearing.
The CPS’ Responsibilities:
The CPS receive files for overnight cases from the police on the morning of the hearing. 
They must make a bail judgement based on the information in the file, records of the 
defendant’s offending history, and police recommendations on bail. Women held on 
overnight custody would typically begin to arrive at the court at 10.30am onwards and 
the CPS would need to be ready to start the overnight list. Any file they had not been 
able to look at would be read during natural breaks. CPS officers, then, had to juggle 
with attending to court proceedings and making judgements on files often, particularly 
when district judges were sitting, with no break all morning.
a) .. .To Provide The Court With Information
The CPS and the defence are the two main sources of information in a remand hearing, 
although clerks and probation officers also contributed at times. Magistrates cannot 
make reasoned decisions without information from the CPS and the defence. However, 
their information does not carry the same weight. There is an assumption that 
information presented by defence representatives is partial because it is their 
responsibility to do what they can to get their client bail (Hucklesby 1997b; Shapland 
1987). In contrast, CPS information is generally considered to be verified and 
completed, though, as we shall see in the next chapter, personal experience of poor CPS 
officers does undermine this faith.
The CPS officers interviewed reported taking this responsibility seriously for two 
reasons. Firstly, all said they were aware that the magistrates rely on them and cannot 
make good decisions unless they are given accurate information. A magistrate said he 
felt it was the CPS’s responsibility
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to give us as much information that we can make the correct decision and 
that has to be in a structured way with as much concrete evidence as 
possible that they’ve checked such as a very real fear of reoffending or 
witness interference. To highlight all the areas that we have to consider 
because we are the lay bench and we don’t always spot the obvious in some 
cases but we have to be told and their job is not to assume that we know all 
the pitfalls and all the bits and pieces, they have to give us the complete 
picture as best they can and why they are saying it backed up by some sort 
of sound concerns such as interfere with witnesses or further offences, that 
sort of thing, (male magistrate)
Where the information isn’t available, it isn’t up to the tribunal to find that 
out. It’s up to the CPS to present it. We’re not there to interrogate (female 
magistrate).
Secondly, all CPS interviewed commented on poor communication with the police and 
the difficulties presented by having inexperienced police filling out remand forms. They 
said that reasons for double checking information from the police was that,
the police decisions are not always 100% correct... You can tell whether it’s 
an experienced officer from the information on the MG7....As I say, it 
would be nice if  they put all the information there. For example the PNC 
print out will show pending matters and I’ve already spoken to the police 
about this, they do give you the bail conditions for the impending matter and 
also the date and the court but they never tell you the type of offence. .. .we 
find the case summary prepared by the officer in the case sometimes not 
quite accurate. For example they say ‘the victim was repeatedly kicked 
twenty times’ but if you read the victim statement it actually happened one 
after another so it’s not all whilst the victim was on the floor, it’s not as if he 
was kicked twenty odd times, it could be spread over half an hour moving 
from one location to another. So if you give that information it’s a little bit 
misleading, (female CPS)
This differs from Burrows et al (1994) who found evidence the CPS had a more 
unquestioning attitude to police information. It should be noted that the CPS 
interviewed all came from Outer District where there were long-standing difficulties in 
the Police-CPS relationship. In Central District, the police contact complained that the 
CPS regularly revised charges to less serious ones, to the great annoyance of the police. 
Hucklesby found that the CPS felt police information was useful but their 
recommendations were not unquestioningly followed (Hucklesby 1994b).
In addition, three CPS officers in this study commented on how uncomfortable they 
found it personally when they put information to the court only for it to be revealed as 
incorrect by the defence or by magistrates asking further questions about it. The CPS in
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Outer District stated that they relied heavily on the police liaison officer to verify or find 
additional information. When he was not available, they would hesitate about putting 
information before the court if  they were not certain about it or if  they felt it was 
incomplete.
You do think twice. Ifs the most embarrassing thing if you put to the court 
‘oh he’s got two outstanding matters at blah blah court’ and the bench asks 
you for what type of offences, when was it? And you just say no! You can’t 
answer their questions! So I’d like more information on the MG7 (female 
CPS).
CPS officers were observed to check police information and altered recommendations 
accordingly. For example, CPS officers stated in court that whilst the police had 
concerns about the bail address, the issues had been resolved to the CPS’s satisfaction. 
A male CPS officer commented that “the way the police check out a bail address might 
be, shall we say, a little cursory.”
So, the CPS stated that for a variety of reasons they took seriously their responsibility to 
present verified and complete information to the court. However, although CPS officers 
insisted in interview that they reached their own conclusions on files and did not rely on 
unverified police information, the pressure on time with overnight cases outlined above 
seemed at times to have prevented this. CPS officers were observed struggling with 
their grasp of the facts of a case and it was not unusual for defence representatives to 
offer clarification on, for example, previous convictions or current prosecutions. 
Evidently, in practice the CPS were not always able to proceed on the basis of 
personally verified and factually correct information.
On those occasions when they did not provide the court with full facts, poor bail 
decisions were made. One magistrate recalled a bail application for a man charged with 
domestic violence
the CPS came and said it was only, it was an argument but it’s this that and 
the other. And I let him out on bail, because no one was opposing it. The 
warrant officer said to me afterwards, ‘he gave that girl such terrible black 
eyes.’ And nobody had told me that she’s been damaged and I would have 
made much more stringent bail conditions if  I’d known. I might not even 
have let him out on bail. And since then I have always asked very 
specifically and I think nothing wrong came of that particular bail decision 
but I am always very aware ever since then to actually ask much more
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specific questions from the CPS. The CPS is often, doesn’t know, gives you 
a load of old rubbish and hasn’t got a clue, (female magistrate)
This example illustrates how the generalised trust magistrates had in the CPS’s 
professionalism was tempered by personal experience of the organisation (e.g. the 
regular use of agency staff) and of individual officer’s mismanagement of cases.
b ) ... To Make Recommendations On Bail
Although magistrates were free to disagree, CPS bail recommendations did constitute 
the basis of the vast majority of bail hearings: they flagged up concerns magistrates 
should be aware of and defence representatives should respond to. On the few occasions 
I observed the CPS refuse to make bail recommendations (mainly because of a lack of 
information), the magistrates appeared to feel somewhat stranded. For example, at a 
Saturday court in Outer District, the CPS representative said he had no information on 
the defendant as the police file had not yet reached him or was incomplete so he could 
not offer a view on hail. The magistrate replied, “well surely you have some thoughts 
for us?”.
Whilst all agreed the CPS had a responsibility to make recommendations to the bench, 
interview and observation data revealed that there was some disjuncture in terms of 
what the recommendations actually represented. Although all CPS representatives 
interviewed stated it was their responsibility to make a reasoned bail recommendation 
based on the evidence, the observation data showed some cases where recommendations 
were made more by rote than by reasoned judgement. As with magistrates, the CPS 
work within the Bail Act framework when making remand recommendations. So they 
too should safeguard the rights of the defendant to be given bail and balance this against 
their responsibility to protect the public and to ensure the process proceeds. The 
following example illustrates that not all CPS recommendations were reasoned 
judgements based on what the CPS representative believed really should happen. 
Talking to the CPS representative before the magistrates came in, the defence 
representative said that his client had already been given bail by another bench in the 
same court that morning on a more serious matter.
Defence: Are you prepared to grant bail seeing as next door have given bail 
already?
CPS: I’ll have to oppose bail because she’s offended on bail but I’m sure the 
bench will bail her.
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It should be noted that magistrates are never in court when these kinds of discussions 
take place so they could not disabuse magistrates of the idea that the CPS 
recommendations are in fact reasoned judgements.
All but two of the magistrates interviewed felt that the CPS were responsible for 
presenting the facts fairly and accurately and making well-informed and professional 
judgements on bail. However, five of the more experienced magistrates and all the 
clerks did voice doubts about how considered CPS recommendations sometimes were.
I think they say what they say in an automatic fashion and they expect us to 
be listening to the defence side and weighing up factors. My impression is 
they more often say ‘custody’ when, they say it automatically and they ask 
for it when it seems clear to us that anyone with any sense would know they 
weren’t going to remand in custody, (male magistrate)
I definitely get the impression with some prosecutors that they don’t actually 
make their own judgement about whether to object or not, they just say 
she’s got previous so I’m going to object but they don’t bail appeal it so that 
means, I know they can only do that for the more serious cases but the fact 
that they don’t say anything about ‘that’s an outrageous decision’ shows 
they’re quite happy once they’ve got bail but they just want the bench to 
make that decision, (male clerk)
Appealing a bail decision to the crown court is the only formal mechanism the CPS has 
to communicate its disagreement with a decision. Other cases need to be heard so there 
is little time for comment and few informal opportunities to express views and give 
feedback on decision making exist. Outside the courtroom, the CPS and the clerks and 
magistrates are located in different areas of the courthouse. As such, they are unlikely to 
have opportunities to discuss particular cases. As the quotation above illustrates, clerks 
and magistrates (five mentioned this spontaneously in interview) interpret the decision 
not to appeal and the absence of any negative comment as an indication of CPS 
satisfaction with decision-making when in fact this apparent concordance may simply 
reflect the lack of an immediate forum to communicate any concerns not serious enough 
to prompt a bail appeal.
The extent to which CPS or, prior to the creation of the CPS, police recommendations 
influence magistrates’ decisions has been a subject of some debate. Previous studies 
have found CPS recommendations to be accepted without question by magistrates.
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In cases where the CPS are satisfied that a defendant can safely be granted 
bail and, if appropriate, the defence agrees to the conditions proposed, the 
CPS do not offer, and the magistrates do not ask for, additional information, 
which tends to suggest that in these circumstances the magistrates take at 
face value the CPS assessment of the bail risk the defendant poses. 
(Hucklesby 1994b:305).
It is important to note the caveat in the above statement: CPS recommendations are 
accepted without question in uncontested cases. There may be concerns about the 
appropriateness of the bail conditions that are applied but challenges on this matter, 
surely, are the responsibility of defence representatives. Thus, if the defence 
representative does not dispute the bail recommendation, why would the magistrates 
challenge the CPS? There may be occasions where the defence representative was not 
performing her professional role adequately and here magistrates did have a role. 
Evidence from this study suggested that where magistrates saw a defence representative 
failing their client, they did intervene and ask additional questions (see above). Of 
course, there must be occasions when magistrates do not take responsibility and poor 
decisions are made. The broad point, however, is that magistrates should not be 
portrayed as having unquestioning acceptance of CPS recommendations in all cases 
simply because they do not intervene in uncontested cases. At one point Hucklesby does 
in fact acknowledge that magistrates behave with greater autonomy in contested cases.
Evidence suggests that magistrates do not always agree with the CPS 
assessment of the situation and in 28 cases where the CPS requested a 
remand in custody and also put forward reasons for that decision the 
magistrates granted conditional bail. Consequently, even a reasoned 
application for a remand in custody by the CPS can be overturned by the 
magistrates. (Hucklesby 1994b:309).
The relationship between CPS recommendations and magistrates’ decisions is not 
straightforward. It seems that CPS views are very influential but magistrates do not 
follow them unquestioningly. In interview, all magistrates said they were prepared to 
disagree with CPS recommendations but four did explicitly acknowledge that CPS 
recommendations were highly influential on benches’ decision making.
Yes, sometimes [I disagree with the CPS], but it comes less well from the 
Bench. And yes, if we do feel strongly then we won’t grant bail of our own 
volition so to speak. But it’s not a comfortable situation to be in because we 
are not there to take sides or that sort of thing. We are there to make up our 
own minds from what we hear from both sides and we want the case 
presented in a balanced way on both sides. So that is a concern, that the CPS
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should in fact pay greater attention to whether or not they are objecting to 
bail, (male magistrate)
Hucklesby found similar sentiments expressed in her study (Hucklesby 1996) and also 
found that magistrates felt unable to question CPS recommendations, even when the 
offence was not serious (Hucklesby 1997b). So, when the CPS made recommendations 
the magistrates took them very seriously and this did lead to some surprising remands in 
custody.
Example 7.14
In one case at Old Market Street, a man was on overnight custody on a charge of rape. 
The CPS asked for a remand in custody. Although it was a serious charge, the defendant 
had no previous convictions and the defence made an exceptionally convincing bail 
application. He raised serious questions about the truth of the allegation and drew 
attention to the police notebooks which contained their concerns about the motivation of 
the complainant. He also pointed out that the complainant had a conviction for peijury. 
Despite this, the mixed lay bench chose not to release the defendant on conditional bail 
but to remand him in custody. When the bench gave their decision, the CPS’s and the 
defence representative’s facial expressions registered their surprise. The CPS 
representative turned to the defence representative and mouthed the words “I’m sorry 
about that” and later told the defence representative that he was surprised by the 
decision as he had expected the bench to bail the defendant. As this example shows, 
given the influence the CPS has over magistrates, particularly lay magistrates, 
recommendations should be made with caution.
Part of the explanation for this decision must be that it was a serious offence and 
magistrates were, as has already been seen, very reluctant to bail any defendant accused 
of a violent offence against a person. In the case vignette which was constructed to 
explore responses to a serious charge but very weak evidence, 15 out of 24 magistrates 
remanded her in custody with eight of them expressing regret but feeling they had no 
choice because they were required to take the prosecution’s case at its highest. Only the 
most senior magistrates (i.e. the longest serving and the bench chairs) felt confident 
enough to reject the CPS recommendations and trust their own judgement. This 
illustrates that even where magistrates did not fear the possibility of a repeat (serious) 
offence being committed, they generally still remanded in custody if requested to do so 
by the CPS.
Others have found CPS and defence representatives settled many bail applications in 
informal discussions before the court sat (Hucklesby 1996, Baldwin, 1977). Defence 
representatives were frequently observed in discussion with the CPS officer but when 
questioned about this in interview, all five of the CPS officers said they never agreed
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difficult cases with the defence. They reported that the conversations mainly concerned 
other issues such as the disclosure of evidence. However, there was evident agreement 
in this case so why did the CPS officer oppose bail i.e. why did the CPS officer make a 
remand request he evidently did not believe in? The CPS feared the consequences of 
having bad judgement and recommending the release of someone who will commit a 
serious offence (see below, the “Evening [Paper] test”). Unlike magistrates, CPS 
officers can reassure themselves that they are not the final arbiters in the remand system 
and it is up to the magistrates to make or fail to make “brave” decisions. In this case, the 
CPS officer failed to take responsibility for his recommendation and because the bench 
were predisposed to accept his recommendation a man was remanded in custody, 
possibly unnecessarily.
c ) .. .To Challenge Bad Decisions
The CPS have the power to appeal magistrates’ bail decisions and have them reviewed 
in the crown court. Defendants remain in custody until the appeal has been heard. The 
CPS are expected to use this tool to fulfil further their remit of protecting the public 
when, in their view, a defendant could not be safely released on bail. Whilst magistrates 
are still considered to be the final arbiters between the CPS and defence representatives, 
all interviewees with legal qualifications applauded this change in the law as a
safeguard against bad decisions. They don’t, it isn’t often that magistrates 
make really bad decisions but sometimes you wonder what on earth was 
going through their heads, (male clerk)
I had one dreadful decision the other week. It was the worst decision I have 
ever had on a bail. I have only ever appealed a bail decision once and that 
was it... It was a car-jacking at gun-point, victims were a female and her 
boyfriend.. .The defence and I, as we do, we sat there. He almost reluctantly 
asked for bail, made a fairly good fist of it but no better than an average fist 
of it and was totally shocked himself to get bail. The defence brief turned to 
me, and they don’t often say this, turned to me and said, what a dreadful 
decision. Privately. ...O f course, the crown court remanded him in custody.
(male CPS)
As was seen in Chapter Four, magistrates and others used the absence of CPS appeals as 
‘evidence’ that magistrates were making good remand decisions. However, in interview 
the CPS said that they did not appeal every bad decision, only the “truly awful ones” 
(male CPS). CPS officers did not routinely use this power but reserved it for the most 
extreme examples of poor decision making.
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This example is also a useful illustration that magistrates did occasionally make 
maverick decisions where the principle of offence seriousness was disregarded and/or 
CPS recommendations were not followed. Such decisions demonstrate the scope of 
magistrates’ discretion. Rumgay (1995) points to the importance of situational factors 
(such as the disposition of individual characters on the bench). Also, Hucklesby (1994) 
noted that clerks in one court purposively selected which magistrates should sit on the 
same bench in order to ensure a balance of views. Chapter Seven further explores the 
influences on the production of decisions and illustrates that these surprising decisions 
are often explicable in terms of the social dynamics of the court.
d) ...To Protect Themselves
Both Hucklesby (1994b) and the present study found that CPS remand 
recommendations were not made simply on the basis of the case. If the remand court list 
contained a large number of overnight custody cases where the police requested 
remands in custody, the CPS in both studies reported applying the Bail Act tests more 
stringently than when there was only one or two potential remand in custody cases. CPS 
officers commented on their desire to protect their credibility in the eyes of the court 
and appearing to ask for too many custodial remands could damage this. Hucklesby 
(1994b) also found CPS officers anticipating district judge’s decisions and tailoring 
their recommendations accordingly. Similarly, as has been seen, CPS lawyers explained 
one incentive to verify the information they offered to the court was to protect their 
reputation. As previously noted, three CPS lawyers expressed wider concerns about the 
personal and professional implications of making bail recommendations. One officer 
had coined the phrase “the Evening [Paper] test” to sum up his fears about what the 
press would say if he recommended bail for a serious offender who reoffended whilst 
on bail. Many remand decisions were fairly clear-cut but most criminal justice 
personnel agreed that there were occasional cases where “brave” decisions should 
rightfully be made. A CPS officer admitted that she was sometimes over-cautious in her 
recommendations not simply because of the fear of the defendant reoffending but also 
for fear of what would happen to her if the papers published the story. She preferred to 
leave these difficult decisions up the magistrates and protect herself by recommending 
custodial remand. As was seen above in Example 7.13 where a man was remanded in 
custody on a charge of rape, expecting the bench to make the ‘right’ decision regardless
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of the CPS’s recommendations can backfire because of magistrates’ respect for CPS 
advice.
Defence Representatives’ Responsibilities:
It is the responsibility of defence advocates to represent their clients in bail hearings. 
Whilst many defendants on overnight custody were represented by their own solicitor, it 
was also common for the “duty solicitor” to represent overnight cases. The duty 
solicitor would be responsible for all unrepresented defendants on the court list who 
requested her help. In large courthouses such as those in Central and Inner District, a 
number of ‘duties’ were usually present each day. The differences between duty 
solicitors and the more peripatetic individual solicitor or barrister must be bom in mind 
when analysing defence representatives’ role in remand hearings. The duty solicitor 
commonly had a large number of cases and so may have been under pressure to process 
them (take instruction and make the bail application in court) more quickly than a 
representative who only had one or two clients. However, many of the peripatetic 
advocates were required to appear at more than one courthouse in a morning and 
consequently needed to get their case heard as early as possible. The duty solicitor was 
likely to appear regularly at the court for so she would have a greater familiarity with 
the court and its personnel. The potential value of having an established relationship 
with the bench is illustrated in the next chapter. Duty solicitors were unlikely to have 
had much, if any, previous contact with the clients they represented. This contrasted 
with individual advocates whose familiarity with their clients’ histories, situation and 
temperament may have provided them with information which enabled them to make a 
more informed and thus more effective bail application.
a) ...To Get Their Client Bailed
Carrying out their clients’ instructions is the primary responsibility of defence lawyers. 
In the vast majority of cases this means trying to get their client bail; very occasionally 
a defendant would elect not to apply for bail. As will be seen later on, defence 
representatives did follow instructions and make convincing bail applications even 
when they believed the defendant should be remanded in custody. This professional 
obligation was usually taken very seriously.
In Example 7.10 the defence representative tried very hard and even misrepresented the 
support the defendant’s mother was prepared to give to try and secure bail. This same
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defence representative was observed outside the court after the hearing talking to the 
defendant’s mother saying
To be honest I think she’s better off inside. She’s too much for you to cope 
with, isn’t she? I’ll try and get all the cases sentenced at once to get a big 
custodial sentence rather than lots of short ones so that she can get some 
drug rehab help whilst she’s inside, (female defence representative)
From what she said, it appeared that the defence representative felt that her client was in 
fact better off in prison because of her drug problem. If this was true, she suppressed her 
own views on what she felt was the best thing for her client and for her client’s mother 
and made a very determined attempt to get her bail. Defence representatives did apply 
for bail even if they felt their client should not be bailed. On the other hand, it may be 
that she was simply saying this to her client’s mother because she had failed to get her 
bailed or that she changed her approach to her client’s situation as a consequence of the 
remand decision.
As defendants are almost wholly dependent on their defence to represent them, the 
lawyer’s commitment to protecting a client’s interests is of paramount importance. In 
some cases defence lawyers worked very hard and secured bail against the odds. In 
others, the defence representations were inadequate and women who should have 
expected conditional bail actually were remanded in custody. One case observed at 
Inswick Comer illustrates the importance of defence representatives fulfilling their duty 
fully.
Example 7.15
Despite the fact that the defendant was appearing in court on six charges of theft and 
dishonesty and one charge of fail to appear, a reasonably strong bail application could 
have been made based on the fact that she was only 21 years old, had no previous 
convictions and had spent a night in police custody for the first time. Her defence 
representative addressed the district judge and said
I am not sure that I am in a position to make a reasonable bail application but 
perhaps you would like to hear the facts of the case first. Sir. (male defence 
representative)
In effect, the defence representative left it up to the district judge whether or not he 
wanted to hear a bail application; the defence lawyer made no attempt to represent his 
client. The male district judge did not request further information and she was remanded 
in custody for three weeks.
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b) . ..To Advise Their Clients
Although not all clients listen, defence representatives felt a responsibility to offer 
advice on how best to proceed with the bail application. Hucklesby found that defence 
representatives sometimes advised their clients not to apply for bail. She explained this 
as defence representatives seeking to protect their credibility by not asking for bail if  it 
was unlikely to be granted (Hucklesby 1997b). In the present study, recommendations 
not to apply for bail were explained more as tactical decisions that would benefit the 
client. For example, with more serious offences where the case was going to the crown 
court defence representatives sometimes advised their clients to “keep their powder dry” 
and wait to apply for bail at the crown court. This was good advice for two reasons, 
firstly it gave the defence a week to organise sureties or securities, to find a bail hostel 
place, to get character references, etc which would all contribute to a stronger bail 
application; and secondly, the defence representatives interviewed all felt that judges in 
crown courts were more likely to give bail than magistrates were^®. The explanations 
offered for this included that crown court judges are professionals and are thus more 
confident in making complex or borderline decisions. Secondly, what appears to be a 
very serious offence in magistrates courts will appear much less serious in a crown 
court relative to the other cases appearing there. Consequently, judges are believed to be 
less likely to remand in custody based simply on the nature of the offence. Without 
having witnessed defence representatives taking instructions from their clients, it is 
impossible to know in how many cases the absence of a bail application stems from 
defence representatives’ recommendations or was the defendants’ own initiative.
c) .. .Not To Apply For Bail
There are cases when defence representatives felt a responsibility to a broader concept 
of justice or public protection and did not make a bail application. In cases where clients 
had mental health problems, defence representatives may not apply for bail even if their 
clients instructed them to because being released was not in their client’s best interests.
Crown courts deal with much more serious offences than magistrates’ courts so there are difficulties in 
comparing remand in custody rates as the nature o f their case loads would alter the necessity of custodial 
remands. Even comparing decisions on the same defendant is problematic as many defendants in effect 
remand themselves into custody at magistrates’ courts by not making a bail application. Again, although 
the decision will be recorded in terms of the Bail Act exceptions to the presumption in favour of bail, the 
issues will not have been aired in court. The official reason cited will have little meaning beyond its 
fulfilment o f an administrative procedure.
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One defence barrister told me that on rare occasions in his career he had deliberately 
made a poor bail application because he did not think his client should be released. He 
acknowledged that this action breached his professional code of practice but said
I live in this community too. There are some people you just don’t want to 
meet in the proverbial dark alleyway aren’t there? (male defence 
representative)
He felt that these clients would have been remanded in custody anyway but he didn’t 
want to “risk being too convincing.” It should be noted that whilst defence 
representatives did acknowledge that poor bail applications were deliberately made, 
these incidents were few and far between.
d) .. .To Be Truthful
Magistrates, clerks and the CPS all believed defence representatives had a responsibility 
to be truthful in their applications and should verify the information they put before the 
court. Three interviewees expressed strong doubts about whether or not defence 
representatives took their responsibilities as officers of the court quite as seriously as 
they should.
What I think are their [defence representatives] responsibilities and what 
they think are their responsibilities are quite different. The defence lawyers 
have become more Americanised, that is it’s my duty to my client and not 
my duty to the court. My duty to the client is to do everything legal to 
prevent my client suffering the consequences of his or her actions rather 
than it’s my duty to the court to present the facts regarding my client in the 
best possible light. Therefore more and more I listen to unsubstantiated 
suggestions about how well this or that client has behaved (male magistrate)
However, most commented that it was hard to generalise because there were good and 
bad defence representatives (as found by Hucklesby (1994b) too), just as there were 
good and bad CPS lawyers. Defence representatives themselves agreed that they would 
never lie to the court but argued that it was not always possible to verify information 
and they had to rely on what their clients told them at times. Defence solicitors in 
Hucklesby’s (1994b) study also commented on the problems of verification.
Some defence solicitors said that they did not verify the information they 
received from the defendant. One solicitor, when asked, said “No, in case
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he’s telling lies.” Other solicitors said they verified information but 
explained that it was not always possible and that they only checked 
information by phone or from past files. Often solicitors verified 
information through the defendant’s relatives especially concerning an 
address. (Hucklesby 1994b:278).
Eight interviewees spontaneously commented on defence representatives’ use of body 
language and phrases such as “my client tells me that...” to communicate to the bench 
their own reservations about the veracity of the information they were putting before the 
court. This has been commented on previously in research studies (Baldwin and 
McConville 1977; Hucklesby 1994b; McConville, et al. 1994; Shapland 1981).
there are times when they repeat what their client has told them but you 
know perfectly well that they don’t believe a word of it, they have ways of 
putting it over, ‘my client tells me that.. .’ is a bit different from ‘I know that 
my client...’. So I think that that they have a responsibility to be as truthful 
as they can about the facts of their client’s situation. They’re not going to 
stand up in court and say ‘my client has told me a pack of lies’ but 
sometimes you know that they don’t believe a certain amount of what 
they’re told. So they’ve got a responsibility to be as truthful as they can 
while defending their chent’s right to freedom, (male magistrate)
You can’t stand up there and swear black is white. You look a fool. And you 
can’t tell the court your client is a bare-faced liar, even if it’s obvious to 
everyone that he is. Instructions have, instructions should be followed but 
you need to do something when you know that you’re peddling lies, (male 
defence representative)
e) ...To Protect Their Professional Reputation
Defence representatives were concerned with protecting their professional standing in 
the court. The above quotes illustrate the technique of using careful language to satisfy 
clients whilst still protecting their reputation for being trustworthy and respectful to the 
court that has also been found in other studies (Hucklesby 1996; McConville, et al. 
1994; Shapland 1981).
Another example would be defence representatives not making a bail application when 
they feel it would be futile and a waste of the court’s time. Defence lawyers argued that 
their reputation was a key tool of their trade and they had a responsibility to themselves 
and to their clients to protect it. It was felt by defence representatives that if  they got a 
reputation for time-wasting or making frivolous applications, magistrates may be less 
accommodating to their requests for more time to take instructions or their bail
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applications may carry less weight. Concern with protecting credibility has been found 
in other studies too (Hucklesby 1994b; McConville, et al. 1994; Shapland 1981).
Cases were observed where defence representatives retracted comments or approaches 
when it became clear that they could damage the defence representatives’ reputations in 
the court.
Example 7.16
In a bail application at Castleford Road, the mixed bench were responding very 
sympathetically to the defence representations that her client had been in custody on 
remand for far longer than was normal. The defence representative went on to try to 
explain a failure to attend, saying that her client had phoned up the court to check the 
date but the court officer had been “rude” to her so she did not follow through with the 
enquiry and so did not know when to attend. At this point, the clerk took exception and 
interrupted the bail application to say
court staff work extremely hard and make every effort to be courteous and 
efficient and I object to your client defending her own failure to attend by 
attacking court staff.
The magistrates expressed their support for the clerk by nodding and through their 
approving facial expressions. The defence representative immediately back-pedalled 
and said
I apologise if I gave the impression that I was criticising court staff and I am 
sure my client did not intend to do so when she instructed me either. I have only 
ever found staff to be helpful and professional.
When the defence representative’s regard in the court was threatened by association, she 
took measures to signal to the court her own support for court staff and to distance 
herself from her client and the instructions she had been asked to follow. The bail 
application, which had been interrupted by the clerk, was not resumed.
Clerks’ responsibilities:
Clerks were widely perceived to be the neutral guarantors of the remand process. Their 
primary role was one of ensuring procedure is followed correctly and advising 
magistrates on matters of law. Their role varied considerably depending on whether 
they appeared with district judges or magistrates as the former, being legally qualified 
and very experienced, required little legal advice and were familiar with the procedure 
so the role of the clerk is to attend to administrative matters such as filling in bail forms 
or setting court dates etc. Lay magistrates relied on clerks to a much greater degree and 
clerks were observed to be actively engaged with managing court proceedings
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(Darbyshire 1984; McLaughlin 1990). Despite evidence that they were clearly proactive 
participants in proceedings when lay benches sat, in interview they maintained that 
magistrates were the decision-makers, not the clerks. Whilst it is true that magistrates 
formally made the decisions, clerks were observed directing magistrates.
a) ...To Protect The Defendant
Clerks all felt they had an important role in protecting the rights of defendants, 
particularly when they did not have a legal representative. In such cases, clerks were 
observed spending some time persuading defendants to see the duty solicitor; this was 
also evident in Hucklesby’s (1994b) study too.
Example 7.17
At Old Market Street a woman was on overnight custody for a number of offences 
including prostitution. The hearing was proceeding when the clerk pointed out that the 
defendant could not be charged as a known common prostitute because there were no 
previous offences of prostitution on her antecedents. On advice from her defence, she 
changed her plea from guilty to not guilty. As neither the CPS nor the defence 
representative had checked that the charges were correct, the clerk took responsibility 
for this.
When lay magistrates were sitting, clerks also seemed to feel that it was their 
responsibility to make sure that defendants understood what was happening at every 
stage of proceedings. When sitting with district judges, clerks tended to defer to their 
expertise and take more of a back-seat role.
b) ...To Ensure Procedure Is Correctly Carried Out
Allied to this concern for defendants’ rights was a focus on ensuring that procedure was 
adhered to and the law was correctly carried out. Again, this role was felt more keenly 
when sitting with a lay bench than with district judges who were generally deferred to 
because of their legal knowledge and experience. One of Hucklesby’s (1994b) 
respondents complained that clerks did not always act as guarantors of correct 
procedure and ensured magistrates considered only relevant mitigation
in [Court C] the magistrates’ clerks rarely provide such advice with the result 
that irrelevant considerations are raised by the defence (Hucklesby 1994b: 154).
One of the most common examples of clerks enforcing correct procedure that was 
observed was clerks telling lay magistrates that they had forgotten to give reasons 
and/or grounds for a remand in custody. At times, particularly when it was a weak
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and/or inexperienced lay bench, clerks went beyond prompting magistrates and supplied 
the reasons and grounds themselves. The degree to which clerks are in fact active 
participants in the remand process is evident in the following example.
Example 7.18
A woman was remanded into custody by a mixed bench at Orrington Street. The bench 
failed to announced the grounds or reasons for the refusal of bail. The male clerk told 
the bench
You have not given your reasons. I anticipate that you will find the reasons to be 
risk of reoffending and failure to attend based on the nature and character of the 
offence and a history of failing to appear.
The clerk was observed filling out the reasons on the bail form even before the 
magistrates confirmed they agreed.
c ) . ..Not To Influence Magistrates’ Decision-Making
The Justice of the Peace Act 1979 (s.528(3)) defines the role of clerks as providing 
advice “about law, practice or procedure” if  requested to do so by magistrates or if  they 
feel it necessary to alert magistrates to an issue. Clerks are not supposed to interfere 
with magistrates’ decision making but previous research has found that clerks do, in 
fact, influence magistrates.
One striking conclusion from this research is that the role of the clerk in 
summary proceedings is far more important than seems to have been 
established previously. No longer can the behaviour of lay magistrates be 
examined without taking into account the behaviour of their clerks 
(Darbyshire 1984)
Clerks’ formal and informal powers are important influences on remand decision 
making. Their role is significant.
not only in what they are seen to do (advising magistrates, administering 
courts), but also in what they are not seen to do (in giving advice in the 
retiring room, setting court lists, and training magistrates). (McLaughlin 
1990:367).
Since the implementation of the Human Rights Act, clerks have had a more active role 
in the process by helping lay magistrates word the individualised reasons for refusing 
bail. A consequence of this additional role is a concern not to influence (and not to be 
seen to influence) magistrates’ decision-making beyond prescribed boundaries. All the 
clerks were adamant in interview that the decisions should be the magistrates’ decisions.
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not theirs. However, clerks admitted there was a very fine line between providing legal
advice on how to frame grounds for refusing bail and improperly influencing decisions.
Even though they all said they had never improperly influenced magistrates’ decisions,
three admitted to using a particular phrase or body language to communicate approval
or disapproval of decisions to magistrates, thus influencing decision making. The
example below illustrates the use of these subtle techniques.
They often say to you ‘we’ve decided to do this but what do you think? and 
then you, if  you agree with it entirely you just say ‘no problem’ straight 
away and off they go but if you don’t agree you can’t just say ‘well I don’t 
agree with that’. I strongly suspect some of my colleagues do say that but 
you’re not supposed to and I don’t. I’ll use the phrase ‘that’s legally 
correct.’ I do say to them when they say ‘you’re not very happy about this’ 
and I say ‘what you’re proposing is legally correct’ and then I say 
‘however.. .’. And that often works actually, (male clerk)
This clerk admits to using a phrase in order to influence decisions even when they are 
“legally correct”. His intention to alter the decision is evident when he says that his 
technique “works” i.e. it results in a different decision.
Defendants’ Responsibilities:
Whilst the role of the defendant in a remand hearing is very limited, they are an 
important group that are too often left out of the analysis of criminal justice processes. 
Defendants also make choices. They may be constrained or poorly informed choices, 
but they do impact on proceedings and must be included in any analysis. For example, 
research has found that black men plead not-guilty more often that other groups charged 
with comparable offences and this impacts on remand decisions (Hood 1992). 
Defendants have the right to be represented and, as discussed above, clerks made efforts 
to persuade unrepresented defendants to see the duty solicitor.
a) ...To Be Actively Involved In The Process
A defendant’s primary choice was whether or not to try and involve themselves further 
in the process through a) giving instruction rather than simply accepting the advice of 
their defence representative, and b) communicating directly with the magistrates. Some 
defendants did not instruct their representatives but simply took advice whilst others 
told them what they want said on their behalf. In particular situations defendants also 
determined whether or not a bail application is required: they decided whether they
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want to be sentenced immediately rather than remanded for a PSR. As defendants rarely 
spoke in remand hearings, it was impossible to know how many had instructed their 
defence representatives and how many simply accepted their solicitor’s advice.
In interview, two of the women on bail said that they knew women who had chosen not 
to apply for bail in order to access the drug detoxification support available in prison. In 
most of the observations, it was unknown whether the defendant was following her 
defence representative’s advice or was choosing a remand in custody herself as the 
reasons for not applying for bail are never stated. However, two cases stood out where 
the defendants’ motivations in their remand applications were evident and illustrated the 
essential need to include defendants’ choices in any meaningful analysis of criminal 
justice processing and outcomes.
Example 7.19
A woman appearing on a charge of attempted theft chose not to make a bail application. 
At her second court appearance, her defence representative said she now wished to 
make a bail application and explained why no previous application had been made:
Her mother has sole care of her five children. She knows that if she is going 
to get her children back, she will have to become drug free. She is 
determined to do this and she instructed me not to make a bail application 
on her last appearance in court because she wanted to take advantage of 
what might be called the compulsory detoxification at [prison], (female 
defence representative)
Example 7.20
A woman had deliberately caused a disturbance of the peace in an attempt to get herself 
remanded into custody so she could access psychiatric support. She had been released 
fi*om prison a few days before and the community psychiatric team had not linked with 
her so she had no medication. She had tried to get support fi*om hospitals but, for 
reasons that were not clear, it appeared that she was prevented fi-om accessing 
immediate medical support in the community. She refused to make a plea and 
demanded to be remanded in custody. When it became evident that the court had no 
power to remand her in custody because the offence was so minor, she attempted to 
assault the warders in order to get herself charged with a more serious offence. She was 
a very small, firail woman and was easily restrained. In evident extreme distress she told 
the court she would assault the first person she saw on being released fi-om the court. 
The court was clearly concerned and a great deal of court time was spent trying to 
access support for the woman but, as it was a Saturday, none could be found. The 
woman was released.
There are myriad questions about the appropriateness and effectiveness of using prison 
as a detoxification unit or a psychiatric support centre but, in infrequent cases, such
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choices were observed in court. The cases illustrate that, on occasion, female defendants 
actively choose custodial remands for their own purposes which bore no relation to the 
officially recorded reasons for that decision.
Occasionally defendants were prepared to engage directly with their hearings. For 
example, they wrote letters for the bench to read or they spoke to the magistrates 
themselves.
I leave it to them [the defence representative] but obviously if I think of 
things like there’s a few things I want them to say to put it clear to them then 
you know I’ll tell them that. At the end of the day. I’ll speak to the judge for 
myself. I know I need a solicitor but at the end of the day sometimes it’s 
better coming from me what happened, (woman on conditional bail to bail 
hostel)
The words and behaviour of one woman appearing at Old Market Street (on charges of 
going equipped for theft and failing to surrender to court) may well have secured her 
bail had it not been realised that she was subject to another warrant and was designated 
‘not for release.’
Example 7.21
Bail was unlikely as she had previously been remanded in custody in these proceedings, 
then was arrested on a fail to attend warrant after being released on conditional bail. The 
defence representative made it clear that it was his client who had asked for the bail 
application to be made and admitted that “nothing has changed” in her circumstances 
that would warrant bail being given on a change of circumstances. The defendant had 
written a letter to the bench about “where she thinks she’s at in terms of these [drugs] 
issues” (female magistrate). Despite her poor bail record, on reading the letter the bench 
made every effort to secure the defendant a place in a bail hostel, making it clear to the 
probation officer that they believed she had “turned over a new leaf’. At this point 
unfortunately it became clear that she was not for release so the bail hostel was not an 
option.
Two CPS and four magistrates volunteered the information without being prompted by 
a question that hearing directly from defendants could benefit the defendant if they 
successfully challenged magistrates’ views of them and encouraged the magistrates to 
have a more individualised approach to the defendant and the decision (see Chapter 
Five).
You see people sitting there and you form a view, you think ‘oh dear, what a 
nasty looking bloke’ and they sit there and the defence is doing the usual 
sort of defence thing, what they’ve got to say. It’s what they’ve got to say, 
they’ve got to go through it all and fair enough. But it’s what we’ve heard 
before, we’ve all us people in the court, heard it a thousand times before.
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The only person who might bring something fresh is sat there and doesn’t 
say anything. Every now and again you see it happen, something happens so 
the bench ask ‘do you mind if we ask your client?’ and the clients speaks so 
well that you think ‘gosh!’ and it just takes you back and if you’re on the 
bench you think ‘well I was quite struck by him or her and I think they 
might be worth a punt on bail here’.. .if they spoke well and they looked like 
they were sincere then suddenly the borderline bail decision goes in their 
favour, (male CPS)
However, in observed cases where women, themselves, did try to speak, their defence 
typically made efforts to keep them quiet. Defendant’s evidence is regarded with 
suspicion when delivered by the defendant, but has more credibility when filtered 
through their defence representative (Shapland 1987). Whilst some magistrates did 
grant the defendant an opportunity to speak, the majority of magistrates dealing with 
this situation responded by attempting to keep the defendant quiet: they either expressed 
their irritation that the defendant was disrupting proceedings or they urged the defendant 
to speak through their representative in case they said something that harmed their 
application. This is an example of how magistrates must choose how to resolve the 
tension between respecting the rights of the defendant to speak for herself; protecting 
the defendant from self-incrimination; and the inclination to maintain correct courtroom 
procedure and decorum.
Defendants have very little influence over court proceedings as they are given a passive 
role by the structure and organisation of the remand system. Court dynamics are 
dominated by the interplay between the various professionals involved (magistrates, 
clerks, lawyers and sometimes probation officers) and defendants are rendered almost 
powerless by this.
Opportunities for defendants to involve themselves in the remand process were indeed 
observed to be very limited. That the majority only speak to confirm their name and 
address is a consistent finding in courtroom research. Hucklesby found that defendants 
were
rarely asked questions by the magistrates or asked if s/he had any comments 
to make (Hucklesby 1994b:303).
Although the accused are hardly distinguishable from one another, this 
group of men (and occasionally women) are the reason for the proceedings.
For the most part, their role is a passive one and they are moved in and out 
of the prisoners box.. .frequently making repeat appearances over the course 
of the day (Kellough 1996:160).
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[A defendant] would not be allowed to speak ‘for himself unless it was in 
the witness-box, and even then in guarded fashion. On the contrary. If he 
sought to speak from the dock, the judge might remind him, as one judge 
did remind a defendant, ‘You must keep silent and if you don’t remain silent 
I’ll send you down and I’ll think seriously about your bail.’ (Rock 
1993:240).
Daly (1994) also found defendants rarely spoke in court and female defendants 
contributed on even fewer occasions than male defendants. Not only do defendants 
rarely speak, they are treated almost as if they are not present in court; they are receivers 
of, not significant participators in, the justice process.
Counsel had no sight of the defendant: their backs were to him, and they 
argued about him almost as if  he were absent.. A defendant would often be 
discussed as if he were not present. (Rock 1993:240).
Rather than being an active adversary, he sits there mute while the crown 
attorney and his own lawyer talk around him.. .treating him like a dependent 
child who is to be seen and not heard. (Ericson and Baranek 1982:181).
Although this thesis advocates placing defendants more centrally in studies of criminal 
justice processing, defendants were not observed to exert any influence over the social 
organisation of remand courts -  though they were certainly affected by it. The observed 
professional monopoly on the nature interaction in courts swiftly discouraged and 
disempowered those defendants who do sought to challenge it by portraying them “as 
being either out of place, out of time, out of mind or out of order” (Carlen 1976:129). 
For example, in one hearing where a defendant repeatedly tried to insist on her need to 
be bailed for the sake of her children, the district judge ignored her but addressed her 
defence representative and said, “I am warning you that if  your client continues to 
interrupt proceedings she will be found in contempt”. Despite the defendant’s attempts 
to assert herself, she was not acknowledged as a full participant in the process, even 
though she was the one most affected by it.
Conclusion
This chapter has illustrated that remand decision making is a social process as well as a 
legal one, where outcomes are negotiated between all the participants, often with the 
exception of the defendant herself who was found to be largely excluded from the 
process by the conventions of professional interaction.
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It has furthered our understanding of how and why inconsistent remand decisions are 
made. Firstly, notwithstanding the inherent ineffectiveness of regulatory structures and 
procedures in a system with high levels of formal and informal discretion, the 
demonstrably collective nature of remand decision making means that decisions cannot 
be regulated by requiring magistrates alone to adhere to certain standards and forms of 
decision making. For example, although it appeared that clerks’ own professional codes 
of conduct did, in fact, largely prevent them from inappropriately determining remand 
outcomes, it was possible for them to directly influence magistrates’ decision without 
any scrutiny, if they chose to. Similarly, it was observed that the ways in which CPS 
officers constructed and presented their own recommendations on remand varied. 
Whilst some gave carefully reasoned recommendations, others offered the facts to the 
magistrates and gave, what appeared to be, less considered recommendations. Given 
that magistrates are largely dependent on the court’s lawyers for the information they 
use in their decision making, it is unsurprising that outcomes are inconsistent when 
those lawyers’ information-giving practices are inconsistent.
Secondly, as demonstrated, participants had to constantly choose between a multiplicity
of roles and responsibilities that all variously affect remand outcomes. An actor’s
choices about which of their roles to prioritise, and the subsequent nature of interaction
with other participants, shaped the processing and resolution of remand cases. The roles
that actors chose between reflected the conflicts between and within a range of
influences including their professional responsibilities, such as a duty to represent a
client; systemic/organisational influences both those general to the remand system, such
as the inherent difficulties in securing sufficient verified information in the time
available, and those specific to particular courts, such as localised shortages of
probation officers to do PSRs and make referrals to bail hostels; and
personal/professional concerns, such as the maintenance of reputation. Explaining a
number of models for sentencing decision making, Shapland (1987) suggests the role
that actors assume affects the information available to sentencers.
the final set of information and opinion presented to the sentencer will 
reflect not only which type of professional is involved but the viewpoint that 
that individual takes in intra-professional disputes about sentencing or the 
role the professional should play in it. (Shapland 1987:82).
This chapter demonstrated that an individual’s ‘viewpoint’ or role did, indeed, influence 
decision outcomes. The selection of which role actors played was a product of the
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interplay between the socio-political and organisational pressures, outlined in Chapter 
Four; which of the remand models applied, discussed in Chapters Five and Six; and the 
social dynamics of the courtroom. Given the complexity of the influences on remand 
decision makers, it is unsurprising that inconsistencies are evident between and within 
courts.
However, although the choices actors made, and the subsequent nature of the interaction 
between participants, was complex, it was not completely unpredictable and 
unstructured. The next chapter identifies and explains the nature of the underlying social 
structure in the courts in this study, and explores how this affected the ways in which 
actors chose to define their own, and others’, roles and the consequences this had for 
remand outcomes.
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Chapter Eight__________________________
The Social Organisation Of R em and  Hearings
The previous chapter showed that how actors defined and prioritised their own (and 
others’) roles and responsibilities shaped the processing and outcomes of remand 
hearings. Previous research has also concluded that justice is negotiated and is 
consequent upon the social dynamics of the courtroom (Baldwin and McConville 1977). 
Whilst acknowledging the influence of structural constraints (Chapter Four) and the 
decision making firamework (Chapters Five and Six) on how actors chose to define their 
roles, this chapter argues that courts’ underlying social structures also fi-amed how 
actors chose to conduct themselves in remand hearings. It is argued that the underlying 
nature of courts’ social organisation can account for the persistent variation between 
courts’ remand rates, that has been reported by other authors, because it encourages 
actors to fulfil certain roles, and not others. Distinctive and stable ‘court cultures’ were 
not evident in the courts studied. Actors’ participation in remand hearings, and the 
subsequent remand outcomes, were found to be structured, instead, by the more fluid 
balance of conflict, collaboration and deference norms evident in the courts studied.
Introduction
Many previous remand studies have commented on the variations found between the 
remand rates of different courts (e.g. see hearings (Bottomley 1970; Burrows, et al. 
1994a; Doherty and East 1985; East and Doherty 1984; Hucklesby 1994b; King 1971; 
Zander 1971; Zander 1979)). Typically these variations are explained not only in terms 
of inputs (i.e. differences in the offence or offender characteristics) but also as a 
consequence of persistent and distinctive working practices, often referred to as ‘court 
culture’. Jones (1985) analysed variation between custodial remand rates using official 
statistics. Notwithstanding the accepted fact that remand statistics from magistrates’ 
courts are problematic (Home Office 2003a), he found strong evidence that, controlling 
for legally relevant factors,
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considerable variation did exist between the areas in the overall proportions 
of defendants remanded in custody. (Jones 1985:117).
It was concluded that differences in court practice might explain this variation. Lydiate 
(1987) argued that the absence of statutory rules of procedure in bail hearings 
contributed to courts developing idiosyncratic practices. Brown et al (2004), Hucklesby 
(1994b; 1997a) and Paterson and Whittaker (1995) all found significant variation in 
courts’ use of custodial remand that could not be wholly explained by differences in 
external factors, such as the nature and seriousness of a court’s caseload. Instead, 
variation in remand outcomes in different courts is often explained by the impact 
internal court cultures have on the processing and, consequently, on the outcomes of 
cases. Hucklesby defined court culture as
a set of informal norms which are mediated through the working 
relationships of the various participants (Hucklesby 1997a: 129).
The working relationships between participants in the remand process are central to the 
formation, perpetuation and nature of court cultures. Descriptive accounts of court 
cultures characteristically identify unusual or exaggerated dynamics in courtroom 
interaction and use this to account for the atypical remand outcomes a court produces. 
For example, Hucklesby (1997a) reported that one court had developed a reputation for 
being harsh and this was directly related to the practices of the stipendiary magistrate 
who usually heard remand applications. She found that the CPS and defence 
representatives both anticipated the views of this forthright magistrate and tailored their 
own contributions to bail hearings accordingly. Jones (1985) found that some courts 
were uncommonly influenced by police remand recommendations. Paterson and 
Whittaker (1995) reported that, in one court, sheriffs often challenged prosecutors to 
recommend custodial remands but this was rare in the other courts studied^ \  These 
examples show one group in the remand process exercising an unusual degree of 
influence over the other participants thus affecting the outcomes of remand hearings 
(usually, though not necessarily, resulting in an increased use of custodial remand).
This study was conducted in Scotland where the law prohibits sheriffs from remanding in custody 
unless the Procurator Fiscal has recommended it. The court where sheriffs often publicly criticised the 
prosecutors’ decisions not to remand in custody, had a higher custodial remand rate than the other courts 
where sheriffs respected prosecutors’ role in the remand process. This suggests that the sheriffs who were 
unusually pre-disposed towards custodial remands exercised influence over decisions that should have 
been made by the prosecutors alone.
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In the following discussion of the nature of interaction and decision making in the 
courts, the defendants themselves are absent. As discussed in Chapter Seven, defendants 
had very little influence in remand hearings. Whilst they could, and did, exert some 
decision making authority at times in relation to their own hearing, observations 
revealed that they were incidental to the ways in which the courts’ insiders, the 
professionals, related to each other. This chapter is concerned with interprofessional 
dynamics, consequently there is little discussion of defendants.
Court Culture
If court culture operated within the courts studied we would expect to find general 
patterns in the choices that actors made. For example, any noticeable differences 
between courts in the degree of correspondence between CPS recommendations and 
magistrates’ decisions may indicate a culture which encouraged unquestioning reliance 
on CPS recommendations and/or magistrates to prioritise the safety of the public over 
the rights of defendants. Unlike Hucklesby’s (1994b) study, this research did not 
analyse substantial data sets so it was not possible to identify whether there were any 
significant differences between remand outcomes in the various courts which may have 
indicated the existence of a court culture. Too few cases were observed to find sufficient 
matched pairs of cases on which meaningful direct comparisons could be made. Where 
comparisons could be made between similar cases, it was unnecessary to explain any 
variation in the use of custodial remand in terms of court cultures as it could be 
accounted for by differences in offence seriousness and offender history. For example. 
Central District was renowned as a shopping area and many of the shoplifters processed 
by the courts there appeared to have travelled to the district with the express purpose of 
shoplifting and they typically had very extensive criminal records. In contrast, the 
shoplifters processed in Outer District tended to have lesser records and were usually 
stealing goods of lower value. That the former court remanded a greater number of 
shoplifters in custody than the latter reflected the differences in the nature of their case 
loads, not in their working practices.
Observation and interview data both suggested that whilst some of the courts could be 
characterised in very general terms (e.g. “Inswick Comer are a bit more formal than us” 
(male clerk), “Connorton Road is more organised, a bit more professional than Old 
Market Street” (male CPS)), none were identifiably harsher or more lenient, either in
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observations or by reputation. All those interviewed, who had experience of more than 
one of the courts studied, believed that, excluding Orrington Street (see below), the 
differences between benches within a particular court were far greater than differences 
between courts. This is a significant problem for the ‘court culture’ rationale of variation 
in decision making: it is over-predictive.
The ‘court culture’ explanation however, cannot account for differences in 
the decisions made by magistrates working in the same court. (Dhami 
2001:54).
One interviewee who had worked both as a clerk and a CPS solicitor said:
This is drawing on my range of experience, that in different [city] boroughs, 
you will see changes within particular benches, perhaps on days, whereas 
the pattern probably wouldn’t be repeated between individual boroughs 
because I think benches, unless it’s a particularly small bench, they are 
usually broad enough and draw from different types of people that you will 
get within a particular bench, you may have a tough Monday bench and a 
weak Wednesday bench, that’s a stereotype, but overall there will be a 
variety of decision making and it may well even itself out and that’s 
probably repeated from bench to bench throughout [the city] and probably 
beyond as well, (male CPS)
This evidence suggests that the courts studied, and others across the city, do not have 
particularly strong internal cultures.
Although the courts directly studied were not perceived to have different cultures, one 
additional magistrates’ court, that was tangentially connected to the research, was 
reported to have a distinct culture. Once a week. Old Market Street was designated as a 
juvenile court and, consequently, no adult cases could be heard there. If any adult 
defendants had been held by the police on overnight custody in Outer District, their 
remand hearings were held in one courtroom in the courthouse of a neighbouring 
district. One courtroom in this courthouse, Orrington Street, was allocated to Outer 
District for the day and was completely staffed by the professionals who populated Old 
Market Street courthouse i.e. no personnel from the neighbouring district were involved 
in these weekly hearings. Consequently, proceedings and court dynamics in the Outer 
District courtroom at Orrington Street were the same as those held at Old Market Street 
itself.
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The only difference between the courts was that, as the court at Orrington Street only 
heard overnight custody cases (i.e. it was rare for anyone to be bailed to appear in this 
courtroom), the courtroom typically had a far slower pace than those at Old Market 
Street. Firstly, on some days only a small number of overnight cases needed to be heard. 
Secondly, the administrative problems of working from a different courthouse, and the 
fact that all the cases were overnight custody cases, meant that proceedings were often 
delayed for up to two hours whilst the defence representatives took instmctions from 
their clients, information was checked and files were retrieved, etc. As a result, it was 
easier to engage in discussions with court personnel there than in the busier courts in the 
study, partly because there was more time available and partly because the CPS officers, 
defence representatives, and list callers were often keen to engage in conversation to 
relieve the boredom of waiting for cases to be ready for court. Interaction with court 
actors was further aided by the fact that the courtroom itself was small so discussions 
could easily be held in conversational tones. Court staff and defence representatives 
were sometimes overheard discussing the personnel and practices of Orrington Street 
courthouse.
These observations revealed attitudes about Orrington Street courthouse which were 
later confirmed in interviews with Old Market Street staff, who worked there once a 
week, and with defence representatives whose clients also appeared in the Orrington 
Street courtrooms used by the neighbouring borough. Excepting the weekly overflow 
court from Old Market Street, Orrington Street magistrates’ court was widely regarded 
as being
[P]ro-CPS and so is pro-custody. It’s a safe, rather it’s a safer bet getting
custodial remand there than at Old Market Street, (female CPS).
[Y]ou know the odds are a bit stacked in [that] court. I wouldn’t say it’s
unfair, just has an approach, (male defence solicitor)
In interview and in observations, other views about the culture of this court were 
expressed. For example, comments were made about the unusually low regard the 
court’s lay magistrates typically had for the district judge. It was observed by 
interviewees that this was no reflection on the particular district judge, but was a 
consequence of the lay Bench’s dislike of professional magistrates operating in ‘their’ 
courthouse.
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At Orrington Street, if you say the district judge said this, then they would 
do exactly the opposite. Well, that’s probably an exaggeration but very often 
it doesn’t do to mention that the district judge has made a decision because 
then immediately it sets them sort of, there’s this great sort of rivalry, well 
not rivalry but Orrington Street Bench don’t much like the district judge 
because it upsets their rotas, basically... It’s a very curious court, (male 
CPS)
In interview, two of the Old Street clerks and two CPS officers commented that clerks 
at this courthouse did not seem to be held in such high esteem as they were in Old Street 
and in other courts they had experience of. It was felt that the Bench regarded their own 
legal and procedural knowledge to be more than adequate, and treated clerks more as 
administrators than as qualified and experienced legal advisors. The data that was 
gathered on this court^^ suggested that it did have a court culture: distinctive working 
practices that affected the processing of remand cases and, consequently, remand 
outcomes.
The fact that many interviewees did identify the Orrington Street courthouse as having a 
distinct culture, and attributed differences in outcomes to this culture, indicates that they 
were not insensitive to the possibility of courts having distinguishable cultures. Their 
differentiation between Orrington Street and the other courts in the study substantiates 
observation data that suggested the courts in this study did not have distinct cultures of 
the kind evident in Orrington Street courthouse and in the work of other authors.
The distinctive nature of Orrington Street raised the question of why a court culture 
emerged in one court but not another. The CPS, clerks and defence representatives 
interviewed who were familiar with the courts attributed the distinctive and persistent 
working patterns in the Orrington Street courthouse to the unusual way in which the 
court’s benches were organised. When magistrates were appointed to that court, they 
were permanently allocated to sit on a particular day. This fostered the development of 
unusually strong daily bench cultures.
I think the difficulty at [Orrington Street] certainly are that there are these 
certain people who always sit together and then they will always decide in a 
particular way...dare I say it, you know that if you come before a certain
It is regrettable that this court was not fully included in the research as a comparison with the other, 
more uniform, courts in this study. The area was, in fact, originally incorporated in the study but delays 
with access to other courts meant there was insufficient time to undertake observations in four separate 
districts. With the benefit o f hindsight, more effort would have been made to include this particular, and 
somewhat peculiar. Bench in the research.
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bench there's not a hope in hell, basically....I've never understood it that you 
can have a Monday bench, Tuesday bench and so it goes on. And it even 
extends to, just before Christmas, we had an invitation saying 'the Thursday 
Bench invites you, whoever, to a little get together’. So, it's that sort of 
formalised. It's very strange and it ought not to happen, (male CPS)
A key element in the development of court culture is stable court workgroups which 
establish and maintain certain working practices (Eisenstein and Jacob 1977). 
Observations did confirm that the same people populated each individual courthouse. 
However, although to a large extent the personnel themselves were constant in the 
courts, the work groups they formed were not so stable. All the courthouses were large 
and very busy. Each contained a number of task-specialised courtrooms e.g. means 
hearings (enquiries into the financial situation of people who had been fined and setting 
the terms of repayment if difficulties had been encountered), remand courts, trials, etc. 
The remand courts all tended to be in constant use from the moment the courts opened 
and they frequently over-ran into the afternoon session. When this happened in Outer 
District, it was not unusual for a different lay bench to be presiding in the afternoon. In 
Central and Inner Districts, however, the same district judges were more commonly 
observed sitting in the morning and the afternoon. Court personnel would move 
between the courtrooms (and defence representatives would also move between the 
courthouses) as individuals and not in set groups. Whilst district judges tended to 
remain in the remand courts^^, clerks, the CPS, probation and defence would move 
around each day. Lay magistrates worked part-time and were organised into a rota so 
they were very unlikely to regularly sit on a bench with the same colleagues.
At Old Market Street, as in all the courts, the district judge dominated proceedings 
when he sat, and the clerks took a more administrative role than they did with lay 
benches where clerks also advised on law. Although in Old Market Street it was always 
the same district judge presiding, his ability to instil distinctive working practices on the 
court was limited by the fact that he only sat half the time. When he wasn’t sitting a lay 
bench presided and, typically, the clerks took a more central role, particularly if it was 
an inexperienced bench. However, sometimes strong bench chairs took control of 
proceedings and clerks had a slightly lesser role again. So, although the personnel were 
relatively stable, their relative power to direct proceedings altered according to the
“I think [district judges] choose remand courts because they think the work is more interesting. Also, 
and this is to be fair to the district judges, it can be very fast and furious in a remand court and if  you’re 
always having to consult with the three it doesn’t go as smoothly and I think they undoubtedly handle 
them more efficiently than we do.” female magistrate.
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configuration of the court on a given day. In Central and Inner Districts, district judges 
presided over the vast majority of remand hearings. However, district judges only 
worked for short periods of some days or weeks at any one time. Again, the locus of 
power to establish working practices shifted. Constant, albeit limited, variation of 
potentially key individuals typified the staffing of the courtrooms and this restricted 
their influence on the development and nature of court culture.
So although individuals were recognisable to each other, and levels of interpersonal 
familiarity were observed to be quite high in many cases, the formation of solid and 
persistent work groups was not observed. This is a likely explanation for the lack of 
coherent court cultures: they were inhibited from developing because of the fluid nature 
of staff allocation. Unlike Lipetz’s (1980) findings, the work groups that did form were 
not coherent or consistent enough to perpetuate a culture and regulate infi*actions when 
new participants joined them.
Although not discussing court culture, Skolnick’s (1967) conunents on cooperation and
conflict in the adversarial system provide interesting support to the findings of this
research. He observes that.
Participants in the criminal process generally recognize the guilty plea as an 
efficient means of adjusting limited court facilities to large numbers of 
criminal cases. Thus there might be thought to exist a positive relation 
between size of jurisdiction and guilty plea percentage. It turns out, 
however, that the pattern cannot be well expressed in terms of a correlation. 
Nevertheless, an examination of the scatter diagram suggests that the greater 
the size of the county, the less the variation in proportion of pleas of guilty. 
Small-size counties, that is, can have a very high proportion of their cases 
settled by the accused’s plea of guilty, or a very low percentage, or can fall 
somewhere in between. When one observes the larger counties, however, 
their capacity to vary from one another seems reduced. These findings 
suggest that in smaller counties idiosyncratic relations between defence 
attorney, prosecutor, and judge are fi'eer to assert themselves. In larger 
counties, however, similar structural conditions appear to impose similar 
restrictions on the parties. (Skolnick 1967:54).
The point is not developed in the article but Skolnick (1967) observed that courts which 
process fewer criminal cases are more prone to ‘idiosyncratic relations’ than busier 
courts. These findings echo those of the present study which also suggest that relations 
in busy courts are more routinised and less variable because individual cultures could 
not establish themselves.
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However, to say these courts did not have distinctive cultures is not to say that the 
courts were without individual character. The courts did vary, for example in the 
physical layout of the courts and that impacted on the formality of the court and on 
participants’ interaction (for the importance of physical space in courtrooms, see 
(Carlen 1983; Rock 1993; Stimson 1986) ). Individual sittings could possess very 
distinct natures and comments such as “the bench is very pro-bail today” were not 
unusual, but they did not seem to endure beyond the immediate situation; they were 
made and re-made at each sitting.
The Adversarial System
It is argued here that in those courts where stable work groups did not form, and so 
idiosyncratic working practices were not established as routine, individual actors were 
consequently and necessarily involved in an on-going negotiation and re-negotiation of 
their relationship to other participants and of the nature of their role in remand hearings 
e.g. whether or not to challenge magistrates’ decisions. Given this, the potential for 
variation and disorganisation in remand hearings seems great. In reality, remand 
hearings were observed to be far more routinised that might be expected both within 
and between courts, so the problem then becomes not to explain variation, but to 
identify and explain the underlying organisation of remand hearings. Following on from 
Rumgay’s (1995) argument in relation to sentencing outcomes, remand decisions are 
understood here as manifestations of the dynamic balance between potentially 
unpredictable social interactions and the influence of the more established and enduring 
normative and legal frameworks within which they take place.
As we have seen, this research found that the legal framework was not rigidly adhered 
to but it did contribute to the nature of the primary decision making framework: the 
three models of remand. Whilst unpredictable decisions were occasionally made, the 
overwhelming majority of decisions were “pretty self-evident in terms of bail or 
custody” (female CPS officer). It was the cusp cases which were most vulnerable to 
inconsistent decision making as they were, by definition, not “self-evident”. While the 
assertion that a decision was “self-evident” should be treated with caution, it is true to 
say that remand decisions took place within a framework which made outcomes fairly 
clear cut in most cases. For example, despite sometimes strongly argued bail 
applications, few violent offenders were expected to get bail and most were remanded
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into custody. So, although the legal framework did not necessarily structure decision 
making, the informal framework, in part derived from the legal framework, did govern 
remand outcomes.
The second factor which Rumgay (1995) cited as exercising a regulatory influence on 
decision making was the normative framework of the court. Skolnick (1967) argued that 
the underlying structure of courts is based on conflict and he compared court dynamics 
to those of sporting events.
Underlying the sporting event, however, is the principle of conflict. Within 
the ethic of the institution it is understood that each fighter will attempt to 
throw his best punches, that each will strain to achieve victory. Otherwise, 
the fight is not considered genuine. Procedure is as important as outcome. 
(Skolnick 1967:52 original emphasis).
Courts are highly complex and unusual working environments because they contain a 
number of professional groups, all with conflicting aims and perspectives. Although 
magistrates have the formal power to take the final decision in remand hearings, they do 
not have the influence to determine the nature and purpose of interaction in remand 
hearings.
The criminal courts consist of separate institutions without a hierarchical 
system of control. There is no central authority. A judge cannot reward a 
clerk, a prosecutor or a public defender who performs well. The courts are 
not a central organization. Each of the courthouse regulars is a 
representative of a sponsoring organization, which in various ways monitors 
their activities, hires them, fires them, and rewards them. (Neubauer, D., 
1998:99 cited in Rock 1993:132)
Within the courthouse could be discovered the representatives of a 
collection of notionally independent bodies whose relations were 
continually negotiated and often tenuous. (Rock 1993:132).
The paradox is that courts’ adversarial proceedings actually foster cooperative working 
practices in order, for example, to speed up proceedings and for administrative ease 
(Ericson and Baranek 1982; Rock 1993; Skolnick 1967; Stimson 1986).
[T]he administrative requirements characterizing the American 
administration of criminal justice makes for a reciprocal relationship 
between prosecutor and defense attorney that strains towards cooperation. 
(Skolnick 1967:53).
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Consequently, there is a tension in the adversarial system between maintaining the 
legitimising conflict and this documented drift towards cooperation.
The point is that all conflict systems share a similar problem of social 
control; that problem is conflict maintenance, or the control of tendencies 
toward cooperation, (Skolnick 1967:53).
Skolnick cites practices such as plea bargaining as evidence of the systemic pressures 
towards cooperative working. He illustrates how cooperation undermines the underlying 
principle of conflict in the adversarial system, which is dependent on each ‘player’ 
trying to win.
While the adversary system contemplates an aggressive defense, the 
“cooperative” systems alters the nature of the services that the defense 
attorney is capable of performing for his client. He may often act less as an 
advocate than as a “coach”, preparing his client to meet the behavioural and 
attitudinal standards acceptable to criminal law officialdom.... Thus 
“cooperation” implies an understanding of the requirements of other 
functionaries in the system... and “rationality” or “reasonableness” suggests 
the acceptance o f prevailing assumptions. (Skolnick 1967:62-63 emphasis 
added).
Where actors forfeit their obligation to fight their own comer, and instead participate in 
the remand system on the basis of ‘prevailing assumptions’ i.e. a common approach, the 
adversarial system no longer functions to balance conflicting needs and rights. Courts 
with strong internal cultures have clearer hierarchies, based around key individuals or 
professional groups who exercise unusual degrees of influence over interaction and 
decision making. Unusually high (or, occasionally, low) custodial remand rates in 
courts with distinct cultures are evidence of the detrimental affect of collaborative or 
deferential working practices in a system that is designed to be based on challenge and 
dispute. For example, professional participants and observers commented that 
magistrates’ deference to CPS views in Orrington Street, and their resulting failure to 
challenge CPS recommendations, resulted in custodial remands being more common in 
this court.
It would be an exaggeration to say that all the courts in this study, except Orrington 
Street, always maintained adversarial relations, and displayed no signs of cooperative 
working practices that are based on common acceptance of ‘prevailing assumptions’. 
However, the relations between professional groups in remand hearings were observed
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to be largely structured around adversarial principles. The adversarial system is 
organised around challenge and each group of participants takes a particular position in 
relation to bail hearings. Thus, the CPS put the state’s case, the defence representatives 
put the individual defendant’s case, the clerks ensure that the law and proper procedure 
are observed, and magistrates are the final arbitrators between the disputing parties.
Of course, other factors did affect the interaction between the involved professionals at 
times (as explored in the next chapter), and lapses from these ideal-typical adversarial 
relations were observed. The reasons for the lapses in adversarial relations in the courts 
in this study are discussed in a later section.
In support of an adversarial conceptualisation of interaction in the courts in this study, it 
was observed that there were some distinct differences between professional interaction 
and remand decision making in this study’s courts compared to others. In Hucklesby’s 
(1994b) account of remand hearings, she argued that the majority of bail decisions were 
negotiated between the defence and the CPS prior to the magistrates sitting. When 
questioned on this, all the CPS and defence representatives in this study said that it was 
very unusual for them to ‘bail bargain’ prior to the hearing and, in fact, they rarely even 
discussed bail prior to the hearing. Dhami (2001) has also commented on the paucity of 
evidence that bail bargaining takes place. The conversations that they were observed to 
engage in in the remand court (prior to the magistrates sitting, during lulls in 
proceedings, etc.) were typically about procedural matters such as dates for hearings or 
disclosure of information. In contrast to the collaborative working practices recorded by 
Hucklesby (1994b), in this study the CPS, in particular, felt that it was not appropriate 
for them to usurp the magistrates’ role in the remand process, which was to act as 
arbitrators between the CPS and the defence position. Even where there were common 
expectations about the probable outcome of a hearing because of, for example, offence 
seriousness (see Chapter Five), the CPS and defence still did not usually engage in 
discussions about acceptable bail conditions.
It’s not a decision that should be made between prosecution and defence, it’s 
a matter for the court. You do get some defence representatives try and 
resolve conditions with you before court, but I tell them that’s not our job.
It’s the court’s decision, (female CPS)
[Defence representatives] come up to me and say ‘what are you saying 
about bail?’ and they are very rarely going to agree with me unless it’s one
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of those where I’ve looked at it and said 'yes of course they are going to 
commit further offences but I’m not going to ask for custody in this’ and 
then it’s one of those when I say ‘have you got an address?’, or whatever 
conditions might be appropriate, rehearse them briefly and they are usually, 
because you are not opposing bail so you are making their life easier, they 
are usually happy to agree to your conditions....But I personally don’t get in 
to this agreeing a bail package generally because that’s the responsibility of 
the bench. If conditional bail as a principle is appropriate then it’s up to 
them to find the right conditions not me.... If conditional bail is appropriate 
then you’ve got a lay bench there and defence who knows the personal 
circumstances, then we’re in this situation where almost my role is gone.
(male CPS)
Although this was the majority view, this was not, however, always the case and some
CPS officers reported that they preferred to resolve cases prior to a hearing rather than
‘fight it out’ in the court.
My approach to it is, basically if  they are remanded in custody and having 
made a decision as to whether I’m going to seek a remand in custody and 
the defence come to me. I’ll tell them I’m going to seek a remand in custody 
but actually take instructions from your client and see what you can come up 
with and my view may alter on that. I think it’s much better really if you can 
come to some sort of agreement over it rather than to fight it all out. (male 
cps)
A female CPS officer gave an additional reason for not agreeing bail terms with defence 
representatives, prior to a hearing in front of magistrates, which highlights the 
adversarial nature of interaction in the courts in this study. She said she did not want to 
be unprepared in case the defence representative did, in fact, appeal to the magistrates 
for different bail terms i.e. she did not trust defence representatives not to take 
advantage and go back on an informal arrangement. This is a good example of how the 
potential for challenge in the system can work to prevent inappropriate cooperative 
practices.
When working with lay magistrates, clerks were observed to take seriously their 
adversarial responsibility to ensure that the law and correct procedure were adhered to. 
It was noticed in observations that clerks publicly challenged lay magistrates on points 
of law and procedure. Even with senior magistrates who were very experienced, it was 
claimed in interview and observed in court, clerks would still object to magistrates’ 
actions if they were incorrect or improper. However, it was also noticed in observations 
that clerks who were vocal, assertive and very engaged with proceedings when working 
with lay magistrates would be silent, deferential and never participate in proceedings.
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unless explicitly asked to, when working with a district judge. This is further discussed 
below. Although there is no independent evidence of this, as no observations were made 
in the retiring room, clerks also reported in interview that they sometimes challenged 
magistrates’ reasons for refusing bail. The salient point here is that even though 
magistrates have formal authority over a court, clerks were regularly observed 
challenging magistrates to ensure adherence to appropriate standards and they were 
never observed to allow lax practices by deferring to a lay bench. They did, however, 
routinely defer to district judges.
Hucklesby (1997b) found that magistrates usually followed CPS recommendations and 
concluded that “most magistrates place considerable faith in the recommendations put 
to them by the CPS” (Hucklesby 1997b:275). Hucklesby considered the CPS to be so 
influential that she reported the CPS to be the most influential people in the remand 
process.
Unlike the deferential relationship between the CPS and lay benches that Hucklesby 
found, the relationship between the two groups was more adversarial in this study. On 
the whole, lay magistrates were observed to approach their role in remand hearings 
conscientiously. Although some were predisposed to accept the truth of CPS officers’ 
statements (see below), in interview the majority of magistrates defined their role in 
remand hearings as that of impartial arbiter, required to balance the evidence of the CPS 
and the defence representatives.
It has already been observed that the CPS felt it was inappropriate to try and supersede 
the decision making authority of the magistracy, and believed the final remand decision 
was the responsibility of the bench, not the CPS. In turn, magistrates reported an 
awareness that the CPS were arguing one side of a case, and so did not automatically 
feel obliged to concur with CPS recommendations, even though they accepted the 
factual truth of their arguments (see below). Magistrates were aware that CPS reasoning 
was, to some extent, partial.
From my point of view it’s as simple as what the adversarial system does is 
the prosecution lays out all the information the court needs to understand 
what is alleged to have happened, puts the prosecution case at its highest, 
the defence does likewise and the bench is supposed to be able to find a 
balance in there somewhere, (female magistrate)
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You’ve got to listen to both of them. You’re not there either to support the 
CPS who sometimes make wildly draconian suggestions but equally you’re 
not there just to be a social worker for the defendant. You’ve got to find 
some sensible balance, (male magistrate)
Their recommendations? Sometimes they’re useful. Sometimes you get a 
CPS person who is very up front and they seem fairly fair. Other times, I 
suppose it’s unfair to say they seem a bit vindictive or a bit over-zealous but, 
well, they are! (male magistrate)
This view was supported by all the clerks who, in interview, stated that they believed 
magistrates were not more influenced by the CPS than by defence representatives. As 
the clerks were ready to criticise magistrates on other points, it is believed that their 
assessment of magistrates’ fairness is probably honest.
I think they do listen equally to both sides. They take their role very 
seriously, most of them. They do pay attention and they do give it due 
consideration, (female clerk)
On balance. I’d say the probably do give equal weight to the CPS and the 
defence. But again, a good one on either side will be more persuasive and 
then they’ll probably get more of a hearing, (male clerk)
Magistrates were also observed to support defence representatives at the expense of 
CPS requests. For example, in four of the observed cases, magistrates warned the CPS 
that instructions would be written on the court file to the effect that if there were any 
more delays in proceedings, the case should be dismissed by the next bench. 
Magistrates were also routinely observed to repeatedly put cases back in order to give 
defence representatives more time to take instructions. On one occasion at Old Market 
Street, the bench refused to allow the CPS to start a remand hearing because they 
anticipated it could take some time and, as it was nearing lunchtime, they were 
concerned that the hearing might be rushed. To ensure the hearing was not pressured by 
time and the defence could be fully heard and considered, they put the hearing back.
Thus, it is argued that the persistent cooperative working practices evident in previous 
research were not apparent in this research. Relationships between professional 
participants in the remand process were, on the whole, structured by their designated 
formal roles in the adversarial system rather than on the basis of established 
idiosyncratic informal rules of interaction.
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The ‘Non-Exercise’ Of Power
It would, however, be a misrepresentation to argue that adversarial roles were always 
dutifully and fully adhered to. Although less routinised than in courts with strong 
cultures, it was apparent that some professionals in the remand system did sometimes 
relinquish the responsibilities of their roles to some extent. In the context of negotiated 
remand hearings, this can be understood as the ‘non-exercise’ of power because 
participants did not fully assert their influence over remand outcomes. Whilst at times 
the consequences of such actions could be unproblematic for all concerned, at others 
they were very damaging, particularly for the defendant -  the least powerful and most 
dependent person in the remand system.
[Djeployed in an appropriate manner, the under-use of power constitutes 
‘the best’ form of prison officer work...This best work consists of the 
diligent and skilled use of discretion. Used in the wrong way, the under-use 
of power can be regarded as lax, unprofessional and, at worst, as a form of 
‘conditioning’ or omission of duty. (Liebling and Price 2003:78 original 
emphasis).
Two reasons for professionals failing to assume adversarial positions and, consequently, 
ceding power to each other have been extrapolated from court observations, and 
supported by interview data: individual reputation and professional reputation.
Individual Reputation
If an individual was familiar to other court actors, this could provide them with a degree 
of influence which would upset the balance of the adversarial relationships. An 
individual’s reputation could be a very powerful resource. For example, where defence 
representatives were personally known to the magistrates on the bench, they could 
overcome suspicions of their veracity and even convince magistrates to make ‘risky’ 
decisions. Again, because the work groups were not stable, these personalised 
interpersonal dynamics did not become entrenched in courts’ interaction but emerged 
periodically when certain individuals, who were all familiar with each other, happened 
to be present at a hearing. The following is an example of reputation affording a 
particular individual the power to influence the choices made by others, and thus impact 
on remand outcomes.
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Example 8.1
In interview, a male clerk recounted the following story:
This particular solicitor was very regular and he became a stipendiary magistrate 
and he was sitting as a stipe in [one district] but he was still acting as a solicitor in 
private practice in [Outer District]. It was a bail application on a murder. He was 
representing and making a bail application for this guy charged with murder. When 
the bench retired to make their decision, now this is one where I didn't go out 
because we didn't go out in those days, the bench used to go out, come back and 
give their decision. While they were out, I said to him, 'now tell me, if you were 
sitting would you have given bail?' and he said 'absolutely no chance' he said 
'absolutely no way would I give this man bail' and he'd just made a bail application 
and I said to him 'I guarantee you they'll give him bail'. He said 'yeah, they probably 
will.' And of course they did, they came in and gave him bail. Because he was a 
really good advocate, very good and he was the most well known local solicitor at 
the court and the bench knew him. And it was a good application but it shouldn't 
have got bail. It was his reputation. Now he would never have got bail if that had 
been someone who they didn't know making that bail application. He'd never have 
got bail. I'm convinced of that.
Similarly, where a CPS officer was particularly well known and respected by a bench, 
they may have been able to exercise a greater degree of influence over magistrates’ 
decision making. However, in the present study, evidence was found that familiarity 
often resulted in less, not more, faith being placed in CPS recommendations. When 
asked about the role of the CPS, five magistrates spontaneously voiced the opinion 
whilst some CPS solicitors were excellent “we all groan when we see on the list that 
we’ve got [certain CPS officers] for the day” (female magistrate). The five magistrates 
who raised this issue did state, however, that they had greater reservations about these 
officers’ recommendations which “seem to be plucked from nowhere, frankly, 
sometimes” (male magistrate). Familiarity with the officers meant that magistrates were 
sensitised to the question of officers’ competence before they even came into court. 
Consequently, magistrates’ familiarity with the individual CPS officers who sat in the 
court actually reduced particular officers’ power to influence court decisions because 
magistrates anticipated poorly reasoned recommendations and having to be more 
proactive in the remand hearing. These individual officers’ reputations meant they were 
not trusted to fully and adequately fulfil their role in the adversarial system, and other 
participants adapted their own role in response.
Equally, the ideal-typical balance of power in the adversarial system could be upset by 
defence representatives and CPS officers anticipating magistrates’ likely views and 
tailoring their bail recommendations correspondingly. Such familiarity could explain
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observed concordance between CPS and defence requests and magistrates’ decisions. 
Hucklesby found that lawyers who were familiar with individual magistrate’s 
standpoints would anticipate decision outcomes and adapt their requests accordingly. 
For example, if  a court had a harsh reputation, the CPS would make more applications 
for remands in custody and defence solicitors, expecting bail applications to fail, 
advised their clients against applying (Hucklesby 1997a). They sought to protect their 
own reputations. This self-protective behaviour by defence representatives should also 
be framed in terms of the personal characteristics of the magistrate. For example, more 
defence representatives and CPS officers might be concerned about their reputation, and 
temper their bail applications accordingly, when in front of a magistrate known to be 
short tempered or have particularly strong views on remand^" .^ Familiarity with others in 
the court afforded court personnel the knowledge of when they could risk arguing a case 
without damaging their credibility, and when they should not.
In Hucklesby’s (1994) study, these anticipatory practices reinforced court cultures. In 
the current study, this aspect of court interaction was not found to be critical as the only 
group who felt confident in predicting magistrates’ decisions were the clerks. A female 
clerk said that because she was familiar with them as individuals she felt able to predict 
magistrates’ decisions
95% of the time. I say that not based on the merit of the application or the 
way it’s put forward but on knowing the magistrates. Okay, I would say 
most of the time, say 80% of the time I could predict what they were going 
to do.. .They’re just people. There are 150 people on the bench here, I could 
give you the names of three who would sell their own granny and remand 
her in custody without any hesitation. Equally I could give you three who 
wouldn’t even consider remanding anyone in custody, (female clerk)
None of the CPS lawyers felt as confident as the clerks. Not being as familiar with
individual lay magistrates, they perceived decision-making as unpredictable
Because of the differences in benches that I was talking about earlier, I 
personally can honestly say that I never sit there confident about bail 
decisions. Never, never. Which is why I carry in my jacket pocket a bail 
appeal form. I do, I carry one with me. The one I appealed [a violent car-
34 Whilst the importance o f factors such as ‘charisma’ in influencing the outcome o f decisions is 
acknowledged, interpersonal characteristics o f individual actors are not discussed in this thesis. It was not 
possible because o f the broad focus on all participants in a number o f different courts. In a more 
ethnographic study, it would be possible to explore the impact o f individual personalities on other 
participants’ actions and, consequently, on decision outcomes.
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jacking at gim-point], I would never in a million years have thought a bench 
could give him bail, but they did. I can’t tell. Maybe my colleagues can, I 
don’t know, but I can’t, (male CPS)
The often peripatetic defence solicitors felt even less able to predict magistrates’ 
decisions and felt anticipatory practices were more likely to be based on daily 
assessments of the particular district judge or lay bench that was sitting. None of the 
four defence solicitors interviewed felt their preparedness to make an application was 
influenced by prior knowledge of magistrates. Two did, however, comment that they 
used their knowledge of an Inswick Comer district judge’s addiction to smoking to 
protect themselves.
I have tried to jump the queue or bump myself off the queue to avoid the 
hour or so before lunch if  she hasn’t had a chance to rise all morning. In 
other words, if  she hasn’t had a fag for hours. She can be tough. I don’t 
mean her decisions, I don’t think I’d say she’s harsher on the defendants.
But, God, does she take it out on us! You must have seen her, she’ll tear 
strips off advocates sometimes, (female defence representative)
When asked, none of the defence representative said they had ever advised a client 
against making a bail application because of the reputation of a district judge or panel. 
When prompted, all four said the main reason for advising a client against a bail 
application in the magistrates’ courts was to not squander a bail application and “keep 
your powder dry”. This was either to give the defence representative more time build a 
strong bail application (e.g. to find sureties or accommodation), or to save the 
application for the crown court where, three of the four defence representatives felt, the 
chances of a successful bail application would be greater as magistrates “tend not to be 
brave with serious offences” and refuse bail where a crown court judge may well grant 
it.
In sum, the actions or recommendations of CPS and defence representatives were 
adapted when they appeared before particularly well known magistrates and district 
judges and magistrates responded differently to lawyers with whom they were 
individual familiar. However, court personnel did not remain in any particular court 
long enough or regularly enough for such behaviours to be established as routine 
working practices. Thus, the unexercise of power that affected decision outcomes, and 
was observed to stem fi*om knowledge of individual professionals involved in a hearing.
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should be understood more as a situational factor (Rumgay 1995), rather than as an 
example of an established court culture.
Professional Reputation
It was observed that some actors in the remand system appeared to feel it was 
unnecessary to fulfil their adversarial role when working with groups of professionals 
who were held in particular high regard. Consequently, the decision making power 
dynamics were unbalanced. Regarding the influence that consultants had over other 
professionals when making referrals to forensic psychiatric units, one consultant in 
Grounds et al’s (2003) study commented,
I think you could direct it one way or another. I mean, I could.. .in quite an 
influential way, because of the position that I have, not because of who I am 
but of what I am, I suppose. (Grounds, et al. 2003:129 original emphasis).
It this scenario, it is not an individual’s personal reputation that matters, but the esteem 
accorded to a particular profession as a whole. It is argued here that this is not evidence 
of court culture as the same professions were esteemed in all the courts studied, except 
for Orrington Street. In this study, clerks and district judges emerged as universally 
esteemed professions. Thus, it was observed that professional respect for district judges 
and clerks was inherent in the general culture of magistrates’ courts and it was only in 
idiosyncratic Orrington Street that, in fact, both of these professions were held in 
unusually low regard.
In previous studies, prosecutors were a powerful group in the remand process and 
exercised a great deal of influence over magistrates (Bottomley 1970; Doherty and East 
1985; Hucklesby 1994b; Jones 1985; Zander 1971), but this was less true in this study. 
Firstly, as discussed above, CPS officers were understood to be the state’s 
representative in a remand hearing. This role encouraged magistrates to trust the 
veracity of their accounts - they did not regard the CPS as being personally involved in 
the cases and therefore had no reason to be less than honest.
The CPS are there, often with a lot of cases to get through, and I don’t think 
they have the time or the inclination to get involved in cases, really. It’s not 
like they’ve got a personal relationship with any, or any commitment to the,
I think they process them as cases but defence represent individual clients, 
(female magistrate)
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This did afford the CPS a degree of influence that defence representatives did not 
always have.
I don’t think the CPS tell porkies, I don’t think they need to but I think the 
defence will be quite happy to admit telling you something if they thought 
that might help get their way. (male magistrate)
However, the role also meant that they were commonly perceived by magistrates as 
presenting just one side of an argument, and it was magistrates’ role to balance the CPS 
view with the defence view. Moreover, this inclination not to defer unquestioningly to 
CPS recommendations was fostered by magistrates’ views on the professionalism of the 
CPS. Magistrates’ attitude to the CPS is an interesting example of how resourcing can 
also impact on professional reputation and therefore on social dynamics in the 
courtroom. Amongst the magistrates interviewed, it was a commonly expressed opinion 
that, historically, the lawyers who had joined the CPS were not as talented as those who 
went into private practice where they could make more money.
The CPS have structural difficulties in the way that the whole organisation 
is set up and arranged. By definition they are going to be middle ability 
lawyers at best. Many of them are going to be part time lawyers and 
therefore they are not going to be as good as a full time professional defence 
lawyer. So, they start off from being probably of lower ability and lower 
commitment. Obviously it’s generalising, there are a number of very good 
CPS lawyers and you tend to know who they are and when you look at the 
court listing and you see who is prosecuting you breathe a sign of relief and 
say this man or woman is actually going to know their job. (male 
magistrate)
I think if  the file isn’t properly brought together and if  you’ve got a morning 
charges [i.e. remand] court with a lot of cases I think the CPS, if it’s not a 
well documented file and the police have not done their bit in terms of 
verifying names, spellings of names, ensuring previous and things like that 
and have not got things like dates to avoid, al of which make it much less 
easy for the CPS to put up cogent reasons. The paperwork, the 
administration can be a huge barrier to them, the CPS and their 
recommendations, being valuable to the bench, (female magistrate)
I think the CPS have got enormous problems. I think the biggest problem 
with the CPS is the CPS itself. It, I have to say I’ve been quite appalled in 
recent years how poor sometimes the CPS is. It appears in court without the 
right papers, not having served the papers on the other side, you know, it’s 
failed to get a DVLC readout for driving offences. They even appear in 
court with the wrong papers. You often get the defence saying ‘my learned 
jfriend might like a copy of this’ which has been sent to them but the CPS
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just don’t seem to have. The quality of some of the CPS prosecutors is also 
pretty patchy, being charitable there, (male magistrate)
Although the quality of CPS officers was seen by magistrates to be improving, it was 
felt that they were now also hindered by a lack of resources and by being overworked. 
Magistrates also felt frustrated that the shortage of CPS officers in the area meant 
agency officers often appeared as prosecutors in court (i.e. lawyers in private practice 
who acted as prosecutors when a permanent CPS lawyer was unavailable). Some 
agency officers were considered to be perfectly competent, although they were not 
expected to have the same level of experience as a permanent officer. Many other 
agency officers, however, were considered to be inept.
You get the measure of them pretty quickly, can they read a file and speak at 
the same time? Some can’t! You can usually ascertain the facts but 
sometimes they’re no more help than that (female magistrate).
In the courts in this study, the CPS were not a profession generally held in especially 
high regard by magistrates for a variety of reasons. Consequently, magistrates in this 
study’s courts were probably more prepared to challenge the CPS than magistrates in 
courts where the CPS were documented to be more esteemed.
Clerks were observed, and reported in interview, to be highly respected by other 
professionals. As was seen in Chapter Five, following the Human Rights Act, clerks 
routinely joined magistrates when they retired to help them frame individualised reasons 
for refusing bail. It was also noted that clerks would be able to influence magistrates’ 
remand decisions if they so desired. Given that retiring with the magistrates could 
afford clerks the opportunity to exercise this influence, one of the clerks interviewed 
registered his surprise that this procedure had never been challenged by a defence 
representative. He attributed the absence of any dispute to the trust that defence 
representatives had in clerks.
When asked, two CPS officers (male and female) both said they “trusted” clerks not to 
exercise undue influence in the retiring room as this would be overstepping their role. It 
could be argued that this trust resulted from the CPS officers knowing the individual 
clerks in the local courts. However, defence representatives’ trust could not be based on 
such personal knowledge as they worked in courts all over the city. This study found
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clerks to be universally trusted by all other court actors. There is no suggestion of any 
impropriety in the behaviour of the clerks in this study, but such comprehensive trust in 
a profession could potentially obscure individuals’ misconduct by preventing the checks 
and balances of the adversarial system taking place.
The second group that was commonly deferred to without challenge was district judges. 
Although a district judge and a panel of lay magistrates have the same formal powers, 
district judges were generally regarded as superior because of their expertise. In this 
research, district judges were universally perceived to make better decisions and this 
was explained in terms of their legal expertise and their greater experience. All of the 
defence representatives and all the clerks interviewed felt that defence representatives 
could more easily “run rings around” or “pull the wool over the eyes” of a lay bench 
than a district judge. This was explained in terms of experience: a lay magistrate is only 
required to sit 26 times a year and, in Central and Inner Districts, would only rarely sit 
in a remand court^^. Consequently, defence representatives had much greater success in 
persuading a lay bench to accept their mitigation. A male clerk explained:
It’s not that they’re [the lay bench] softer [than the district judge], it’s that 
they don’t have that experience to know when it’s genuine or not. If you’re 
in court every day like me, you get a sixth sense, you know when to trust 
people. Our district judge has got it, but he would, he’s an excellent 
magistrate, very experienced, (male clerk)
The respect invested in district judges’ professionalism meant that even where they 
behaved inappropriately or arbitrarily, they were not challenged. Other participants 
routinely deferred to district judges which meant that they were afforded even greater 
power to determine remand decisions than their formal authority actually conferred. In 
the observations, clerks were never observed to challenge district judges except on 
matters of fact e.g. the number of previous convictions. In Example 7.4, when the 
district judge remanded the defendant in prison, refusing to hear a bail application jfrom 
the defence, the clerk did not comment even though the clerk would clearly have been 
cognisant that the defendant’s rights were being neglected. Some district judges 
routinely failed to give the reasons for a remand in custody and this was never observed 
to be challenged by clerks. In contrast, clerks would regularly point out such omissions
“When you start, even in my first five years, half the time I probably didn’t know what was going on 
and certainly at Inswick Comer where we have seven court rooms, though we don’t usually use all seven, 
you can go for very long periods without being in a remand court” (female magistrate).
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if lay magistrates were sitting. Clerks’ role, and their own perceptions of their 
responsibilities, altered depending on whether they were working with district judges or 
lay magistrates. Clerks always deferred to district judges, assuming a more 
administrative role. When working with lay magistrates, who do not have district 
judges’ legal experience and expertise, clerks assumed the far more assertive role of 
legal advisor as well as administrator.
The views of someone from a respected profession could, at times, also be used by 
others as resources to influence remand decision making. One clerk and two CPS 
officers reported using district judges’ authority vicariously: when a lay bench was 
hearing a second bail application and the clerk/CPS feared they would grant bail, they 
would make a point of informing the bench when the initial bail decision was made by a 
district judge. This would ensure that the magistrates refused bail as they deferred to the 
district judge’s decision. Similarly, if  a defence representative could offer the view of an 
expert and respected professional, magistrates would usually defer to it, even against 
their own judgement at times.
Example 8.2
An 18 year-old woman appeared on overnight custody at Orrington Street charged with 
robbery. Force was used and the victim was 13 years old. Bail was opposed by the CPS. 
The CPS told the court that the defendant was on bail for five other robberies and the 
current offence was committed on bail. A crown court judge had given her bail to attend 
a drug rehabilitation centre but she had not been attending. This information was 
supplied to the CPS by a police officer who attended court. Although she was 
eventually remanded in custody, the female bench were clearly discussing granting bail. 
Given the nature and number of the offences, it was highly unusual for the magistrates 
to even consider bail; the most likely explanation is that they were unsure if they should 
remand in custody because a senior authority (the crown court judge) had already 
granted bail. It is evident that they struggled with the decision to remand in custody as 
they spent an unusually long time on this hearing (47 minutes), asked numerous 
questions about whether the judge had had access to the same information as they did, 
and also took evidence from the police officer who attended court on this case.
Example 8.3
A  woman was appearing before a male district judge at Inswick Comer charged with 
breach of bail as she had absconded from a bail hostel. The bail hostel staff requested 
that she be bailed back to the hostel. The district judge voiced his opinion that they had 
made the wrong decision and judged her likely to abscond again. However, he did bail 
her, saying “it’s not for me to question their judgement, they know more about mnning 
a bail hostel than I do.” On no occasion was a magistrate observed refusing to bail to a 
hostel if the hostel staff had accepted the referral.
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Conclusion
This chapter sought to further develop an understanding of patterns of decision making 
in remand hearings by identifying the nature of the underlying normative framework in 
the courts in this study. It was argued that actors’ choices about how they conducted 
remand hearings (how they resolved their roles and responsibilities and how they 
related to other participants) were largely determined by three factors: firstly, the 
framework of what a particular remand decision was ‘for’ (i.e. the three models 
discussed in Chapters Five and Six); secondly, unpredictable situational factors 
(Rumgay 1995), such as a charismatic, and thus persuasive, defence representative; and, 
thirdly, the nature of the normative structure of interaction in the courts studied. This 
chapter focused on the latter. It was argued that the social rules of interaction made it 
more or less likely that an individual would behave in a certain way, and thus affect the 
processing and outcome of a remand hearing. If a particular individual or group had 
disproportionate influence in a court, they would have the power to affect how that 
court collectively resolved remand hearings.
‘Court culture’ has been advanced by other authors to explain patterns of interaction in 
particular magistrates’ courts. It was argued in this chapter that the concept did not 
explain behaviour in the courts in this study because their organisational structure 
prevented stable work groups forming, thus preventing idiosyncratic and informal 
working practices from becoming established. Instead, it was observed that 
professionals routinely conducted themselves, and related to each other, through their 
ascribed roles in the adversarial system i.e. CPS officers represented the interests of the 
state, defence representatives represented the interests of the defendant, clerks ensured 
correct legal procedure was followed, and magistrates were the final arbiters between 
the competing viewpoints. Defendants had no impact on courts’ interaction. Where they 
did seek to assert themselves, they were swiftly disempowered by courtroom 
professionals and by the structures and procedures of the magistrates’ court.
It was reported that, in the absence of established informal working practices, the 
majority of social interaction was structured by these ideal-typical adversarial roles. 
However, it was also observed that, in certain circumstances, adversarial relations were 
forsaken. Certain individuals familiar to, and respected by, the court could exercise 
unusual degrees of influence, as could certain professions, i.e. clerks and district judges, 
who were treated with deference by the other participants and were rarely challenged
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even where they self-evidently behaved inappropriately, and at times illegally. This 
absence of challenge meant that they had disproportionate power to influence remand 
proceedings and, as a result, remand outcomes. It was argued that the ‘non-exercise’ of 
power evident in this interaction did not result in established idiosyncratic working 
practices, a court culture, because the organisational fluidity of courts’ staffing 
prevented stable work groups firom forming.
There was some limited evidence of cooperative working practices in the courts studied. 
On occasion, defence representatives, the CPS and magistrates would agree a course of 
action to overcome problems. Most commonly, this occurred when a remand decision 
was being made to satisfy the organisational and information needs of the criminal 
justice process itself (see Model Three in Chapter Five). Although this could be argued 
to be an example of ‘best practice’ in the exercise of discretion (Liebling and Price 
2003) because it secured a common aim quickly, the fact that defence representatives 
participated in these cooperative practices was of some concern. In these cases it was 
not uncommon for defendants to be remanded in custody for additional periods of time, 
something which was unlikely to be in their best interests. Whilst such practices may 
make administrative sense, there is a danger that any drift towards cooperative working 
practices between professionals leaves the defendant, the least powerful person in the 
remand hearing, even more vulnerable, and their interests inadequately represented or 
even overlooked.
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Chapter Nine
Conclusion
This chapter explores what this thesis contributes to our understanding of remand 
decision making. It discusses the theoretical framework adopted for analysis and the 
research questions set out in Chapter One in light of the main findings from the 
research. Later sections look at the policy implications of the work, and identify areas 
for future research.
Introduction
This thesis began by commenting on the rapid expansion of the female custodial remand 
population and observing that we know too little about how and why courts make 
remand decisions to be able to explain this increase. This research used in-depth 
analysis of decision making in magistrates’ courts in three metropolitan districts to try 
to remedy our lack of knowledge on this subject. The focus was on women at risk of a 
custodial remand as we have no specific research data on women and remand. We 
cannot simply extrapolate from men’s experience of the remand system as the evidence 
that does exist suggests that the treatment of men and women varies. Quantitative data 
demonstrate that trends in the female custodial remand population differ from those in 
the male population, with the female custodial remand population being one of the 
fastest growing groups in the prison system. Whilst statistical data indicate that there are 
important issues to explore, it is difficult to make sense of these developments as there 
has been virtually no qualitative work on this subject so we do not know how and why 
women are (with increasing frequency) being remanded in custody.
The primary aim of this research was to address our current lack of knowledge on how 
and why courts remand women in custody. This question is explored through an 
examination of four interrelated issues: the relationship between the legal framework 
and actual remand practice; the nature of courts’ social dynamics and their impact on 
decision making; the reasons why women are remanded in custody; and why the
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number of women remanded in custody is increasing. The thesis also sought to address 
the broader theoretical question of how to conceptualise and explain decision making 
within the complex environment of a criminal justice organisation i.e. magistrates’ 
courts. In tackling these questions, the research adopted qualitative research 
methodologies. Of particular note are the case vignettes which were successfully used to 
test emerging theories and elicit data that could not be obtained using other research 
techniques.
Theorising Remand Decision Making
This thesis has focused on remand decisions made about female defendants, but some of 
its findings on the nature of decision making in the remand system may equally apply to 
men. For example, the strategic choice that clerks and others make in deferring to 
district judges is evident in hearings for both men and women. This first section will 
discuss the broad contribution this thesis makes to our understanding of remand 
decision making. The following four sections address the more specific research 
questions in light of the research findings.
This research has established that remand decision making is subject to a number of 
different interacting influences. We need to adopt a conceptual approach which 
incorporates a series of theoretical insights in order to fully comprehend the nature of 
remand decision making. In sum, remand outcomes are produced by the application of 
three models of remand decision making (loosely based on the law and organised 
according to offence seriousness, individual assessment and case processing needs) in 
the social and organisational environment of magistrates’ courts. The remand system as 
a whole is located within a socio-political context which can also exert influence on 
how and why remand decisions are made.
The legal framework did provide an overall structure for remand decision making, and 
key principles, such as the right to bail, were evidently embedded in magistrates’ 
approach to remand. However, formal and informal discretion resulted in the legal 
framework being adapted to suit the rationales of the different models -  the same 
criteria were used in different ways depending on the aims and objectives of any given 
model. It was evident that a one-dimensional assessment based on the seriousness of the 
offence category informed the majority of remand decisions. Even where the evidence
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of the case or the actual nature of the offence suggested the opposite course of action 
would be appropriate, decisions were still primarily made on the basis of the offence 
category. It was clear from the data that offence seriousness was the primary rationale 
for bail decisions and law was differentially applied depending on the seriousness of the 
offence. It has been observed in previous research that offence seriousness is extremely 
important in explaining patterns of remand decisions and that factors such as age, race, 
gender, etc. are not primary determinants of remand decisions. However, this research 
found that different types of cases were processed differently and thus the importance of 
particular decision making cues varied according to the nature of the case.
In cusp cases offence seriousness was not the primary determinant because, by 
definition, the cases were on the borderline of offence seriousness. Where offence 
seriousness was not easily classified, it was evident that the personal characteristics of 
the defendant became far more important in case resolution. Moral assessments of 
defendants were, in this study, found to be closely linked to conventional gender roles 
and expectations.
Although fairly robust and predictable, the application of these models to remand 
decisions varied. Firstly, it was evident that the production of remand decisions was a 
social process. Whether and how models were applied in particular cases was affected 
by actors’ choices about how they defined their own roles and responsibilities in the 
system, and how they negotiated with other participants in the remand hearing. These 
choices, in turn, were influenced by the underlying normative framework of social 
interaction in court -  for example, whether typified by cooperation or conflict, whether 
idiosyncratic or consistent with other courts. Secondly, organisational factors such as 
the lack of resources influenced participants’ expectations about how it was possible to 
resolve cases, for example a shortage of probation officers may have meant fewer PSRs 
were requested.
Although the data from this research cannot demonstrate this, it has also been suggested 
that, over time, structural influences (such as socio-political debates or changes in the 
law) may act upon the models to change how certain offences and/or defendants are 
perceived and categorised, and thus change how they are processed. It is suggested that 
magistrates’ courts are adopting harsher sentencing practices and remand decisions 
which take place in this environment reflect the greater propensity to make custodial
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decisions. Historical research exploring which categories magistrates allocated 
particular offences to may help to illuminate this point.
There is no deterministic relationship between these different levels of influence. For 
example, changes in the legal framework could alter the models either through direct 
restrictions on the use of discretion (e.g. magistrates altered their approach to first time 
burglars following the Lord Chief Justice’s advice, see Chapter Four) or, perhaps, 
through altering perceptions about the general rationale for custodial remands. 
However, it was evident from the failure of the regulatory mechanisms that the legal 
framework could also be disregarded by decision makers who exercised a great deal of 
formal and informal discretion in how they constructed and resolved remand cases. The 
different levels interact with each other, individually and collectively generating the 
structures and processes which govern remand decision making. It is suggested that 
where laws or legal advice are precisely framed and specific (as with the initial advice 
on remanding burglars), they are more likely to alter behaviour. However, the nature of 
the remand decision (the pressure on time, problems with securing verified information, 
the multiple official and unofficial purposes it serves, etc.) means that the majority of 
decisions cannot be legally circumscribed so precisely, and the exercise of discretion is 
essential and unavoidable.
It should be noted that the relative importance of decision making cues can also vary 
with the nature of the court. For example, both Hucklesby (1994b) and Rumgay (1995) 
found that decision outcomes were influenced by whether or not a defendant was local 
to the area. Perhaps reflecting the nature of the courts and the city environment, 
magistrates in this research did not appear to incorporate this factor into decision 
making. Defence representatives commented that as Crown Courts’ case loads consisted 
of graver offences, they were more prepared to grant bail in cases which magistrates 
automatically remanded in custody because, in comparison to the bulk of cases in 
magistrates’ courts, the offences were perceived to be too serious for bail. It may be that 
magistrates’ courts which serve areas where case loads consist of more or less serious 
offences would also be found to have different thresholds for the use of custody.
Whilst the nature of the court can clearly be important, this study, in fact, found there 
was unexpected consistency in the culture and working practices of the different courts. 
Previous research has shown that courts’ working practices can vary and this affects
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remand processing and outcomes. The professionals interviewed in this study, who had 
experience of multiple courts in the city, stated that there was more variation within 
courts than between courts and this was also noted during observations. The daily 
culture of a court did vary according to situational factors such as the composition of the 
particular bench. However, these emergent cultures did not become embedded in the 
courts in this study as work groups were not stable enough for particular working 
practices to take hold. Interaction in courts was found to be structured more by formal 
adversarial relationships than by idiosyncratic inter-professional dynamics. It was, 
however, observed that professionals in these courts did sometimes fail to adhere to 
their formal roles and responsibilities, and arbitrary and unexpected decisions were the 
result.
Previous studies have sought to establish which group of participants in the remand 
process was the most influential, for example many have commented that magistrates 
defer to police and/or CPS recommendations. Importantly, as Jones (1985) points out, 
the relative influence of any group varies depending on the working practices of a court. 
This research has demonstrated that it is necessary to understand the social organisation 
and working practices of a court in order to understand the origins of the relative 
influence of different groups. For example, the unusual way that benches were 
organised at Orrington Street fostered a self-confident and assertive Bench which 
adopted an identifiable and persistent approach to remand cases which reportedly 
favoured the CPS and so tended to result in an increased use of custodial remand. 
Although statistical data can reveal differences in remand rates between courts, they tell 
us little about the dynamics of decision making. Thus, a high use of custodial remand 
might indicate a Bench deferential to the CPS’s pro-custody recommendations, or it 
might be a product of the CPS and/or defence representatives anticipating magistrates’ 
decisions and adapting their contributions to remand hearings in light of a predictably 
pro-custody Bench. Whilst the outcome in each example is a higher custodial remand 
rate, the dynamics of the process differ. Any measure to reduce the use of custodial 
remand would need to be tailored to the normative structure of each court if  it was to be 
successful.
This research has demonstrated that analysis of decision making within a complex 
criminal justice organisation, such as a magistrates’ court, needs to adopt a multi­
layered approach if it is to capture and make sense of the complex influences on the
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process. An integrated model of decision making allows us to explain outcomes in 
individual cases as well as any general patterns in decision making. Analysis which 
focuses solely on either the legal framework, political and economic factors, court 
culture, or offence/defendant characteristics will provide only a partial explanation of 
the production of remand decisions. This chapter will now address the specific research 
questions in more detail in light of the empirical findings from this thesis.
The Relationship Between the Legal Framework And 
Remand Practice
An important finding of this research has been that the high degree of formal and 
informal discretion evident in remand decision making permitted significant variations 
in the way that remand law was applied. The use of bail law varied depending on 
rationale of the three models: the first model identified the importance of offence 
seriousness; the second was individualised decision making influenced by moral 
assessments of defendants; and the third was based on the administrative needs of the 
justice system. The research illustrated that the impact of the legal framework on 
working practices was limited; legal rules were sometimes followed, sometimes flouted, 
and frequently circumvented. It is possible that subsequent guidance and legislative 
amendments to the Bail Act have undermined the clarity of the principles contained in 
the Bail Act, and the variable adherence to the legal framework that was observed in 
this research reflects magistrates’ attempts to make decisions within this more confused 
situation.
This research sought to identify and explain the underlying reasons for remand 
decisions rather than simply accepting that the legal criteria for refusing bail 
corresponded unproblematically to participants’ actual reasons. An important finding 
was that the formal reasons cited in court for remanding a defendant in custody were 
sometimes only tenuously connected to the real reasons. In such cases, the formal 
reasons given in court were ex post facto accounts required by systems designed to 
ensure accountability, but were not a record of the actual rationale for a custodial 
remand. Even where decisions were based on the Bail Act exceptions, this research 
found that the citing of reasons was erratic: sometimes reasons and/or grounds for 
decisions were not given, illegitimate reasons were given (i.e. bail was refused because 
of the nature of the offence), and reasons given at different hearings, although based on
254
the same information, were inconsistent. It is clear that formal accounts of remand 
decisions should not be accepted as unproblematic records of magistrates’ remand 
reasoning. This finding presents problems for future research on remand decision 
making as it undermines the validity and reliability of one aspect of remand records: 
although the fact of a custodial remand would not be in dispute, the meaning or purpose 
of that decision could not be established from records of the official reasons. As was 
seen in Chapter Four, some participants in the process themselves admitted that the 
reasons given in court could conceal rather than illuminate magistrates’ decision making 
criteria. Consequently, it is suggested here that further directives to magistrates to give 
full reasons and grounds for refusing bail will do little to improve accountability in the 
remand system as it is currently organised.
It was found that bail law actually has the effect of limiting the extent to which 
magistrates could be honest about the real reasons for some custodial remands as only 
certain reasons are officially acceptable. This study identified other reasons, not 
contained in the Bail Act 1976, which formed the basis of remand decision making but 
which were usually concealed behind the requirement to cite one of the official 
exceptions to the right to bail. However, this research, reflecting Hucklesby’s (1994b) 
findings, observed that magistrates have actually adopted one of the Bail Act grounds 
for refusing bail (offence seriousness) as a reason in itself. Although a custodial remand 
cannot officially be justified solely by the nature of the offence, offence seriousness was 
offered as a reason for custodial remands and this was found not to be challenged by 
other participants in the remand process. “The nature and seriousness of the offence” is 
an acceptable ground when used, for example, as supporting evidence for refusing bail 
because of risk of failing to appear (as the likely sentence might encourage the 
defendant to abscond) but is not a formal reason in itself. It appears to have been 
accepted, however, as an informal reason, and the fact that it is established amongst all 
practitioners is demonstrated by the fact that it is rarely challenged by defence 
representatives or clerks. This is a clear illustration of how remand decisions are 
organised by the three models and the adherence to the legal framework is adapted 
accordingly.
Previous studies have criticised observed deviations from the formal legal framework 
and criteria for decision making. For example, most studies comment on the lack of 
information provided in some cases and call for more thorough remand hearings
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hearings (Bottomley 1970; Burrows, et al. 1994a; Doherty and East 1985; East and 
Doherty 1984; Hucklesby 1994b; King 1971; Zander 1971; Zander 1979). What these 
studies miss, because of their focus on the legal framework, is that whilst additional 
information might seem desirable, it would, in many cases, make little or no difference 
to whether or not a defendant was remanded in custody. This is because case outcomes 
are not typically based on a convincing and extensive argument about the legalities of a 
defendant’s situation. This research found that the resolution of the vast majority of 
cases needed little debate as they were ‘taken for granted’ or ‘axiomatic’ (Hawkins
2002). Such cases did not require the remand process to be played out in full as the 
outcome was organised around issues that were not formalised in bail law, but were 
known and appeared to be accepted by the majority of participants. These informal, but 
widely accepted, procedural rules were observed to override formal legal rules. This 
loose interpretation of bail law clearly illustrates that decision makers operated with a 
wide degree of discretion.
As the aim of the thesis was to identify and explain actual decision making practices, 
rather than simply measuring the extent of divergence from formally sanctioned 
practice, it was important to develop an understanding of what characteristics made a 
case ‘self evident’. This research found that remand law was routinely ignored but the 
majority of remand decision making was not idiosyncratic or haphazard. On the 
contrary, it was highly regulated and organised around the informal rules of the three 
remand models. These informal rules of the remand system were evident in the routine 
working practices of the magistrates’ court.
The first and most obvious example of routinised practice that dispensed with some 
aspect of the legal framework was the common decision not to apply bail law. As 
explored in the first model of remand decision making, if an offence was unlikely to 
attract a custodial sentence, the defendant would not be remanded in custody. At the 
opposite end of the scale, the working rule was that if an offence involved violence 
against the person, the defendant would be remanded in custody. These practice rules 
persisted even when legal criteria that suggested the opposite course of action should be 
taken. For example, with non-serious offences, even when magistrates anticipated that a 
defendant would break the law, they rejected the powers afforded to them by bail law 
and instead applied practice-based rules that discouraged the use of custody in such 
cases.
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Whilst the majority of remand decisions were axiomatic because they were based on 
offence seriousness, some cases could not be easily categorised and thus required more 
involved and individualised decision making practices: the cusp cases. These were the 
cases which required a full discussion based on comprehensive information and so, 
typically, these were the cases that took longest to resolve. A later section will discuss 
the gendered aspect of decision making in cusp cases more fully. In this section, it is 
simply observed that this research found three practice-based models of remand 
decision making that were structured by offence seriousness, moral assessments of 
defendants, and case processing needs. Instead of shaping practice, the legal framework 
appeared, in fact, to be a resource that was selectively drawn upon to suit the rationale 
of each model.
In other studies of remand, it has been argued either that the degree of correspondence 
between, for example, CPS officers and magistrates illustrates that magistrates defer to 
CPS officers or that the prosecution anticipates the decisions of magistrates and adjusts 
recommendations accordingly. This research questions whether we need to explain 
correspondence in decision making through the influence that one group exerts over 
another. It is argued that in the majority of remand hearings, the decision outcome is 
“self evident”. That little information is supplied and levels of agreement are high does 
not demonstrate one group is deferring to another, it illustrates that there is a clear 
framework of how cases should be resolved i.e. the three models of remand. There 
appeared to be a high degree of consensus about which category a case fell into and so, 
subsequently, there was also agreement about how a case should be processed. This was 
evident, for example, in cases where a custodial remand was inevitable because of 
offence seriousness but a defence representative had been instructed to make a bail 
application i.e. they often used body language and verbal cues to signal to the court that 
they knew the application would be unsuccessful. Equally, if a case would 
automatically attract bail, the participating professionals would frequently bypass stages 
of the remand hearing. For example, even when CPS officers raised concerns about bail 
risk (often in the knowledge that they would be disregarded by magistrates) defence 
representatives were observed not to address the issues raised but simply state that the 
offence was not serious.
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The ‘cusp case’ category contained those cases where there was no obvious consensus 
about how to proceed and, consequently, a full remand hearing was necessary. Cusp 
cases were not common, particularly in this research which focused on women. These 
hearings were typically much longer and often contained significantly more information 
about both the offence and the defendant than in cases where there was a consensus 
based on offence seriousness or the organisational needs of the criminal justice system. 
In cusp cases, because of the inherent lack of agreement, the influence of other factors, 
such as the social dynamics of the courtroom became more important. This is discussed 
below.
This research found that the legal framework did not define working practice. It was a 
resource which decision makers could draw upon, or bypass, depending on the nature of 
the case they were hearing. It would be wrong, however, to characterise the legal 
framework as totally without impact on decision making. Examples were cited in 
Chapter Four which illustrated that specific legislative changes and/or central 
government directives could have an immediate impact on decision making. It is 
unfortunate that this research did not cover a period long enough to record the 
integration of such central government advice into the routine working practice of 
magistrates’ courts. It is possible that, given time, the impact of such instructions would 
be softened and would ultimately be assimilated by magistrates into the accepted 
framework for processing offences. Although these specific changes in remand law 
were observed to have an immediate impact on decision making, the majority of 
decisions were observed to be based on a rationale that was only loosely coupled to 
remand law.
Social Dynamics in Magistrates’ Courts
This research found that the framework of how cases should be resolved was structured 
by the rationales of the three models: offence seriousness, individual assessment, and 
case processing needs. However, these models were applied within the social 
environment of a magistrates’ court. Thus, although the models could predict the 
outcome of the vast majority of cases (primarily because of the defining importance of 
offence seriousness), they were not the only determinants of remand outcomes. This 
study found that remand decisions were primarily the outcome of the three models, 
which were loosely coupled to the legal framework. However, they were also influenced
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by unpredictable situational factors, such as the particular personalities on a bench on a 
given day, and by the social dynamics of the courtroom.
It was observed in Chapter Seven that professional participants in the remand system 
had to select from a series of possible options when defining their own role in a hearing, 
and that the choices they made could alter the outcome of hearings. For example, if 
magistrates chose to frame their role in terms of protecting the individual defendant 
from the powers of the state, they would be more likely to grant bail rather than remand 
in custody. Each group in the remand process had a range of roles which they had to 
choose between at each remand hearing and the ways in which actors chose to frame 
their own roles was found to depend on three factors. The first factor was the purpose of 
the remand hearing as defined by which of the three models it fitted into. For example, 
if  an offence was serious, magistrates prioritised their responsibility to protect the public 
over their role in protecting the rights of unconvicted defendants not to be imprisoned. 
If the characteristics of the offence and/or defendant meant it was a cusp case, 
magistrates typically prioritised their responsibility to make a fair and reasoned decision 
and encouraged lengthier and more complex remand hearings. Where an offence was 
not serious and would not result in a custodial remand, magistrates were observed to 
bypass ‘unnecessary’ legal discussion and procedures to encourage swift decision 
making in busy magistrates’ courts.
Secondly, fluid situational factors, such as the particular composition of the bench or the 
mood of a district judge on any given day, influenced how other participants framed a 
particular hearing. For example, as was seen in Chapter Seven, some defence 
representatives at Inswick Comer were prevented from taking full instructions because 
of the desire of a district judge to stamp their authority on the courtroom and insist that 
the court was not kept waiting any longer. Defence representatives were observed to 
choose to be deferential to this district judge and protect their own reputation rather than 
risk opprobrium by trying to defend their clients’ rights to a full consultation with their 
legal representatives.
Thirdly, the underlying normative framework stmctured social interaction in the 
courtroom and this could influence how participants chose to frame their own role and 
to relate to others. For example, in Orrington Street clerks were not afforded the same 
respect as they were in the other courts, and this, it was argued by interviewees, affected
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their preparedness and ability to challenge magistrates in remand hearings. It is argued 
that in the courts in this study, with the exception of Orrington Street, the importance of 
courts’ social dynamics was less than that which has been observed in other studies 
because the courts’ organisational structure prevented stable work groups from forming. 
Without stable workgroups, idiosyncratic working practices were not consolidated into 
distinctive court cultures.
One of the reasons for selecting courts in different areas was to explore variation in 
working practice and to relate this to differences in courts’ rules of interaction i.e. to 
identify and explain the choices participants made about their roles according to the 
nature of the dominant court culture. However, unexpectedly, this research did not find 
evidence of distinct differences between the social organisation of most of the courts in 
the study. In contrast to much previous work on remand, it became evident that the 
pattern to be explained was not variation between courts’ working practices but the 
unexpected level of consistency between them. This consistency was not identified 
through statistical analysis of remand rates in the various courts but was evident in court 
observations and from professionals’ comments about their experience of working in 
the various courts. Interviewees volunteered the view that Orrington Street had a 
different culture, but argued the other courts in the study did not. This indicates they 
were not unaware of the possibility of variation between courts, but judged the majority 
of the courts in this study not to have idiosyncratic working practices.
Consistency between courts has also been illustrated in other research studies. For 
example, although one of Hucklesby’s (1994b) courts had an unusually high custodial 
remand rate, the figures for the other two courts in the study were very similar. Whilst 
deviations from the norm are interesting, it is also important to look ‘through the 
looking glass’ (Heidensohn 1997:791) and explain not the exception but the rule.
An important finding of this research is that the courts did not have the stable work 
groups previously identified in research on courts with strong internal cultures. In the 
absence of such familiarity, which fosters idiosyncratic working practices, the 
normative structure of the courts in this study was found to be more formally organised 
around the principles of the adversarial system. Inconsistency in decision making was 
still possible within a Bench, and was indeed demonstrated in this research. However, as
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the respondents themselves argued, there were not large and persistent differences 
between Benches’ remand decisions.
It was evident that failures to exercise adversarial responsibilities could affect decision 
making processes and outcomes. Thus, clerks’ deference to district judges resulted in 
their failure to fulfil one of their primary roles and to challenge improper practice in 
remand hearings. Whilst the majority of district judges’ decisions did seem to be well 
judged and based on extensive experience and professionalism, some examples of the 
arbitrary exercise of power were observed in this research. It was observed that the 
clerks in this study would not permit even the most experienced and confident lay bench 
to behave in this manner. When working with lay magistrates, clerks appeared to 
assume responsibility for ensuring correct procedure, something they ceded 
responsibility for when working with district judges.
However, it was only in Orrington Street, where work groups were unusually stable, 
that these atypical approaches became consolidated into working practices distinct and 
persistent enough to be defined as a court culture, and to affect remand processing and 
outcomes. Elsewhere, although the rules of the ‘game’ did vary on a day-by-day, or 
even case-by-case, basis depending on the peculiarities of situational factors, the 
participants kept returning to a common normative framework where interaction was 
organised around the roles ascribed to them by their position in the adversarial system.
Expressions of concern about ‘justice by geography’ and individual court cultures are 
not uncommon. Indeed, Home Office circulars have addressed such issues and urged 
magistrates to be more consistent in their decision making. In discussing consistency in 
remand hearings, there are important contributory factors which have not been much 
discussed in this wholly court-based research. For example, the role of decision makers 
earlier in the process in defining and filtering cases. It is particularly regrettable that this 
research was not able to incorporate police decision making into the analysis of courts’ 
decisions as, for example, Jones (1985) identified the importance of police decisions, 
and courts’ responses to those decisions, in explaining patterns of remand outcomes. 
Notwithstanding this omission, this research does contribute one important finding to 
the question of how to ensure greater consistency in remand decision making: 
encourage all participants to adhere to their formal responsibilities as defined by the 
adversarial system. From observations it was evident that it was when actors failed to
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take responsibility for their own roles, ceding power to other participants, that irregular, 
idiosyncratic and even unjust decision making ensued.
The Reasons Why Women Are Remanded In Custody
The risks of failing to attend and offending on bail are the most commonly used reasons 
for all groups remanded in custody. However, as discussed in previous sections, most of 
the official reasons for custodial remands do not necessarily tell us much about the real 
reasons why defendants are remanded in custody. This is partly because the official 
reasons encapsulate a very wide range of concerns and risks. There are two exceptions 
to this statement which need to be discussed briefly. Firstly, this study found that the 
specific reason of using a custodial remand because of concerns about a defendant 
interfering with justice is very rarely used with women, and this reflects the 
predominantly non-violent nature of female offending. Secondly, women with 
psychiatric problems were occasionally observed to be remanded in custody under the 
Bail Act 1976 exception of ensuring the defendant’s own protection. With the 
prevalence of psychiatric problems in the female custodial remand population, it was 
surprising that more psychiatric custodial remands were not observed. Perhaps this 
indicates that defendants’ psychiatric and psychological needs are not addressed at the 
remand stage.
It has been argued that bail hostels could be used to divert defendants from custodial 
remands but the evidence of this study indicates that an increase in the number of bail 
hostel beds for women would not reduce the female custodial remand population. 
Magistrates were keen to use bail hostels because the majority were very reluctant to 
use custody in anything other than the ‘last resort’. However, the Home Office female 
only bail and probation hostel in the city had ongoing difficulties keeping its residence 
levels up to Home Office requirements, and this was an historical as well as a current 
problem. The lack of referrals could not be explained by magistrates being unaware of 
the hostel as its staff made ongoing efforts to raise awareness about the work done at 
this hostel. Although Outer District magistrates were found to be less familiar with the 
hostel. Inner District’s court was close to the hostel and its profile was much higher 
there. Inner District was a busy court and its magistrates were reluctant to use custodial 
remands, a sentiment accentuated by the notorious conditions in the local female prison.
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Yet they did not choose to use a local bail hostel with which they were familiar. This 
strongly suggests that bail hostels do not address the reasons why women are remanded 
in custody. Magistrates saw bail hostels as a resource to be used when a defendant’s 
accommodation was unsuitable or he (his usually applied to men not women) was of no 
fixed abode. Observed cases and magistrates’ and defence representatives’ comments 
alike demonstrated that women rarely had such difficulties with their accommodation. 
Interviewees expressed the view that women tended to have more secure 
accommodation than men because they were more often carers for young children or, 
where they did not have secure accommodation of their own, they were more likely to 
have maintained friendship and family networks. This meant they could usually find a 
satisfactory address for bail purposes if required. If accommodation was not a problem 
for the female defendants in this study, for what reasons were they being remanded in 
custody? The evidence of this study indicates that we need to look at the nature of 
women’s offending, and at the characterisation of female defendants by professionals in 
the remand system in order to answer this question.
As we have seen, considerations of offence seriousness overrode all other factors in the 
majority of cases. Offences categorised as serious invariably resulted in a custodial 
remand regardless of the nature of the particular act(s). On the other hand, offences 
regarded as not serious invariably resulted in the defendant being bailed. Even where 
Bail Act exceptions to the grant of bail clearly applied, they were typically overlooked 
and consequently, even where legally justified, custodial remands were very rare in such 
cases. It was established that there were some offences which could not be easily 
categorised by offence seriousness: the cusp cases. As was seen in Chapter Five, 
magistrates approached these cases in a different manner, tending to require more 
information in the hearing and basing their decisions on individualised assessments of 
the defendant rather than simply on offence characteristics. Defendants were also 
observed to be remanded in custody for administrative reasons, although this was rarely 
the initial reason for a custodial remand.
Women are rarely remanded in custody for the primary reason that the overwhelming 
majority of female offending is non-violent acquisitive crime. These are the types of 
offences which only occasionally attract custodial remands. Magistrates’ reluctance to 
use custodial remands in these cases stemmed from a widespread conviction (evident 
amongst CPS officers, clerks, and defence representatives as well as in the magistracy)
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that if  an offence would not attract a custodial sentence, it would be unjust to use a 
custodial remand. As the majority of female offenders commit such offences, they are 
unlikely to be remanded in custody. However, some women were remanded in custody 
for such offences when they had extensive antecedents, and where they persistently 
failed to attend court and/or offended on bail. In 2002, 41 per cent of female remand 
receptions were for theft and handling (see Table 1.4) so custodial remands evidently 
are used for non-serious offences. However, the evidence of this research indicates that 
magistrates typically only used custody in such cases as a ‘last resort’. They strove hard 
to keep defendants charged with these types of offences out of custody, bailing and re­
bailing women time and again despite obvious breaches of bail and undeniable risks that 
they would breach bail and/or offend on bail again. The evidence of this research is that 
those women who are remanded in custody for theft and handling are typically 
exceptionally prolific repeat offenders with substantial histories of Bail Act violations. 
Even in these cases, magistrates were still reluctant to use custody, as was evident in the 
observations and further explored in the case vignettes.
At the opposite end of the scale, serious offences almost invariably attracted custodial 
remands. Again, anticipation of sentencing featured in magistrates’ rationale, with some 
commenting that it was to defendants’ advantage to get their sentence underway as soon 
as possible. Magistrates did observe that it was very unusual for women to be charged 
with such offences and remand decisions about male defendants were considered to be 
more straightforward because of the more serious nature of their offending.
The evidence of this research suggests that when the rationale for a remand decision 
was offence seriousness, magistrates tended to rely on the general offence category 
rather than the specific features of the individual offence. This decision making strategy 
presents particular problems for female defendants charged with a serious offence and 
applying for bail. Research on female offenders repeatedly makes the point that 
appearances of leniency in sentencing disappear when the nature of female offending is 
compared to that of male offending i.e. within a given offence category, women’s 
offences tend to be less serious (Burman 2004; Daly 1994; Hedderman 2004; 
Hedderman and Gelsthorpe 1997; Home Office 2003a). Therefore, if remand decisions 
tend to be based on the offence category rather than specific offence details, the 
seriousness of women’s offences will be overestimated, and a custodial remand made 
more likely.
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This raises concerns about the necessity of custodial remands for women charged with 
serious offences. If decision making was based more on the nature of the particular act, 
rather than being overwhelmingly influenced by the crude offence category, fewer 
women might be remanded in custody for such offences.
The evidence of this research illustrates that magistrates are very reluctant to remand 
women in custody for ‘typical’ female offences such as theft and handling. Where such 
offences do result in the use of custodial remand, it is because of the cumulative 
offending pattern rather than the individual offence. When the offences are more 
serious, this research suggests that some remands may be unnecessary as they fail to 
take into account the nature of women’s offending i.e. women tend not to offend as 
seriously or as repeatedly as men.
It is also suggested that women might be particularly likely to be processed as cusp 
cases because of the relative scarcity of women in the criminal justice system. As 
magistrates do not have as much experience processing women, they are less likely to 
have formed ideas of ‘normal cases’ with female defendants. Thus it is possible that a 
greater proportion of remand hearings for women would be individualised rather than 
based on established cues such as offence seriousness alone. In such cases, the evidence 
from the cusp case vignette and observations suggest that women’s remand outcomes 
are in significant part based on moral evaluations of their characters and lives. This, as 
we have seen, actually benefited many women but penalised others.
This research analysed magistrates’ rationale when taking remand decisions about 
women in cases on the cusp between conditional bail and custodial remand. These cases 
illustrated the ways in which participants in the remand system characterised women in 
the justice system. It is noted again that in the majority of remand hearings, whilst 
participants may indeed have reached moral judgements about defendants, these views 
did not influence remand outcomes because of the overriding importance of offence 
seriousness. It is argued here that although cusp cases were a minority of all remand 
cases, they are important because, unlike most decisions in the remand system, cusp 
cases are not axiomatic and so they are the cases most vulnerable to discriminatory 
practices. Also, these are the cases where trends in the use of custodial remand can be
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identified in the longer term -  this issue will be returned to in the next section of this 
chapter.
It has already been established that magistrates were generally reluctant to remand 
defendants in custody, particularly for non-serious offences, as they were deeply 
conscious of the harm that could be done by custodial remands and the ‘audacity’ of 
putting an innocent or unsentenced person into prison. This research found that cusp 
cases also tended to be fi*amed in terms of a reluctance to use custody to some extent but 
were additionally strongly influenced by moral judgements about the female defendants 
rather than on the nature of offending or assessments of bail risk. This was evident in 
both the narratives that defence representatives used in court to try and persuade 
magistrates that their clients were ‘worthy’ of bail, and also in magistrates’ discussions 
of the cusp case vignette. It was found that the moral assessments were often 
constructed around gender expectations of women. Thus, indications of conformity and 
control in women’s lives would encourage magistrates to grant bail.
This study found evidence that some women were, indeed, less likely to receive a 
custodial remand than men for a number of reasons. Firstly, as discussed above, where 
it was established that women conformed to gender role expectations, they were more 
likely to be remanded on bail. Although men were not the focus of this study, some 
evidence did emerge that this was true for men too, as magistrates argued they would 
try hard to keep a male out of prison if he would lose his job and be unable to support 
his family as a result. Secondly, a majority of magistrates said that they were reluctant 
to remand a woman in custody if she was a mother. However, this did not apply in all 
cases, but only those where it was established that the woman was a ‘responsible’ 
mother. Thirdly, some magistrates admitted that their general view of women affected 
their remand decision making. They said that they were less inclined to think of women 
as entrenched offenders and expressed particular reluctance to remand women in prison 
because they believed that women found the experience of custody much harder to cope 
with than men.
The evidence of this research supports findings on sentencing which indicate that 
although women do benefit from a degree of leniency in the justice system, this is not 
true for all women in all types of cases (Daly 1994; Hedderman and Hough 1994). 
Women who are charged with serious offences tend to be remanded on the basis of the
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offence category and not the nature of the act. As women’s offences within a given 
offence category do tend to be less serious in nature, and to be less likely to be repeated, 
this suggests that some women are being harshly treated at the remand stage. Because of 
the relative scarcity of women in the criminal justice system, remand decision making 
appears to be more individualised for women than men, and outcomes are often framed 
in terms of moral assessments of the women. Whilst this benefits those women who can 
demonstrate gender role conformity, some women attract different treatment because 
their lives are less conventional. Some lifestyles may indeed be valid evidence of 
heightened bail risk; for example, magistrates strongly associated substance misuse 
problems with an increased risk of offending while on bail. However, the danger is that 
those women who choose unorthodox lifestyles, or are from cultural backgrounds with 
which magistrates are unfamiliar, might be penalised not because they genuinely present 
a greater bail risk but because they do not conform to the expectations of magistrates -  a 
fairly coherent group of predominantly white, middle-class and middle-aged 
individuals.
Why More Women Are Being Remanded In Custody
Given the evidence from this research that the majority of women commit offences for 
which magistrates are extremely reluctant to use custodial remand, how can we account 
for the marked increases in the use of custodial remand for women that has occurred in 
recent years? Whilst this question cannot be answered from data from this research 
alone, the findings of this project can be combined with previous work on sentencing 
patterns to offer an explanation: that more women are remanded in custody because 
remand decisions are ‘contaminated’ by sentencing rationale.
The increase in the female sentenced population has been explained by the combination 
of a number of factors: more women being sentenced, higher custody rates, and longer 
custodial sentences (Hedderman 2004). Although there has been an increase in the 
numbers of women being processed by the criminal justice system, the main reason for 
the rise in the prison population is increased custody rates i.e. more women found guilty 
of an offence are sentenced to custody rather than given non-custodial sentences.
In terms of the types of sentences awarded, both men and women have seen 
a reduction in the use of discharges, fines and suspended sentences. For men 
this was largely offset by a doubling in the use of custody, whereas for 
women the use of custody tripled but the use of probation also increased.
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Combined with the increase in the number of women being sentenced and 
the decline in the number of men, the net effect of the changes between 
1992 and 2000 is that whereas one woman was previously imprisoned for 
every 20 men, the ratio is now 1 in 10. (Hedderman 2004:84).
How relevant is this in explaining remand increases? It appears that the custody rate has 
increased as a result of socio-political pressures towards ‘tougher’ sentencing 
(Hedderman 2004; Hough, et al. 2003). However, custodial remands should be made 
according to criteria that are, at least formally, largely independent of those that 
determine sentencing outcomes. Whilst the likely sentence for an offence may have 
some relevance if there are fears that it would encourage the defendant to abscond, this 
is generally regarded to apply mainly to long custodial sentences and should not be used 
as a sole ground for remanding in custody. So, while the increasing use of custodial 
sentences might justify some of the increase in custodial remands, it does not provide a 
valid explanation for all of it.
If the offences that women commit were becoming more serious, this might explain the 
increase in the custodial remand rate as offence seriousness is a strong determinant of 
custodial remands. However, the evidence demonstrates that women’s offending is not 
getting more serious and so custodial remands cannot be increasing for this reason.
[AJlthough the number of women being dealt with by the courts has 
increased, the proportions being dealt with at the Crown Court has remained 
relatively stable. This suggests that the greater use of custody is not being 
driven by an overall increase in the seriousness of women’s offending. 
(Hedderman 2004:89).
[T]he increased use of custody has occurred at both venues [Crown Courts 
and magistrates’ courts] for all offences, bar robbery at the magistrates’ 
court, indicating that sentencing in general has simply got more severe. 
Second, the rise in the number of women convicted of theft and handling, 
and the greater than average increase in the use of custody for this group, 
lends further support for the idea that the rise in sentenced prison receptions 
is being driven by a more severe response to less serious offences. 
(Hedderman 2004:90 original emphasis).
Table 1.4 showed that as only 22 per cent of females received onto custodial remand in 
2002 were charged with serious offences (i.e. violence against the person, sexual 
offences, burglary and robbery), the majority of women remanded in custody are there 
for relatively non-serious offences. Tables 9.1 and 9.2 illustrate that custodial sentences 
are being used at a greater rate across all offence groups, for example the proportion of
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women convicted for theft and handling who were sentenced to custody by magistrates 
increased from two per cent in 1992 to 14 per cent in 2000.
Table 9.1: The Use Of Custody For Females (All Ages) By Type Of Court
Magistrates’ Courts Crown Court
1992 2000 1992 2000
No. sentenced to custody 635 3971 1510 2928
Percentage sentenced to custody 2% 10% 23% 42%
No. sentenced for indictable 
offences
33,454 40,739 6,536 7,059
Percentage o f female offenders 
sentenced at Crown Court
16% 15%
Source: (Hedderman 2004:90).
Table 9.2: Proportion Of Adult Women (Over 21) Convicted Of Indictable 
Offences Who Were Sentenced To Custody
Magistrates’ Courts Crown Court
Offence 1992 2000 1992 2000
% custody % custody % custody % custody
Violence 2 11 22 33
Sexual offences 0 (13) (41) (67)
Burglary 9 32 27 53
Robbery 0 0 58 75
Theft and handling 2 14 21 41
Fraud and forgery 2 8 22 32
Criminal damage 4 5 19 25
Drugs 1 4 39 55
Other (non-motoring) 2 6 22 30
Motoring 0 3 (22) (32)
All indictable offences 2 11 24 42
0  based on less than 100 women sentenced
Source: (Hedderman 2004:91).
The third reason given to explain the greater numbers of women in prison is that 
custodial sentences are longer and this swells the average prison population. This could
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obviously not account for the increase in the custodial remand population, although it 
might contribute to a degree to magistrates’ assessment that defendants would abscond 
in some cases. Again, this could not explain the magnitude of the increase in the use of 
custodial remand.
It appears that the custodial remand population increases with the sentenced prison 
population. However, this cannot be fully explained by the increase in the numbers of 
women coming before the courts, by the use of longer sentences, or by changes in the 
nature of female offending patterns. Moreover, evidence from this and other studies 
indicates that magistrates are actually very reluctant to remand people in custody. It has 
been repeatedly noted that magistrates in this study believed they only used custodial 
remand as a ‘last resort’. This reluctance to use custody was also found in a study on the 
increased use of custodial sentences and, as Hough et al (2003) argue, it appeared to be 
genuine.
Like most people, [sentencers] will think of themselves as humane and 
civilized. So at one level it would be surprising if  sentencers did not talk in 
terms of prison as a last resort. However the sincerity with which these 
views were expressed was striking. Some of them emphasised the difficulty 
and distaste they felt in imposing a custodial sentence. (Hough, et al. 
2003:35).
If, as is contended, magistrates really are reluctant to remand in custody, how can we 
explain the fact that custodial remands are being used more often even though there are 
no objective reasons that can account for the increase i.e. the increased use of custodial 
remands cannot be wholly explained by changes in factors that would legitimately affect 
the custodial remand rate? The evidence from this research is that the rise in the use of 
custodial remands is because remand reasoning is ‘contaminated’ by the sentencing 
environment. That is, sentencing trends per se cannot be used to explain changes in 
remand rates as sentencing decisions are made on different criteria to remand decisions. 
However, it is argued here that the sentencing environment, which is in part influenced 
by legislative changes, does affect remand decision making. Sentencing patterns have 
been used here to illustrate that custody is increasingly used for offences of lesser 
seriousness. It is suggested that this rise in the use of custodial remands is a reflection of 
this shift in what is regarded as serious enough to warrant a custodial sentence. As 
remand decisions are taken within the same environment as sentencing decisions, and 
are made by the same personnel, it is not surprising that this increasing punitiveness in 
sentencing decisions is also reflected in remand decisions.
270
There was clear evidence that magistrates felt constrained not to use custodial remands 
in cases where a custodial sentence was unlikely. It is possible that the increased use of 
custodial sentences for more categories of offences may reduce magistrates’ inhibitions 
about using custodial remand. It is no longer ‘unjust’ to use custodial remands for 
offences where custodial sentences have become more likely. Further, sentencing 
patterns signal changing perceptions about the ‘seriousness’ of particular types of 
offences. This research clearly showed that offence seriousness was routinely used as 
‘perceptual shorthand’ (Skolnick 1966) in remand decisions. If an increasing number of 
offences are perceived as serious then, as seriousness is used by magistrates as a criteria 
for making remand decisions, the number of custodial remands would also logically 
increase. So it is argued that despite the fact that women’s offences have not actually 
become more serious in nature, and despite the fact that the right to bail still applies to 
the same degree, changes in sentencing patterns have resulted in an increased use of 
custodial remand. It appears that magistrates are still genuinely committed to using 
custody only as a last resort, but the point at which the last resort is reached (either 
because of offence seriousness or defendants’ characteristics (e.g. see (Hough, et al.
2003)) has altered and, as a result, magistrates are now remanding cases in prison which 
previously would not have crossed the custodial threshold.
Policy Implications And Future Research
The findings of this thesis suggest that if  greater consistency in magistrates’ decision 
making is desired, any policy directed to this end must address all the participants in the 
process and not focus solely on magistrates and magistrates’ courts. Firstly, at each 
stage of the remand process, discretion is exercised and cases are defined. This filtering 
process means that by the time a case reaches the magistrates’ court, it has already been 
framed in a certain way. Magistrates’ remand decisions are just the final stage in a 
cumulative process of decision making that begins with the Police. Secondly, it was 
demonstrated that the underlying nature of interaction in the court room could act as a 
regulatory mechanism for decision making. Where courts (and individuals) leant 
towards cooperative or deferential working practices, arbitrary and idiosyncratic 
decisions became increasingly likely. Although it might not be appropriate for 
governments to be issuing unsolicited advice to defence representatives, if all
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participants were encouraged to participate more fully in formal adversarial interaction, 
the drift to informal consensual working in magistrates’ courts might be countered. It 
would be interesting to map courts’ deviations from the average custodial remand rates 
onto variations of courts’ key characteristics^^. For example, this research suggests that 
the larger, busier urban courts would show fewer variations in remand rates, because 
they are more likely to be organised along adversarial principles, than courts in rural 
areas where stable work groups might be more likely and would foster particularised 
working practices.
If the increase in the female custodial remand population is to be slowed or even 
stopped, the most important issue to address is the attitudes of criminal justice personnel 
on the use of custody for both sentencing and remand. This research has shown that 
women may be remanded in custody for less serious offences than they previously 
were, even though magistrates are still very reluctant to use custodial remand. It is 
suggested that this paradox can be explained by a perceptual shift in the threshold at 
which offences/defendants are defined having reached the ‘last resort’ and custodial 
remands become perceived as the only option, and by an increasing emphasis on the 
offence seriousness model of decision making. The ratchet effect is evident in trends in 
sentencing practice and, as this research has suggested, is also responsible for increases 
in the custodial remand population. Simply instructing magistrates and others to use 
custody only where absolutely necessary will not reduce the custodial remand 
population in the near future because magistrates already genuinely believe that they 
only refuse bail when they have no other option. Bail law must remain flexible as not 
every eventuality can or should be legislated for, and legal changes have been shown to 
be circumvented anyway. However, attempts to reduce the custodial remand population 
could include offers of guidance on where the custody threshold lies. There are 
established routes, such as Home Office Circulars, which could be used to communicate 
such guidelines. It could be made explicit that, for example, offences of theft and 
handling should not be regarded as serious enough to attract a custodial remand, except 
in extreme circumstances such as particularly high value or prolific offending. Although 
it could not be established in this research, it would be interesting to use historical 
analysis to explore the extent to which the shift in the point at which custodial remands
Repeated atteir^ts were made to secure this information from the Home Office but they were unable to 
supply me with national data on magistrates’ courts use o f custodial remand.
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are defined as ‘necessary’ or unavoidable is related to the nature of socio-political 
debates on crime and justice.
Of course legal changes can and do exercise influence over remand practice. Where 
discretion is restricted by legal rules which contain very specific advice, this research 
has shown this is reflected in remand decision making (see Chapter Four). However, the 
wide scope for the exercise of informal and formal discretion in the remand system 
means legislative changes are not automatically translated into practice. They are often 
adopted and adapted according to the informal decision making frameworks that 
dominate remand processing.
In light of this, it is important to comment on government proposals to introduce 
assessment of substance misuse problems into the remand decision. No doubt this 
policy will be monitored and evaluated but this research suggests some aspects of the 
policy which would need particular focus. Given the prevalence of substance misuse in 
the offending population, will there be sufficient resources available to fund places for 
all who are referred? Magistrates’ and defence representatives’ comments on bail 
hostels show that if they perceive a shortage in bed spaces, they will be less likely to 
suggest and explore the option. Perceptions of access to such resources will be as 
important as the actual availability of places.
If there are not sufficient places, how will magistrates select candidates? This research 
illustrated that simple models such as bifurcation, or crime control versus due process, 
cannot fully explain the complexities of the remand system where multiple decision 
making models operate. How would the new official purpose of rehabilitation be 
incorporated into a stage in the criminal process which is already serving myriad 
(official and unofficial) purposes? Analysis of cusp cases illustrated that moral 
assessments based on personal characteristics were the deciding factor in some remand 
hearings. If there is any shortage of spaces and/or any confusion about how access to 
rehabilitation should be allocated, the evidence of this research is that extra-legal 
criteria will be used. Moreover, magistrates might be unwilling to bail a defendant to a 
rehabilitation centre if they feel the defendant is trying to ‘play the system’ and secure 
bail without any commitment to being rehabilitated. Again, a lack of clear guidelines 
will encourage the construction of informal working practices which will structure how 
this policy is actually implemented.
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A further question is whether magistrates would continue the established practice of 
bailing a defendant accused of non-serious offences when the proposal permits them to 
remand that defendant in custody if she had refused to participate in a treatment 
programme. Where the powers contained in a new proposal are incompatible with the 
principles of established working practices, remand professionals will establish informal 
rules in order to resolve the conflict. Given the increased use of custodial remand for all 
offences, the concern must be that these proposals will encourage an ever-faster 
growing custodial remand population.
The foregoing discussions illustrate that this thesis has provided a great deal more 
information about the processing of women and remand decision making than was 
previously available, although it has also, inevitably, raised more questions about the 
nature of remand decision making which can only be addressed by further research. 
Most importantly, it suggests a model of remand decision making for women that is 
different in emphasis from earlier models which did not explore how different types of 
cases and defendants are processed according to different rationales. Consequently, it 
provides more indications of how interventions and guidance could be provided to limit 
remands in custody to the necessary cases. This research suggests that clear statements 
of principle on what custodial remands should be for are vital to any necessary attempts 
to reduce the custodial remand populations.
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Appendix One
R em and  Law
Part I, Schedule 1 of the Bail Act 1976: Reasons for refusing bail.
“(2) The defendant need not be granted bail i f  the court is satisfied that there are 
substantial grounds for believing that the defendant, i f  released on bail (whether subject 
to conditions or not), would -
(a) fa il to surrender to custody, or
(b) commit an offence while on bail, or
(c) interfere with witnesses or otherwise obstruct the course o f justice, whether 
in relation to himself or any other person.
(2A) The defendant need not be granted bail i f  -
(a) the offence is an indictable offence or an offence triable either way; and,
(b) it appears to the court that he was on bail in criminal proceedings on the 
date o f  the offence.
[Paragraph 2A of Section 4 was inserted into the Bail Act 1976 by s.26 of the Criminal 
Justice and Public Order Act 1994].
(3) The defendant need not be granted bail i f  the court is satisfied that the defendant 
should be kept in custody fo r  his own protection or, i f  he is a child or young person, fo r  
his own welfare.
(4) The defendant need not be granted bail i f  he is in custody in pursuance o f the 
sentence o f a court or o f any authority acting under any o f the Services Acts.
(5) The defendant need not be granted bail where the court is satisfied that it has not 
been practicable to obtain sujficient information fo r  the purpose o f taking the decision 
required by this part o f  this schedule fo r  want o f  time since the institution o f 
proceedings against him.
(6) The defendant need not be granted bail i f  having been released on bail in or 
connection with the proceedings for the offence, he has been arrested in pursuance o f  
section 7 o f this Act.
[section 7: liability to arrest for absconding or breaking conditions of bail].
Exception applicable to defendants whose case is adjourned for inquiries or a report:
(7) Where his case is adjourned for inquiries or a report, the defendant need not be 
granted bail i f  it appears to the court that it would be impracticable to complete the 
inquiries or make the report without keeping the defendant in custody. ”
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Schedule 1, Part I, paragraph 9 of the Bail Act 1976: Grounds to be considered when 
applying an exception to the right to bail.
“Decisions under paragraph 2
(9) In taking the decisions required by paragraph 2 or 2A o f this part o f this schedule, 
the court shall have regard to such o f the following considerations as appear to be 
relevant, that is to say -
(a) the nature and seriousness o f the offence o f default (and the probable method 
o f dealing with the defendant for it),
(b) the character, antecedents, associations and community ties o f  the defendant,
(c) the defendant’s record as respects the fulfilment o f his obligations under 
previous grants o f  bail in criminal proceedings,
(d) except in the case o f a defendant whose case is adjourned fo r  inquiries or a 
report, the strength o f the evidence o f his having committed the offence or 
having defaulted,
as well as to any others which appear to be relevant. ”
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Appendix Two___________________________
Interview S ch ed u les
Magistrates
Firstly, thank you very much for agreeing to be interviewed. As you know from my 
introductory letter, I am conducting research on the remand process in a number of 
magistrates’ courts. This interview will last approximately one hour and will, with your 
consent, be tape recorded. The tape will be kept in a secure filing cabinet at the 
London School of Economics, your identity will not be disclosed to anyone and 
everything that you say will be treated confidentially. You can, of course, refuse to 
answer any question you are unwilling to answer and please feel free to ask questions if 
you need clarification on any point. I will be using the term ‘remand decision/process’ 
etc in this interview and this encompasses both bail (conditional and unconditional) and 
remands in custody. I will use the phrase ‘remand in custody’ if we are discussing 
custodial remands. Do you have any questions?
1 -  How many years have you sat on the Bench?
2 -  Have you sat on Benches other than [borough]?
I  am now going to present you with three cases and I  will ask you to make a remand 
decision on each. Please feel free to make notes i f  you would like.
Case One.... [read out and record decision]
Case Two.. .[read out and record decision]
Case Three.. .[read out and record decision]
After each vignette:
Can you answer the following questions. Please refer to your notes and do ask me to 
refresh your memory where necessary.
3 -  Can you tell me specifically what you were aiming to achieve when you made this 
decision?
[prompt: Bail Act legislation allows decisions to be made and used for a variety of 
reasons. I wonder what reasons you felt were relevant in this case.]
4 -  What was the most important information in this case, in your view?
5 -  Are there any additional pieces of information that would help you in reaching a 
decision?
6 -  What difference, if any, would it make if the defendant was pleading not guilty?
7 -  What difference, if any, would it make if the defendant did not enter a plea at this 
hearing?
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S -  [If the decision was RICJ What single piece of additional information or change in 
circumstance, if  any, could the defence put forward at the next bail hearing which would 
encourage you to release the defendant on bail?
Repeat for Case Two and Case Three.
Thank you. I  will not be asking you any further questions about these cases. I  am now 
going to ask you some questions about the remand process.
9 -  Can you recall any changes in remand decision-making during the time that you 
have sat on the Bench?
[prompt: eg legal, procedural, aim, outcome]
10 -  In your view, what is the main purpose of custodial remands?
11 -  How often do you think you achieve this purpose?
Fd like you to think specifically about female offenders in the following questions:
12 -  What do you find most difficult about remand decisions in cases of female 
defendants?
13 -  Can you recall a case where you took a chance by bailing a female defendant 
instead of remanding her in custody? What factors prompted you to act as you did?
14 -  Can you recall a case where you had to remand a woman in custody against your 
better judgement? What factors prompted you to act as you did?
And now Fd like to focus on the personnel involved in a bail application:
15 -  What do you think defence solicitors’ responsibilities are towards their client and 
towards the court are when making bail applications?
16 -  What issues, if  any, do you feel arise from defence solicitors’ responsibilities 
towards the court and to their clients?
17 -  From your own observations, do the CPS face any particular difficulties when 
making remand recommendations?
18 -  If someone’s first appearance before the Court is fi*om the cells on overnight 
custody, does this have any impact on proceedings and decision-making?
And in the final two questions, Fd like you to think broadly about your experience o f the 
remand process:
19 -  If you could make three changes to any aspect of the remand process, what would 
they be and why?
20 -  If you could make three changes to remand legislation, what would they be and 
why?
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Those are all my questions. But before we finish, do you have any questions or is there 
anything o f importance that you would like to raise which we have not had a chance to 
cover in this interview?
Thank you very much for your time.
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CPS
Firstly, thank you very much for agreeing to be interviewed. As you know from my 
introductory letter, I am conducting research on the remand process in a number of 
magistrates’ courts. This interview will last approximately one hour and will, with your 
consent, be tape recorded. The tape will be kept in a secure filing cabinet at the 
London School of Economics, your identity will not be disclosed to anyone and 
everything that you say will be treated confidentially. You can, of course, refuse to 
answer any question you are unwilling to answer and please feel free to ask questions if 
you need clarification on any point. I will be using the term ‘remand decision/process’ 
etc in this interview and this encompasses both bail (conditional and unconditional) and 
remands in custody. I will use the phrase ‘remand in custody’ if we are discussing 
custodial remands. Do you have any questions?
• How many years have you worked for the CPS?
• Have you worked in courts other than - and -?
• Do you think that different courts have different characters?
• How would you describe - and -’s [courts] character?
• In your experience, do you think court character bears any relation to outcomes?
I  am now going to ask you some questions about the remand process.
• Can you recall any changes in remand decision-making during the time that you 
have sat on the Bench?
[prompt: eg legal, procedural, aim, outcome]
• What difference, if any, do you think that Magistrates being trained in structured 
decision making made to remand decisions?
• Have you worked in the Video Link?
- what do you think of it?
• In your view, what is the main purpose of custodial remands?
• In your experience, are custodial remands ever used to serve any other purpose?
I ’d like you to think specifically about female offenders in the following questions:
• What, if  anything, do you find most difficult about remand recommendations in
cases of female defendants?
• Can you recall a case of a female where you considered requesting a remand in
custody but actually recommended that the Bench bail her?
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- What was it that changed your mind?
• Can you recall a case of a female where you recommended a remand in custody but 
the Bench bailed her?
• Can you recall the last time that a woman was bailed to a bail hostel?
• In your experience, do Magistrates ever request bail hostels if the defence has not 
offered one?
And now we 're talking about cases o f males and females again. I 'd  like to focus on the 
personnel involved in a bail application, firstly the Magistrates:
In your opinion, what do you think Magistrates’ responsibilities are in the remand 
process?
To what extent, if  at all, can you predict Magistrates’ remand decisions?
In your experience, how often do the Bench not follow your remand 
recommendations?
Can you recall the last case where a Benches’ remand decision surprised you? 
Preferably a case of a female being remanded but a male example is fine.
Have you ever appealed a Magistrates’ remand decision? 
o Can you tell me why you appealed it?
What difference, if any, is there in remand decisions made by Lay Magistrates and 
District Judges?
Do you have preferences about whether you appear before a Lay Bench or a District 
Judge?
Next, some questions about the defence:
• What do you think defence solicitors’ responsibilities are towards their client when 
making bail applications?
• And what are their responsibilities towards the court?
• To what extent are the defence and the CPS usually in broad agreement about the 
remand recommendations?
• In your experience, what percentage of remand hearings have already been agreed 
between the CPS and the Defence before the Bench comes in?
I'd  like to talk about the defendant now:
281
• To what extent, if  any, do you think that a defendant’s demeanour and body 
language in court affects remand decisions?
• If someone’s first appearance before the Court is from the cells on overnight
custody, does this have any impact on proceedings and decision-making?
• Do you think custodial remand status has any impact on remand decisions at the
second bail hearing?
• Do you think custodial remand status has any impact on sentencing?
And now the Police:
• What contact, other than the recommendations on the MG forms, do you have with 
the Police on remand recommendations?
• What are the systems of communication between you and the Police? 
prompt: primarily on paper or do you speak?
• How useful do you find Police remand recommendations in ONC cases?
• Can you recall the last time the Police attended a remand hearing? 
why did they attend?
do you think it makes any difference to the outcome?
• Can you describe for me the nature of your relationship with the Police, I’ve heard it 
described as ‘semi-Glidewell’.
• Would you personally like to see the Glidewell system in [area]?
And last, but not least, the CPS:
• Can you describe for me the process whereby you decide what remand 
recommendations to make?
prompt: mags use structured decision making.
• Does this differ for overnight cases? 
eg as you have less time to see them.
eg as, I assume, a reviewing lawyer won’t have had time to look at the file.
• From your own experience, do the CPS face any particular difficulties when making 
remand recommendations?
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And in the final three questions, I ’d like you to think broadly about your experience o f  
the remand process:
• If the remand process (ie how cases are processed and decisions made) was being 
reviewed, what changes, if  any, would you personally like to see?
• If the remand legislation (ie the Bail Act, exceptions to bail) was being reviewed, 
what changes, if any, would you personally like to see?
• Decision makers in the remand system have quite a lot of discretion -  in terms of 
the information they can draw upon, decision outcomes, etc. If there was a proposal 
to reduce this discretion, what would your reaction be and why?
Those are all my questions. But before we finish, do you have any questions or is there 
anything o f importance that you would like to raise which we have not had a chance to 
cover in this interview?
Thank you very much fo r  your time.
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Legal Advisors/Clerks
Firstly, thank you very much for agreeing to be interviewed. As you know from my 
introductory letter, I am conducting research on the remand process in a number of 
magistrates’ courts. This interview will last approximately one hour and will, with your 
consent, be tape recorded. The tape will be kept in a secure filing cabinet at the 
London School of Economics, your identity will not be disclosed to anyone and 
everything that you say will be treated confidentially. You can, of course, refuse to 
answer any question you are unwilling to answer and please feel free to ask questions if 
you need clarification on any point. I will be using the term ‘remand decision/process’ 
etc in this interview and this encompasses both bail (conditional and unconditional) and 
remands in custody. I will use the phrase ‘remand in custody’ if  we are discussing 
custodial remands. Do you have any questions?
• How many years have you worked as a legal advisor?
• Have you worked in courts other than - and -?
• Do you think that different courts have different characters?
• How would you describe - and -’s [courts] character?
• In your experience, do you think court character bears any relation to outcomes?
I  am now going to ask you some questions about the remand process.
• Can you recall any changes in remand decision-making during the time that you 
have sat on the Bench?
[prompt: eg legal, procedural, aim, outcome]
• What difference, if any, do you think that Magistrates being trained in structured 
decision making made to remand decisions?
• Have you worked in the Video Link?
- what do you think of it?
• In your view, what is the main purpose of custodial remands?
• In your experience, are custodial remands ever used to serve any other purpose?
r d  like you to think specifically about female offenders in the following questions:
• What, if  anything, do you think is most difficult for Court personnel in remand 
decisions on female defendants?
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• Can you recall the most recent case where a woman was remanded in custody? 
what questions, if any, did the magistrates ask you about the remand?
• Can you recall a case of a female where a remand in custody was recommended by 
CPS but the Bench bailed her? Can you recall the reasons why they bailed her? 
and again, can you talk me through the questions they asked you?
• Can you recall the last time that a woman was bailed to a bail hostel?
• In your experience, do Magistrates ever request bail hostels if  the defence has not 
offered one?
And now we ’re talking about cases o f males and females again. I ’d like to focus on the
personnel involved in a bail application, firstly the Magistrates:
• In your opinion, what do you think Magistrates’ responsibilities are in the remand 
process?
• To what extent, if  at all, can you predict Magistrates’ remand decisions?
• In your experience, how often do the Bench not follow CPSs remand 
recommendations?
• Can you recall the last case where a Benches’ remand decision surprised you? 
Preferably a case of a female being remanded but a male example is fine.
• Have you ever seen a Magistrates’ remand decision appealed?
o Can you tell me why it was appealed?
did you agree with the appeal?
• What difference, if  any, is there in remand decisions made by Lay Magistrates and 
District Judges?
• Do you have preferences about whether you work with a Lay Bench or a District 
Judge?
Next, some questions about the advocates:
• What do you think defence solicitors’ responsibilities are towards their client when 
making bail applications?
• And what are their responsibilities towards the court?
• In your experience, what difference, if any, do you think a good defence lawyer 
makes to a defendant’s chances of getting bail?
• In your experience, what difference, if any, do you think a good CPS lawyer makes 
to a defendant’s chances of being remanded in custody?
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From your own observations, do you think the CPS face any particular difficulties 
when making remand recommendations?
Do you think that Magistrates listen equally to the CPS and the Defence?
I ’d like to talk about the defendant now:
• To what extent, if any, do you think that a defendant’s demeanour and body 
language in court affects remand decisions?
• If someone’s first appearance before the Court is from the cells on overnight 
custody, does this have any impact on proceedings and decision-making?
• Do you think custodial remand status has any impact on remand decisions at the 
second bail hearing?
• Do you think custodial remand status has any impact on sentencing?
And last, but not least, I ’d like to talk about your role:
• Can you talk me through the kinds of questions that magistrates ask you and the 
kinds of advice that you give to magistrates?
• What impact do you think that your advice has on magistrates decision making?
• Have you ever been tempted to ‘encourage’ magistrates to make a different decision 
if you think they are wrong? Perhaps in a case of a very serious offence?
And in the final three questions. I ’d like you to think broadly about your experience o f 
the remand process:
• If the remand process (ie how cases are processed and decisions made) was being 
reviewed, what changes, if any, would you personally like to see?
• If the remand legislation (ie the Bail Act, exceptions to bail) was being reviewed, 
what changes, if  any, would you personally like to see?
• Decision makers in the remand system have quite a lot of discretion -  in terms of 
the information they can draw upon, decision outcomes, etc. If there was a proposal 
to reduce this discretion, what would your reaction be and why?
Those are all my questions. But before we finish, do you have any questions or is there 
anything o f importance that you would like to raise which we have not had a chance to 
cover in this interview?
Thank you very much fo r  your time.
286
Appendix Three
C a se  V ignettes
Case Vignette One: Non-serious Offence
Facts:
30 year old woman appearing on overnight custody charged with two counts of 
shoplifting.
She is not entering a plea to the charge today.
CPS:
This is a simple case of shoplifting with no aggravating features. Yesterday, the 
defendant attempted to leave BHS with two jackets valued at £120, concealing them 
about her person and making no attempt to pay for the goods. She was apprehended by 
security staff and was later charged at the Police Station. She had been arrested last 
week on another charge of shoplifting, clothes to the value of £52 and was bailed by 
Police but she committed this current offence before she appeared in Court. She has a 
long history of previous convictions for shoplifting matters, three of which were 
offences committed on Court bail in the last year. Bail is opposed on the risk of further 
offending based on her record and the fact that the current offence was committed on 
bail.
Defence:
My client is not entering a plea to either charge today as I need time to see her file -  her 
defence would be one of duress. My client tells me that a former associate, from the 
time she was involved in drugs, came to her home and he forced her to commit this 
offence. She told the police this in interview and she was initially bailed by police.
My client is not entering a plea on the substantive offence today as I have not seen the 
AI and would also need to look at the transcripts of the Police interview. My firm has 
only just taken over from another firm in this case so I am unsure of what happened at 
earlier stages. I would ask for an adjournment for one week to take instructions.
The charges are not the most serious and a remand in custody is perhaps rather harsh 
given the low value of goods taken. My client has no real history of failing to appear, 
just one in the last year. I would suggest a condition of residence and perhaps reporting 
to her local police station would be sufficient to focus her mind on not offending and 
co-operating with the Court.
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Case Vignette Two: Serious Offence
Facts:
A 28 year old woman appearing on overnight custody charged with domestic burglary. 
Pleading not guilty to the charge.
CPS:
The facts of this case are that the victims were at home at the time of the burglary -  
7.30pm. They were upstairs and, hearing noises then the front door closing, they came 
downstairs. They looked around and found that the key to their car was missing. On 
checking outside, they discovered that the car was missing. Police were alerted and the 
defendant’s fingerprints were found on the front door. Aggravating features are that this 
is a domestic burglary and the victims were in the house at the time of the offence. The 
defendant has an extensive history of deception offences and has received custodial 
sentences recently. She has offended on bail three times in the last year. The defendant 
is a crack cocaine addict and she offends to finance her habit. Bail is opposed on risk of 
failing to attend based on the seriousness of the offence and the risk of further offences 
based on her record.
Defence:
My client is pleading not guilty to this offence. The only evidence is one finger print on 
the outside of the front door -  there is no forensic evidence from the inside of the house. 
My client admits to being in the area and says that she could quite possibly have 
knocked on this front door, thereby leaving her fingerprints. Her pattern of offending is 
almost entirely one of deception. She knocks on people’s doors posing as a charity 
worker and asks people for money. She has no record for burglary and this offence is 
totally out of character. My client is adamant that she is not guilty and I would say that 
the Crown’s case is not a strong one. I would ask for a week’s adjournment for the 
Crown to review the charges.
It is true that my client’s record is not a pretty sight and that she has offended on bail in 
the past. However, she has re-established contact with her family in the last year and 
although she has offended in this period, her rate of offending has significantly reduced. 
Her mother and brother are both in the court today and they both live in the area and are 
willing to now let her reside with either of them. Her mother does not work but her 
brother is prepared to offer a surety for her up to the sum of £500. They are eager for 
her to have an opportunity to break her addiction and will support her in this. All her 
recent sentences have been custodial and my client is aware that custody is the almost 
certain outcome if she were to be found guilty to a burglary charge. However, she has 
always appeared in Court in the past and, as I say, she is adamant that she is innocent. 
The Crown’s case is weak and I believe the charges should be reviewed. I would ask 
the Court to bail my client for a week for this purpose. Conditions of residence with her 
mother or brother and perhaps a surety if the court felt it necessary could be imposed if 
the Bench had concerns about my client offending.
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Case Vignette Three: Cusp Case
Facts:
A 25 year old white woman appearing on overnight custody charged with theft of a 
handbag.
Pleading guilty to the charge.
CPS:
This offence dates back around six weeks. The victim of the offence was in a public 
house with friends. At around 9.30pm she went to get her purse fi*om her bag and 
realised that her handbag had been stolen. The defendant was observed in an alleyway 
near the public house by Police on foot patrol. The defendant appeared to be going 
through a bag and was discarding items. When she noticed them approaching her, she 
dropped the bag. The Police asked her name and found the bag to contain credit cards 
and other identifying documents in a different name. When asked if the bag was hers, 
she admitted it was not. She was taken to the station where she was later arrested and 
charged. She was released on conditional bail by the court for a PSR but failed to 
attend her Probation appointment and did not attend court. She was arrested on warrant 
yesterday. She has a heroin addiction and steals to fund her habit. She has a substantial 
record for similar offences and shoplifting and she has offended on bail previously. 
Bail is opposed on the risk of failing to attend and offending on bail based on her 
previous record and her failure to attend in these proceedings.
Defence:
She regrets not attending court and realises that she has made things worse for herself. 
Her reason for not attending, though it does not amount to a reasonable excuse, is that 
she has been successfully addressing her drug addiction. My client has turned a comer 
and appears before you a very different person to the one who offended a month or so 
ago. In that time she has secured herself a place at a drug rehabilitation centre [one that 
is known by the court]. My client deserves credit for having organised this herself 
without assistance from any agencies. She attends the centre on a regular basis and 
tells me that she is on a methadone maintenance script. She is successfully addressing 
her dmg problem and a custodial remand at this stage would jeopardise all the progress 
that she has made. She realises she should have surrendered to the court and tells me 
she did intend to do so. She was unwise not to have surrendered before but she has 
been trying to address her dmg habit and her offending behaviour. It is to her credit that 
she has not come before the courts in the last month. If she had offended, this warrant 
would have come to light. Her record of offending and failing to appear is not 
impressive but I ask the court to acknowledge the steps she has taken to sort herself out 
and to give her a second chance by granting her bail for a PSR to be prepared. She has 
lived at her current address for 9 months. She would now welcome Probation support 
and is willing to abide by whatever conditions the court sees fit to impose.
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